Takedown: Inside the Hunt for Al QaedaOn September 11, 2001, as Central Intelligence Agency analyst Philip Mudd rushed out of the Eisenhower Executive Office Building next to the White House, he could not anticipate how far the terror unleashed that day would change the world of intelligence and his life as a CIA officer. For the previous fifteen years, his role had been to interpret raw intelligence and report his findings to national security decision makers. But within weeks of the 9/11 attacks, he would be on a military aircraft, flying over the Hindu Kush mountains, en route to Afghanistan as part of the U.S. government's effort to support the fledging government there after U.S. forces had toppled the Taliban. Later, Mudd would be appointed deputy director of the CIA's rapidly expanding Counterterrorist Center and then senior intelligence adviser at the FBI. A first-person account of Mudd's role in two organizations that changed dramatically after 9/11, Takedown sheds light on the inner workings of the intelligence community during the global counterterror campaign. |
From inside the book
Results 6-10 of 47
... move quickly. no one would have predicted how fast the northern alliance and its american partners would sweep south, into the Taliban heartland, and it did not take a crystal ball to figure out that there had better be a diplomatic ...
... move would lead to a decade in this counterterrorism fight. There was no way to anticipate what followed. Those of us on the team knew about South asia, but we were novices at the nation-building game. Many of us who had watched ...
... moving farther from Pakistan's controlling orbit as the world demanded a new government, and there was commentary ... moved north and was chipping away at the last resistance. weeks later, accepting a foreign invasion that would sweep ...
... move that caused consternation among some in washington—and a wide variety of afghans. The Iranians had not had diplomatic relations with the United States since the fall of the Shah in 1979, but dealing with them made sense: after all ...
... moving quickly during those first months, especially when measured against the experience of the Soviets and the ... moved from “quagmire” in Qandahar to a banquet hall in Bonn in less than two months. The Bonn conference was settling on ...
Contents
1 | |
2 A Return to Langley | 27 |
Moving Beyond the Core of Al Qaeda | 70 |
The Intelligence Problem of Iraq | 90 |
Deputy Director of the Counterterrorist Center | 104 |
6 The Years of Threat | 135 |
The FBI Calls | 145 |
Intelligence at the Department of Homeland Security | 191 |
Index | 199 |