trary intention, sufficient to pass heritable property vested at the date of the deed in the disponer with a special destination to heirs substi. tute.-Campbell v. Campbell, L.R. 5 App. 787.

(iv.) H. L.-Public Well-Local Authority-Right to Repair—30 & 31 Vict., c. 101, s. 89.-A well, situated in private ground, the water of which has been used gratuitously by the inhabitants in the vicinity for the prescriptive period, is a public well within sec. 89 of the Public Health (Scotland) Act, 1867.-Smith v. Archibald, L.R. 5 App. 489.

(v.) H. L.-Railway-Working Mines Under-Notice-8 & 9 Vict., c. 33, ss. 70-72.-Where a mineowner gives notice under the Railways Clauses (Scotland) Act, 1845, of his intention to work minerals under a railway, the railway proprietors can stop the working at any time by notice of their willingness to pay compensation for the minerals.-Dixon v. Caledonian Rail. Co., L.R. 5 App. 820.

Settled Estates Act:

(i.) Ch. Div. V. C. M.-Settled Estate.-An estate was devised by trustees to sell and invest proceeds and pay income to A. for life, with remainder to his children, every sale after A. should have attained twenty-one to be made with his consent. The property had not been sold, A. had attained twenty-one and his children were infants: Held that this was a settled estate within the Act.-Re Morgan's Settled Estates, 49 L.J. Ch. 577. Settlement:

(i.) Ch. Div. M. R.-Construction-Right Heirs of A. deceased and B.— Gavelkind. By a voluntary settlement gavelkind lands were limited to C. for life with remainder to her issue, and for default of issue,"to the use of the right heirs of E. deceased and J.," who was then living, the two sisters of the settlor, their heirs, and assigns, as tenants in common for ever. C. survived J., and died without issue: Held that J. took a vested remainder in fee simple in a moiety of the property expectant on the death of C. without issue, and that this passed to J.'s gavelkind heirs.-Hawes v. Hawes, L.R. 14 Ch. D. 614.

(ii.) Ch. Div. M. R.-Covenant to Insure Life-Inability to Insure Through Ill-health.-A., on his marriage in 1873, covenanted with trustees to insure his life on or before a certain date. Shortly before that date his life became uninsurable through ill-health, and continued so until his death: Held that the trustees were entitled to rank as creditors in the administration of his estate.-Arthur v. Wynne, L.R. 14 Ch. D. 603; 49 L.J. Ch. 556; 43 L.T. 46; 28 W.R 972.

(iii.) C. H.-Covenant to Settle-Volunteers-Power of Appointment--Infant. -By his marriage settlement a husband agreed to settle his wife's reversionary interest in a fund, upon trusts with power to the wife to appoint by deed, and in default upon trusts for her next-of-kin. The wife died while an infant without issue. Her interest remained reversionary and no further settlement was made. The husband having gone into liquidation: Held that the trustee was entitled to the fund as against the next-of-kin, who were mere volunteers and could not enforce the covenant to settle.--Semble that a power in gross to appoint personalty by deed can be exercised by an infant.-Andrew v. Andrew, 43 L.T. 135; 28 W.R. 930.

(iv.) Ch.Div. V. C. H.-Perpetuity-Restraint on Anticipation—Gift to Class. -A sum was settled in trust for present and future children in equal shares with a restraint on anticipation of daughters' shares, some daughters being then in esse: Held that the restraint was effectual as to the shares of those daughters who were in existence at the time of the settlement.-Herbert v. Webster, 49 L.J. Ch. 620.

(v.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Presumption of Death-Missing Cestui-que-Trust. -Where a cestui-que-trust, who takes a vested interest under a settle. ment, has not been heard of since a period prior to the date of the settlement, the presumption is that he was alive at that date.-Re Corbishley's Trusts, L.R. 14 Ch. D. 846.

(vi.) Ch. Div. D. J.-Rectification-Evidence of Interested Party.-There is no absolute rule that in no case can there be a rectification of a settle.

ment upon the uncorroborated testimony of an interested party.Lovesy v. Smith, 28 W.R. 979.

(vii.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Scotch Settlement-Exclusive Power.-By a marriage settlement made in Scotland on the marriage of a domiciled Englishman with a domiciled Scotchwoman, the husband settled real estate in England and consols, and the wife settled property in Scotland. The trusts of the husband's property contained a trust on the death of husband and wife for such child or children of the marriage, and if more than one, in such shares and in such manner and form as husband and wife by deed, or survivor by deed or will, should appoint, the rest of the trusts of the husband's property being in the English form. The deed was registered in the Court of Session in Scotland: Held that the settle. ment, so far as concerned the husband's property, must be construed according to English law, and that the power to appoint was exclusive. -Chamberlain v. Napier, 49 L.J. Ch. 628.

(viii.) Ch. Div. V. C. M.-Voluntary Settlement-Mistake-Rectification.— N. W. and his son C. W. agreed to re-settle certain property, and it was then settled on N. W. for life, remainder to C. W. for life, remainder to C. W.'s first and other sons in tail. There were no powers of revocation, jointuring, or raising portions. Nineteen years afterwards when C. W. had a son fourteen years old, the Court being satisfied that the settlors did not at the time understand the effect of the settlement, granted rectification by inserting a power of revocation and new appointment.— Welman v. Welman, 43 L.T. 145.

Ship:

(i.) H. L.-Charter-party-Demurrage-Custom of Port.-A charter-party provided that the cargo should be discharged with all dispatch according to the custom of the port: Held that the charterer was bound to use reasonable diligence in performing the part of the delivery which fell upon him by the custom of the port, but that he was not bound to take measures to prevent delays arising from the custom of unloading there. -Postlethwaite v. Freeland, L.R. 5 App. 599; 49 L.J. Ex. 630; 42 L.T. 845; 28 W.R. 833.

(ii.) P. D. A. Div.-Charter-party--Deliver at Safe Port-Breach.-A charter-party provided that a ship was to take a cargo and proceed to a safe port in England or as near thereto as she could safely get and always to lie and discharge of boat. The ship, which drew 16 ft. was ordered to Lowestoft where low water is 11 ft., but it is usual for ships to lighten in Lowestoft Roads. The ship proceeded to Harwich and the master refused to lighten in Lowestoft Roads, though the consignee gave notice that he was willing to lighten the ship there: Held that the ship committed a breach of the charter-party.-The Alhambra,43 L.T. 31. (iii.) C. A.-Charter-party-Deviation.-A deviation for the purpose of saving life is justifiable, but not a deviation for the mere purpose of saving property. -Scaramanga v. Stamp, L.R. 5 C.P.D. 295; 49 L.J. C.P. 674; 42 L.T. 840. (iv.) C. A.-Charter-party-Unjustifiable Sale by Captain-Liability.—Plaintiffs wishing to send cement from London to C., defendants offered them room for it in the ship D., and then chartered the ship of the owners for

the voyage, the charter-party providing that the master and owners should be responsible to all whom it might concern, as if the ship had been loaded independently of the charter; and that the charterers' responsibility, except for freight, should cease on the vessel being loaded. The next day an agreement between defendants acting for the owners of the ship, and plaintiffs, provided that the former should receive the cement on board at a certain price. The cement was shipped and bills of lading for it signed by the master, and on the voyage the vessel was damaged and put into an intermediate port, where the master unjustifi. ably sold the cement: Held that defendants were not liable for the conversion.-Wagstaff v. Anderson, 28 W.R. 856.

(v.) C. A.-Collision-Fog-Costs.-When at night a mast-head light is seen but no side-lights, it is an indication to an approaching vessel that the light is that of a steamer whose side-lights are obscured by fog, and the vessel should make the signals prescribed by Art. 10 of Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. Where the Court of Appeal varies the decision of the Court below by finding both vessels to blame, there will be no order as to costs in either Court.-The Milanese, 43 L.T. 107. (vi.) C. A.-General Average.-A ship, after suffering a general average loss, was obliged to put into an intermediate port on her voyage for repairs, in effecting which it was necessary to unload, warehouse, and re-load the cargo: Held that expenses incurred in so doing and port dues at and pilotage expenses in leaving the intermediate port were properly treated as general average.-Attwood v. Sellar, 49 L J. Q.B. 515. (vii.) C. A.—Marine Insurance-Construction-Constructive Total Loss.— One of the bye-laws of an insurance company subject to which all insurances were made, provided that in the event of any ship being stranded or damaged and not taken into a place of safety the directors might procure its safety, and that no acts done by them under this power should be deemed to be an acceptance or recognition of any abandonment of which the insured might have given notice, and the company under any circumstances should only pay for the absolute damage caused by the perils insured against which was in no case to exceed the sum insured: Held that this did not exclude a constructive total loss, but was intended to apply only to a partial loss.-Forwood v. North Wales Marine Insurance Co., 49 L.J. Q.B. 593; 42 L.T. 837; 28W.R. 938. (viii.) C. A.-Offence against Kidnapping Act, 1872-Seizure of VesselReasonable Suspicion.-Plaintiff's vessel started on an expedition in 1871 and natives of the Pacific Islands were shipped with their consent. The Kidnapping Act, 1872, was passed during the voyage, and defendant, a naval officer, seized the vessel. In an action for seizure the jury were asked whether defendant had reasonable grounds for thinking that the vessel was employed in breaking the Act, and they found for defendant: Held that there was no misdirection.-Burns v. Nowell, L.R. 5 Q.B.D. 444. (ix.) P. C.-Slave Trade Acts-Seizure of Portuguese Ship in Harbour— 36 & 37 Vict., c. 88, s. 4.-Section 4 of Slave Trade Act, 1873, cannot be extended to apply to a Portuguese vessel, lying in British waters.Regina v. Casaca, L.R. 5 App. 548; 49 L.J. P.C. 41.

(x.) P. D. A. Div.—Salvage-Seamen's Rights-Settlement-17 & 18 Vict., c. 104, s. 182.-When solicitors are duly authorized by seamen to settle a claim against their employers in respect of their share of salvage after the whole amount has been ascertained, and the solicitors accept a sum in satisfaction, such agreement is not void under sec. 182 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, though the amount accepted be less than the seamen were entitled to recover in an action for distribution.-The Afrika, 49 L.J. P.D.A. 63.

(xi.) P. D. A. Div.-Towage-Delay-Remuneration.-Where a tug contracts to perform a specified service for a specified sum and, from causes beyond the control of either tug or tow, the completion of the contract is delayed, the tug is not entitled to extra remuneration for the delay.— The Hjemmett, 49 L.J. P.D.A. 66.

Solicitor :

(i.) C. A.-London Agent-Accounts-Interest-3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 42, s. 28; 33 & 34 Vict., c. 28, ss. 3, 17.-In a suit by a country solicitor against his town agent for an account, in which the agent claimed a specific balance and interest thereon, a decree was made for accounts and pay. ment of the balance found due. On taking the accounts a balance was found due to the agent: Held that interest was not payable thereon.Ward v. Eyre, 49 L.J. Ch. 657.

(ii.) C. A.-Lien for Costs-Judgment Creditor-Garnishee Order.Solicitors who act for a plaintiff in an action in which he recovers damages, are entitled to a charge on such damages for their costs as against a judgment creditor of plaintiff who has obtained an ex parte garnishee order before the costs have been taxed.-Shippey v. Grey, 49 L.J. C.P. 524; 28 W.R. 877.

Trade Mark:

(i.) C. A.—Infringement—Registered Mark-Evidence.-The M. R. having dismissed an action for infringement of a registered trade mark of worsted goods, described as a white selvage with certain interwoven marks, on the ground that when the goods were dyed the selvage was not white: Held that plaintiff should have been allowed to prove that his selvage in its dyed state would be known in the trade as a white selvage.-Mitchell v. Henry, 43 L.T. 186.

(ii.) C. A.-Registration—Similar Mark-Colour-38 & 39 Vict., c. 91, s. 6.— Registration of a trade-mark refused on the ground that, if it were printed in a particular colour, it would be so like the trade-mark of another firm that purchasers might be misled.-Re Worthington's Trade. Mark, 49 L.J. Ch. 646.

(iii.) C. A.—Registration-Words in Foreign Character. The regulation issued by the Commissioners of Patents forbidding the registration as a trade mark of any words in foreign characters is ultra vires, and void.— Re Rotherham's Trade Mark, L.R. 14 Ch. D. 585; 49 L.J. Ch. 511; 43 L.T. 1. (iv.) C. A.-Secret Recipe-Use of Discoverer's Name.-J. W. T. who had learned the process of making a preparation sold by J. T., under the name of T.'s food for cattle, while in the employment of J. T., became manager to a company which sold the same article under the same name. Held that J. T.'s executors were entitled to restrain the company from using the name 'T.'s food for cattle," unless they took precautions to prevent the public from supposing that the article sold was made at J. T.'s establishment.- Massam v. Thorley's Cattle Food Co., L.R. 14 Ch. D. 748; 42 L.T. 851; 28 W.R. 966.

Trustee :

(i.) Ch Div. M. R.-Investment - Real Securities-Long Leaseholds.— Trustees having power to invest on mortgage of real securities are not, generally speaking, justified in lending on the security of long terms of years.-Re Boyd's Settled Estates, L.R. 14 Ch. D. 626.

(ii.) C. A.-New Trustee-Form of Order-Trustee Act, 1850, s. 16.-Where new trustees were appointed of a fund which was invested on unautho rised securities, the Örder provided that the trustees should have a right

to call for a transfer of the funds to themselves or to any purchasers, the trustees undertaking to hold the proceeds on the trusts of the settlement.-Re Peacock, 43 L.T. 99.

(iii.) Ch. Div. V. C. M. -New Trustee-Retiring Trustee-Trustee Act, 1850, s. 32. One of four trustees of a will desiring to retire, the Court appointed the three continuing trustees in the place of themselves and the fourth.-Re Shipperdson's Trusts, 49 L.J. Ch. 619.

(iv.) Ch. Div. M. R.-New Trustee-Vesting Order.-Form of vesting order of stock settled by will where the surviving trustee had died without legal personal representative, and new trustees had been appointed under the will.-Re Crowe's Trusts (2), L.R. 14 Ch.D. 610; 42 L.T. 822; 28 W.R. 885.

(v.) C. A.-Prize of War-Grant to Secretary of State on Trust for Persons Entitled.-Her Majesty, by Royal Warrant, granted certain booty of war to the Secretary of State for India in Council, in trust for the use of the persons entitled to share in it, as declared by the Admiralty Court on a reference to it from the Crown: Held that an action by one of the persons entitled against the Secretary for an account and distribution of the fund could not be maintained.-Kinloch v. Secretary of State for India, 49 L.J. Ch. 571.

Vendor and Purchaser :—

(i.) C. P. Div.-Conditional Sale of Horse-Death before Completion.-Plain. tiff sold to defendant a horse on condition that it should be taken away by defendant and tried for eight days and then returned if not approved of. The horse died on the third day without fault of either party: Held that plaintiff could not maintain an action for the price.-Elphick v. Barnes, L.R. 5 C.P.D. 321; 49 L.J. C.P. 698.

(ii.) C. A.—Conditions of Sale-Leaseholds-Continuing Breach of Covenant. --Conditions of sale of leaseholds provided that the production of the last receipt of rent should be conclusive evidence of the performance of the covenants in the lease or waiver of any breaches. The lease con. tained a covenant not to carry on any trade on the premises without the license of the lessors. Part of the property had been under-let to persons carrying on trade there, and the lessors with knowledge of this had continued to receive the rent: Held that the purchaser was bound to accept the title.-Lawrie v. Lees, 49 L.J. Ch. 636. (iii.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Conditions of Sale-Right to Rescind.-Conditions of sale by auction incorporated the Common Form Conditions of the Birmingham Law Society. The abstract of title of the property sold led the purchaser to believe the title clear; but subsequently notice of an incumbrance, previously unknown to the vendor, was given to the purchaser, who required the vendor to discharge the same: Held that the 8th of the Common Form Conditions gave the vendor no right to rescind, and that the purchaser was entitled to have the incumbrance discharged out of the purchase-money.-Jackson to Oakshott, L.R. 14 Ch. D. 851; 49 L.J. Ch. 523.

(iv.) Ex. Div.-Covenant to inclose Land-Breach-Measure of Damages.— The deed conveying land purchased by defendant corporation contained a proviso giving the plaintiff a right of pre-emption in case defendants should re-sell the land within ten years, and covenants by defendants that any buildings erected on the land should be built in a certain style, and to inclose the land with a wall or railing of a certain height: Held that the covenant to inclose was an absolute covenant, and not conditional on the defendants building on the land, and that the measure of damages for breach of the covenant, was the cost of erecting a wall or railing of the