any fixed spot in the enclosure, but carried on their business there in competition with each other, betting with those of the public within the enclosure desirous of betting with them, they were held to use no house, office, room, or other place for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto within the meaning of the above section. But in the new case the defendant habitually resorted to the archway for betting of the worst description, into which no element or consideration of sport entered. There was not the palliation of any interest in sport entering the mind of the bookmaker or his customers. Hawke v. Dunn (66 L.J.R. Q.B. 364) is neutral with regard to this, the latest, case.

Horne v. Raine (104 L.T. 556) is another sporting case, and shews that a person may be convicted under sect. 30 of the Game Act, 1831, for trespassing in search of game, when in fact there was no game to search for. This decision is concomitant with Reg. v. Brown (24 Q.B.D. 357) which overruled the old-fashioned ideas developed in Reg, v. Collins (L. & C. 473), that if a person puts his hand into the pocket of another with intent to steal what he can find there, and the pocket is empty, he cannot be convicted of an attempt to steal because the attempt could not have been carried out.

The decision of Stirling, J., in In re Du Cane and Nettlefold's Contract (33 L.J. 342) involved a principle foreshadowed in In re Keck and Hart's Contract (33 L.J. 173), where the question of a compound settlement arose. These two cases may now be deemed to have given a quietus to the inconvenient and tiresome rule laid down in In re Tibbitt's Settled Estates ([1897] 2 Ch. 149), which in its turn followed In re Meade's Settled Estates ([1897] 1 T.R. 12), a decision emanating from the sister Isle.

Reg. v. Edwards (42 S.J. 472) supports Reg. v. Jones (42 S.J. 82), and illustrates the power of sect. 13 of the Debtor's Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict., c. 62), in stopping the loophole through which dishonest persons have formerly escaped punishment. The celebrated Jeremy Diddler was wont to frequent oyster stalls, in days long gone by, eat his fill of oysters, and then lament that unhappily he was not blessed with sufficient of this world's anodyne to pay for them. What could be done to such a person? He had not stolen the oysters, nor had he in obtaining them made use of any false pretence. It was simply a debt. Sect. 13 of the above Act, however, says that any person shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour if in incurring any debt or liability he has obtained credit under false pretences, or by means of any other fraud. Here the position is changed. Jeremy Diddler and his many followers are always guilty of obtaining credit by means of false pretences, if the jury are of opinion that he or they had no intention of paying when he or they incurred the liability.

In Kruse v. Johnson (42 S.J. 509) the Queen's Bench Division supported the validity of a bye-law of the parish of Leeds, in Kent, under which the conductor of an openair religious service had been convicted of singing in a public place within fifty yards of a dwelling house after having been required to desist. It will be noticed that there is a wide difference between this judgment and that in Johnson v. Mayor of Croydon (16 Q.B.D. 708), where it was provided that no person (save the military) should sound or play upon any musical instrument in any of the streets in the borough on Sundays. This bye-law was unreasonable and ultra vires, and by far too elastic. In Kruse v. Johnson, however, the offence was limited by the bye-law to a certain area, and required the prohibition of some person aggrieved before the bye-law could be acted

on.

Noise, when undue and unreasonable, has always been a nuisance at Common Law. It would be very desirable if the Statute 35 & 36 Vict., c. 61, which regulates the user of steam whistles and trumpets in manufactories, could be extended to all noisy instruments and to all places.

Roper v. Knott (33 L.J. 244) is a decision of considerable importance. A strong Court-Lord Russell of Killowen, C.J., Day, Wills, Grantham, Wright, Kennedy, and Channell, JJ.-overruled a Court, consisting of the late Lord Coleridge and Matthew, J. The decision construes sect. 52 of 24 & 25 Vict., c. 97 (the Malicious Injuries to Property Act, 1861). In 1889 the last-named Judges, in Hall v. Richardson (54 J.P. 345), held that the servant of a milk dealer, who having spilt some of his master's milk filled in water to make up the quantity, and sold the dilution to customers, had not wilfully or maliciously damaged the property of his master under the above section. This is now overruled. There is no necessity for an animus on the part of the defendant to injure someone. It is sufficient if the act which caused the damage to the property was done with the knowledge that the consequence of the act would cause the damage. This decision of course in no way militates against the exception contained in the above section concerning the fair and reasonable supposition of a defendant, that he has a right to do the act complained of.

The case of Anderson v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Co. (33 L.J. 197) is well worthy of consideration, for it presents us with an anomaly seldom known to our Law. It differs from the older case of Baily v. De Crespigny (L.R. 4 Q.B. 180), because here the covenant was entered into after the passing of the Act by which the Railway Co. were authorised to acquire compulsorily certain lands. including the house, afterwards assigned to the plaintiff,

On the other hand, in Baily v. De Crespigny, the plaintiff was lessee to defendant for a term of years of a plot of land. Defendant retained the adjoining land and covenanted that neither he nor his assigns would during the term erect any but ornamental buildings on a certain paddock fronting the demised premises. But a Railway Co., acting under Parliamentary powers, took the paddock compulsorily and built a station on it. There the defendant succeeded, because the impossibility created by Statute excused him from the observance of his covenant.

Sumpter v. Hedges (42 S.J. 362) is a very interesting case, and well supported by authority. It shews that where a special contract is entire, the party who may be unable to carry out his duty cannot claim on a quantum meruit, unless the other party is willing to treat it as a new contract. The decision follows Munro v. Butt (8 E. & E. 738), and further shews that where a special contract has been only partly performed, the mere fact that the past performance has been beneficial is not enough to render the party benefited liable to pay for it; it must be shewn that he has taken the benefit of the past performance under circumstances sufficient to raise an implied promise to pay for the work done notwithstanding the non-performance of the special contract. Thus, if a builder contracts to build and complete a house for a sum payable on completion, and he partially builds the house, but fails to complete it, the fact that the owner of the premises has resumed possession of the premises does not entitle the builder to sue either on the special contract or for work and labour; for the special contract has not been performed, and the mere fact that the owner has taken possession of his premises does not afford an inference that he has dispensed with the special contract and made a new contract to pay for the work actually done, SHERSTON BAKER.

Reviews.

[SHORT NOTICES DO NOT PRECLUDE REVIEWS AT GREATER LENGTH IN SUBSEQUENT ISSUES.]

The Government of India, being a Digest of the Statute Law relating thereto, with Historical Introduction and Illustrative Documents. By Sir COURTENAY ILBERT, K.C.S.I., Assistant Parliamentary Counsel to the Treasury, sometime Law Member of the Council of the Governor-General of India. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1898.

This is a lucid, useful, and well-ordered book. But we may explain at the outset to the English, as distinguished from the Anglo-Indian, reader what it is and what it is not. Its title, "The Government of India," might, perhaps, be taken by some to mean the manner, system, and principles by which India is governed; but such is not the meaning. The Government of India here means an institution, namely, the authority which is set up within Indian limits by various Acts of the British Parliament for the governing of India, and also the authority which by the same Parliament is set up in England for controlling the Government in India. The main part of the book, the kernel of it indeed, consists of a digest of the statute law, that is the Acts of Parliament relating to this authority in India and this authority in England. The statutes refer to these two subjects, and to these alone. Though the book may incidentally throw some light on the enacting of laws and the administering of justice in India; yet this is not an essential object, and its elucidation is not necessarily to be attempted. The administration of justice in India is a vast subject, impossible of treatment in a book of this character. This administration derives its force from the legislative and from the executive authority. For it, as well as for other State departments, fiscal, political, and so forth, a great mechanism has been formed under the general title of "the Government of India "—which has grown during several generations, and has become, perhaps, the largest Imperial organization now existing among the nations. The present book presents a digest