c. 55, s. 150.-An owner of premises having received notice from an urban authority to pave a street, indorsed on the notice a power for the urban authority to execute the works and an undertaking to repay the cost: on summary proceedings to recover the cost from him: Held that the owner could not require proof to be given of the fulfilment of the conditions precedent to the existence of the right of the urban authority to issue the notice, though he might give evidence himself of the want of such right.-Lewis v. Cardiff Urban Authority, 47 L.J. M.C. 101.

(ix.) C. P. Div.-Local Authority-Verbal Contract by-11 & 12 Vict., c. 63, s. 85; 38 & 39 Vict., c. 55, s. 173.-A local board within the Public Health Act, 1848, and urban authority within the Public Health Act, 1875, verbally directed their surveyor to prepare plans for new offices: Held that, as the value of the contract exceeded £50, it could not be enforced against the local board, and that part performance made no difference in this respeet.-Hunt v. Wimbledon Local Board, L.R. 3 C.P.D. 208.

(x.) C. P. Div.-Local Authority-Liability-Sewer-Notice of Action.—A local board, which was both a highway and a sewer authority, engaged a contractor to lay down a sewer, who was to be responsible for damage arising from the execution of the works, and to maintain the road in repair for three months from completion of contract: after the expiration of the three months, the road gave way in one place owing to defective filling up of the trench, and in consequence plaintiff's horse was injured Held that the local board was liable. A notice of action which claimed for damage caused by non-feasance: Held sufficient, although in fact the injury was caused by mis-feasance.-Smith v. West Derby Local Board, 38 L.T. 716.

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(xi.) C. P. Div.-Rating-Local Act-38 & 39 Vict., c. 55.-A local Act directed certain Commissioners to make rates on houses within the town of M., for paving, lighting, &c., the streets in the town, and declared that all person paying such rates should be exempted from all charges of paving, lighting, &c., any of the footways and cross-paths of the borough: the Public Health Act, 1872, constituted the borough of M., which in. cluded the town, an urban sanitary district, and the corporation an urban authority: the corporation made a general borough rate, under 38 & 39 Vict., c. 55, to meet expenditure, including paving, lighting, &c., of the town: Held that such rate was invalid as the local Act was not repealed by the last-mentioned Act.-Corporation of Monmouth v. Churchwardens of Monmouth, 38 L.T. 612.

Railway :

(xxv.) Ex. Div.-Balee-Wrongful Conversion-Trover.-Plaintiff, a merchant at H., sent goods to defendants' station at B., to be held by them as warehousemen, to plaintiff's order: A., an agent of plaintiff, obtained the goods from defendants on orders not signed by plaintiff subsequently, plaintiff sold the goods to other persons, and gave them delivery orders, some of whom had paid: and as to those that had not paid, A. had obtained the delivery orders from them, and given them to defendants: Held on an action for damages for pre-delivery, and for the value of the goods not paid for, that plaintiff was not entitled to any damages nor to the value of the goods not paid for.-Hiort v. L. & N. W. Rail. Co., 38 L.T. 424.

(xxvi.) Ch. Div. V. C. B.--Construction of Bridge-Nuisance-Railways Clauses Act, 1845.-A railway company constructed a bridge over a road so as to carry the metals over it at the height marked in the deposited plans, but not leaving the amount of headway required by the Railways Clauses Act: in order to provide this headway they lowered the road, and in consequence the road became habitually flooded: Held

that the company must alter their bridge so as to give the necessary headway and keep the road at a proper level.-Attorney-General v. Furness Rail. Co., 38 L.T. 555; 26 W.R. 650.

(xxvii.) C. P. Div.-Negligence.-Plaintiff, a passenger on defendant's railway, entered a carriage, and after he had completely entered, but before he had taken his seat, a servant of the company shut the door without warning and injured plaintiff's thumb: Held no evidence of negligence to go to the jury.-Maddox v. L. C. and D. Rail. Co., 38 L.T. 458. Revenue:

(xv.) H. L.--Succession Duty-Entailed Estate-16 & 17 Vict., c. 51, s. 2.—A person succeeding to an entailed estate in strict settlement must be held to take by devolution of law from the person last possessed within the meaning of Section 2 of 16 & 17 Vict., c. 51.-Earl of Zetland v. Lord Advocate, L.R. 3 App. 505; 38 L.T. 297; 26 W.R. 725.

Scotland, Law of :

(vii.) H. L.-Improbative Deed-Statute 1696, c. 15; 37 & 38 Vict., c. 94.— An agreement for a lease, dated 7th June, 1873, was written bookwise on seven sheets of paper: only the last page was signed by the full names of the grantors, the other pages being initialed: Held that the agreement was under Statute 1696, c. 15, inoptative: Sections 38 & 39 of 37 and 38 Vict., c. 94, are not retrospective.—Gariner v. Lucas, L.R. 3 App. 582. (viii.) H. L.-Restoration of Church-Allocation of Seats.-A parish church being out of repair, R. agreed to erect a new church on his own land, and to convey it to the heritors on condition that they would convey to him the old church: part of the old parish had been disjoined and erected into a quoad sacra parish: Held that in apportioning the seats in the new church the heritors of the disjoined lands were entitled to be considered as heritors of the parish.-Duke of Roxburgh v. Millar, L.R. 3 App. 14.

(xxiii.) C. A.—Advancement—Annuity-Hotchpot.-Decision of V. C. H. (see Settlement ix., p. 68) reversed.-Hatfield v. Minet, L.R. 8 Ch. D. 136; 38 L.T. 629; 26 W.R. 701.

(xxiv.) C. A.-After-Acquired Property-Held that a covenant to settle wife's after-acquired property, did not apply to a fund to which she was entitled on the happening of the double contingency of her mother surviving her father, and herself surviving her mother, where the contingencies determined during the coverture, but there remained an outstanding life estate which did not determine till after wife's death: decision of V. C. M. (see Settlement i., p. 30) reversed.-Re Mitchell's Trusts, 38 L.T. 462; 26 W.R. 762.

(xxv.) Ch. Div. V. C. B.-Construction-Gift Over-Property was settled on trust to apply the income for the maintenance of two children till the younger should attain twenty-one, and then to pay the income to them, their heirs and assigns in equal shares: provided that if either of them should die without leaving issue, his share of the income was given over: one of the children attained twenty-one, and died leaving issue: Held that he took an estate in fee simple as his share.-Olivant v. Wright, 38 L.T. 677.

(xxvi.) Ch. Div. V. C. M.-Construction-Maintenance.-By a marriage settlement, property was vested in trust after the death of the wife, and if the husband should marry again and there was issue of the intended marriage, to pay the husband the income of one-half the property, and to apply, if there should be four or more children of the marriage, the

income of the other half for their maintenance and education, and subject thereto to pay the income to the husband for life, and if there should be no issue, then to pay the whole income to the husband: there were four children living and a child of a deceased daughter: the husband had married again: Held that the trust for maintenance and education did not cease on the children attaining twenty-one, or marrying and that the trust was only for the benefit of the children of the marriage, and the child of the daughter took no interest.—Frewen v. Hamilton, 47 L.J. Ch. 391.

(xxvii.) Ch. Div. M. R.-Covenant by Infant-Consideration Ratification.In a marriage settlement, where the intended wife was a minor, her father covenanted to pay an annuity to her for life, and then to her husband, and she covenanted that the share to which she was entitled under a will, should be settled on the trusts of the settlement: she never formally ratified the settlement but received the annuity: Held that she had ratified the settlement by her acts, and that the fund was bound by the trusts of the settlement.-Re Smith's Will, 38 L.T. 466.

(xxviii.) C. A.-Post-nuptial

Settlement-Consideration-Infant.-Decision of V.C.H. (see Settlement xxi., p. 105) reversed, the Court holding on the facts that the settlement was not a ratification of the anti-nuptial agreement.-Trowel v. Shenton, L.R. 8 Ch. D. 318; 38 L.T. 389.

(xxix.) C. A.-Tenant for Life-Fines on Renewal.-Property demised for a term determinable on the dropping of three lives, at a yearly rent, and a heriot payable on the dropping of each life, with a covenant for perpetual renewal at a fixed fine, was, subject to the lease, settled in strict settlement, giving the trustees powers to grant leases with or without covenants for renewal, and to perform any covenant for renewal previously entered into, so that the best rent should be reserved without taking any fine or premium: Held that the fines arising under the compulsory renewals belonged to the tenant for life.-Brigstocke v. Brigstocke, L.R. 8 Ch. D. 357; 38 L.T. 760; 26 W.R. 761.

Ship:

(1.) C. A.-Assignment-Foreign Ship-Bill of Sale-Registration-17 & 18 Vict., c. 104, ss. 55, 57.-A ship built for a foreigner, and to be delivered to him at a foreign port, was assigned by the builder to a creditor, under an agreement not in the form required by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, and was not registered under that Act, or under the Bills of Sale Act: Held that the vessel was not a British vessel within the meaning of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, and that the assignment fell within the exception in section 7 of the Bills of Sale Act and was valid.-Union Bank of London v. Lenanton, L.R. 3 C.P.D. 243; 47 L.J. C.P. 409; 38 L.T. 698.

(li.) C. A.—Authority of Master-Sale of Cargo.—The master of a ship has prima facie no authority to sell the cargo: and to justify a sale, without the authority of the owners, he must show an urgent necessity for the sale and inability to communicate with the owners.-Acatos v. Burns, 26 W.R. 624.

(lii.) C. A.-Authority of Ship's Husband-Pledging Freight.-R., part owner of a ship, who had mortgaged his share, and who was also acting as ship's husband, assigned to plaintiff the freight payable by the charterers in respect of a voyage then unfinished: before the end of the voyage, the other owners of the ship and R.'s mortgagee appointed another ship's husband, who gave the charterers notice not to pay the freight to plaintiff: Held that R. had no power to assign the whole freight, and that the mortgagee had effectually interfered so as to entitle himself to R.'s share of the freight as against R. and the plaintiff.Beynon v. Godden, 26 W.R. 672.

(liii.) Q. B. Div.-Bill of Lading-Demurrage-18 & 19 Vict., c. 111, s. 1.— In the absence of express stipulation, it is an implied term in a bill of lading that the consignee, or his assigns, will take delivery of the goods within a reasonable time, and the assignee of the goods is subject to this liability: nor will the liability be affected by any express stipulation in the charter-party which is not incorporated in the bill of lading.Fowler v. Knoop, 47 L.J. Q.B. 473.

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(liv.) C. A.—Charter-party.—Plaintiff and defendant agreed by charter-party that defendant's ship after loading dead-weight at M. for defendant's benefit should proceed to a first-class Spanish port, defined to mean a port at which a steamer with cargo from a foreign port could load without risk of detention by customs authorities, and there load a cargo for plaintiff the ship had on board, as plaintiff knew, goods which by the Spanish Customs' regulations prevented the ship from loading at the port of V., where she was ordered, and in consequence she was unable to load plaintiff's cargo: Held that plaintiff could not recover on action for breach of charter-party.—Cunningham v. Dunn, 38 L.T. 631. (lv.) Q. B. Div.-General Average-Salvage Services.-A ship having stranded in the course of a voyage to L., the shipowner sent over persons to undertake salvage operations, and the whole cargo was saved and brought to L., and the freight earned: the shipowner incurred consider. able trouble and expense in getting the cargo to L., identifying and distributing it, and in the general average statement a remuneration to him was charged for arranging for salvage operations and distributing the cargo: Held the charge was improper.-Schuster v. Fletcher, L.R. 3, Q.B.D. 418; 38 L.T. 605; 26 W.R. 756.

(lvi.) C. A.-Insurance-Seaworthiness-Onus of Proof.-Decision of Q.B.D. (see Ship xlv., p. 106) affirmed.-Pickup v. Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co., 26 W.R. 689.

(lvii.) C. A.-Insurance-Voyage Policy-Deviation.-In an action on a voyage policy it was proved that the loss occurred during a voyage collateral to the voyage described in the policy: Held that the assured could not recover.-Wingate v. Foster, 38 L.T. 737; 26 W.R. 650.

(lviii.) P. D. A. Div.-Limitation of Liability-25 & 26 Vict., c. 63, ss. 54, 60. In an action for limitation of liability by the owners of a vessel that had caused damage: Held that in estimating the gross tonnage they were entitled to make a deduction in respect of space appropriated to the crew below a spar.decked vessel, and that the vessel must be deemed to be of the tonnage denoted in her national certificate of registry.-The Franconia, 38 L.T. 719; 26 W.R. 743.

(lix.) P. D. A. Div.-Salvage-Life Salvage-Contribution.-The C steamship found the S steamship disabled from injuries sustained in a collision, and took on board the passengers and crew of the S and specie part of the cargo, but abandoned the vessel: the specie was arrested in a salvage action by the owners of the C, who were awarded a sum for salvage of specie and life salvage: Held that the owners of the S, not having had any property salved, were not personally liable to pay any salvage money. -Cargo ex Sarpedon, L.R. 3 P.D. 28.

Solicitor :

(xvii.) C. P. Div.-Change of Solicitor-Costs-Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, sub-s. 11.-The rule at law as well as in equity now is that an order for changing a solicitor shall be made without any provision as to the payment of the solicitor's costs.-Grant v. Holland, L.R. 3 C.P.D. 180; 26 W.Ř. 742. (xviii.) C. P. Div.-Costs-Charging Order-23 & 24 Vict., c. 127, s. 28.—The motion for a charging order under 23 & 24 Vict., c. 127, s. 28, must be made before the judge who tried the cause.-Higgs v. Schrader, L.R. 3 C.P.D. 252; 47 L.J. C.P. 426.

(xix.) Ch. Div. M. R.-Costs-Taxation-One Transaction.-Where solicitors who were employed in a bankruptcy sent in their bill of costs, down to a certain day before the whole estate was sold, and after the sale of the estate they sent in another bill of costs: Held on summons to tax both bills, that they could not be treated as forming one bill, and that more than six months having elapsed since the delivery of the first bill, it could not be taxed.-Re Hall and Barker, 26 W.R. 501. (xx.) Q. B. Div.-Costs-Taxation-6 & 7 Vict., c. 73, ss. 37, 38.—Bankruptcy proceedings having been instituted against D., he agreed with the solicitor of his chief creditor to pay him a lump sum for costs, if he would induce his client to allow D. to liquidate by arrangement: After his discharge, D. applied for an order to tax the solicitor's costs: the order was refused.-Ex parte Docker, Re Heritage, 38 L.T. 509; 26 W.R. 633.

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(xxi.) C. A.-Lien-Fund Preserved-23 & 24 Vict., c. 127, s. 28.-Decision of V.C.B. (see Solicitor xiii., p. 107) affirmed.-Bulley v. Bulley, 38 L.T. 401; 26 W.R. 638.

Trade Mark:

(xi.) H. L.-Infringement-Evidence of Deception.-In order to obtain protection for a trade mark, it is not necessary to prove that it has been used fraudulently, but it is sufficient to show that it has been used in a way calculated to mislead intending purchasers.-Singer Manufacturing Company v. Wilson, L.R. 3 App. 376; 47 L.J. Ch. 481; 38 L.T. 303; 26 W.R. 664.

(xii.) C. A.-Infringement—Injunction-Costs-Lien-Decision of F. J. (see Trade Mark iii., p. 72), reversed.-Moet v. Pickering, L.R. 8 Ch. D. 372; 47 L.J. Ch. 527; 26 W.R. 637.

(xiii.) C. A.-Infringement-Musical Publication.-Defendants were restrained from publishing a work edited by H., under the title of H.'s New Edition of Jousses' Royal Standard Pianoforte Tutor, as a fraudulent imitation of the title of a work of which plaintiffs were proprietors, called H.'s Royal Modern Tutor for the Pianoforte.-Metzler v. Wood, 38 L.T. 541; 26 W.R. 577.

(xiv.) Ch. Div. V. C. M.-Infringement--Stamped Bottles.-Where a trader sells a production in bottles or casks stamped indelibly with his known design, the court will restrain another trader from selling a similar production in such bottles or casks, though he affix to them a label of his own.-Rose v. Loftus, 38 L.T. 409.

(xv.) Ch. Div. F. J.—Infringement-Trade-Name.-Plaintiffs being sole owners of collieries in the parish of R., which they worked themselves, defendants were restrained from describing themselves as the R. Colliery Proprietors, although they were lessees of a mine near R. from which coal was raised, known in the market as R. coal; and they had a place of business at R.-Braham v. Beachim, L.R. 7 Ch. D. 848; 47 L.J. Ch. 348; 38 L.T. 640; 26 W.R. 654.

(xvi.) Ch. Div. M. R.-Registration-Application to Remove-Laches-Costs -38 & 39 Vict., c. 91, s. 5.-On an application to remove from the register a trade-mark of H. & Co., who had registered it after advertise. ment, claiming 41 years user, it appeared that for some time the mark had been a common mark, and for six years had been so to the knowledge of H. & Co., and that the applicants were not aware of the advertisement: the trade-mark was ordered to be removed from the register, and the respondents to pay costs.-Re Hyde & Co.'s Trade-Mark, L.R. 7 Ch. D. 724; 38 L.T. 777; 26 W.R. 625.

(xvii.) C. A.-Registration-Distinctiveness. Decision of V. C. H. (see TradeMark x., p. 108) reversed, on the ground that the opinion of the Com