« PreviousContinue »
Held, that the secretary of a corporation organized under that law was not a servant within said section. · Cotin v. Reynolds, 37 N.Y. 640.
5. A complaint in a New York court alleged that “ defendant is a stockholder in the said Mechanics' Bank” (in Georgia), “and that, under and by virtue of a law or laws of the said State of Georgia, said defendant is liable," without averring that such a law was in force at the time the debt was contracted, and without showing that the liability was founded on a contract, and not a penal provision of a statute. Held, on demurrer, that the liability must be presumed to arise from such a penal provision. By CLERKE, J. – Winter v. Baker, 50 Barb. 432. See Branch v. Roberts, ib. 435.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3; CONTRIBUTION, 1; ESTOPPEL, 2; NOTICE; Tax, 5–7.
Costs. — See ATTORNEY; Trust, 2. COURT MARTIAL. — See CONFLICT OF FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITY, 1.
COURTS OF STATES. In an action on a judgment alleged to have been rendered by “the Circuit Court of Kent County, State of Michigan,” held, that judicial notice would be taken of the fact, that the circuit courts of the several States are courts of general jurisdiction (DOWNER, J., dissenting).- Jarvis v. Robinson, 21 Wis. 523. See PROBATE; REMOVAL OF SUIT. Courts OF UNITED STATES. See REMOVAL OF SUIT; Tax, 6. COVENANT. — See DEED; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2.
CREDITOR. — See AssIGNMENT. CRIMINAL LAW. - See AUTREFOIS Acquit; CONFESSION; CONFLICT OF
FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITY, 1; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 3; EMBEZZLEMENT; FORGERY; JUDICIAL ACT; JURY; LARCENY; MURDER ; RAPE; REPEAL; VARIANCE.
CRUELTY. — See DIVORCE.
CUSTOM. The only liability excepted in a bill of lading given by defendants being "dangers of the river,” held, that a custom which would exempt them from loss by robbery could not be shown. — Boon v. Steamboat Belfast, 40 Ala. 184. See INSURANCE, 2.
DAMAGES. 1. L. delivered stone to H., a forwarder, to be sent by a common carrier to Saginaw, and there delivered to the agent of the American Express Co., with directions to deliver the same to the purchaser on payment of the price. H. forwarded the goods without the instructions, and they were delivered to the purchaser, who was insolvent, before payment. Held, that H. was liable to L. for the price of the stone. — Hutchings v. Ladd, 16 Mich. 493 ; s.c. more at length, ante, 2 Am. Law Rev. 775. 2. In an action for a breach of contract to deliver stoves, &c., to plaintiff
, who was to sell and account for them at a stated price, keeping any excess of the proceeds over said price, plaintiff proved the difference between the agreed price and the market value. Defendant offered to prove that plaintiff must have
DELIVERY. — See CONSIGNOR; FRAUD; SALE, 1; STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.
DESERTION. — See DIVORCE, 3.
DISCRETION. — See Trust, 1.
DIVORCE. 1. A suit for a divorce a vinculo, brought in the name of a lunatic wife by her prochain ami, cannot be maintained. — Worthy v. Worthy, 36 Ga. 45.
2. To a libel for divorce, the defendant recriminated adultery. It was proved that, since his marriage to defendant, the libellant had married another woman, and occupied the same house and bed with her for several days. Held, that evidence of the second wife and a physician, to prove that he did not and could not have connection with her, was inadmissible. — Clapp v. Clapp, 97 Mass. 531.
3. Withdrawal by a wife from her husband's bedroom to another in the same house, and unjustifiable refusal to have sexual intercourse with him for five years, are not desertion, within the statute giving a divorce for that cause. - Southwick v. Southwick, 97 Mass. 327.
4. By statute, a divorce may be granted when either party “shall have become an habitual drunkard.” The complainant married the defendant, knowing him to be an habitual drunkard at the time of the marriage. Held, that the case was not within the statute. — Porritt v. Porritt, 16 Mich. 140.
5. Cruelty, to be a cause for divorce, must be such as to cause at least a reasonable apprehension of injury to the life, limb, or health of the libellant, if the parties should live longer together. — Bailey v. Bailey, 97 Mass. 373; Odom v. Odom, 36 Ga. 286. See CONFLICT OF Laws, 1.
DOMICILE. Defendants had their domicile in one parish, and, to avoid the dangers of the war, removed to another parish, where one of them traded in cotton, and both of them voted once or twice. It was the constantly declared intention of both to return to their former residence. Held, that they had not changed their domicile. - Folger v. Slaughter, 19 La. An. 323.
Donatio Causa MORTIS. One fleeing from the rebel conscription in East Tennessee was under a sufficient apprehension of death to make a valid donatio causa mortis (MILLIGAN, J., dissenting). — Goss v. Simpson, 4 Coldw. 288.
DOWER. — See INCUMBRANCE.
DRAFT. The War Department rules, under which a draft was made in 1863, were valid ; and the Draft Commissioners appointed by the Governor of a State, and the Governor himself, when engaged in enforcing the draft, pursuant to said rules, were officers of the United States.
Persons who conspired to resist, and resisted, the draft, were guilty of “ levy.
opened, a sufficient number to make the count correspond: the inspectors neglected this duty. Held, that the election was not thereby made void. — People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283; same case more fully stated, ante, 2 Am. Law Rev. 574. See 3 Am. Law Rev. 142.
EMANCIPATION. — See SLAVE, 2, 3.
EMBEZZLEMENT. The fraudulent conversion, by a person in the employ of a national bank, of property of individuals deposited in such bank, is not punishable by any statute of the United States, and may therefore be punished under a State law.
The taking of such property by such a person, and sending it out of the State as collateral security for the taker's own debt, is a fraudulent conversion, although at the time the taker intended to restore it, in specie, before it was found to be missing. (A portion of said property was sold, and never restored.) — Commonwealth v. Tenney, 97 Mass. 50. See LARCENY.
EMINENT DOMAIN. 1. A freight company for loading and unloading freight, &c., is not for public uses, and the right of eminent domain cannot be used in its favor. — Memphis Freight Co. v. Mayor, &c., of Memphis, 4 Coldw. 419.
2. A railroad company cannot use land, taken by eminent domain, for other than public uses; as for the deposit of dirt, &c., not connected with the efficient use of their right of way. — Lance's Appeal, 55 Pa. 16. EQUITY. — See CONTRIBUTION, 3; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2; LEASE ; PROBATE;
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE; Tax, 6.
ESTOPPEL. 1. In a second action for flowing land, the same embankment, &c., being shown to exist which caused the previous damage, the defendant is estopped by the prior judgment against him to deny his liability for the injury, although its extent is to be determined by new proof. — Plate v. N.Y. Central R.R. Co., 37 N.Y. 472.
2. In an action against the maker of notes given to a corporation for stock, and by it indorsed to plaintiff, a bona fide holder, the defendant is estopped to set up that the corporation has no legal existence, because not organized within the State granting the charter. — Camp v. Byrne, 41 Mo. 525.
3. When a defendant is estopped by his representations to deny, as against the plaintiff, that he indorsed the note sued on, the plaintiff may recover the whole amount due on the note, although his actual damage in relying upon the representation was less. — Fall River N. Bank v. Buffington, 97 Mass. 498. See TENANT AT WILL.
EVIDENCE. 1. A proposal to compromise is not admissible as evidence against the party making it, unless some fact or distinct liability is admitted in the offer. — Pike v. Doyle, 19 La. An. 362.
2. “What did the deceased usually earn ?” is a proper question in an action