of administration, but in December of the same year he was appointed a Vice Chancellor on the promotion of the late Sir George J. Turner. This office he held for fifteen years, until in March, 1868, he was made one of the Lords Justices of Appeal in Chancery. The new Lord Chancellor has always been held in great esteem and regard both by the bar and public.

The place of Lord Justice of Appeal in Chancery vacated by the promotion of Lord Hatherly, after having been declined by Lord Cairns, has been given to Sir George Markham Giffard, the most recently appointed of the Vice Chancellors, while Mr. W. Melbourne James, Q.C., becomes Vice Chancellor. Mr. John Wickens, of the Chancery Bar, has received the appointment of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. The new Lord Chancellor of Ireland is the Right Hon. Thomas O'Hagan, one of the Judges of the Court of Common Pleas in Ireland.

The new Attorney General is Sir Robert Porrett Collier, who was born 1817, created a Queen's Counsel 1854, and in 1863 was made Solicitor General, and held that office till the Russell-Gladstone ministry resigned in June, 1866. We suppose that it is due to his having held that place, that he owes his present appointment. He seems to be spoken of slightingly, not to say, contemptuously.

Sir John Duke Coleridge is the new Solicitor General. He is the eldest son of Mr. Justice Coleridge, and was born in 1820, and was called to the bar in 1846. In 1855, he became a Queen's Counsel. Mr. Coleridge is not a learned lawyer; indeed, he makes no claim to be a lawyer at all, but he is perhaps the most eloquent and successful advocate at the English bar.

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"Lord Camp

LORD CAMPBELL'S LIVES OF LYNDHURST AND BROUGHAM. bell has had his revenge, perhaps in the most curious form that revenge has ever been taken. It would not suggest itself at first sight to any one, that the most efficient way to pay back old scores on your rivals, or rather those who were too far above you to be rivals, who eclipsed you altogether in the race of life, and hustled, oppressed, and ridiculed you in the obscurity to which you were relegated, is to write a biography of them which it would not be decent to publish while the subjects of it were living, but which is kept ready for their death, and may even do its work although you are dead before them. Yet this is what Lord Campbell has done; and the shaft, long prepared and polished, is at last driven home. . . . Nursing his revenge long, brooding over his subject for years, dealing with personal transactions in which he was himself concerned, possessed by a steady and malignant antipathy of which he was not fully aware, he has brought every power to bear in the execution of the work; and writing from the fulness of his heart, rushing on from topic to topic that really interested him, he has achieved a singular success as a literary artist. Instead of the two lives before us being mere loose heaps of gossip and anecdote, as previous lives from the same pen have been, they are sketches of character, character only imagined to a large extent, though that rather adds to their literary merit, which, for compactness and force of outline and vivid coloring, are rarely excelled by the cleverest novelist. . .

...

"Such being the nature of the book, it would of course be out of place to discuss the character or career of either Lyndhurst or Brougham in connection

with it. We have only their personal careers viewed in the narrowest aspect. We see nothing of Lyndhurst but the self-seeking politician, in pursuit from the first of self-advancement, loving fashion and distinguished society and gay life, but with an ardent ambition to hold the most prominent place in the political scene, using all his knowledge and learning and varied accomplishments as mere counters in the personal game, — careless even of the judicial fame that was in his power, in order that the real end of his life might be reached. The insinuations that he concealed his parentage, turned coat in politics, obstructed for personal ends, measures which he believed of public advantage, and was ever stealthy and cunning, make the character Mephistophelian or demoniac. . . . Of course, Lyndhurst, with all his unscrupulousness and devotion to mean ends, does not answer to this picture. A man of his powers could not but leave a distinct intellectual mark of some sort, and his human qualities of generosity and good nature deserved kindlier treatment. The caricature of Brougham is even more complete. The things which Campbell is concerned with his insatiable vanity, his escapades, his affectation of universality in literature and sciencewere, after all, the smallest parts of a man who was full of intellectual force, who moved England for one generation as it has been given to few men to move it, and some of whose writings will live in spite of the eager voluminousness with which he wrote and spoke. . . . Lord Campbell could not have written a real biography of Brougham, though he might perhaps of Lyndhurst; but he has certainly done so of neither. His book may perhaps be resorted to by future biographers for the sake of personal reminiscences, if the taint of malicious exaggeration, and even malicious invention, will permit them to use it. In other respects, despite the entertainment it may give to those who yet remember something of Lyndhurst and Brougham, and their relations to their biographer, it is a thoroughly bad book."— Spectator.

WASON V. WALTER. — Libel. — Privilege. This was a case of grave constitutional importance. One Wason petitioned the House of Lords for the removal of Sir Fitzroy Kelly, the Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer, charging him with having told a lie. Several members of the House of Lords took part in the debate which ensued on the presentation of the petition, and commented severely on the unfounded nature of the charge, and on the motives of the petitioner.

The Times published a report of the debate, and also articles commenting thercon, whereupon Wason brought a suit against the proprietor of the Times for libel. At the trial, the Lord Chief Justice directed the jury, that if the report was a fair and faithful report, it was privileged; and that if the articles were fair and legitimate criticisms on the debate and subsequent proceedings, they also were privileged. The jury found for the defendant, and a rule was obtained for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, and the case was argued in the Court of Queen's Bench.

The court discharged the rule. Cockburn, C.J., in his opinion, admitted that there was no decision in favor of the claim of privilege, but he sustained it on the analogy of the principle that faithful and fair reports of the proceedings of courts of justice, though the character of individuals may incidentally suffer, are privileged on the ground that the advantage to the community is so great

that the occasional inconvenience to individuals arising from it must yield to the general good.

The court were much pressed with the famous case of Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, in which it was held, that an order of the House of Commons directing a paper, not forming a part of the proceedings of the House, and containing libellous matter, to be printed and sold to the public; and a resolution of the House, that such an order was within its privileges, did not protect the publisher of the paper from libel. The Lord Chief Justice declared his " unhesitating and unqualified adhesion" to that case, but held it to have no application to the present. He admitted that Mr. Justice Littledale and Mr. Justice Patterson had, in Stockdale v. Hansard, denied the advantage of the proceedings in Parliament being made public, but he thought that in giving expression to these unnecessary dicta, they had taken "a very short-sighted view of the subject."

It was also urged that the discussion in the House of Lords, on the bill to amend the law of libel, introduced by Lord Campbell, assumed that the publication of Parliamentary reports was not privileged. The Chief Justice does not deny this. But he replies: "We, before whom this case is now presented for judicial decision for the first time, and who have had the advantage of able and learned arguments at the Bar to assist us, must endeavor to ascertain the law as applicable to the case; and if our minds are satisfied as to what the law is, must decide according to our convictions, undeterred by the authority of great names or the opinions of those who, although our superiors in all other respects, had not the advantage of forensic discussion, or the opportunity of a judicial consideration of the subject; and this is the more necessary, as we observe that one of the main grounds insisted on for resisting Lord Campbell's bill, was that there was no necessity for legislation, inasmuch as no action had ever been brought in respect of the publication of a Parliamentary debate."

Another point made against the claim of privilege, namely, that each House of Parliament does, by its standing order, prohibit the publication of its debates, was disposed of on the ground that such standing order is never enforced.

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The case is one, in fact, which could not in England, in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine be decided other than it was; and yet one hundred, fifty, perhaps twenty-five, years ago, the decision could not fail to have been otherwise. Sir Alexander Cockburn owns as much. He says whatever disadvantages attach to a system of unwritten law, — and of these we are fully sensible, — it has at least this advantage, that its elasticity enables those who administer it to adapt it to the varying conditions of society, and to the requirements and habits of the age in which we live, so as to avoid the inconsistencies and injustice which arise when the law is no longer in harmony with the wants and usages and interests of the generation to which it is immediately applied. Our law of libel has in many respects only gradually developed itself into any thing like a satisfactory and settled form. The full liberty of public writers to comment on the conduct and motives of public men has only in very recent times been recognized. Comments on government, on ministers and officers of State, on members of both Houses of Parliament, on judges and other public functionaries, are now made every day, which half a century ago would have been the subject of ex officio informations, and would have brought down fine and imprisonment on publishers

and authors. Yet who can doubt that the public are gainers by the change, and that, though injustice may often be done, and though public men may often have to smart under the keen sense of wrong inflicted by hostile criticism, the nation profits by public opinion being thus freely brought to bear on the discharge of public duties? Again, the recognition, of the right to publish the proceedings of courts of justice has been of modern growth.”

FEMALE SUFFRAGE. In the case of Chorlton v. Lings, the question whether the names of women could be properly put on the lists of voters for members of Parliament came before the Court of Common Pleas. Mr. Coleridge (now the Solicitor General) appeared in favor of the right of women to vote. Mr. Mellish, Q. C., for the other side. The revising barrister had struck off the name of Mary Abbott from the voting list, and an appeal was taken from his decision. Mr. Coleridge contended that, as matter of law, women had the franchise; that they did, in point of fact, exercise it in ancient times; and that no statute has taken it away from them. He produced several instances of women having executed indentures returning members to Parliament; and also a return in 1 & 2 Ph. & M., executed by Dame Elizabeth Copley, which states that she herself had elected a knight. The learned counsel relied on the fact, that Lord Romilly's Act (13 & 14 Vict. c. 21), § 4, provides, “that, in all acts, words importing the masculine gender shall be deemed and taken to include females, unless the contrary is expressly provided," joined with the fact that, in the Representation of the People Act, 1867, by which the franchise is now regulated, the word 99 man is used. He also cited the case of Olive v. Ingram, 7 Mod. 263, in which it was held, that women might vote in the election of sextons, and might be themselves sextons; Rex v. Stubbs, 2 T. R. 395, in which it was held, that they might be overseers, and for the reason that the only qualification required was that they should be substantial householders; and Reg. v. Crosswaite, 17 Ir. Law (N.S.), 157, in which it was held that the words " every person" included women, and that they might vote in the election of town commissioners under a local act. That decision, it is true, was reversed in the Exchequer Chamber (17 I. Law, 463); but only by four judges against three, so that the majority of the Irish judges were in favor of the right.

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The judges (Bovill, C.J.; Willes, Byles, and Keating, JJ.), after taking time to consider, delivered their opinions seriatim, against the right claimed. The grounds of the decision were, shortly, that Lord Romilly's Act did not apply to the case; and further, that women were under a legal incapacity to vote for members of Parliament. The case is considered very dryly on legal and historical grounds, as it should be; the Chief Justice commencing his opinion with the remark, that "It is quite unnecessary to consider the question whether it is desirable that women should possess the franchise." Mr. Justice Willes, however, cannot refrain from protesting against "its being supposed that the exclusion, or, more properly, the exemption, of women in this respect, was at all founded on any underrating of the capacity of their sex in point of intellect or in point of worth. It would be entirely inconsistent with what is one of the great glories of civilization, the respect and honor that are paid to the fair sex." Mr. Justice Byles, on the other hand, gets rather huffy over the matter.

"I trust their [the Scotch judges'] unanimous decision and our unanimous decision will for ever exorcise and lay the ghost of a doubt which ought never to have made its appearance."

THE JAMAICA CASE. We have at various times noted incidents in the proceedings against Governor Eyre, 1 Am. Law Rev. 594, 757; 3 Am. Law Rev. 185. The criminal proceedings came to an end by the grand jury ignoring the bill; but a Mr. Phillips also brought a civil suit, an action of trespass, against Governor Eyre, for having assaulted, beaten, flogged, wounded, tortured, and imprisoned him. The case was heard and decided on the pleadings in favor of the defendant, on the ground that the legislature of Jamaica had passed an act of indemnity in favor of Governor Eyre and of all others engaged in putting down the insurrection in that island. The Court of Queen's Bench held, that if an act causing personal injury be either enjoined or rendered lawful by the law of the country where it is done, an action cannot be maintained in England in respect of it; and further, that if a wrongful act, inflicting personal injury, is committed in a colony, an act of the Colonial Legislature rendering legal the wrongful act done, subsequently passed before an action has been brought in England, takes away the right of action, not only in the courts of the colony, but also in those of England.

It seems to be taken for granted, both by the friends and opponents of Governor Eyre, that this puts an an end to the suits against him.

PROSECUTION OF THE RITUALISTS. On p. 793 of the second volume of the American Law Review, we gave the result of the judgment of Sir Robert Phillimore, Dean of the Arches, in the case of Martin v. Mackonochie. The learned judge, in spite of the most marked High-Church tendencies, decided against the lawfulness of the use of incense, and of the mixing water with wine in the administration of the communion, and of the elevation of the consecrated elements. But he refused to admonish the defendant against excessive kneeling, holding that this was a matter to be referred primarily to the discretion of the bishop; and he further held, that two lighted candles might be placed on the holy table, during the celebration of the communion, "for the signification that Christ is the very true light of the world."

The defendant, Mr. Mackonochie, it is said, would have rested satisfied with this decision, especially as he was not ordered to pay the costs of the suit, which were very heavy; but the promoter appealed to the Privy Council, and the members of the Judicial Committee who heard the case, and who were the Archbishop of York, Lord Chelmsford, Lord Cairns, Sir W. Erle, and Sir J. Colville, have given judgment against the defendant on all points. The opinion of the court was read by Lord Cairns, and decides that the rubric of the second year of the reign of King Edward VI., sanctioned by St. 2 & 3 Edw. VI., c. 1, regulates the ritual of the Church of England, and according to this rubric the following practices are unlawful:

First. The elevation during or after the prayer of consecration of the paten

and cup.

Secondly. Kneeling or prostration before the consecrated elements.