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signed in the action against B. on March 3, and a ca. ga. lodged with the sheriff on March 6. On March 29, B. was arrested, and discharged the same day by order of the bank, on payment of costs. The plaintiffs having sued B. on the bill, held, that C. had a vested right of action against B. on C.'s payment of the bill on March 21, for the fact that C. had not paid the costs on March 21 only gave the bank a lien on the bill, but did not affect C.'s right to a remedy on the bill; that neither the taking on execution nor discharge of B. could take away C.'s right, and that therefore the plaintiffs could recover. — Woodward v. Pell, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 55.


BOND. 1. A. made his will. Shortly after, B. gave A. a bond for £8,000, conditioned to be void if B. should pay £4,000, with interest, within three months after his taking an absolute interest in the residue given by A.'s will, the interest being contingent on A.'s son dying without issue, B. surviving. Held, that interest was due on the bond only from the time when B. acquired a vested interest in the residue. — Mathews v. Keble, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 691.

2. A testator charged the share of a residuary legatee with money due to him from the legatee on the security of a bond, and all interest thereon. "Held, that the whole debt and interest, though they exceeded the penalty of the bond, must be deducted from the share. Ib. . See BILLS AND Notes, 3; BOTTOMRY BOND.

BOTTOMRY BOND. 1. A ship, with a cargo of mahogany for England, having suffered sea-damage, put into Key West, and there underwent necessary repairs. The master, not being able to raise money on personal security for the repairs, gave a bottomry bond on ship, freight, and cargo. He did not, before hypothecating, communicate with the owner or the consignees of the cargo, by reason of the great delay and uncertainty in the transmission of letters. Held, that the bond was binding on ship, freight, and cargo. The Lizzie, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 254.

2. When the master fails to obtain funds from the owners of the ship or cargo, he is authorized to raise money to pay for necessary repairs and supplies, after such repairs and supplies have been furnished, by giving a bottomry bond on ship, freight, and cargo to persons other than those who have furnished the repairs and supplies, especially when by the lex loci these latter persons have a maritime lien on the ship to enforce their demands. — The Karnak, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 289.

3. A master, being also part-owner of a vessel, had, by a bottomry bond, bound himself, ship, freight, and cargo. He brought a suit against the vessel for his wages and disbursements. Held, that the owners of part of the cargo could not oppose his being paid his wages and disbursements in priority to the bondholder. - The Daring, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 260.

BROKER. A., an officer of a company formed to carry on the business of stockbroking, . bought some stock for a customer in the course of business, and signed the

bought and sold notes, the principals not seeing one another, and no one else acting as broker in the transaction. A. had no license to act as broker. Hed, that he was liable to a penalty for acting as broker. — Scott v. Cousins, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 177. See Custom; SALE, 2–6.


CARRIER. — See RailwAY, 2.


1. Bequest in trust for “such charities and other public purposes as lawfully might be in the parish of T.,” is a good charitable gift. — Dolan v. Macdermot, Law Rep. 3 Ch. 676.

2. Legacies to the Royal, to the Royal Geographical, and to the Royal Humane Societies, are charitable. — Beaumont v. Oliveira, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 534.

3. Testator bequeathed as follows: “I give to the trustees of Mount Zion Chapel, where I attend, £3,500, and appoint as trustees to the same A. and G.; and I direct that their receipt shall be a discharge to my executors; and the money to be appropriated according to statement appended." There was no statement appended. Held, that the gift was not intended for A. and G. beneficially; that the court could not presume a charitable object in the bequest; and, if not charitable, that the object was so indefinite that the gift must fail. – Aston v. Wood, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 419.

4. Under wills dated between 1716 and 1803, various funds were given for the ministers, and otherwise for the benefit of Protestant Dissenters called “ Presbyterians," at D. There had existed a Presbyterian chapel at D. since 1662, some Baptists had associated with them, and the Baptist element had so increased, that, in 1863, only a few of the members were Presbyterian, and since 1803 the ministers of the chapel had been Baptist. An information was filed in 1863, raising the question who were entitled to these funds, which were proved to have been enjoyed by the minister and congregation for the last seventy years; and in 1865 a congregation was formed by persons claiming to be strict Presbyterians, who now claimed the funds as such. Held, (1) that the use of the term “ Presbyterian " did not amount to a requisition that the particular religious doctrines or mode of church government now claimed to be Presbyterian should be taught or observed; and that, under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 45, the usage for the last twenty-five years must be held conclusive, and that the congregation who had enjoyed the funds must be declared entitled; (2) that, on the evidence, there had been no strictly Presbyterian congregation at D. for the last century, and that the funds would, if necessary, be applied cyprès in favor of the congregation in possession. — Attorney-General v. Bunce, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 563. See MORTMAIN; WILL, 5. CHARTER PARTY. - See FREIGHT, 3; SAIP, 1-3.


COLLISION. 1. The owners of a foreign vessel claimed damages for a collision between their vessel and an English ship, in Belgian waters. The defendants, owners of the English ship, pleaded that the vessel was in charge of a pilot, whom they were compelled by the Belgian laws to take. The plaintiffs pleaded in reply that, by the same laws, the owner of the vessel in fault, though compelled to take a pilot, continued liable for damages. Held, that the reply should be stricken out; that an English court would not enforce a foreign municipal law, and give a remedy in damages in respect to an act which by the English law imposed no liability on the person from whom the damages were claimed. — The Halley, Law Rep. 2 P. C. 193.

2. The Merchant Shipping Act exempts a vessel from compulsory pilotage in her own port. The defendants' vessel took a pilot outside of her own port at a point where pilotage was compulsory, and the pilot brought her into the port. Through the pilot's negligence, she came into collision with the plaintiff's vessel. It was in dispute whether the collision was inside or outside of the port. Held, (per MARTIN, BRAMWELL and CHANNELL, BB. ; KELLY, C.B., dissentiente), that even assuming that the collision was within the port, yet that the pilot having been compulsorily put in charge of the ship, and his duty as pilot not having ended, he was not the servant of the defendants, and they were not responsible for his negligence. — General Stoam Navigation Co. v. British & Colonial Steam Navigation Co., Law Rep. 3 Ex. 330.

3. The owners of a vessel having, by compulsion of law, a pilot on board, are yet liable for the damage caused by a collision, if the master's neglect of duty was conducive thereto. The Minna, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 97.

4. The bailees of a barge which has been injured by a collision, can sue in rem in the Admiralty; but the court will direct that the money awarded as compensation for damages shall not be paid till it has been satisfactorily established that the payment will release the owners of the vessel sued from all claims by the owners of the barge in respect of the collision.- 1b.

5. In a collision cause, the defendant cannot rely on a simple negative, but must state the circumstances relating to the collision. — The Why Not, Law Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 265. See ADMIRALTY, 2; INSURANCE, 1.


COMPANY. 1. T., being a registered holder of five shares in a joint stock company, left the share certificates with her broker. A transfer of the shares to S. purporting to be executed by T., together with the certificates, was left with the secretary for registration. The secretary, in the usual course, wrote to T. that the transfer had been so left, and receiving no answer after ten days, registered the transfer, and removed the name of T., and placed the name of S. on the register, giving S. & certificate that he was the registered holder of the five specific shares. A. bargained for five shares, through brokers in the usual way, and paid the value of the five shares, and the specific five shares were transferred to him by S., and

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A.'s name was put on the register and the five shares delivered to him. Afterwards the transfer to S. was discovered to be a forgery, and T.'s name was ordered by rule of court to be restored to the register. On a case stated; Held, that the giving of the certificate to S. amounted to a statement by the company intended to be acted on by purchasers of shares in the market that S. vas entitled to the shares; and that A, having acted on that statement, the company were estopped to deny its truth; and that A. was, therefore, entitled to recover from the company the value of the shares, at the time the company refused to recognize him as a shareholder, with interest from that time. – In re Bahia & San Francisco Railway Co., Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 584.

2. The articles of association of a company provided that the business should be fixed, determined, and regulated by such rules, regulations, and by-laws as the directors might from time to time make, which should be entered in a book kept for that purpose, and signed by three directors. A by-law so made prohibited certain acts. A resolution authorizing some of such acts was afterwards passed by the directors and entered in their minute book, but not entered in the book of by-laws nor signed by the directors. Per GIFFARD, L.J., that a third person would not be affected by the by-law unless it was proved that he knew it; and, semble, that had he known it, the resolution of the directors would have done away with its effect. Royal Bank of India's Case, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 252.

3. A shareholder in a company, in behalf of himself and the other shareholders, may maintain a bill to set aside an agreement by the company as ultra vires, without joining as defendants any of the shareholders who have assented to the agreement. — Clinch v. Financial Corporation, Law Rep. 4 Ch. 117.


CONDITION. A lease contained a proviso for re-entry in case the lessee or any occupier of the premises should be convicted of an offence against the game laws. The occupier of the premises having been convicted of killing game without a game certificate, the assignee of the reversion brought ejectment. Held, that be could not maintain the action, (per MARTIN, CHANNELL and CLEASBY, BB.), because the condition did not run with the land, and therefore the assignee could not avail himself of its breach; (per KELLY, C.B.), because killing game without a certificate was an offence, not against the game, but against the revenue laws.Stevens v. Copp, Law Rep. 4 Ex. 20. See LEGACY, 1; VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL ESTATE, 2. CONFIDENTIAL RELATION. — See UNDUE INFLUENCE.

CONFLICT OF LAWS. Where an Englishman contracts a debt in a foreign country the provisions of the lex loci contractus do not avail to entitle the creditor to payment of his debt out of equitable assets administered in this country, in priority to other creditors. — Pardo v. Bingham, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 485. . See COLLISION, 1.


CONTEMPT. 1. While a suit was pending to restrain the infringement of a patent, in which one of the issues raised was as to the novelty of the plaintiff's invention, a discussion having arisen in a newspaper as to the merits of the invention, the defendant's solicitor wrote, under an assumed name, a letter, which was published in the newspaper, taking part in the discussion, and alleging facts tending to disprove the novelty of the invention. The plaintiff, thereupon, sent to the editor of the newspaper a letter, which the editor refused to insert on account of its personal imputations, in which he referred to the suit, and suggested that the writer of the letter was an interested party. The editor, not knowing that the writer was the solicitor in the suit, but knowing that he was a solicitor, subsequently published a further letter from him disputing the novelty of the invention. Held, that the solicitor had been guilty of contempt in publishing letters tending to influence the result of the suit. A motion to commit the publisher of the newspaper for contempt was refused, but without costs. Daw v. Eley, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 49.

2. For a newspaper to publish affidavits filed in behalf of the plaintiff in a bill of equity (but not yet before the court), with comments tending to prejudice the plaintiff's case, is a contempt. — Tichborne v. Mostyn, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 55, note.

3. When there is no collusion, a husband will not be committed for his wife's breach of injunction. -Hope v. Carnegie, Law Rep. 7 Eq. 254. See Costs.

CONTRACT. A. applied for workmen to the Free Labor Society, and filled up and signed a form containing the particulars and terms of employment, and his address at S. This form was read over to B. by the secretary of the society, and B. then signed an agreement headed “Free Labor Society," by which he stated that he had accepted employment at S., and agreed that one-half day's wages, “ being his fee to the society for obtaining him the employment,” should be deducted from his wages, and that he would not quit “ the service of his employer" without just cause. Held, that the documents sufficiently referred to one another to constitute a contract in writing signed by other parties within the meaning of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 141, § 9, giving summary jurisdiction to justices in cases between master and servant. — Crane v. Powell, Law Rep. 4 C. P. 123.


CONVERSION. A testator devised real estate to trustees on trust to pay the profits to his wife till her death or marriage, and on her death or marriage on trust for his children who should be then living, and their respective heirs as tenants in common, with a power to the trustees, in their discretion, to sell the real estate, and in event of such sale to divide the proceeds among his children, who should then be living, in equal shares. During the widow's lifetime, one of the children assigned all his personal estate in possession, remainder or expectancy, to A. On the widow's

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