INTEREST.

1. Interest is to be allowed on cash advances, as a matter of law. - Field v. Burnam, 3 Bush, 518.

2. In an action in Massachusetts on a note made and payable, on a day certain, in New York, without any further agreement as to interest, the plaintiff can only recover six per cent interest, the legal rate in Massachusetts, though seven per cent is the legal rate in New York. - Ayer v. Tilden, 15 Gray, 178. INTERNAL REVENUE. -See STAMP.

The State courts have jurisdiction of crimes committed on the United States military reservation of Fort Leavenworth. - Clay v. State, 4 Kansas, 49. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1; RECORD.

LACHES. See FORGED NOTE; GUARANTY, 2; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 3.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. A landlord may distrain during the term, after the death of the tenant and before administration granted, for rent due and in arrear. Want of notice does not render a distress invalid. — Keller v. Weber, 27 Md. 660.

2. Land was conveyed in fee, reserving a rent charge with a right of re-entry for non-payment. The grantor died, leaving six heirs. Held, that one of said heirs could maintain ejectment for one-sixth of said lands, for non-payment of rent, without joining the others. · Cruger v. McClaughry, 51 Barb. 642. 8. One of the Van Rensselaer leases was executed in 1799. It did not appear that rent was ever paid under it, and it was proved that rent had not been paid for twenty-two years. Held, that as the so-called lease was in fee, it was an assignment, and did not create the relation of landlord and tenant, and that the claim against the grantee on his covenant was barred. - Lyon v. Chase, 51 Barb. 13. See Cruger v. McClaughry, ib. 642; Van Rensselaer v. Barringer, 39 N. Y. 9; Hosford v. Ballard, ib. 147.

1. It is competent for the State legislature to enact that all tolls, dockage, and wharfage charges, payable into the public treasury, shall be due and collectible exclusively in gold and silver money of the United States. — People v. Steamer America, 34 Cal. 676.

2. A contract to deliver a certain number of ounces of silver of a specific fineness, or an equivalent in gold, on a certain day, is a contract for the delivery of a commodity, and not for the payment of money. The measure of damages for the breach of such a contract is the market value of the commodity at the time of the breach, estimated in the most common currency (i.e. in legal tender), with interest. - Essex Co. v. Pacific Mills, 14 All. 389.

3. So, a lease reserving "the yearly rent of four ounces two pennyweights

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737

and twelve grains of pure gold, in coined money."- Sears v. Dewing, 14 All. 413.

4. Where a party brings a bill to have a conveyance, which is absolute on its face, declared a mortgage to secure an oral promise to pay a certain sum of money in gold, and to redeem, he cannot redeem except on paying said sum in gold, and this not on the ground of the "Specific Contract Act," but because he who seeks equity must do equity. - Cowing v. Rogers, 34 Cal. 648.

5. A bill in equity will not lie to enforce specific performance of an award to pay a certain number of dollars in gold. Howe v. Nickerson, 14 All. 400. See Tufts v. Plymouth Gold Mining Co., ib. 407.

6. After a passenger had been carried several miles of his journey on a railroad, the conductor demanded a certain sum in gold as the fare. The passenger tendered that amount in paper, and refused to pay gold, whereupon he was put off the train. Held, that the railroad company were liable. - Tarbell v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 34 Cal. 616.

- See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 1. LIBEL.-See CORPORATION, 1.

LICENSE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 1.

LIEN. See CASES FOLLOWED, 2.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

Adverse possession of land for the time required by the Statute of Limitations gives an absolute right to the party in possession, and entitles him to all the remedies given by the law to quiet his possession. He may therefore maintain an action against the party having the record title, to have the same declared void. Arrington v. Liscom, 34 Cal. 365. See, however, as to distinction between rights on which no action can be brought and rights which are made destroyed. Montague v. Garnett, 3 Bush, 297.

A mandamus lies to compel the governor of Maryland to issue a commission to which the petitioner is entitled, under the State constitution, that being a ministerial act. Magruder v. Swann, 25 Md. 173. See Magruder v. Tuck,

ib. 217.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4, 5.

MARRIED WOMAN.

A debt contracted by a married woman, for the accommodation of another person, without consideration received by her, will not be enforced in equity against her separate estate, unless made a charge upon it by an express instrument. Willard v. Eastham, 15 Gray, 328. See HUSBAND AND WIFE.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

1. A railroad company, having employed competent persons to supervise and inspect its road-bed and bridges, is not liable for an injury to one of its servants

caused by the falling of a bridge in consequence of a latent defect. Erie Railway Co., 39 N.Y. 468.

Warner v.

2. The fact that a railroad company's servant was of a higher grade than another servant of said company, injured through his negligence, does not make the company liable. Shanck v. Northern Central R. R. Co., 25 Md. 462; Cum

1. Although a power of sale mortgage authorizes the mortgagee or his assignee to become the purchaser at the sale, yet if he fails in the utmost diligence in protecting the rights of the mortgagor, the mortgagor will be allowed to redeem. - Montague v. Dawes, 14 All. 369. See Hahn v. Pindell, 3 Bush, 189, 193. 2. Land was conveyed, subject to a mortgage, by a deed poll, which expressed that the grantee was to pay it, and save the grantor harmless from the same as part of the consideration. The wife of the grantor released dower in the mortgage, but not in the subsequent deed. The grantee paid the sum due, and took an assignment of the mortgage. Held, that the mortgage was discharged, and the grantor's widow remitted to her full right of dower. — McCabe v. Swap, 14 All. 188.

See LEGAL TENDER, 4; PLEDGE; SEISIN.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

MURDER.

See. WAY.

A verdict of" guilty as charged in the indictment " on a common law indictment for murder, is a conviction of murder in the first degree, where a statute establishes degrees of the crime. - Kennedy v. The People, 39 N.Y. 245.

NATIONAL BANK.

The Act of Congress of June 3, 1864, § 41, provided that shares in national banks might be assessed, under State authority, “at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere." A State law authorized the assessment of such shares in the town where the owner resided, for all taxes levied in said town. Held, that the above provision was constitutional, and that said State law complied with it. Said provision only requires that the assessment be made under the State authority existing at the place where the bank is located. — Austin v. Board of Aldermen, 14 All. 359. But see State v. Haight, 30 N.Y. 399; State v. Hart, ib. 434; 2 Am. Law Rev. 519.

See EMBEZZLEMENT.

NAVIGABLE STREAM. - See ОнIO RIVER.
NEGLIGENCE.

1. Defendant negligently let his horse go loose and unattended in the street of a city, where the horse kicked the plaintiff. Held, that defendant was liable without proof that the horse was vicious. - Dickson v. McCoy, 39 N.Y. 400.

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V.

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.62

2. Plaintiff was injured owing to a defect in a highway, but would not have been if his horse had not been vicious. He had never driven the horse before, and did not know of its viciousness. Held, that plaintiff could recover substantial damages (PARK, J., dissenting). Driving a vicious horse is prima facie evidence of negligence. - Daniels v. Saybrook, 34 Conn. 377.

See BURDEN OF PROOF; CARRIER, 3-5; FORGED NOTE; MASTER AND SERVANT; RAILROAD, 3-5; WAY.

NOMINAL DAMAGES. - See DAMAGES, 5.

NOTICE.-See FORGED NOTE; GUARANTY, 2; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1;
RAILROAD, 2; REGISTRY OF DEEDS.

OHIO RIVER.

The title of the owner of land bounding on the Ohio River, if not excluded by the terms of the grant under which he holds, extends to the middle thread of the main channel of the river, and all accretions (such as a sand-bar) belong to the riparian owner as an incident to the title (ROBERTSON, J., dissenting).— Berry v. Snyder, 3 Bush, 266.

ORDER.

1. Defendant agreed to pay "$1,700 lawful money of the United States, and five hundred dollars in an order on W. & T." Held, that parol evidence was admissible to show that the order was to be for sash, blinds, &c., and not for money. - Hinneman v. Rosenback, 39 N.Y. 98.

2. An order for the payment of a certain sum in chattels does not legally import an undertaking by the drawer that the payee shall obtain the chattels, nor that the drawer will be answerable to him for the value of them on the drawee's refusal to accept or to pay the order. Sears v. Lawrence, 15 Gray, 267.

PARENT AND CHILD.

A father does not lose his right to the custody of his minor children by permitting them, after they have been taken away from his home by their mother, to remain with her, and away from him, undisturbed for several years. -Johnson v. Terry, 34 Conn. 259.

PARTNERSHIP. See CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENTS AND STATUTES, 4.
See FORGED NOTE; MORTGAGE, 2.
PLEADING.-See STAMP, 4.

PAYMENT.

PLEDGE.

Stock was pledged with power to pledgees to sell on default without notice. On pledgor's default, pledgees sold the stock at the Brokers' Board, and bought it themselves. The stock rose in value, and was sold later to third parties. Held, that the first sale was made at the right place, but was void, as the pledgees, like trustees, had no right to buy; that the bailment continued therefore until the second sale, which was good under the power. - Maryland Fire Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple, 25 Md. 242; Baltimore Mar. Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple, ib. 269. See Bryson v. Rayner, ib. 424.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

A shop-keeper is not liable for the act of his superintendent and clerks in calling a policeman, and causing the arrest and search of a woman suspected of stealing goods, if done without his authority, express or implied. — Mali v. Lord, 39 N.Y. 381.

See BOUNTY; CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENTS AND STATUTES, 4-6; CORPORATION, 2; DAMAGES, 4; EVIDENCE; MASTER AND SERVANT.

PROMISSORY NOTE. See BILLS AND NOTES.

PROXIMATE CAUSE.-See DAMAGES, 1-3; INSURANCE, 2.

PUBLIC USE.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 3, 4; EMINENT DOMAIN. QUIA EMPTORES. -See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 3.

RAILROAD.

1. A railroad company, which, for a consideration, receives the cars of a connecting company into its custody and control, and draws them with their contents over its own road, is liable as a common carrier for injuries to such cars during their transit over said road. — Vermont & M. R.R. Co. v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 14 All. 462.

2. Defendants advertised the hours at which their trains would start in the newspapers, but it was their custom sometimes to postpone the hour of a train's starting, giving notice only by handbills in their cars and stations. On the day in question, after giving such notice, they postponed the hour. Plaintiff, who had purchased a package of tickets, and did not know of the postponement, presented himself for carriage at the advertised hour. Held, that defendants were liable for not carrying him at that hour. Sears v. Eastern R.R. Co., 14 All. 433.

3. A railroad company is not liable for injuries received by a passenger while voluntarily and unnecessarily standing on the platform of a car in motion, although by the express permission of the conductor and brakeman. — Hickey v. Boston & L. R.R. Co., 14 All. 429.

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4. The same diligence is not required from a railroad company toward a stranger as toward a passenger. The care required is that which experience has found reasonable and necessary to prevent injury to others in like cases. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Breinig, 25 Md. 378. See Philadelphia, W., & B. R.R. Co. v. Kerr, ib. 521.

5. A railroad is not bound to maintain a fence on the line of its road against cattle unlawfully in a pasture adjoining. — Mayberry v. Concord Railroad, 47

N.H. 391.

See CARRIER; CORPORATION, 2; DAMAGES, 4, 5; EASEMENT; EVIDENCE; LEGAL TENDER, 6; MASTER AND SERVANT; STAMP, 1; TAX, 1.

A judgment of a court of general jurisdiction (i.e., in California, a court of record) cannot be impeached collaterally, because service by publication on a