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from the sale of coal were the gross returns less working expenses including 4 per cent. interest on capital. Lord Rokeby v. Elliot, 38 L.T. 846.

(ii) Q. B. Div.-Coal Mine-Inspector's Authority-35 & 36 Vict., c. 76, ss. 46, 51.-The authority of an inspector to require a remedy for a danger in a mine under section 46 of Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1872, does not extend to requiring the withdrawal of workmen from the neighbourhood of the danger.-Spon Lane Colliery Co. v. Baker, 39 L T. 13. (iii.) Ex. Div.-Inclosure Act Highway — Support. - An Inclosure Act reserved to the lord of the manor rights and powers of working mines: Held that the lord was not entitled to work the mines so as to injure public roads.-Benfieldside Local Board v. Consett Iron Co., 47 L.J. Ex. 491.

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(iv.) C. A.-Lease-Quarry-Right to Work.-To enable a termor punishable for waste to work mines or quarries it must be shown that the reversioner had commenced working them with a view of making a profit, or that they were worked by his express authority.-Elias v. Griffith, L.R. 8 Ch. D. 521; 38 L.T. 871; 26 W.R. 869.

Mortgage :

(i.) Ch. Div. F. J.-Breach of Covenant-Receipt of Interest-Waiver.-— A mortgage deed provided that if interest was paid punctually the mortgage should continue for two years: Held that the receipt of interest after default in punctual payment and notice to pay off did not constitute a waiver of mortgagee's right to call for immediate payment. -Keene v. Biscoe, 47 L.J. Ch. 644.

(ii.) Ch. Div. F. J.-Equitable Mortgage-Bankruptcy-Foreclosure.— Where an equitable mortgage by deposit has been effected, and both mortgagor and mortgagee have become bankrupt, the trustee of the mortgagee is entitled to foreclosure.-Waddell v. Toleman, 38 L.T. 910; 26 W.R. 802.

(iii.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Foreclosure-Leaseholds.-A mortgage of leaseholds by sub-demise, contained an absolute declaration of trust by mortgagor of his reversion. The mortgagor refusing to assign, judgment of foreclosure of the equity of redemption in the premises and of the reversion was given, but vesting order of the reversion refused till decree made absolute.-British Empire Co. v. Sugden, 47 L.J. Ch. 691.

(iv.) Ch. Div. M. R.-Mortgagee in Possession-Account.---In an action for account by mortgagor against a mortgagee in possession, the mortgagor is entitled to an account of proceeds of sale received by mortgagee, or which, but for his wilful default, might have been received: but this does not entitle him to question the propriety of the sale or the adequacy of the price.-Mayer v. Murray, 47 L.J. Ch. 605.

(v.) C. J. B.-Payment in Nature of Penalty.-By a mortgage of chattels in consideration of £400 lent, mortgagor covenanted to pay £544 by eight quarterly instalments, and if mortgagor became a liquidating debtor mortgagee was empowered to enter, sell, and repay himself all of the £544 then unpaid: Held that the provisions of the mortgage were not in the nature of a penalty.-Ex parte Cochrane, Re Sendall, 38 L.T. 820; 26 W.R. 818.

(vi.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Policy--Agreement to Assign-30 & 31 Vict., c. 144. A written agreement to execute a legal assignment of a life assurance policy when requested, is not an assignment within the Policies of Assurance Act, 1867, and notice of such agreement to the assurance office does not give priority under section 5 over the prior equitable title of a person who has not given notice.-Spencer v. Clarke, 47 L.J. Ch. 692.

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(vii.) Ch. Div. F. J.-Priority-Registration - Notice.-A solicitor mort. gaged leasehold property in Middlesex to plaintiff, the mortgage not having been registered, and subsequently mortgaged the same property to W. who registered the mortgage: on both occasions he acted as mortgagee's solicitor: Held that the solicitor's knowledge of the earlier mortgage must be imputed to W., and, therefore, his mortgage could not be allowed priority.-Bradley v. Riches, 38 L.T. 810; 26 W.R. 910. (viii.) Ch. Div. F. J.-Priority-Tacking-Consolidation.-Two properties M. and S. having been separately mortgaged to A., S. was mortgaged to B., and afterwards M. to C. A being entitled to consolidate: Held that B. was entitled to redeem both the properties, and hold them as security for the amount paid to A. and his own debt.-Brad'ey v. Riches (2), 39 L.T. 78.

(ix.) Ch. Div. F. J.-Priority-Voluntary Deed-Consolidation-27 Eliz., c. 4.-Held, on the facts of the case, that a mortgage deed executed to secure a sum of money previously lent was voluntary, and void against plaintiffs subsequent mortgagees, and that plaintiffs were not entitled to consolidate their mortgage with an equitable mortgage of other property by same mortgagor, which they had paid off but did not take an assign. ment of Cracknall v. Janson, 39 L.T. 31.

(x.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Reversionary Interest-Statute of Limitations.-A mortgage of a reversionary interest in a mortgage debt which forms part of a residuary bequest with power to vary investments: Held not to be a mortgage of an interest in land within the meaning of section 42 of 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 27: and that arrears of interest for more than six years could be recovered.-Smith v. Hill, 26 W.R. 878.

(xi.) Ch. Div. F. J.-Settled Property-Resulting Trust-Conversion.-By a marriage settlement lands of the husband were settled to such uses as the husband and wife should jointly appoint, and, subject thereto, to the husband and wife in succession for life, with remainder for benefit of the children of the marriage, with ultimate remainder to the husband in fee: the husband and wife mortgaged the lands, and the proviso for redemp. tion provided that the mortgagee should re-convey the property to the uses of the settlement: and there was a declaration that, if the power of sale were exercised, the mortgagee should pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to the husband, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns: the power of sale having been exercised after the husband's death: Held that there was no resulting trust of the surplus proceeds, but that they went to husband's legal personal representatives.-Jones v. Davies, 47 L.J. Ch. 554.

Municipal Law:

(i) C. P. Div.-Nomination for Councillor Qualification-Jurisdiction— 38 & 39 Vict., c. 40.-A person is entitled to be nominated for office of councillor for a borough, if otherwise qualified, if he is enrolled on the burgess roll in force at the time of election: the Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the mayor who has allowed such an objection to a nomination.-Budge v. Andrews, 47 L.J. C.P. 586.

(ii.) C. A.--Penalty-5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 126.-3 & 4 Vict., c. 97, s. 16.— A penalty for impeding the officer of a railway company in the execu tion of his duty, summarily recovered before a borough justice, goes to the borough.-Attorney-General v. Moore, L.R 3 Ex. D. 276.

Negligence

(i.) C. P. Div.—Innkeeper-Liability for Injury to Guest.-A statement of claim alleged that while plaintiff was staying at defendant's hotel as a guest for reward of defendant, by defendant's negligence the ceiling of a room fell down and injured plaintiff: Held that there was a good cause of action. Sandys v. Florence, 47 L.J. C.P. 598.

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(i.) C. A.-Jurisdiction-Stay of Proceedings.-The jurisdiction of the Palatine Court is co-ordinate with that of the High Court: the Palatine Court has no jurisdiction to restrain an action in the High Court.—In re Alison's Trusts, 47 L.J. Ch. 755.

Partition:

(i.) V. C. M.-Sale-31 & 32 Vict., c. 40, ss. 3, 5.-In a partition action, the owners of 3-16ths of the property asked for a sale, and the owners of 13.16ths wished to keep the property undivided, and offered to purchase the shares of the other parties: the Court ordered a valuation at Chambers of the 3-16ths, and sale of the same to the other owners. Gilbert v. Smith, L.R. 8 Ch. D. 548; 26 W.R. 905. Partnership :—

(i.) C. A.-Articles-Construction.-Articles of partnership for 21 years between plaintiff and defendant, provided that the business should be carried on at certain premises, or in such other place or places as the partners might agree upon: the partners took other premises, and when the lease of these expired, the plaintiff refused to concur in a renewed lease Held that he was entitled to an injunction restraining defendant, who had renewed the lease in his own name, from employing the assets or pledging the credit of the firm in carrying on the business at these premises. Clements v. Norris, 47 L.J. Ch. 546.

(ii.) C. A.-Covenant not to Engage in other Business-Breach-Remedy.— A covenant in a partnership deed that covenantor will not engage in any trade or business, except on account of and for the benefit of the partnership, will not enable the other partner to call for an account of profits made by the covenantor in a separate business for which he provides the capital out of his own moneys: the only remedy is by injunction, or dissolution, or damages.-Dean v. M'Dowell, 47 L.J. Ch. 537; 38 L.T. 862.

(iii.) Ch. Div. V. C. B.-Dissolution-Patent-Assignment to Company Legal Title. --A., a sole patentee, worked a patent with B. under cir cumstances constituting a partnership at will: afterwards A. left B., and assigned the patent to C. and D. as promoters of a company, the assignment being registered on an action by the company for an injunction against B. Held that he had acquired a right to work the patent, but that he had no right to have the company declared trustees for him of a moiety of the patent.-Kenny's Buttonholeing Co. v. Somervell, 38 L.T. 878; 26 W.R. 786.

(iv.) C. A.—Holding out as Partner-Bankruptcy-Reputed Ownership.-P., carrying on business alone under the style of P., Son and Co., employed his son in the business, and held him out as a partner: P. and his son were jointly adjudicated bankrupts as ostensible partners: Held that P.'s separate estate being in the apparent possession of the firm with his consent, formed the joint estate of the firm. Ex parte Hayman, Re Pulsford, 47 L.J. Bcy. 54.

Patent:

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(i.) C. A.-First and True Inventor-Communicated Knowledge-21 Jas. I., c. 3. A British subject who has had communicated to him in England by another British subject, an invention of the latter, is not the first and true inventor within the meaning of 21 Jas. I., c. 3: nor does the fact of his being the legal personal representative of the inventor, entitle him to take out letters patent.-Marsden v. Saville Street Company, 26 W.R. 784; 39 L.T. 97.

(ii.) H. L.-Infringement-Specification.-Where the provisional specifi

cation of a patent claimed the use of two substances in combination, and the final specification claimed the use of one alone, and did not specify how it was to be employed: Held that no action for infringement would lie in respect of using the substance mentioned in the final specifi. cation alone.-Bailey v. Roberton, 38 L.T. 854.

Poor Law:

(i.) Q. B. Div.-Settlement by Residence-Receipt of Relief-39 & 40 Vict., c. 61, s. 34.-Where a pauper had resided for three years in a parish so as to render himself irremoveable, but such three years expired before the passing of 39 & 40 Vict, c. 61, and subsequently to the expiration of the three years had continued to reside in the same parish, but was in the receipt of parochial relief: Held that the receipt of the relief did not deprive the pauper of the settlement acquired by his status of irremovability.-Regina v. Brampton Union, L.R. 3 Q.B.D. 479.

Power of Appointment:

(i.) Ch. Div. V. C. H.-Successive Appointments-Insufficient Fund.— The donee of a special power of appointment of £3,000 charged on certain property, made three appointments by successive deeds of £1,000 each to objects of the power. The security for the £3,000 proving inadequate : Held, that the appointees took according to the priority of appointments. -Stokes v. Bridgeman, 47 L.J. Ch. 759.

Practice :

(i.) Div. C. A.—Appeal-Attachment of Debt-Trial before Judge--Ord. 45, r. 7.—Where on an attachment under a garnishee order by a judgment creditor for money due by judgment debtor, a third party claims the moneys and consents to a judge at chambers deciding the issue summarily, no appeal lies from such decision.-Eade v. Winser, 47 L.J. Q.B. 584.

(ii.) C. A.-Appeal-Costs.-Where a plaintiff had obtained an interim injunction in the Court below, giving the usual undertaking as to damages, and on the hearing the injunction was dissolved and the action dismissed, but without costs or any inquiry as to damages, though on appeal an inquiry as to damages may be directed, and a cross appeal by plaintiff is dismissed, the Court of Appeal has no power to vary the order as to costs in the Court below.-Graham v. Campbell, 47 L.J. Ch. 593. (iii.) C. A.-Appeal-Costs-Judicature Act, 1873, s. 49-Ord. 55.-An appeal will lie from an order directing the payment of a trustee's costs, charges, and expenses.-Jones v. Chennell, L.R. 8 Ch. D. 492; 47 L.J. Ch. 583.

(iv.) C. A.—Appeal-European Society Arbitration.-By the European Arbitration Act, 1875, it was provided that no appeal should lie from any order made before the Act unless the arbitrator expressly certified in writing that it was desirable that such appeal should be brought: Held that a formal certificate from the arbitrator was necessary.-Ex parte British Nation Association, Re European Arbitration, L.R. 8 Ch. D. 679.

(v.) C. A.-Appeal-Informal Notice.-A person against whom an order had been made in a winding-up, served the official liquidator with an informal notice, wherein he stated that it was his intention to appeal: Held that the notice was sufficient.-Little's Case, Re West Jewell Mining Co., L.R. 8 Ch. D. 806.

(vi.) C. A.- Appeal - Mistake - Enlargement of Time - Ord. 57, r. 6.— Appellant's solicitor, after giving notice of appeal from an interlocutory order within 21 days, believing the notice to be irregular, withdrew it,

and gave a fresh notice on the day after withdrawal, which was two days after the time limited for appealing: the Court gave special leave for an enlargement of time.-Taylor's Case, Re Ambrose Lake Mining Co., L.R. 8 Ch. D. 643; 47 L.J. Ch. 696.

(vii.) C. A.-Appeal-Non-Suit-New Trial-Ord. 39, r. la; 40, r. 1.-When a judge directs a non-suit and the facts are disputed, plaintiff cannot appeal to Court of Appeal, but must apply to Div. Court for a new trial. -Etty v. Wilson, 39 L.T. 83.

(viii.) C. A.—Appeal-Order in Chambers-Time.-Where a judge has made an order in Chambers, and on rehearing affirmed the order in Court, an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal within 21 days of the order in Court: Semble applications for rehearings in Court of orders made in Chambers should be made within 21 days from order in Chambers.-Dickson v. Harrison, 38 L.T. 794.

(ix.) C. A.-Appeal-Quarter Sessions-Poor-Rate-Judicature Act, 1873, s. 19.-An appeal having been brought from a decision of the Q. B. Div., on a case stated by the Quarter Sessions on appeal against a borough rate the Court was equally divided as to whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.-Regina v. Overseers of Walsall, L.R. 3 Q.B.D. 457. (x.) C. A.-Appeal-Time-Demurrer.-An order allowing or over-ruling a demurrer is not an interlocutory order as respects the time for appealing.-Trowell v. Shenton, 26 W.R. 837.

(xi.) C. A.-Appeal from County Court-13 & 14 Vict., c. 61, s. 14; 39 & 40 Vict., c. 59, s. 20.-An appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from the decision of the Divisional Court in a case stated under the County Courts Act, 1850, s. 14, if leave to appeal be given.-Crush v. Turner, L.R. 3 Ex. D. 303; 47 L.J. Ex. 639.

(xii.) P. D. A. Div.-Appeal from County Court-Admiralty Action-31 & 32 Vict., c. 71, s. 31.-A plaintiff claiming an amount not exceeding £50 in an Admiralty action in a County Court, cannot appeal.-The Falcon, 47 L.J. P.D.A. 56.

(xiii.) C. A.-Appeal from Lord Mayor's Court--20 & 21 Vict., c. 157, ss. 10, 46. -No appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from a decision of a Divisional Court on an appeal from the Lord Mayor's Court unless leave to appeal be given.-Appleford v. Judkins, 47 L.J. C.P. 615; 38 L.T. 801.

(xiv.) C. A.-Compromise of Action-Payment out of Court.-S. having brought an action in the C. P. Div. against D. to recover a sum due for commission, commenced an action in the Chancery Div. to establish a lien on D.'s interest in a fund in administration there, and an order was made that £5,000 of the fund should be set apart to answer S.'s claim, further pro. ceedings stayed till after trial of action in C. P. Div., with liberty to apply subsequently an agreement was come to as to the amount of S.'s claim: Held that the Court had jurisdiction to direct the amount agreed upon to be paid out to S. out of the £5,000.-Scully v. Lord Dundonald, L.R. 8 Ch. D. 658.

(xv.) P. D. A. Div.-Costs-County Court Admiralty Jurisdiction-Wages-31 & 32 Vict., c. 71.-In an action for master's wages and dis. bursements, a certificate under 31 & 32 Vict., c. 71, is not necessary to entitle a successful plaintiff to costs, though he recover less than £150, as a County Court has no jurisdiction in Admiralty over such a claim.— The Dictator, 38 L.T. 947.

(xvi.) C. A.-Costs-Detinue-30 & 31 Vict., c. 142, s. 5.-In an action of detinue for a picture, plaintiff recovered £10 the assessed value of the picture and one shilling damages: Held that the action was founded on tort within 30 & 31 Vict., c. 142, s. 5.-Bryant v. Herbert, L.R. 3 C.P.D. 369; 39 L.T. 17; 26 W.R. 898.

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