goods caused by negligence of the crew, though the vessel was under charter, if the shipper did not know of the charter, and if the master put up the ship as a general ship. The Figlia Maggiore, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 106.

3. The plaintiffs were indorsees of the bill of lading of a cargo, which, according to the charter-party which referred to the bill of lading, was to be unloaded at S. "at the usual place of discharge." On arriving at S. the master put into the A. dock, when the plaintiffs ordered him to remove the ship to the B. dock, which the master refused to do until he had been paid the expenses of entering the A. dock. Both docks were places of delivery for similar cargoes. In a suit for breach of contract for non-delivery of cargo: Held, that the master was justified in mooring in the A. dock, but having received directions to move to the B. dock was bound to obey them. The Felix, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 273.

4. The payment of a fare is necessary to constitute a "passenger" whose presence on board imposes the obligation, under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, § 354, of taking a pilot. - The Lion, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 102.

See BILL OF LADING; BOTTOMRY BOND; COLLISION; DAMAGES, 2, 3; FREIGHT; INSURANCE; PRIORITY, 2; STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU; WILL, 1.

SLANDER.

In an action for slander, a new trial will not be granted on the mere ground of insufficiency of damages. — Forsdike v. Stone, Law Rep. 3 C. P. 607.

In a suit for specific performance, a purchaser will be forced to take a title which appears to the Court of Appeal to be good, though the judge of the court below was of a different opinion; that fact not being sufficient to constitute a doubtful title. — Beioley v. Carter, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 230.

See COVENANT, 2; PARTNERSHIP, 1; TRUST, 3; VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE, 1.

SPIRITUALISM. - See UNDUE INFLUENCE.

STAMP.

The Inland Revenue Department allowing a discount to persons purchasing a large amount of stamps, a clerk of the patents had been accustomed to buy stamps for the accommodation of the patentees, purchasing them at a discount, but charging the patentees their full value. Held, that he must account to the government for any profit made on stamps purchased with public moneys, but not for any profit made on stamps purchased with his own money.- Attorney General v. Edmunds, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 381.

See BANKRUPTCY, 2.

STATUTE.

A contract entered into by a company which is ultra vires is not ratified by references to it in subsequent local and personal acts of Parliament, not expressing any direct intention to confirm it. - Kent Coast Railway Co. v. London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 Ch. 656.

DIGEST OF THE ENGLISH LAW REPORTS.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-See CONTRACT.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-See TENANCY IN COMMON, 2.

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6

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

A., at Bahia, shipped a cargo by the order and at the risk of B., of Glasgow, in a ship chartered by A. The charter-party provided that the ship should proceed"either direct or via Falmouth, for orders to a port in Great Britain, and deliver the cargo in conformity with the bill of lading." The bill of lading stated that the ship was "bound for Falmouth for orders," and that the cargo was to be delivered "to order or its assigns." A. sent to B., the charter-party, the bill of lading, indorsed to "B. or order," and the invoice, which stated that the cargo was shipped "for the account and risk of B., for Falmouth, for orders and a market." The ship arrived at Falmouth, and the master, in accordance with directions from A., announced its arrival to A.'s agents, and asked them for orders. The agents applied to B. for instructions as to the destination; but before any were given B. became insolvent, and A. stopped the cargo. Held, that the transitus was not over, and that the stoppage was effectual. — Fraser v. Witt, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 64.

SUNDAY.

A statute provided that no licensed victualler should sell wine or ale on Sunday, except as refreshment for travellers." A. walked on Sunday to a spa, two and a half miles from his house, for the purpose of drinking the mineral water there for the sake of his health, and was supplied with ale at a hotel at the spa. Held, that A. was a traveller within the exception. -Peplow v. Richardson, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 168.

SURETY.-See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

SURVIVORSHIP. See VESTED INTEREST, 1.

TAIL, ESTATE IN. - See DEVISE, 3; VESTED INTEREST, 2.

ΤΑΧ.

Commissioners were incorporated with powers to construct a bridge, and to borrow from the treasury £120,000 on an assignment of the tolls; they were authorized to take tolls, to be applied to pay the expenses of the bridge, and then in repayment of the sum borrowed. Held, that they were not liable to the poor rate, as they were in occupation of the bridge as servants of the crown, deriving no benefit from the tolls, and were therefore exempt from the operation of 43 Eliz. c. 2, § 1. (Exch. Ch.) - The Queen v. McCann, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 677. See INCOME TAX.

TENANCY IN COMMON.

1. Real estate, partly agricultural land and partly a quarry, was owned in undivided shares. The quarry was worked and the agricultural land let by one of the co-owners in behalf of the rest, and the net rents and profits in general divided among the owners. In some years, however, the profits were laid out in the purchase of other lands, partly agricultural and partly used in connection with the

quarry. The purchased lands were conveyed to the managing owner for the time being, and managed like the original lands. Held, that the share of one of the owners passed on his death intestate to his heir, and not to his representative. -Steward v. Blakeway, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 479.

2. Two tenants in common were entitled to property, as they supposed, in the proportion of five-ninths and four-ninths, and the rents had been received by a common agent and divided accordingly. In 1827, the supposed owner of the fourninths settled her share, describing it as a moiety; this description was treated as an error, and the rents were received and divided as before till 1864, when it was discovered that the tenants in common were really entitled in the proportion of three-fourths to one-fourth. Held, that there had been an ouster of one tenant in common by the other in 1827.—In re Peat's Trusts, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 302. See NEXT OF KIN, 2.

TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDER-MAN.

A tenant for life of leaseholds for years obtained, before his estate for life had come into possession, the grant of a reversionary term, to commence after the determination of the old term. He came into possession, and died, having had the estate during part of the term created by the new grant. Held, that the remainder-man, in respect to the fine and renewals, must pay an amount to be ascertained in reference to the actual enjoyment of the tenant for life; compound interest to be computed on the remainder-man's proportion up to the death of the tenant for life, and simple interest afterwards. — Bradford v. Brownjohn, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 711.

1. The Court of Chancery has inherent jurisdiction in an administration suit to appoint trustees where none have been appointed by the testator. - Dodkin v. Brunt, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 580.

2. If persons holding funds have always dealt with them as if they were trust funds, they are liable for losses occasioned by improper investments, though they did not in fact know who the cestuis que trust were. — Ex parte Norris, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 280.

3. A married woman, one of several devisees in trust for sale, cannot bind herself to convey the estate, and a bill by the purchaser to enforce specific performance of a contract by such trustees was dismissed, but without costs, and without prejudice to any action. — Avery v. Griffin, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 606. See CHARITY; CONVERSION; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2; EXECUTORY TRUST; HUSBAND AND Wife, 1, 4.

ULTRA VIRES.

1. Money due to a bank on bills of exchange drawn and accepted by directors of a mining company, indorsed by the company and discounted by the bank, the proceeds of which were applied in satisfying an overdrawn account (£200) of

DIGEST OF THE ENGLISH LAW REPORTS.

719

the company with the bank, and the balance (£900) for the benefit of the company; held not due as on a loan within the meaning of the articles which prohibited the directors from contracting any loan beyond £500 without the consent of the shareholders. In re Cefn Cilcen Mining Co., Law Rep. 7 Eq. 88.

2. A bank (A.), unauthorized to accept as security shares in another bank, except by transfer to a third person, took a transfer of shares in a bank (B.), in which they were named as transferees. This was executed not under seal, but by the signature of the manager. Bank (A.) received dividends on these shares. Bank (B.) being ordered wound up, held, that bank (A.) was a contributory. -Royal Bank of India's Case, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 91.

3. Though it be ultra vires in a banking company to buy shares in another company on speculation, yet it may take such shares on deposit as security, and have them transferred into its own name, and thus become subject to the liability attaching to shareholders in such company. - Royal Bank of India's Case, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 252.

See COMPANY, 3; STATUTE.

UNDUE INFLUENCE.

A., a widow, aged seventy-five, within a few days after first seeing B., who claimed to be a 66 spiritual medium," was induced, from her belief that she was fulfilling the wishes of her deceased husband, conveyed to her through the medium of B., to adopt him as her son, and transfer £24,000 to him; to make her will in his favor; to give him a further sum of £6,000; and also to settle on him, subject to her life-interest, £30,000 (these gifts being without consideration, and without power of revocation). Held, that the relation existing between them implied the exercise of dominion and influence by B. over A.'s mind; and that as B. had not proved that these gifts were the pure voluntary acts of A.'s mind, they must be set aside. - Lyon v. Home, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 655.

USAGE-See CUSTOM; SALE, 2-6.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE.

1. On a sale by order of court, the purchaser will not be compelled to take an equitable title without the legal estate being got in, except, perhaps, where a dry legal estate is in an infant. - Freeland v. Pearson, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 246.

2. The plaintiff contracted to purchase of the defendant a house described in the particulars of sale as "freehold," subject to certain conditions. Condition 5 was: "The abstract of title will commence with a conveyance of April 17, 1860, and no purchaser shall investigate or take any objection in respect of the title prior to the commencement of the abstract." Condition 9 was: "If any error or misstatement shall appear to have been made in the particulars of sale, it is not to annul the sale, but shall entitle the purchaser to compensation." The abstract of the deed of April 17, 1860, recited an indenture, and also other conveyances, by which the property was conveyed to the defendant's testator in fee, subject (so far as the premises were subject thereto) to the covenants and conditions in the said indenture. The plaintiff asked further explanations of what these covenants and conditions were, which was refused. Held, that the

V.

65

plaintiff was entitled to an unincumbered freehold title, under the deed of April 17, 1860, and was therefore entitled to rescind the contract. - Phillips v. Caldcleugh, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 159.

3. The owner of an estate agreed to sell it to A., representing it as containing 1,530 acres. A. agreed to sell it to a company, and part of the price was paid by them to him, £75,000 in cash, and £75,000 in bonds of the company, and A. paid the vendor £50,000 as a deposit. It appeared that the estate contained only 1,100 acres, and A. thereupon wrote to the vendor declining to complete. The company afterwards rescinded the contract, and A. brought an action against the vendor, which was compromised by repayment of the deposit and rescission of the contract. The company filed a bill against A. and some other defendants, who had agreed to share with him, for a return of the £75,000, and of the bonds. Held, that the bill was maintainable, that the company might rescind for misrepresentation, though they might have been able to ascertain the extent of the estate, and that they were entitled to repayment of the £75,000, and to a return of the bonds, and had a lien on a portion of the £50,000 repaid to A., which had been paid into court.

The contract provided that the estate, as to extent of acreage, should be taken to be conclusively shown by certain deeds. Held, that this was merely a conveyancing condition as to identity, and that, coupled with the representation as to the acreage, it did not estop the company from rescinding on the ground of deficiency of acreage.

The same relief was asked against the other defendants as against A. One made answer that the suit was improper, another that he was improperly made party. Held, that if they were not necessary, they were proper parties; that no relief, in the shape of repayment, could be given against them, but that as they had not merely submitted to any order that the court should make, they would not be allowed costs (reversing the decision of MALINS, V.C.).— Aberaman Ironworks v. Wickens, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 101.

See COVENANT, 1, 2; PRIORITY, 1; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE; TRUST, 3; VENDOR'S LIEN.

VENDOR'S LIEN.

A vendor of land to a railway company, who have used it for their railway, is entitled to a lien on the land for the unpaid purchase-money, and to have this lien enforced by a sale, though the railroad be made and ready for traffic. Wing v. Tottenham and Hampstead Junction Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 Ch. 740.

VESTED INTEREST.

1. Testator gave a fund on trust to pay the income to A. for life, and after the death of A., leaving issue, on trust to pay and transfer both principal and interest to the children of A., in equal shares, and if but one child, then to such child, to be paid to them, if sons, at twenty-one, and if daughters, at twenty-one or marriage, "with benefit of survivorship;" and in case there should be no children of A. at his death, or if all such children should die before twenty-one or marriage, then over. Of the five children of A., who attained twenty-one, two, B. and C., died in A.'s lifetime, while three, D., E., and F., survived him. Held, that B. and C. took vested interests, and that their representatives