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P. C.—Patent—Assignee—Prolongation—Patents, d.c., Act, 1883.—An assignee of a patent, which he has bought as a commercial venture, has no claim to prolongation, because the patent has been unremunerative to him.–In re Hopkinson's Patent, 75 L.T. 462.
C. D.—Variation between Specifications—Rights of Patentee.—A provisional specification need not give more than a rough description of the invention, and need not describe details of its advantages or of the manner in which it is to be carried out. Where the invention consists of several parts, every part need not fulfil all the objects claimed, and advantages not expressly mentioned may apply to some of the parts. In the complete specification, the inventor may refer to the manner in which the invention can be applied to discoveries made by other persons since the date of the provisional specification. A patentee is entitled to the benefit of his invention if it is applied by other inventors to purposes not contemplated by him.—Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. East London Rubber Co., 75 L.T. 488.
C. A.—English Patent—Infringement—Goods made abroad and sent through Local Agent to English Customer-Injunction.—Where goods infringing an English patent were made abroad, and handed by the manufacturers to a forwarding agent at the place of manufacture who sent them by post to a customer in England, and received payment through the post, the Court in an action by the owner of the English patent, granted an injunction restraining the foreign manufacturers or their agents from importing or bringing into or delivering in England, goods infringing the patent, or from selling or supplying, or assisting or taking any part in such importation or delivery.—Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Johnson dá Co. and the Basle Chemical Works, Bindschedler, 76 L.T. 21.
Poor Law Loans Act, 1871 (34 Vict., c. 11), s. 2.–Guardians of a poor law union had borrowed sums of money before the date of the Poor Law Loan Act, repayable in periods not exceeding thirty years by annual instalments which included interest as well as principal. The instrument securing the loan contained a stipulation that with the consent of the lenders the whole sum might be repaid before the stipulated period. The Poor Law Loan Act enables guardians to pay off loans before the stipulated period on obtaining an order from the Local Government Board, but the Act has a proviso that loans outstanding at the date of the passing of the Act should not be paid off without the consent of the lender. Held (dissentiente, Smith, L.J.), reversing the decision of the Court below, that the Guardians could not even with the sanction of the Local Government Board redeem the loan prior to the stipulated date without the consent of the lender. -The Guardians of the Poor of the West Derby Union v. The Metropolitan # #" Society, L.R.  1 Ch. 335; 75 L.T. 412 and .T. 73.
C. A.—Guardians—Judgment for Costs in Supreme Court—Date from which time runs—Poor Law (Payment of Debts) Act, 1859, s. 1.—Costs of an appeal which guardians are ordered to pay are not a “debt" within sect. 1 of the Poor Law Act, 1859, till after taxation, and the time for payment runs from the date of allocatur.—Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway v. Guardians of Poor of Doncaster Union, L.R.  1 Q.B. 117; 75 L.T. 472.
Q. B. D.—Settlement by Residence—Absence in a Hospital–9 d. 10 Vict., c. 66, s. 1–Divided Parishes Act, 1876 (39 a 40 Vict., c. 61), s. 34.— Where a man had resided in one parish from July, 1892, to April,
1896, but during the months of May, June, and July 1895, had been a patient in a hospital outside the parish. it was held that he had not acquired a status of irremovability in the parish of residence within the terms of the Divided Parishes Act. 1876.—St. Olare's Union v. Canterbury Union, L.R.  1 Q-B-438; 76 L.T. 88.
(i.) Q- B. D.—Lighthouse—Dues—Dues received on account of a lighthouse do not come under consideration in assessing its rateable value. –Commissioners of Port of Lancaster v. Orerseers of Poor of Barror-inFurness, L.R.  1 Q-B- 166.
(ii) C. D. – Solicitor-Costs—Administration Action–Person Liable— Solicitors Remuneration Act, 1881–General Order. s. 7.—Solicitors to a testator, who were also solicitors to his executor, delivered a bill of costs to the person having the conduct of an action for the administration of the deceased's estate. The taxing-master's certificate was not made out for some time, and the solicitors claimed interest. Held, that the person liable under sect. 7 of the General Order was not the Person having the conduct of the action, but the executor; and no demand having been made upon him, the solicitors were not entitled to interest—In re McMario; Penfield v. McMardo, L.R.  1 Ch. 119; 75 L.T. 576.
(iii.) P. D.-Collision—Writ against Foreign Corporation—Serrice on Agents' Manager–0. ix. r. 8.—Where a foreign corporation paid a com: mission and annual allowance to an agent who rented offices in London, the service of a writ upon the agent's manager was held not to be service upon the corporation within the meaning of O. ix., r. 8. —The Princesse Clémentine, L.R. 1897. P. 18; 7.5 L.T. 695.
(iv.) C. D.—Serrice Out of Jurisdiction—Potrer of County Court and of High Court–0. xi... r. 2.—A county court action had been transferred to the High Court on the ground that the value of the estate concerned exceeded the county court limit. Service on the defendant, resident in Scotland, had been directed under O. li... r. 23. of the C.C. rules; and the defendant had answered interrogatories before the transfer. Heid. that under the rule in question service out of the jurisdiction could in the circumstances of the present case be ordered by a county court; though under like circumstances these would be under the Supreme Court rules, O. xi., r. 2, a restriction on the High Court to have regard to the comparative cost and convenience of proceedings in England” when there was a concurrent remedy in Scotland. And that as it would be unfair for a plaintiff to obtain an advantage by bringing an action in a wrong Court, the defendant should have an opportunity, there having been no waiver, to give evidence that the High Court has no jurisdiction without considering the question of cost and convenience.—Wood v. Middleton, L.R. [ISS7] I Ch. 151; 75 L.T. 480.
(v.) C. A.—Judgment under O. Kiv.—Appeal from Chambers is to Court of Appeal.-An appeal against an order of a judge in chambers giving leave to extend final judgment under O. xiv., r. 1, must be brought in the Court of Appeal, as it is a “matter of practice and procedure” within sect. 1, sub-sect. 4, of the Judicature Act, 1894.—Cannon Brewery Co. v. Gilbey, 75 L.T. 407.
(vi) C. A.—0. xiv., F. 2—Summons for Judgment—Dismissal on Technical 0%jection—Second Summons—Res Judicata-—Unconditional leave to defend was given on a summons under O. xiv. in consequence of a
technical omission in the writ. The writ was amended and a fresh summons taken out, when the leave to defend was made conditional on payment into Court of the sum claimed. Held, on appeal, that the Court had power to adjudicate upon the second summons.—Dombey and Son, Limited (in liquidation) v. Playfair Bros. and Others, L.R.  1 Q.B. 368; 7.5 L.T. 676.
(i.) C. A.—Suing in formá pauperis—Affidavit—Case and Opinion ExhibitsRight to Inspect–O. xvi., rr. 23 & 24.—A defendant is not entitled to inspect the case and opinion of counsel which are made exhibits to the affidaxit of an applicant for leave to sue informá pauperis.—Sloane v. The British Steamship Co., Limited, L.R.  1 Q.B. 185; 75 L.T. 542.
(ii.) C. D.—Third Party Procedure—O. xvi., r. 48.—On the ground that a banking account into which trust funds had been paid was the partnership account of a firm of solicitors of which a deceased trustee had been a member, the defendant a co-trustee of the deceased, obtained leave, in an action for alleged breach of trust, to serve a third party notice on the surviving members of the firm. Held, that as the claim of the defendant was not for indemnity, for, whether the action against him succeeded or failed, he could if the firm was liable pursue his remedy against the surviving partners, the third party notice
must be discharged.—Wynne v. Tempest, L.R.  1 Ch. 110; 75 L.T. 624.
(iii.) H. L. —Statute of Frauds—Pleading – O. xix., rr. 4, 15, 20.—The respondents were printers of a newspaper, and the appellant was the publisher and also the managing director of a company who were the proprietors of the paper. An action in which the respondents were plaintiffs, was brought on a guarantee signed by the defendant, the present appellant which ran, “If you will bring out the present number, I will repeat my guarantee to see you paid in full,” and the question arose whether the document guaranteed payment for a single number, or for the amount due for printing this and other numbers. At the trial the plaintiff gave evidence, that the document was in substitution of a parol guarantee, previously given for the whole debt, and the defendants not having pleaded the Statute of Frauds (which would have been irrelevant to the Statement of Claim), were held not entitled to rely on the statute. Held, reversing the decision of the Court below (see Vol. 22, p. 22, iv.) that if the evidence was admissible, the defendant was not debarred from relying on the statute by the
fact that he had not pleaded it.—Brunning v. Odhams Brothers, Limited, 75 L.T. 602.
(iv.) C. A.—Payment into Court before Defence—Defence denying Liability— O. xxii., rr. 1, 4, 6, 7.—A defendant paid a sum into Court and served notice that it was sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's claim. A month afterwards the defendant delivered a defence denying liability, and the plaintiff joined issue. Held, that the defence and the joinder of issue should be struck out, and that the only question for the Court
was damages.—Dumbleton v. Williams, Torrey, and Field, Limited, 76 L.T. 81.
(v.) C. D.— Plaintiff Improperly Joined—Action Discontinued—Jurisdiction —Old Practice—0. xxvi., r. 1.—Solicitors of a company joined, without authority, the company with themselves as co-plaintiffs in an action and costs were incurred. On a notice of motion by the company to strike out its name, the solicitors gave notice to discontinue the action, and took the objection that as the action was gone, the Court had no jurisdiction. Held, that there being no rule on the point, the old practice in Chancery prevailed, and that the Court had jurisdiction to deal with the motion.—Gold Reefs of Western Australia v. Dawson, L.R.  1 Ch. 115; 75 L.T. 575.
P, D,—Probate Suit-Judgment in absence of Plai1|ti_[T—Leave to Restore Cause—O. xxxvi., r. 33.—Where judgment had been given in a probate suit at the hearing of which the plaintifi was by mistake not represented. leave was given to restore the cause, on the plaintifi paying, by a fixed day, the defendant’s costs, as between solicitor and client.—Cudworth v. Hayward, 75 L.T. 456.
C. D.—Evidence—Statements in Afl'idavit—-Order to Examine Authm-— O. xxxvii., r 5. -Leave was given for the examination before an examiner, of a person alleged to have made to a deponent, statements set out in an affidavit filed on behalf of plaintifis on a motion, the deposition to be taken in evidence as if it were an aflidavit.—The Turner Pneumatic Tyre Co., Limited v. The Dunlap Pneumatic Tyre Co., Limited, 75 L.T. 651.
C, A,—Comolidation of Actions—0. xlix., r. 8.—-At the instance of a plaintifi as well as at that of a defendant causes or matters pending in the same Division, may under the Order be consolidated by direction of the Court, or a Judge.—Martin v. Martin and Co., L.R.  1 Q.B. 429; 76 L.T. 44.
Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict., c. 66), s. 49—O. lv., r. 1.—On an appeal against an order excluding an executor and trustee, who had severed the defence in an administration action from participation in one set of costs allowed, the Order was varied to the effect that the allowed costs should be apportioned by the taxing-master, but so only as to give costs to the excluded executor for work actually done by him.—In re Isaac; Cronbach v. Isaac, L.R.  1 Ch. 251; 75 L.T. 638.
m a foreclosure action where a receiver of rents and profits has been appointed, the mortgagee ought to be charged with any sum paid into Court by the receiver, with any sum in the receiver’s hands at the date of the certificate and with such sum as the mortgagee shall submit to be charged with, in respect of rents and profits to come into the receiver's hands prior to the order for foreclosure absolute. Form in Seton’s Judgments, 5th Edition, Vol. 3, p. 2142 (Addenda) varied.— Simmons v. Blandy, L.R.  1 Ch. 19; 75 L.T. 646.
Husband and Wife Owners of Adjoining Hou.ses—O. xvi., r. 1-0. xviii.—A husband and a wife. each of whom owned a house, brought separate actions against the same defendant for threatened interference with ancient lights. Held, that if it should be found that the wife was not entitled to her separate use, the taxing-master should disallow extra costs occasioned by bringing more than one action.—Heimbs v. Newcastle Co-operative
Society, 76 L.T. 109.
without Authority/—Costs—Liability of Plaintifs Solicitors.—An infant had been without authority joined as a plaintiff by solicitors who were unaware of his incapacity. Held, that the solicitors must pay the costs of the defendant, caused by the infant being made a plaintifl, and must also pay the costs of the application by summons taken out by the defendant. Fricker v. Van Gratten (see Vol. 22, p. 50, iii.) followed.—Geiliger v. Gibbs, L.R.  1 Ch. 479; 76 L.T. 111.
P,]),—Divorce Suit—-Suflicient Notice of Setting Down for Trial— Divorce Court Rules 44, 47.—A letter from the petitioner's solicitor to the 1-espondent’s solicitor, stating that he had set the cause down for
trial. was held to be a suflicient notice ; but as a decree had been made in the absence of the respondent owing to his solicitor relying on a more formal notice, a new trial was ordered on the respondent's solicitor undertaking personally to pay the costs thrown away.—Flui|ter v. Fluister and Hutton, L.R.  P. 22.
Principal and Agent:
(i.) Q. B.—Cont1-act by Public Servant of Cr0wn—Liabilitg of Agent.—A public servant acting for the Crown is not liable for breach of implied warranty of authority to enter into a contract. Collen v. Brown (8 E. and B. 647) considered.—Dunn V. Macdonald, L.R.  1 Q.B. 401.
Public Health :
(ii-) C. D.——National Sch00l—Street—Charge on Sch0ol—Enforcement by Sale or M0rt_qage—School Sites Act, 1841 (4 and 5 Viet., c. 38), as. 6, 7 and 15—Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Viet., c. 55), s. 257.—Where the expenses of paving a street on which a national school abutted had been declared to be a charge on the school, it was held, that the sum required could be raised by sale or mortgage of the premises, though the site was originally conveyed to trustees for “no other purpose whatever” than a school.—Hornsey District Council v. Smith, 75 L.T. 684.
(iii.) Q. B,—Liquids from Factory/—Drains—Dutg of Local Authority-— Mandamus—Public Health Act, 1875, ss. 15, 21, 299—Rivers Pollution Prevention Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Viet., c. 75), ss. 7, 10.-—On the ground that no sufficient remedy was afforded by sect. 299 of the Public Health Act, 1875, a mandamus was granted to compel alocal authority under sects. 15 and 21, to provide sewers to carry off liquids from a factory in the district. But a mandamus to compel the authority to give facilities, under sect. 7 of the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act, 1876, for carrying off the liquids by existing sewers was refused, on the ground that a sufiicient remedy was provided in this case by sect. 10. (See also Vol. 22, p. 21, i.)—Peebles and Others v. Oswaldtwistle Urban District County Council, L.R.  1 Q.B. 384 ; 75 L.T. 689.
(iv.) Q. B. D.—“ Cowkeeper ”—Dairyman-—Public Health (London) Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Viet., c. 76), ss. 20, 141.—A person who keeps cows for the purpose of fattening calves and does not sell milk is not a dairyman within sect. 20, nor a cowkeeper within sect. 41 of the Public Health Act, and therefore does not require a licence from the London County Council.— Umfreville v. The London County Council, 75 L.T. 550.
(vi.) C. D.-Railway Companies Act, 1867, s. 4—Rights of Judgment Creditor of Railway.—-Where a railway company had made default on an obligation imposed by statute to repay to another railway company certain expenditure on a joint station, it was held that execution would not issue on a judgment against the defaulting company as the obligation was not a “contract” within the terms of sect. 4 of the Railway Companies Act, 1867.—In re Manchester and Milford Railway, L.R.  1 Ch. 276; 75 L.T. 416.