contracts made in relation to the traffic in slaves, void; as well those which were prior, as those subsequent to, the prohibition. By HYMAN, C.J., on the ground of the warranty. ILSLEY and LABAUVE, JJ., dissenting. Prior contracts were not made void. The warranty did not cover the case. — Wainright v. Bridges, 19 La. An. 234. See Austin v. Sandel, ib. 309; Addison v. Seltoon, ib. 352; Tate v. Fletcher, ib. 371; Gremillon v. Crousillac, ib. 377; Courtney v. Shelton, ib. 380; Posey v. Martingley, ib. 384; Halley v. Haffner, ib. 518. See Bass v. Freeman, 36 Ga. 435.

4. Defendant, who had hired a slave for several years of the plaintiff, was notified by the slave, in 1864, to pay her in plaintiff's stead. Defendant, who was living within the lines of a United States military post, where the slave had taken refuge, did so. Held, that the plaintiff could recover the hire of the slave notwithstanding (SHACKELFORD, J., dissenting). - Gholson v. Blackman, 4 Coldw. 580.

1. A bill in equity, to compel specific performance of a bond, in common form, conditioned to convey to the complainant a parcel of land in the country upon payment of a stipulated price, on or before the first day of April, which alleges that the complainant, after the date of the bond, occupied and improved the land with the respondent's knowledge and consent, and tendered the price with interest on the twenty-fifth day of May next ensuing, is not demurrable uponthe ground that time was of the essence of the contract. - Barnard v. Lee, 97 Mass. 92. See Gentry v. Rogers, 40 Ala. 442.

2. A party wall, creating a reciprocal easement for support between adjoining estates, is not such an encumbrance as will enable a purchaser who was not notified of its existence to resist specific performance. - Hendricks v. Stark, 37 N.Y. 106.

See LEASE.

STAMP.

1. A petition to set aside the probate of a will, is not "process by which a suit is commenced" within the United States revenue laws, and does not require a stamp. - Sowell v. Sowell, 40 Ala. 243.

2. The Act of Congress, approved June 30, 1864, so far as it requires a stamp to be affixed to legal process issuing from the State courts, is unconstitutional.

By BYRD, J.: Said act does not apply to process issuing from State courts.— Smith v. Short, 40 Ala. 385.

3. The provision of U. S. St. of 1866, c. 184, § 9, that no document, not duly stamped, shall be used as evidence in any court until the requisite stamps shall have been affixed thereto, applies only to courts of the United States. — Carpenter v. Snelling, 97 Mass. 452; Lynch v. Morse, ib. 458.

4. The omission to affix a revenue stamp to an instrument requiring one, will not invalidate the instrument, unless such omission be with intent to defraud the government of the stamp duty. - Holyoke Machine Co. v. Franklin Paper Co.,

97 Mass. 150;. Vorebeck v. Roe, 50 Barb. 302; Blunt v. Bates, 40 Ala. 470, 475.

5. An attorney, to whom a note, executed at a place within the United States at which no collection district was at that time established, was intrusted for collection, had such an "interest" in the same as authorized him to affix a stamp to it, to protect his client, before Jan. 1, 1867. The neglect to cancel it till afterward does not matter.- Blunt v. Bates, 40 Ala. 470.

STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF..

See CHATTEL MORTGAGE, 2; CORPORATION, 4; DIVORCE, 4, 5; FACTOR; LOTTERY; NATIONAL BANK, 1; RAPE, 2; REGISTRY OF DEEDS; REPEAL; STAMP; SUNDAY, 5, 6; TAX, 6, 7; TIME; WILL, 2.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
STATUTES OF UNITED STATES.

See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See BANKRUPT LAW; CONFLICT OF FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITY; EMBEZZLEMENT; ILLEGAL CONTRACT, 2; JURY, 1; NATIONAL BANK; PARDON; REMOVAL OF SUIT; STAMP; TAX, 3, 4, 6.

STAY LAW.

1. The Act of the pretended legislature of Louisiana, approved June 10, 1863, suspending prescriptions, was void, and is not a good reply to a plea of prescription.-White v. McKee, 19 La. An. 111. But see Watson v. Stone, 40 Ala. 451. 2. The Alabama Stay Law is not unconstitutional as to contracts made before its passage (WALKER, C.J., dissenting). - Ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 77.

STEAMBOAT.-See ILLEGAL CONTRACT, 2.

STOCK.-See CONTRIBUTION, 1; ILLEGAL CONTRACT, 1; TRUST, 1.
STOCKHOLDER. See CORPORATION, 1, 2, 5; ESTOPPEL, 2.

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

Brown agreed to buy flour for plaintiffs, and received from them money for it; defendants, at his request, no price being agreed on, sent him sixty-five barrels to a station on the railroad, to go to plaintiffs at R., and directed the agent at the station to load it; about the time the loading had been completed, but before the car had been closed or moved from the siding, the defendant, hearing that Brown was insolvent, came to the station, directed the loading to stop, and had the flour shipped on his own account to Philadelphia. Held, that the court should have charged that the delivery was not final and complete until the flour had passed wholly out of the power of the defendant into the possession of the railroad company for transportation to R. Completeness of delivery to Brown, who rati fied the retaking by the defendants, was not a test of delivery to plaintiffs.— Wenger v. Barnhart, 55 Pa. 300.

1. A will made on Sunday is valid in Pennsylvania. - Beitenman's Appeal, 55 Pa. 183.

2. A note payable on demand, bearing date of a Sunday, but made and delivered on a previous day, is not within the Sunday laws. - Stacy v. Kemp, 97 Mass. 166.

3. An agreement was made, and a note, in pursuance of it, signed and indorsed on Sunday, but the note was not delivered till Wednesday. Held, that the note was valid, and not within the Sunday law. - Fritsch v. Heislen, 40 Mo. 555. See Dickinson v. Richmond, 97 Mass. 45.

4. F. bought fifteen mules of A. on Sunday, and gave his note for the price on that day. Two of the mules were not delivered until Monday. Held, that there could be no recovery on the note, but that A. could recover for the two mules delivered on Monday. - Foreman v. Ahl, 55 Pa. 325.

5. Gathering seaweed which will probably float away before Monday is not a work of necessity which may be done on Sunday.- Commonwealth v. Sampson, 97 Mass. 407.

6. Neither is finishing the hoeing of a field suffering for want of it, and which defendant's business would not allow him to attend to on Monday. - Commonwealth v. Josselyn, 97 Mass. 411.

It is not a defence to an action against the surety of a bank teller alleged to have embezzled funds of the bank, that the cashier has not daily examined the settlements of the cash accounts, and otherwise superintended the affairs of the bank, and that the directors have not unexpectedly counted the teller's cash book and the cash, as required by the by-laws, although the embezzlement is alleged to be the result of this neglect. - State v. Atherton, 40 Mo. 209. See CONTRIBUTION, 2; LEGAL TENDER, 1.

TAX.

1. A State cannot tax liquors imported from foreign countries, while in the hands of an importer and in the original casks. Otherwise, of liquors imported from other States of the Union (BYRD, J., dissenting as to this), or when foreign liquors leave the importer's hands, or when the original casks are broken.-Hinson v. Lott, 40 Ala. 123.

2. A commission merchant received goods from citizens in other States, sold the same in the form in which they were received, and accounted with his principals for the proceeds, less his commissions. In an action for a tax on the gross amount of such sales, held, that said tax was unconstitutional. - State v. Kennedy, 19 La. An. 397.

3. Certificates of indebtedness issued under the Act of Congress of March 1, 1862, are not exempt from State or municipal taxation. They are mere acknowledgments of pre-existing indebtedness, and are not instruments necessary for the carrying on of the Government.

Semble, said certificates are not covered by any of the exemption clauses in the acts of Congress. But if they are, such clauses are of no force, as the exemption, when it exists, is constitutional, not legislative.-People v. Hoffman,

37 N.Y. 9.

4. So, legal tender notes, issued under the Act of Congress of Feb. 25, 1862, are not exempt. — People v. Board of Supervisors, 37 N.Y. 21.

5. A tax on the franchise of a corporation, e.g., a savings bank, is not void because part of that franchise is the right of investing in United States bonds, which have been invested in accordingly. - Monroe Savings Bank v. City of Rochester, 37 N.Y. 365.

6. A State may sue in a circuit court.

A circuit court may enjoin a revenue officer from collecting a tax not warranted by the Act of Congress (citing Cutting v. Shook, before NELSON, J.).

The Internal Revenue laws of Congress, subject" corporations" owning railroads, &c., to a tax. Held, that a State was not a corporation within the meaning of the acts (June 30, 1864, March 3, 1865). — State of Georgia v. Atkins, 35 Ga. 315.

7. A tax of one half mill on each one per cent of such dividend or profit was chargeable by law on the capital stock of companies on which a dividend or profit should be made or declared of six per cent or more. A corporation began with $100,000 capital, which was increased to $1,000,000 out of its profits, the increase being invested in improvements, but not formally divided among the stockholders. A dividend of six per cent was declared, on which a tax was paid. Held, that the $900,000 increase was liable to tax. — Lehigh Crane Iron Co. v. Commonwealth, 55 Pa. 448.

8. Plaintiff transferred to defendant a lease dated Dec. 1, 1860, and containing a proviso that the lessee, and all persons to whom the leasehold interest should be transferred, should, whilst the owners and holders of said interest, pay off and discharge all taxes or assessments by the city of St. Louis. By a special city ordinance, approved March 31, 1860, a new pavement was ordered for the street adjoining the let premises. This work was by law a charge on the adjoining property, and a special tax was authorized to be laid thereon when the work was completed. The work was not completed, nor the assessment made, until Dec. 23, 1860. Plaintiff was compelled to pay the assessment. Held, that the work became a charge on the property at the date of the assessment, and that he could recover of his assignee. Anderson v. Holland, 40 Mo. 600. See ASSUMPSIT, 2, 3; BAVARIA.

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TELEGRAPH.

1. A telegram ordering the purchase of stock was sent from L. to New York by a through line, prepaid. The nature of the message appeared on its face, and the sender also notified the operator that he should look to the company for damages if they failed to send it. The message never arrived, and the stock was bought under a later order, having advanced in value from the time when the first order should have arrived to the time of purchase. Held, that the telegraph company were liable, and that the advance was the measure of damages. - United States Telegraph Co. v. Wenger, 55 Pa. 262.

2. Action for the conversion of a barge, alleged to have been let for use only as a receiver, by using it for transportation, whereby it was sunk. Plaintiffs had sent this telegram: "You may have barge Globe for $400 until Oct. 1. Rent payable, 1st July, and 1st Oct. March 19th, 1860. Penfield, Day, & Co." Evidence that an oral bargain was made on the 17th, restricting the

use as above, but leaving the price to be settled later, was objected to on the ground that the telegram was the only legal evidence of the contract. Held, that it might be shown that the telegram was not intended to set out the whole contract, but only a single term of the same, and that the other terms might be shown aliunde. Also, that if the contract was as alleged, the action lay; but that, if there were no restrictions on the use of the barge, defendants were only liable for negligence. Judgment of Supreme Court reversed. -Beach v. Raritan & Delaware Bay R.R. Co., 37 N.Y. 457.

TENANT AT WILL.

A tenant at will is estopped from denying his landlord's title without surrender of the leased premises, or eviction by title paramount or its equivalent. - Towne v. Butterfield, 97 Mass. 105.

1. One who, before the rebellion, was duly admitted to and practised in a court of the United States, and who has received a full pardon from the President, and taken the oath of amnesty, may resume his practice in said court without taking the oath required by the Act of Congress of January 24, 1865. Such requirement, as to him, is unconstitutional. - Ex parte Law, 35 Ga. 285.

2. The test oath cases, 4 Wall. 277, 333, followed. - Murphy & Glover Test Oath Cases, 41 Mo. 339.

3. The Missouri Constitution of 1865 requires a test oath of past and present loyalty to the United States as a condition precedent to voting. Held, that this is not an ex post facto law or a bill of pains and penalties.-Francis P. Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63. See State v. Woodson, ib. 227; Murphy & Glover Test Oath

Cases, ib. 339.

TIME.

By a statute, notice must issue to the alleged keeper of intoxicating liquors seized on a search warrant within twenty-four hours after the seizure. Held, that Sunday was to be excluded in reckoning the twenty-four hours.- Commonwealth v. Certain Intoxicating Liquors, 97 Mass. 601.

See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 1.

TOWN.-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 2.

TRADE MARK.

Plaintiff purchased from his brother, E. Howe, Jr., a patentee, a license to use the patented combination in the manufacture of sewing machines. He stamped his machines with the word "Howe," as a trade mark. Semble, per SUTHERLAND and CLERKE, JJ., that he could acquire a right to the exclusive use of said trade mark, as a manufacturer of sewing machines, even as against his brother. Howe v. Howe Machine Co., 50 Barb. 236. See Rogers v. Taintor, 97 Mass. 291.

TREES.-See REGISTRY OF DEEDS.