11. After the day appointed to show cause against a bankrupt's discharge, several creditors who had opposed the discharge, applied for an order to examine the bankrupt. All of these creditors had proved their debts some time before the said day, and the bankrupt had been examined at length by the assignee. No affidavit was filed to show a reason for the examination sought. The order was refused. In re S. Isidor (N.Y. S. D.), 1 B. R. 33.

12. A creditor, to obtain an order for the examination of the bankrupt under § 26, must apply by petition or affidavit duly verified, and show good cause for the granting of the order. — In re J. L. Adams (N.Y. S. D.), 2 B. R. 33.

13. A creditor may apply for the examination of the bankrupt without having filed a specification of the grounds of his opposition to the bankrupt's discharge. — In re A. Baum (N.Y. S. D.), 6 I. R. R. 28.

14. At a meeting before the register to show cause in opposition to the bankrupt's discharge, a creditor has a right to examine the bankrupt without obtaining an order of the court. - In re G. Brandt (N.C. D.), 2 B. R. 76.

15. The register has no power to decide on the competency, materiality, or relevancy of a question put to the bankrupt while under examination. — In re I. Rosenfield (N.J. D.), 1 B. R. 60; s.c. 3 Pitts. L. J. (N.s.) 245; 1 L. T. B. 47.

16. The register must receive and report any testimony offered, though he considers it inadmissible. In re J. A. Koch (N.Y. N. D.), 1 B. R. 153.

17. The practice of a register in conducting an examination was to pass upon every objection, allow the parties to take formal exceptions, and then, at the close of the testimony, on a motion to strike out specified points so objected to, or to admit excluded questions, to certify the questions to the court. The practice was approved. In re S. W. Levy (N.Y. S. D.), 6 I. R. R. 134; In re I. Lyon, ib. 135; In re C. G. Patterson, ib. 157.

18. An objection to a question in the examination of a bankrupt does not raise such a question of law as can be adjourned into court under § 4. — In re S. M. Levy (N.Y. S. D.), 6 I. R. R. 163.

19. When a bankrupt under examination shall be allowed to consult with his counsel is a matter within the discretion of the register. [Citing In re Winsor, 8 Law Rep. 514; Peabody v. Harmon, 3 Gray, 113; Ex parte Parsons, 1 Atk. 204; Ex parte Bland, ib. 205.]— In re E. P. Tanner (Mass. D.), 1 B. R. 59 ; s.c. 3 Pitts. L. J. (N.s.) 244; In re C. Judson (N.Y. S. D.), 1 B. R. 82; In re J. C. Collins (Ky. D.), 1 B. R. 153; In re C. G. Patterson (N.Y. S. D.), 6 I. R. R. 165.

20. After a bankrupt has been examined by his creditors or the assignee, he may be examined by his own counsel. — In re S. B. Leachman (Ky. D.), 1 B. R. 91; s.c. 1 L. T. B. 48; In re S. M. Levy (N.Y. S. D.), 6 I. R. R. 163.

21. A bankrupt is not obliged to answer questions as to business done after the date of filing his petition in bankruptcy, provided the same has no connection with his business prior to said date. — In re I. Rosenfield (N.J. D), 1 B. R. 60; s.c. 3 Pitts. L. J. (N.S.) 245; 1 L. T. B. 47.

22. A bankrupt cannot be compelled to answer a question whether he has since the commencement of bankrupt proceedings lost in gaming any property belonging to his estate. - In re C. G. Patterson (N.Y. S. D.), 6 I. R. R. 166.

DIGEST OF CASES IN BANKRUPTCY.

511

23. A bankrupt may be examined to show that the debt due to the examining creditor was created by fraud. - In re J. A. Koch (N.Y. N. D.), 1. B. R. 153. 24. In proceedings in bankruptcy evidence of fraud in the creation of a debt cannot be introduced by a creditor, for the purpose of showing that his debt would not be affected by the discharge. In re D. Tallman (N.Y. S. D.), 1 B.

R. 122; In re J. S. Wright (N.Y. S. D.), 2 B. R. 57. 25. A bankrupt may decline to answer a question, if the answer would criminate himself. - In re J. A. Koch (N.Y. N. D.), 1 B. R. 153.

26. A bankrupt having said on examination that he does not own the house he lives in, cannot be asked whether his wife owns it; nor if he is asked whether he has not recently been acting as the reputed agent of his wife in business transactions, and has answered that he has not in any matter in which he had any personal interest, can he be compelled to answer the question further. He cannot be compelled to answer questions about the property of his wife or of other persons. In re A. P. Van Tuyl (N.Y. S. D.), 1 B. R. 193.

27. In the examination of H., a bankrupt, a question whether H. had heard his wife speak of selling her house, is inadmissible; but the following questions are admissible: whether H.'s wife kept a bank account; when a horse sold by H. before his failure to a relative was taken from the stable where H. kept him; whether H. recommended his wife to purchase certain property; how long H.'s brother had carried on business at a certain place, and whether such brother was successor to the firm of which H. was a member; what a trustee to whom H. had assigned his property for the benefit of creditors had done with the property; whether such trustee had turned over the property to H.'s brother; when H.'s brother, for whom H. was managing agent, had been in New York last; whether said brother was frequently in New York; and what was the value of the stock in the business of said brother.-In re G. W. Carson (N.Y. S. D.), 2 B. R. 41.

28. A bankrupt ordered to appear and submit to an examination on the application of a creditor, is not entitled to witness fees. In re W. Okell (N.Y. S. D.), 1 B. R. 52; s.c. 3 Pitts. L. J. (N.S.) 232; 1 L. T. B. 32; In re N. A. McNair (N.C. D.), 2 B. R. 77.

29. The bankrupt's wife is not bound to attend for examination, unless the usual fees are paid or tendered to her. In re A. P. Van Tuyl (N.Y. S. D.), 2 B. R. 25.

30. The wife of a bankrupt, when examined, is entitled to the same fees as other witnesses for attendance and travel, and those fees are to be determined by the Fee Bills Act, 1853, § 3, and are to be recovered as in ordinary actions.In re W. Griffen (N.Y. S. D.), 1 B. R. 83.

See AFTER ACQUIRED PROPERTY, 2; ARREST, 13; DISCHARGE, II. 11, 12; FEES, I. 5, 12, 17-20, 28; II. 3; SPECIFICATION, 10; WITNESS.

EXECUTION.

1. Executions taken out against the bankrupt's property by creditors who had no reason to believe him insolvent, are valid liens on the property. In re J. Black (N.Y. S. D.), 2 B. R. 65.

2. The lien under an execution levied on a bona fide judgment, is not discharged by subsequent proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy, and the sheriff

will be allowed to sell under the lien, paying any surplus after the judgment creditor is satisfied to the assignee of the bankrupt, or if no assignee has been appointed, then to the clerk of the court.—In re H. Bernstein (N.Y. S. D.), 6 I. R. R. 222; s.c. 1 L. T. B. 45.

3. The lien under an execution, properly levied by State laws, is not discharged by subsequent proceedings in voluntary bankruptcy, whether the levy be actual or constructive. [Citing Cresson v. Stout, 17 Johns. 116; Van Winkle v. Udall, 1 Hill (N.Y.), 559.]—In re J. P. Smith (N.Y. S. D.), 1 B. R. 169; s.c. 1 L. T. B. 112.

4. If judgment is recovered and execution levied on a bankrupt's estate after the adjudication, but before the appointment of a trustee under § 43, the execution, if not void, ab initio, becomes void by the appointment of a trustee. In re D. B. Williams (Conn. D.), 2 B. R. 79; s.c. 1 L. T. B. 107, 113.

5. Semble, that the court can order property of the bankrupt to be taken from the sheriff who has levied on the same under an execution, and handed over to the assignee; the assignee to sell the same, and the judgment creditor to have leave to apply to be paid the amount of his judgment out of the proceeds of the sale. [Citing Parker v. Muggridge, 2 Story, 334.] — In re F. Schnepf (N.Y. E. D.), 6 I. R. R. 214; s.c. 7 Am. Law Reg. (N.s.) 204; 1 L. T. B. 46.

6. The marshal levied on property of A. which was exempt from attachment or execution under the State laws. Subsequently, A. filed his petition in bankruptcy, and was adjudged bankrupt, but the marshal went on and sold the property. The court ordered the sale set aside. — In re J. H. Griffin (Ga. D.), 2 B. R. 85.

See ASSIGNEE, III. 2, 4; JUDGMENT; SUFFERING PROPERTY TO BE TAKEN.

EXEMPTED PROPERTY.

1. The same property is exempted in involuntary as in voluntary proceedings. In re Ellis (Mo. E. D.), 1 B. R. 154.

2. No partnership property can be exempted under § 14, unless exempted by the State laws. In re J. H. Hafer (Pa. E. D.), 1 B. R. 147; s.c. 3 Pitts. L. J. (N.S.) 389; 25 Leg. Int. 148.

3. It is said that when a firm is adjudged bankrupt, each member is entitled to the full benefits of the exemption out of the partnership assets, unless he has received exemption out of his individual assets. — Ex parte Pennington (Miss.D.), 1 B. R. 187.

4. The "other articles and necessaries," which may be set off to the bankrupt, do not include real estate. — In re A. G. Thornton (N.C. D.), 2 B. R. 68; s.c. 4 Pitts. L. J. (N.s.) 49.

5. A bankrupt, who is a householder, is entitled to have his necessary household and kitchen furniture exempted to any amount not exceeding $500, though his wife owns other household and kitchen furniture as her separate property.— In re Van B. Cobb (Ind. D.), 1 B. R. 106; s.c. 1 L. T. B. 59.

6. If the bankrupt, under a State law exempting property of the value of $100, has selected household furniture to that amount, he cannot have any more household furniture exempted under the Bankrupt Law. [This case is so obscure that it is by no means clear whether the above is the point decided, or what the point was.] In re T. Noakes (Md. D.), 1 B. R. 164.

7. The law of Pennsylvania exempts from execution such property to the amount of $300 as the debtor may elect. This amount is additional to and not included in the exemption of $500, which the assignee may allow, even though the debtor elects under the $300 exemption property of the classes included in the $500 exemption. But the assignee is not bound to allow the whole $500. - In re D. Ruth (Pa. E. D.), 6 I. R. R. 166; s.c. 3 Pitts. L. J. (N.s.) 63; 24 Leg. Int. 356; 7 Am. Law Reg. (N.S.) 157.

8. By § 14, there is excepted from the operation of the act (1) certain kinds of property to a certain amount, and (2) also such other property "not included in the foregoing exceptions" as is exempted from execution by the State laws. Held, that the bankrupt can claim under the second exception only property of a kind different from those kinds included in the first exception. In re M. W. Feely (Pa. W. D.), 3 Pitts. L. J. (N.s.) 291. [The facts are not fully stated; it would seem, however, that $500 worth of household furniture was set off to the bankrupt under the first exception, and that he wished to add a further amount of $300 worth of furniture under the exemption in the State law, which the court refused. Suppose the amount exempted by the State law, instead of being $300, had been $700, would he have been entitled to have had the $700 set off to him? According to the language of this case, he would not, sed quære tamen. - EDS.]

9. If the State law does not exempt money from attachment or execution, and a bankrupt has no assets, except debts due him, he is not entitled to have any of the money collected by the assignee on such debts set off to him under § 14. In re J. H. Lawson (Md. D.), 2 B. R. 19.

10. Where, by a State law, certain real estate of a debtor is exempt from execution, if certain requirements of the law have been complied with, such property is not exempt under the Bankrupt Act, unless said requirements have been complied with. — In re J. W. Farish (N.C. D.), 2 B. R. 62.

11. The vested interest in a fund which will come into possession after the determination of an existing life-interest is, to the amount of $300, exempted from levy and sale on execution or other process or order of court by the laws of Pennsylvania, and is therefore exempt under the Bankrupt Act, in case of a bankrupt domiciled in Pennsylvania. - In re Bennett (Pa. E. D.), 2 B. R. 66; s.c. 25 Leg. Int. 316; 1 Balt. Trans. 21.

12. Property, which would have been exempt from assignment under the Bankrupt Law, was attached on process from a State court, and sold pendente lite. Proceedings in bankruptcy being soon after commenced, the proceeds of the sale were paid over by the sheriff to the assignee. Held, that the bankrupt was entitled to the proceeds. — In re Ellis (Mo. E. D.), 1 B. R. 154.

13. A vendor's lien on land is not affected by the land being set off to the bankrupt owner as exempt from the operation of the Bankrupt Act. In re L. Perdue (Ga. D.), 2 B. R. 67; s.c. 2 West. Jur. 279.

14. On the constitutionality and effect of the exemption clause in the Bankrupt Act, see 6 Am. Law Reg. (N.s.) 721; 7 Am. Law Reg. (N.s.) 55; 7 Am. Law Reg. (N.S.) 180; 3 Pitts. L. J. (N.s.) 152.

See ASSIGNEE, II. 3; III. 5; EXECUTION, 6.

FEES.
I. Register.

1. The register is entitled to no fee for making Form 15, nor for the "order

appointing assignees and notice," nor for making the assignment of the bankrupt's property. In re J. W. Dean (Ky. D.), 1 B. R. 26; s.c. 1 L. T. B. 9.

2. The register is entitled to a fee of $2 for taking the assignee's bond, though the bond was required by the register, and not by the judge, as, semble, it should have been. In re J. W. Dean (Ky. D.), 1 B. R. 26; s.c. 1 L. T. B. 9.

3. The register is entitled to a fee of $2 for issuing a supplemental warrant. — In re J. H. Robinson (N.Y. S. D.), 1 B. R. 49; s.c. 1 L. T. B. 25.

4. The register, for issuing the original warrant, or a supplemental warrant in addition to the fee of $2, is not entitled to a further fee of $1, as for an application for the first meeting, nor to a fee for the certified list of creditors for the warrant. - In re J. H. Robinson (N.Y. S. D.), 1 B. R. 49; s.c. 1 L. T. B. 25. 5. An order for the examination of the bankrupt, made on behalf of a creditor, is neither an "order where notice is required to be given," under G. O. 30, nor is it "an application for any meeting" under § 47, and therefore the register is not entitled to any fee for making it. In re J. Mackintire (N.Y. S. D.), 6 I. R. R. 29.

6. Semble, that the provision in § 47, that a register is entitled to a fee of $1 "for every application for any meeting in any matter under this act," means that when the register applies to the creditors - that is, orders them to meet-he is entitled to the fee. In re J. W. Dean (Ky. D.), 1 B. R. 26; s.c. 1 L. T. B. 9.

7. On an application for discharge, upon which the second and third meetings were ordered to take place on the day appointed to show cause against the discharge, the register was allowed a fee of $1. Semble, if there had been no order for the second and third meetings, he would have been entitled to no fee. In re J. W. Dean (Ky. D.), 1 B. R. 26; s.c. 1 L. T. B. 9. In re J. H. Robinson (N.Y. S. D.), 1 B. R. 49; s.c. 1 L. T. B. 25.

8. Notwithstanding G. O. 25, the Bankrupt Act does not require second or third meetings to be held when there are no assets, or when no debts have been proved. But when a register ordered the second and third meetings to be had on the day appointed to show cause against the discharge, he was allowed a fee of $1 for so doing. — In re J. W. Dean (Ky. D.), 1 B. R. 26; s.c. 1 L. T. B. 9.

9. When the second and third meetings are held on one day, the register is allowed but one fee of $1 for attending them. — In re J. H. Robinson (N.Y. S.D.), 1 B. R. 49; s.c. 1 L. T. B. 25.

10. For attending the "second and third and final meetings" all on the same day, under Form 51, the register is entitled to a fee of only $3. — In re J. W. Dean (Ky. D.), 1 B. R. 26; s.c. 1 L. T. B. 9.

11. Whether a register is entitled to charge $5 for the first day's attendance · of a petitioning debtor before him, quære. At any rate, if there are two cases commenced on the same day before him, he cannot charge more than $3 in each. — In re B. Sherwood (Pa. E. D.), 1 B. R. 74; s.c. 25 Leg. Int. 76; 1 L. T. B. 47.

12. A creditor obtained an order for examination of the bankrupt; the bankrupt appeared, but the attorney for the creditor was not ready, and, at the attor ney's request, the examination was postponed. Held, that the register was not entitled to a fee of $5 as for "a day's service under a special order.” — In re I. Clark (N.Y. E. D.), 6 I. R. R. 206.