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2. A party insured against injury “ by violent and accidental means, within the meaning of the contract and conditions annexed," was injured internally by jumping from a car and running some distance, for purposes of business only, and not from peril or necessity. Held, that he could not recover.

The meaning of the principal words was not enlarged by conditions, excepting injuries hardly within their scope such as duelling, over-exertion, sunstroke, &c. - Southard v. Railway Passengers' Ass. Co., 34 Conn. 574.

3. A policy of insurance on the life of a husband was made payable to the wife, her executors, administrators, or assigns, for her sole use, and in case of her death before his to be paid to her children. A statute authorized a husband to effect such an insurance, and protected it from his creditors. The wife assigned the policy for value, and died before her husband. Held, that the policy was payable to the children, not to the assignee, in the event which had happened. - Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 34 Conn. 305.

4. “For value received, I promise to pay H. D. or his order, eighty-five dollars, for the use of the N. E. P. Union Store, No. 607, on demand, with interest, S. S. Moore, Treasurer.” It was proved that M. was treasurer and acting partner, and had authority to bind the firm of the N. E. P. Union. Hed, that the note was that of the firm alone, and not of M. — Dow v. Moore, 47 N.H. 419.

5. “ The president and directors of the A. B. Co. will pay," &c., signed “C. D. Pres., E, F." et al., does not bind the individuals signing, but only the corporation. - Yowell v. Dodd, 3 Bush, 581.

6. “The president, by the order of the board of the A. B. Co., promise to pay," &c.., signed “C. D. Pres., E. F." et al., binds the individuals signing, and not the corporation. — Caphart v. Dodd, 3 Bush, 584.

See AGREEMENT, 1; BANKRUPT LAW, 2; BOUNTY; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 2; EMBEZZLEMENT; FEE SIMPLE, 1; GUAEANTY, 1; INNKEEPER; INSURANCE, 3; NATIONAL BANK; ORDER, 1; WATERCOURSE; WAY; WILL, 1, 3. CONTRACT.-See AGREEMENT; Ber; BURDEN OF PROOF; CARRIER, 1-4; Cox

SIDERATION; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3-6; CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENTS AND STATUTES, 2–6; DAMAGES, 2, 3; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 2; GUARANTY; HUSBAND AND WIFE; LEGAL TENDER, 2; ORDER, 2; RAILROAD, 2; SALE; SUNDAY; Tax, 1.

CORPORATION. 1. Semble, an action will lie against a corporation for a libel published by its directors in the discharge of their office, and their malice is the malice of the corporation. — Maynard v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. 34 Cal., 48.

2. A railroad company may be charged with exemplary damages for injuries done with force or malice to a passenger by a conductor of said company. – Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co. v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 4; FEE SIMPLE, 1; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 1; CONFLICT OF Laws, 1; SEAL.

County. — See Tax, 1.
COVENANT. -See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 3.

DOWER. If the owner of a tract of land sells part of it and then dies, his widow is to have her whole dower out of the remaining portion. — Morgan v. Conn, 3 Bush, 58. See AGREEMENT, 3; MORTGAGE, 2.

DURESS. — See Tax, 2.

EASEMENT. The establishment and running of a horse railroad in the public street imposes an additional burden on the land, and may be enjoined at the suit of an adjoining proprietor who owns to the middle of the street. — Craig v. Rochester City é B. R. R. Co., 39 N.Y. 404.

EMBEZZLEMENT. The embezzlement by an officer of a national bank of a special deposit in such bank, is not made punishable by any statute of the United States, and may there fore be punished under a State law. (McCURDY, J., dissenting.) Secus, of such embezzlement of the property of the bank. — State v. Tuller, 34 Conn. 280.

EMINENT DOMAIN. Upon the taking for a public highway, by the right of eminent domain, of the franchise to build and maintain a bridge, the proprietors are not entitled to compensation for the value of the bridge as a structure, but for the loss of their franchise only. — Central Bridge Co. v. Lowell, 15 Gray, 106. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4.

ENTRY. - See SEISIN. EQUITY. - See AGREEMENT, 2, 3; CHARITY; CONDITION, 2; CONFLICT of Laws, 1; LEGAL TENDER, 4, 5; MARRIED WOMAN.

ESTOPPEL. — See SALE, 3.

EVIDENCE. The statements of the general freight agent of a railroad company, made as to goods delivered to him for transportation pending the contract of carriage, were admitted in evidence against the company, although made eight months after he received said goods. — Burnside v. Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 47 N.H. 554. See BURDEN OF Proor ; ORDER, 1; STAMP, 2, 3.

EXECUTION. - See MANDAMUS.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR. — See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. — See CORPORATION, 2.
EXEMPTION.-See CONSTITUTIONAL Law, 3; CONSTITUTIONAL Law,

STATE, 2.
EXPRESS COMPANY. - See CARRIER, 1-3; STAMP, 1.

GENERAL AVERAGE. A vessel fell in with a ship in a sinking condition. To save the lives of the ship's passengers and crew, the master of the vessel consented to receive them; but as it was necessary to throw overboard part of his cargo to make room for them, he began to do so before any of them came on board, and continued it while they were coming on board until room enough was made. The owner of the vessel sued the insurers for a contribution to general average for the above jettison. Held, that he could not recover (CHAPMAN and FOSTER, JJ., dissenting). - Dabney v. New England Mutual Ins. Co., 14 All. 300.

GOLD. — See LEGAL TENDER.
GOVERNOR. — See MANDAMUS.

GUARANTY. 1. “Mr. H., — Sir: you can let D. have what goods he calls for, and I will see that the same are settled for. Yours truly, H. S. B.," is a continuing guaranty. — Hotchkiss v. Barnes, 34 Conn. 27.

2. A delay of three years in giving notice that a guaranty in similar terms bas become operative, discharges the guarantor. — Whiting v. Stacy, 15 Gray, 270. See Parkman v. Brewster, ib. 271. See BILLS AND NOTES, 2.

HIGHWAY. - See Way.

HOMESTEAD. A lease of a homestead for a year is not of itself an abandonment of the homestead right. — Locke v. Rowell, 47 N.H. 46.

HUSBAND AND WIFE. 1. If a wife leaves her husband's house because of his violence and cruelty, and from reasonable apprehension of her safety, he is liable for her board, and also for the board of their child whom she takes with her, if, knowing where the child is, he makes no attempt to reclaim it; and he is not discharged from such liability by his wife's subsequent return to his house. Reynolds v. Sweetser, 15 Gray, 78.

2. A married woman paid debts of her husband at his request out of money which came to her from relations, but which was not shown to be her separate property. He afterwards, in consideration thereof, gave a note and mortgage to : trustee for her benefit. After his death his administrator paid said note, with notice that the heirs disputed its validity. Held, that the note was invalid, and the administrator should not be allowed for paying it in his account. — Phillips v. Frye, 14 All. 36. See MARRIED WOMAN.

ICE. — See WATERCOURSE.
ILLEGAL CONTRACT. — See BET; SUNDAY.

INCUMBRANCE. — See SALE, 4.

INDICTMENT. See MURDER.
INJUNCTION.- See CONDITION, 2.

O WOMAN.

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