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2. A coupon, payable to bearer, cut from a bond and owned by one party while another owns the bond, is still a lien under a mortgage given to secure the bond, and entitles the holder to share pro rata in the proceeds of said mortgage on foreclosure. Miller v. Rutland & W.R.R. Co., 40 Vt. 399. See Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Grat. 750.
See RAILROAD, 6; War, 5.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. If a city, in the exercise of its right to grade highways, creates a stagnant pond on a man's land close to his house, it is liable in damages. — Nevins v. City of Peoria, 41 Ill. 503.
See ConsTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 2; RAILROAD, 5.
NATIONAL BANK. 1. T. owed a national bank $35,000. R. had in the bank a deposit of $44,000. The bank, being insolvent, stopped payment. R. the next day assigned his deposit to T. Held, that by the National Banking Act of June 3, 1864, $$ 52, 50, T. could not set off the deposit against his debt to the bank. Venango National Bank v. Taylor, 56 Penn. St. 14. See Thorp v. Wegefarth, ib. 82.
2. A State tax on shares in National Banks is illegal when the laws allowing the incorporation of other banks tax only the capital of the latter, although there are none of the latter banks in existence. — Hubbard v. Board of Supervisors, 23 Iowa, 130.
NEGLIGENCE. 1. If a traveller, who is able to take care of himself, unnecessarily puts his arm out of a car window while the cars are in motion, and his arm is injured in consequence, his negligence will prevent his recovering against the railroad company, although they were also in fault. — Pittsburgh & Connellsville R.R. Co. v. McClurg, 56 Penn. St. 294.
2. If a passenger in a box car leaps from the same to prevent being carried beyond the station at which the train is then stopping, and which is his destination, knowing that it is dangerous to do so, the railroad company is not liable for the injury so received, although it has made no proper provision for passengers leaving said car. — Evansville & Crawfordsville R.R. Co. v. Duncan, 28 Ind. 441.
3. If a child under five is injured by a train while playing near home on a railroad track, his presence there unexplained is negligence which will prevent his recovering, gross or wilful negligence on the part of the defendant not being shown. — Lafayette & Indianapolis R.R. Co. v. Hoffman, 28 Ind. 287.
4. The passing of a party over a county bridge, with knowledge that it is in an unsafe condition, but without notice to him or the public not to use it, is not such negligence as will prevent his recovering for an injury caused by the giving way of the same. - Humphreys v. Armstrong County, 56 Penn. St. 204. See CARRIER 2, 3; PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. — See CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT;
NEGRO. —See CONSTITUTIONAL Law, 5; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 1;
ORDINANCE. RAILROAD, 5.
PARTNER. A partner has not authority as such to submit partnership matters to arbitration so as to make the award binding on the firm. — Martin v. Thrasher, 40 Vt. 460.
PARTY WALL. See COVENANT, 1.
PATENT. - See ESTOPPEL.
PAYMENT. See SUBROGATION.
PENALTY. See CARRIER, 1.
PRACTICE. See JUDICIARY ACT.
PRESUMPTION. In a suit against the plaintiff's intestate, P., being charged as trustee, admitted a debt due from him to said intestate, but not yet payable. On account of the death of the latter no judgment was rendered against P. The plaintiff sues as said intestate's administrator to recover said debt, relying on the above admission. Held, that the fact that the debt admitted had since become due did not rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case without proof of payment. — Farr v. Payne, 40 Vt. 615.
See CAPTURE; WILL, 3.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
PROXIMATE CAUSE. — See DAMAGES, 1.
RAILROAD. 1. A company's charter authorized it to build a railroad from A. to B., a distance of five miles. A subsequent act authorized an extension of eleven miles, amounting in character to a new enterprise. A disagreeing stockholder applied for an injunction, which was granted. A power reserved by the legislature to alter, amend, or repeal the charter does not apply to this class of cases. Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N.Y. R.R. Co., 3 C. E. Green, 178.
2. Del. & R. Canal & C. & 4. R. & T. Co. v. Rar. & Del. Bay R. Co., 1 C. E. Green 321; ante, 3 Am. Law Rev. 132, RAILROAD, 1, was affirmed on appeal. s.c. 3 C. E. Green, 546.
use and by authority of the General Government, and that the mare was so used. Prayer that the case might be transferred to the United States Court under Act of Congress of March 3, 1863, § 5. Held, that no “color of authority exercised under the President of the United States or of any act of Congress” was shown. Prayer refused. — Short v. Wilson, 1 Bush, 350. See Eifort v. Bevins, ib. 460. A like prayer was granted in Edwards v. Ward, 2 Bush, 606.
RES ADJUDICATA. - See INTERPLEADER.
SALE. H. contracted with plaintiffs for four barge-loads of oil, about 2,000 barrels, at $4.50 a barrel. The barges were furnished by H., and were partially filled, when the barges and oil were burned. Held, that the property had not passed, and the loss fell on the plaintiffs. — Rochester Oil Co. v. Hughey, 56 Penn. St. 322. See CONVERSION ; SLAVERY, 2; STAMP, 4; TENDER; WAREHOUSEMAN.
SAVINGS BANK. See GIFT.
SECESSION. The laws of Mississippi were not affected by the Ordinance of Secession, nor by the deposition of the State magistrates in May, 1865, nor by their restoration in the autumn of that year. An indictment, found Dec. 4, 1865, for a larceny committed May 30, 1865, was sustained. — Harlan v. State, 41 Miss. 566.
SHIP. — See GENERAL AVERAGE.
SLAVERY. 1. Slavery was not abolished in Mississippi until the passage of the Ordinance of the State Convention of 1865. — McMath v. Johnson, 41 Miss. 439.
2. A warranty on a sale of slaves that they “are slaves for life,” is not broken by their subsequent emancipation. Neither did the ordinance of emancipation affect such previous sale, but the vendor can recover the whole purchase money. - Bradford v. Jenkins, 41 Miss. 328. See Scott v. Scott, 18 Grat. 150.
3. A woman who had been a slave until emancipated by the Constitutional Amendment, but who had lived with a male slave as his wife for sixteen years, gave her note for $384, Jan. 8, 1866. April 19, 1866, she obtained a certificate legalizing her marriage, under a State law, and when sued on said note pleaded coverture. Held, that as against the plaintiff the legalization did not relate back. - Stewart v. Munchandler, 2 Bush, 278. See WAR, 2.
SOLDIER. — See WILL, 1.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. On a lease from W. to H. was indorsed “that at the expiration of the said term, H. shall have the privilege of purchasing the whole of said premises ” at a fixed price. H. brought a bill demanding a marketable title. W.'s wife refused to join in the conveyance, but no collusion with her husband was shown. Held, that W. was not bound to indemnify H. against his wife's claim, and specific performance was refused. — Hawrally v. Warren, 3 C. E. Green, 124.
STAMP. 1. That part of the Internal Revenue Law which attempts to take away the remedy on certain private contracts in writing if they are not stamped, is unconstitutional. — Hunter v. Cobb, 1 Bush, 239.
2. The maker of a promissory note through whose fault an insufficient stamp was affixed to it, cannot object to its being received in evidence. — Jacquin v. Warren, 40 Ill. 459.
3. That a note was not stamped until after it was issued is not a defence as against a bona fide holder for value. - Blackwell v. Denie, 23 Iowa, 63.
4. One who has received a promissory note from which a stamp was accidentally omitted, for goods sold to the maker at the time of making it, may recover for the goods if he cannot on the note. — Wilson v. Carey, 40 Vt. 179.
5. Even if the want of a stamp renders a note inadmissible in evidence under a special count, yet under the common counts in assumpsit the note is admissible to explain testimony that a settlement was made between the parties at the date of said note, and that an amount was found due equal to that for which said note was given. — Israel v. Redding, 40 III. 362; Jacquin v. Warren, ið. 459.
6. A deputy collector stamped an appeal-bond after the same was filed, without leave of the court. The act was not authenticated by the collector's seal, nor were his inability and the deputy's authority proved. Appeal dismissed. Brown v. Crandal, 23 Iowa, 112.
7. An appeal was taken from the judgment of a justice of the peace, but the transcript was not stamped. Held, that the appellant should have been allowed to stamp it, and show that his omission to do so was not with intent to evade the provision of the act of Congress. Quære, whether said provision be constitutional. — Harper v. Clark, 17 Ohio St. 190. See Disbrow v. Johnson, 3 C. E. Green, 36.
8. The record of an insufficiently stamped chattel mortgage is not notice to a purchaser of the chattels, nor are his rights affected by the collector's restamping the mortgage after his purchase.
Evidence that when such mortgage was executed the mortgagor received only such a part of the amount secured as the stamp would cover, and that it was agreed that on payment of the rest a new stamp should be affixed, and that the rest was never paid, is inadmissible as against the purchaser. McBride v. Doty, 23 Iowa, 122. STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF. - See BETTERMENT, 2; DOMICILE; EXEMPTION,
3; NationAL BANK; RAILROAD, 5 ; TAX; TENANT IN COMMON; WHARF;
WILL, 2. STATUTES OF UNITED STATES. — See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4, 5; JUDICIARY
ACT; MISSISSIPPI RIVER; NATIONAL BANK; REMOVAL OF SUITS FROM STATE TO UNITED STATES Cor rs; STAMP; Tax.
STAY LAW. A deed of trust to secure a debt provided for the time and terms of a sale. A Stay Law was passed forbidding sale under such deeds before a certain date. Held, that it was unconstitutional. — Taylor v. Stearns, 18 Grat. 244. See Pexrose v. Erie Canal Co., 56 Penn. St. 46, 49.