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bought and sold notes, the principals not seeing one another, and no one else acting as broker in the transaction. A. had no license to act as broker. Held, that he was liable to a penalty for acting as broker. Scott v. Cousins, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 177. See Custom; SALE, 2–6.

BURDEN OF PROOF.— See INSURANCE, 3.

CARRIER. - See RAILWAY, 2.

CHARITY.

1. Bequest in trust for “such charities and other public purposes as lawfully might be in the parish of T.,” is a good charitable gift. — Dolan v. Macdermot, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 676.

2. Legacies to the Royal, to the Royal Geographical, and to the Royal Humane Societies, are charitable. Beaumont v. Oliveira, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 534.

3. Testator bequeathed as follows: “I give to the trustees of Mount Zion Chapel, where I attend, £3,500, and appoint as trustees to the same A. and G.; and I direct that their receipt shall be a discharge to my executors; and the money to be appropriated according to statement appended.” There was no statement appended. Held, that the gift was not intended for A. and G. beneficially; that the court could not presume a charitable object in the bequest; and, if not charitable, that the object was so indefinite that the gift must fail. Aston v. Wood, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 419.

4. Under wills dated between 1716 and 1803, various funds were given for the ministers, and otherwise for the benefit of Protestant Dissenters called “ Presbyterians," at D. There had existed a Presbyterian chapel at D. since 1662, some Baptists had associated with them, and the Baptist element had so increased, that, in 1863, only a few of the members were Presbyterian, and since 1803 the ministers of the chapel had been Baptist. An information was filed in 1863, raising the question who were entitled to these funds, which were proved to have been enjoyed by the minister and congregation for the last seventy years ; and in 1865 a congregation was formed by persons claiming to be strict Presbyterians, who now claimed the funds as such. Held, (1) that the use of the term “ Presbyterian " did not amount to a requisition that the particular religious doctrines or mode of church government now claimed to be Presbyterian should be taught or observed; and that, under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 45, the usage for the last twenty-five years must be held conclusive, and that the congregation who had enjoyed the funds must be declared entitled; (2) that, on the evidence, there had been no strictly Presbyterian congregation at D. for the last century, and that the funds would, if necessary, be applied cyprès in favor of the congregation in possession. - Attorney-General v. Bunce, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 563. See MORTMAIN; WILL, 5. CHARTER PARTY. - See FREIGHT, 3; SHIP, 1-3.

CHEQUE. — See GIFT.
CODICIL. See REVOCATION OF WILL.

COLLISION. 1. The owners of a foreign vessel claimed damages for a collision between their vessel and an English ship, in Belgian waters. The defendants, owners of the English ship, pleaded that the vessel was in charge of a pilot, whom they were compelled by the Belgian laws to take. The plaintiffs pleaded in reply that, by the same laws, the owner of the vessel in fault, though compelled to take a pilot, continued liable for damages. Held, that the reply should be stricken out; that an English court would not enforce a foreign municipal law, and give a remedy in damages in respect to an act which by the English law imposed no liability on the person from whom the damages were claimed. - The Halley, Law Rep. 2 P. C. 193.

2. The Merchant Shipping Act exempts a vessel from compulsory pilotage in her own port. The defendants' vessel took a pilot outside of her own port at a point where pilotage was compulsory, and the pilot brought her into the port. Through the pilot's negligence, she came into collision with the plaintiff's vessel. It was in dispute whether the collision was inside or outside of the port. Held, (per MARTIN, BRAMWELL and CHANNELL, BB. ; KELLY, C.B., dissentiente), that even assuming that the collision was within the port, yet that the pilot having been compulsorily put in charge of the ship, and his duty as pilot not having ended, he was not the servant of the defendants, and they were not responsible for his negligence. — General Steam Navigation Co. v. British & Colonial Steam Navigation Co., Law Rep. 3 Ex. 330.

3. The owners of a vessel having, by compulsion of law, a pilot on board, are yet liable for the damage caused by a collision, if the master's neglect of duty was conducive thereto. The Minna, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 97.

4. The bailees of a barge which has been injured by a collision, can sue in rem in the Admiralty; but the court will direct that the money awarded as compensation for damages shall not be paid till it has been satisfactorily established that the payment will release the owners of the vessel sued from all claims by the owners of the barge in respect of the collision.- 1b.

5. In a collision cause, the defendant cannot rely on a simple negative, but must state the circumstances relating to the collision. — The Why Not, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 265. See ADMIRALTY, 2 ; INSURANCE, 1.

COMMON, TENANCY IN. See TENANCY IN COMMON.
COMMON CARRIER. — See RAILWAY, 2.

COMPANY. 1. T., being a registered holder of five shares in a joint stock company, left the share certificates with her broker. A transfer of the shares to S. purporting to be executed by T., together with the certificates, was left with the secretary for registration. The secretary, in the usual course, wrote to T. that the transfer bad been so left, and receiving no answer after ten days, registered the transfer, and removed the name of T., and placed the name of S. on the register, giving S. a certificate that he was the registered holder of the five specific shares. A. bargained for five shares, through brokers in the usual way, and paid the value of the five shares, and the specific five shares were transferred to him by S., and A.'s name was put on the register and the five shares delivered to him. Afterwards the transfer to S. was discovered to be a forgery, and T.'s name was ordered by rule of court to be restored to the register. On a case stated; Held, that the giving of the certificate to S. amounted to a statement by the company intended to be acted on by purchasers of shares in the market that S. Fas entitled to the shares; and that A. having acted on that statement, the company were estopped to deny its truth; and that A. was, therefore, entitled to recover from the company the value of the shares, at the time the company refused to recognize him as a shareholder, with interest from that time. — In re Bahia & San Francisco Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 584.

2. The articles of association of a company provided that the business should be fixed, determined, and regulated by such rules, regulations, and by-laws as the directors might from time to time make, which should be entered in a book kept for that purpose, and signed by three directors. A by-law so made prohibited certain acts. A resolution authorizing some of such acts was afterwards passed by the directors and entered in their minute book, but not entered in the book of by-laws nor signed by the directors. Per GIFFARD, L.J., that a third person would not be affected by the by-law unless it was proved that he knew it; and, semble, that had he known it, the resolution of the directors would have done away with its effect. Royal Bank of India's Case, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 252.

3. shareholder in a company, in behalf of himself and the other shareholders, may maintain a bill to set aside an agreement by the company as ultra vires, without joining as defendants any of the shareholders who have assented to the agreement. — Clinch v. Financial Corporation, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 117.

See BILLS AND NOTES, 2, 3; ESTOPPEL; MORTGAGE, 1; RAILWAY; SALE, 2–6; STATUTE; ULTRA VIRES. CONCEALMENT. — See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2.

CONDITION. A lease contained a proviso for re-entry in case the lessee or any occupier of the premises should be convicted of an offence against the game laws. The occupier of the premises having been convicted of killing game without a game certificate, the assignee of the reversion brought ejectment. Held, that be could not maintain the action, (per MARTIN, CHANNELL and CLEASBY, BB.), because the condition did not run with the land, and therefore the assignee could not avail himself of its breach ; (per KELLY, C.B.), because killing game without a certificate was an offence, not against the game, but against the revenue laws. – Stevens v. Copp, Law Rep. 4 Ex. 20. See LEGACY, 1; VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE, 2. CONFIDENTIAL RELATION. See UNDUE INFLUENCE.

CONFLICT OF Laws. Where an Englishman contracts a debt in a foreign country the provisions of the lex loci contractus do not avail to entitle the creditor to payment of his debt out of equitable assets administered in this country, in priority to other creditors. - Pardo v. Bingham, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 485. See COLLISION, 1.

CONSPIRACY. - See INDICTMENT, 2.

CONTEMPT. 1. While a suit was pending to restrain the infringement of a patent, in which one of the issues raised was as to the novelty of the plaintiff's invention, a discussion having arisen in a newspaper as to the merits of the invention, the defendant's solicitor wrote, under an assumed name, a letter, which was published in the newspaper, taking part in the discussion, and alleging facts tending to disprove the novelty of the invention. The plaintiff, thereupon, sent to the editor of the newspaper a letter, which the editor refused to insert on account of its personal imputations, in which he referred to the suit, and suggested that the writer of the letter was an interested party. The editor, not knowing that the writer was the solicitor in the suit, but knowing that he was a solicitor, subsequently published a further letter from him disputing the novelty of the invention. Held, that the solicitor had been guilty of contempt in publishing letters tending to influence the result of the suit. A motion to commit the publisher of the newspaper for contempt was refused, but without costs. - Daw v. Eley, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 49.

2. For a newspaper to publish affidavits filed in behalf of the plaintiff in a bill of equity (but not yet before the court), with comments tending to prejudice the plaintiff's case, is a contempt. Tichborne v. Mostyn, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 55, note.

3. When there is no collusion, a husband will not be committed for his wife's breach of injunction. —Hope v. Carnegie, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 254. See Costs.

CONTRACT. A. applied for workmen to the Free Labor Society, and filled up and signed a form containing the particulars and terms of employment, and his address at S. This form was read over to B. by the secretary of the society, and B. then signed an agreement headed “ Free Labor Society," by which he stated that he had accepted employment at S., and agreed that one-half day's wages, “ being his fee to the society for obtaining him the employment,” should be deducted from his wages, and that he would not quit “ the service of his employer” without just cause. Held, that the documents sufficiently referred to one another to constitute a contract in writing signed by other parties within the meaning of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 141, 89, giving summary jurisdiction to justices in cases between master and servant. Crane v. Powell, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 123.

See BILL OF LADING; COVENANT; Custom; DAMAGES, 2, 3; INFANT; MASTER AND SERVANT; MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED; SALE; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE; STATUTE.

CONVERSION. A testator devised real estate to trustees on trust to pay the profits to his wife till her death or marriage, and on her death or marriage on trust for his children who should be then living, and their respective heirs as tenants in common, with a power to the trustees, in their discretion, to sell the real estate, and in event of such sale to divide the proceeds among his children, who should then be living, in equal shares. During the widow's lifetime, one of the children assigned all his personal estate in possession, remainder or expectancy, to A. On the widow's death, the trustees, in exercise of the power, sold the real estate. Held, that the child's share of the proceeds did not pass to A. - In re Ibbitson's Estate, Lax Rep. 7 Eq. 226.

COPYRIGHT. 1. A., a citizen of the United States, published a work in the monthly parts, between January and December, 1867, of a magazine published in the United States. In October, 1867, A. went to Canada, and while there, when the work wanted six chapters for completion in the magazine, an edition of the whole was published in London, under an agreement between A. and the plaintiff, an English publisher. A reprint taken from the pages of the magazine having been subsequently published by the defendant. Held, that the copyright was divisible, and could be claimed for a portion of the book only, and the publication by the defendant of the last six chapters was enjoined. - Low v.Ward, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 415.

2. In a trades' directory, the names of those who paid for the privilege were printed in capitals, with additional descriptions of their business called “extra lines." Held, that such payment did not make the information common property, so as to entitle the compiler of another directory to reprint it from slips cut from the first, even where the persons whose names were so printed had been applied to, to verify the information, and had paid for the insertion of their names in the second directory with the distinctive features of capitals and extra lines. — Morris v. Ashbee, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 34. See PARTNERSHIP,

2.

CORPORATION. - See COMPANY.

Costs. A motion to commit A. for breach of an injunction was refused, but without costs, and A. appealed. Held, that an appeal as to costs in such a case would not be entertained. Hope v.

Carnegie, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 264. See ATTORNEY; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 8; LUNATIC, 2; MESNE PROFITS, 2; VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE, 3.

COVENANT. 1. The purchaser of lands below sea-level is bound to inquire how all walls necessary for the protection of his property against the sea are maintained.

Lands below sea-level, previously held in undivided shares, were, in 1794, partitioned by a deed containing a covenant that the expense of maintaining the walls belonging to the lands thereby divided should be borne by the owners thereof, and should be payable out of the lands by an acre-scot. Hed, that 8 purchaser of part of the lands was bound by the covenant, though he had no actual notice thereof, and th re was jurisdiction equity to deal with the

- Morland v. Cook, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 252. 2. A. sold part of an estate to B., who entered into restrictive covenants for himself, his heirs and assigns, with A., his heirs, executors, and administrators, as to buildings on the purchased property; but A. did not enter into any core nants as to the land retained. After this A. sold to other persons various lots of the part retained, but nothing appeared as to the contents of their conver.

case.

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