the winter session of the existing Congress, with a fair prospect of success. These two acts are supported by an overwhelming mass of testimony from civil servants all over the country. There are but very few such, who, in answer to a list of over thirty searching interrogatories, fail to recognize either the crying nature of the evil, or the probable efficiency of the proposed reform. The testimony of J. M. Connnell, assessor of internal revenue at Lancaster, Ohio, is given in full against the measure, and forms perhaps the most convincing argument in its favor. The first bill established a Board of Commissioners; the present one a new executive department, with the Vice-President at its head; and they are authorized, through a system of competitive examination, to remodel the civil service, by "opening admission to all; by giving their appointments to the most worthy, and in such a way as to secure the best attainable talent; " or, looking at the negative side of their office, in the words of Mr. Jenckes, "to extirpate, eradicate, or, in plain Saxon, dig up, root out, and throw aside any, every, and all kinds of patronage in appointments to the public service."

We cordially and earnestly commend the report and its accompaniments to the perusal of all lawyers, legislators, and friends of America.

The Civil Practice Act of the State of California, including Amendments of 1868; with Notes and References to the Decisions of the Supreme Court. General Laws germain to the Practice Act, and Standard Forms applicable thereto; and an Appendix, containing the Acts concerning Forcible Entries and Unlawful Detainers, and the Rules of the Supreme Court, and of the District Courts of the City and County of San Francisco. Edited by CHARLES H. PARKER, Esq. San Francisco: H. H. Bancroft & Company. 1868.

THE Civil Practice Act of California appears to be founded on the New York Code; and, like that code, it has required a vast number of decisions to explain its meaning. In the present book, the different sections of the act are given in order, and after each, in smaller type, the decisions which have been made under it. In States where the rules regulating practice have not been reduced to a set system, the preparation of such a book would be more difficult, but would be of even greater advantage. In many of the Atlantic States, lawyers have to struggle along as best they may, without any books of practice at all, or, at best, with such as were never very good, and are now antiquated; and they would be grateful indeed to any one who would do for them what Mr. Parker has done for the profession in California. We cannot pretend to judge how thorough the editor has been in the collection of the authorities; but we can say that the plan is excellent, and the statement of the decisions pointed and concise.

In § 200 of the Act, we notice the following provision: "In an action on a contract or obligation in writing, for the direct payment of money, made payable in a specified kind of money or currency, judgment for the plaintiff, whether the same be by default or after verdict, may follow the contract or obligation, and be made payable in the kind of money or currency specified therein; and in an action against any person for the recovery of money received by such person in a fiduciary capacity, or to the use of another, judgment for the plaintiff, whether the same be by default or after verdict, may be made payable in the

same kind of money or currency received by such person." We should be glad to see such a provision in the laws of all the States, unless indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States, by deciding the Legal Tender Act unconstitutional, should render such a law unnecessary.

A Digest of the Decisions of the Federal Courts, from the Organization of the Government to the Present Time. By FREDERICK C. BRIGHTLY, Esq.

Philadelphia: Kay & Brother. 1868.

THIS is a large volume of nearly a thousand pages, but each page is compact of sound and solid matter. The preface says, "Great care has been taken to make the Digest as complete and perfect as possible. Every authority has been examined; in no case has the syllabus of a reporter been implicitly relied on, but the case itself has been collated, and the result given in the author's own language.

"In addition to the regular reports of the Supreme Court of the United States, from Dallas to 5th Wallace, inclusive (with some cases in the 6th volume), of the Circuit and District Courts, and of the Court of Claims, with many cases scattered throughout the earlier State Reports, [the writer] has, at great expense and trouble, collected upwards of two hundred volumes of law periodicals and magazines (many of them extremely rare), containing decisions of the various Federal courts, not elsewhere reported, all of which he has incorporated in his work." The author goes on to explain the reasons which have induced him to include this last class of cases. We assure him no apology is necessary; it is this very class of cases which, from their difficulty of access, ought to be the most carefully gleaned for insertion in such a digest.

Mr. Brightly has long been favorably known to the profession by his excellent Digest of the United States Statutes, upon which the only criticism we ever heard passed, was that it was too good, as it tempted the lawyer to rely upon it too exclusively, without having recourse to the statutes themselves.

There are two methods, two good methods, in either of which a case may be inserted in a digest: either the facts of the case may be succinctly stated, and the decision of the court appended, or the proposition of law which is the ratio decidendi may be extracted. There is no absolute rule for the use of the one method or of the other; but a good reporter will use either or both, according to the case with which he has to deal. Yet it is impossible that the natural bent of the digester should not incline him to the one rather than to the other, and it is the second method that Mr. Brightly evidently prefers; and we confess that we share his preference. The gist of a case is much more readily caught by the reader in this way than when he has to extract it from a statement of facts; this method does, in short, for the reader, what he would otherwise have to do for himself; and again, it insures a great diminution of bulk. It is only thus that Mr. Brightly has been enabled to compress his work into one volume,—an immense convenience. The learned author has evidently a great gift at extracting the real point of a case, as any one may see who will compare one of his neat and pithy statements of law with, for example, the irrelevant and rambling sentences which stand for head notes in the late Mr. Howard's Reports.

This taste, however, for generalizing, this preference for broad propositions of law, rather than for particular statements, though it marks a higher order of

mind, and leads, on the whole, to more satisfactory results, has yet its temptations and its dangers. There is a temptation to slur over facts which do not easily submit themselves to generalization, or to prefer a generalization which is really less effective than a more particular statement; and there is a danger of stating propositions too broadly, of laying down doctrines which, for lack of the necessary limitations, are misguiding, if not false; and to these temptations Mr. Brightly has sometimes yielded, and into these dangers he has sometimes fallen.

To illustrate what we mean, we will take a few instances from one of the recent volumes of the decisions of the Supreme Court, the 5th of Wallace.

The case of The Bird of Paradise, 5 Wallace, 545 was thus: A vessel was chartered for a voyage; the charter party provided that part of the freight should be paid by the charterer's acceptance, at six months from the sailing of the vessel, and the remainder by like bill at three months from the date of delivery, or in cash under discount, at the charterer's option. The charter party also contained this clause: "The ship and her freight are bound to this venture." The acceptance at six months from the sailing was dishonored, and the charterer was insolvent before the arrival of the vessel at the port of discharge. Held, that the ship owner had a lien for that part of the freight to be paid by said acceptance, but not for the remainder.

Now, it may be difficult to state the point decided in this case, in the form of a general proposition; but Mr. Brightly does not meet the difficulty, but avoids it when he gives us this:

"What amounts to a waiver of the lien for freight. The Bird of Paradise, 5 Wall. 545." This is proper for an index, hardly for a digest.

Again, in Packet Co. v. Sickles, 5 Wallace, 580, the court held, that a contract, to pay for the right to use a patented article on a certain boat for twelve years, if the boat should last so long, was within the Statute of Frauds, as an agreement not to be performed within a year. Mr. Brightly gives the case thus: A contract by which performance is to run through a term of years, but which by its tenor may be defeated at any time before the expiration of the term, is one not to be performed within a year,' within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds, and must be in writing." Here it seems to us a particular statement would have the advantage in brevity, clearness, and precision.

A more serious matter arises under Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wallace, 290.

The 470th and 471st sections in Mr. Brightly's Digest are as follows: "470. The States have power to enact Statutes of Limitation, barring actions on judgments rendered in other States. Bank of Alabama v. Dalton, 9 H. 522; Bacon v. Howard, 20 H. 22.

"471. A State legislature cannot bar an action on a judgment obtained in another State, by a Statute of Limitation. Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290."

Here it would seem as if Christmas v. Russell directly overruled the preceding cases; but in reality it does nothing of the sort. The point really decided in Christmas v. Russell was this:

A State statute which enacts that "no action shall be maintained on any judgment rendered by any court without this State, against any person who, at the time of the commencement of the action in which such judgment was or shall be rendered, was or shall be a resident of this State, in any case where the cause

of action would have been barred by an act of limitation of this State, if such suit had been brought therein," is unconstitutional. This case is perfectly consistent with the previous cases. In those, it was decided that a State might impose a Statute of Limitations on all suits in its own courts; in this, that it cannot insist on having its Statute of Limitations regarded by the courts of other States. Here Mr. Brightly's love of brevity has led him into a palpable mistake.

We make these remarks in no spirit of fault finding. Mr. Brightly's reputation is strong enough to bear criticism.

One word more: we do not suppose that Mr. Brightly has been able, in so large a book, to avoid all errors of the press; but we have referred to its pages from the table of cases, and from the reports, backwards and forwards, for some hours, and we have not detected a single misprint, or one wrong citation.

A Digest of the Reports of the United States Courts, and of the Acts of Congress, from the Organization of the Government to July, 1868. Comprising the Reports of the United States Supreme Court, those of the Circuit and District Courts, and of the various Territorial and Local Courts established by the United States; together with the leading provisions of the Statutes at Large, and important Auxiliary Information upon the National Jurisprudence. Vol. III. In which titles of importance or special character have been edited or revised by Hon. DAVID MCDONALD, Hon. N. K. HALL, HENRY DUTTON, LL.D., GEORGE GIFFORD, Esq. The whole compiled by BENJAMIN VAUGHAN ABBOTT and AUSTIN ABBOTT. New York: Diossy & Company. 1868.

THIS third volume of Abbott's United States Digest has come to our hands too late for us to make that thorough examination of it which we could wish, and to compare it carefully with Mr. Brightly's similar work. We have spoken of the two former volumes (1 Am. Law Rev. 732, and 2 Am. Law Rev. 534); one more will apparently complete the work.

Mr. Brightly's Digest has the advantage of being comprised in one volume, and of being the work of one mind; the Digest of the Messrs. Abbott, on the other hand, states the cases with more fulness. We should be inclined to recommend the former to those who have the reports themselves at hand, the latter to those who have not. The typographical devices by which Messrs. Abbott's Digest is distinguished are very ugly, but very convenient. The plan, too, of noting the date at which, and the circuit in which, a case was decided, thus: 3rd Circ. (Pa.) 1821, Griffith v. Bradshaw, 4 Wash. C. Ct., 171, is good, and the brief statements of the Acts of Congress, though hardly amounting to “leading provisions of the statutes," have a greater value than we at first gave them credit for; so, too, the plan of giving the chief authorities relied upon by the courts in giving their decisions. In short, this work is as full and complete as it could be made, and yet retain its character as a digest.

Digest of Fire Insurance Decisions in the Courts of Great Britain and North America. By H. A. LITTLETON and J. S. BLATCHLEY. Second Edition. Revised and Enlarged. By STEPHEN G. CLARKE, Counsellor at Law. New York: Baker, Voorhis, & Company. 1868.

In the preface to the first edition of this work, which was published in 1862, the authors say they have attempted to include "all the decisions on the subject

cases,

of insurance against fire pronounced in the Courts of Great Britain and North America, from the earliest times down to the latest reports." They add, "We have examined 2,576 volumes, and have attempted to give abstracts of 930 which are embodied in 1,525 sections." The present editor has "carefully examined every volume of reports published in this country or Great Britain since the former edition appeared, and also a few volumes of prior date accidentally omitted from that edition." There is an increase of 316 cases and 691 sections over the former edition. We notice that the table of reports cited includes the very latest publications.

This is one of a class of special digests which will multiply as the mass of the common law becomes more and more unwieldy, and we anticipate, before many years, digests on all heads on which we now have text books. For students, text books will always be necessary; but for the practical lawyer such digests as the present are far more useful, and, when carefully done, far more trustworthy, than text books, unless the text books be the work of such minds as, in the present days of great business and large fees, seldom find time to enrich the literature of the law. And if business men and insurance agents will persist in attempting to be their own attorneys, they had much better use this book, from which they will at any rate gain a wholesome sense of the uncertainties of the law, than the manuals got up for their special benefit, and whose glittering generalities lead them so often into the quagmires of litigation.

Cases decided in the Court of Claims of the United States at the December Term for 1866; with the Rules modified and adopted since the December Term for 1865, and the Recent Acts of Congress relating to the Court. Reported by CHARLES C. NOTT and SAMUEL H. HUNTINGTON. Vol. II. Washington: 1868.

By far the greater part of the decisions in this volume are in cases arising on transactions during the late war; many of them on contracts made by commanding generals on alleged "public exigencies," without the usual precautions against fraud required by law and by the customs of the service. It is instructive to observe, that those generals who seemed to have been the fondest of this display of vigor in "cutting red tape" are not those whose military services have generally been considered the most valuable to the country.

In Curtis v. United States, p. 144, it is held, that a statute limiting the amount of an expenditure is notice in law and in fact to the contractor, that the officers of the Government cannot exceed the prescribed bounds. If these are exceeded, the contractor must be deemed to have gone beyond the fixed limit at his own risk.

In Dennis v. United States, p. 210, it is decided that the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction of marine torts.

The longest and most interesting case in the volume is Meade v. The United States, p. 224, where the court decide that a release by the United States to a foreign government (in part consideration of a cession of territory) of an indebtedness to an American citizen, acknowledged to be valid, is a taking of private property for public use. But where a special mode for obtaining compensation is designated by statute or by treaty, or where the power of assessing