pleased with the elegant little book before us. It is beautifully gotten up, with flexible binding, like a pocket-book, small but clear type, a succinct head-note for every section, notes of cases at the foot of each page, and a very full and carefully prepared index. The pains taken to make the references to the cases complete seem to be very great; and we observe also with pleasure that the original text of laws subsequently incorporated in the Code is generally given; a feature which every lawyer will value. We can only say, in short, that the book speaks for itself. It cannot but be very useful.

The Quarterly Journal of Psychological Medicine and Medical Jurisprudence. Edited by WILLIAM A. HAMMOND, M.D., Professor of Diseases of the Mind and Nervous System in the Bellevue Hospital Medical College, &c. Vol. III. No. 3. July, 1868. New York: D. Appleton & Co. London: Trübner & Co. 1868.

THERE are many excellent things in this number: discussions on the soundness of the too common belief that suicide implies insanity; an essay on the legal consequences of insanity; several interesting cases throwing light on some points in medical jurisprudence; and the like. But we cannot consider the contribution of Dr. Horatio R. Storer one of those excellent things. It is characterized by such intemperateness of expression, such heat, such puerile volubility, that it seems to us not to deserve a place among so many serious and thoughtful essays on medical jurisprudence. Some of our readers may recollect that, in our April number (2 Am. Law Rev. 543), we had occasion, in a notice of the January number of Dr. Hammond's Journal, to remark on Dr. Storer's article on the law of rape; and that we could not help commenting on the offensive tone of superiority, and the entirely needless display of temper, exhibited throughout his essay. In our July number (2 Am. Law Rev. 743), we very briefly adverted to a reply to the views advanced by Dr. Storer, by a lawyer of New York, Mr. Stern. Here we see what may be called Dr. Storer's replication, and a most extraordinary thing it is. We have no room to go into the subject-matter of the discussion; but we may remark, that, while it is a perfectly fair subject for argument, there is nothing in it calling for any thing but a sober and sensible treatment from any rational and educated man. What sort of a treatment it gets from Dr. Storer may be gathered somewhat from the title of his article, which runs as follows: "A Consideration of the More Remarkable of the Remarks by Counsellor Simon Stern, upon the Law of Rape." (The unfortunate man having appended "counsellor at law" to his name, the above effective metathesis is the result.) Ex pede Herculem. Dr. Storer appears, all through his article, to labor under intense excitement and indignation, all wholly unnecessary, but extremely amusing. He is "compelled" by "the importance of the question involved" "to show that" Mr. Stern's "remarks are, in the main, irrelevant, contradictory of themselves, and illogical." He "exposes" "three more of the knots" in his "flimsy and confused tissue of contradictions." Nor is he content with thus belaboring Mr. Stern. He pitches into the profession generally: An "oversight of inherent flaw in one's own argument, in anxiety to defend a cause that had been espoused, would seem," he says, "characteristic of many eminently legal minds." Whether a man who writes about a grave question of law in this vein is in a fit state of mind to discuss the subject usefully, the legal profession may judge. In our

opinion, Dr. Storer had better leave these embarrassing topics for some more unexciting theme. It would seem that the consideration of these subjects, however matter of fact they may seem to a lawyer, produces a tumult in his sensitive breast. We should advise him to defer another blast until he is quite sure that he can keep cool.

Reports of Cases in Law and Equity, argued and determined in the Supreme Court of Georgia, at Milledgeville, December Term, 1866. With an Appendix, containing Several Cases decided by the Honorable John Erskine, in the Circuit and District Courts of the United States for Georgia. To which is prefixed a Table of Cases reported in the first thirty-one volumes of the Georgia Reports, and afterwards cited in one or more of said volumes. Volume XXXV. By LOGAN E. BLECKLEY, Reporter. Atlanta, Ga. 1868.

MR. BLECKLEY ends his labors as reporter with this volume, and has shown his conscientious industry by prefixing to it the table mentioned in the titlepage. This is most useful; and it is only to be regretted that, whenever new reports appear, a similar index to the cases cited in them is not added as a matter of course. The index to the present volume also is remarkably complete.

The Georgia Reports are equal to the average of our State reports. If they are not above that mark, we think it is in part owing to the small number of judges; a matter which is alluded to in connection with another State (Nevada) in this number. When it is considered under what interruptions and difficulties the law must have been practised for the last few years in several of the Southern States, it is matter of surprise that their courts should have maintained so high an excellence as is to be observed. It is still more gratifying to notice that in these pages there is little, if any, of the misplaced and turgid rhetoric to which some American judges are too prone. There is a touch of bathos in Heard v. State, pp. 169, 170, and a doubtful figure in Riley v. Martin, p. 139, where the abolition of slavery is likened to "the flaming sword placed at the east of the garden of Eden, at Adam's expulsion, turning every way towards the community." But these, we believe, are all.

We have only space to refer to one or two cases here; the next Digest will contain all of general interest.

Ansley v. Anderson, p. 8, was as follows: A. sold goods for Confederate money, for and at the request of B., who, mistaking his legal rights, refused to accept the proceeds when tendered him. A. thereupon deposited the amount to his own credit in his general bank account, and notified B. that it was subject to his order at any time. Confederate money became worthless, and B. now ratifies the sale and demands the value of the proceeds at the time of the sale. Held, that he could not recover. The loss was not owing to negligence of A., but to the nature of the proceeds themselves. Fulton Bank v. Marine Bank, 2 Wallace, 252, was distinguished. Harris, J., dissented, on the ground that A., by mixing the specific proceeds with his general balance, had converted them to his own use; that the proceeds were not really subject to B.'s order, and so not at his risk. This is a close case, and the reasoning of the dissenting judge is hard to answer. But look at it this way: A. was ordered to barter goods for a certain other commodity, of a kind known to be in the market and circulating at fixed valuations. Before tender, A. surely was only bound to furnish B. the

amount and kind of the commodity ordered, not any specific bills. B. surely could not have objected to the tender on the ground that the bills were not those received, though of the same kind. Now, A. always had in his storehouse, in this case his bank, the commodity of the amount and kind he was directed by his principal to procure, and was always ready to deliver the same to him. The commodity, not being called for, perished by inherent defect. Why should the agent be liable? He was ordered to procure, not specific bills, but bills to a certain amount, and this he did.

To put contracts made during the war on a fair basis, an ordinance of the Convention of 1865 wisely provided that either party to such a contract, which was not yet executed, might give in evidence, in any suit for the enforcement of the same, the consideration and value thereof at any time, and the intention of the parties as to the particular currency in which payment was to be made, and the value of such currency at any time; and that the verdict and judgment should be on principles of equity. Held (waiving discussion of the legislative power of the Convention), that said ordinance did not impair the obligation of contracts. Slaughter v. Culpepper, p. 25. It is certainly desirable that such an ordinance should be upheld, if possible. The results of some of the decisions noted in a late number of our Digest -Title "Confederate Money" (ante, Vol. II. pp. 694, 695)-must be distressing and unjust in the extreme. See, also, Baily v. Milner, p. 330. Adams v. Brooks, p. 63, wisely upholds the principle of stare decisis, in the face of doubts of the correctness of the original decision. Our courts are not apt to err on the side of too much respect for precedent.

The opinions of the circuit and district judge, Erskine, in the Appendix, are all on questions of great moment and interest. Ex parte Law, p. 285, decided before Ex parte Garland, 4 Wallace, 333, held, that the test oath required from attorneys of the national courts was unconstitutional.

State of Georgia v. Atkins, p. 315: A State may sue in a circuit court; and it is not a "corporation," within the United States Internal Revenue laws. Baily v. Milner, p. 330: A note given in consideration of Confederate money is void. See Scudder v. Thomas, p. 364.

United States v. Athens Armory, p. 344: A full pardon granted and accepted prior to the seizure of property or the institution of any proceeding to condemn it, is a bar to a judgment of condemnation under the Confiscation Acts.

Such are some of the points which Judge Erskine discusses with learning and industry. Altogether, this little volume contains more interesting matter than many of twice its size.

Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Second Circuit. By SAMUEL BLATCHFORD, Judge of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Volume IV. New York: Baker, Voorhis, & Co. 1868.

THIS Volume contains the cases decided in the Second Circuit from March, 1857, to September, 1861. Four years have passed since the third volume was published, and the latest case in the present volume is seven years old. We trust greater speed will be used in publishing the later decisions. Several of the cases here reported have already appeared in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, where they were taken on appeal.

We notice several cases of interest in this volume. In Brownson v. Wallace, p. 465, it was held, that a court of the United States sitting in New York could not regard letters testamentary or of administration granted in another State, and such letters give no authority to sue in such court.

In The Union, p. 90, and in The White Squall, p. 103, are interesting discussions of the power of a Court of Admiralty to re-arrest a vessel for the same cause of action on which she has been once arrested and delivered up on bail.

In The Yuba, p. 352, it was held to be no objection to a recovery on a bottomry bond that the repairs were made before the loan of money to pay for them was effected.

In Silliman v. Hudson River Bridge Co., p. 74, the constitutionality of the act of the legislature of New York, authorizing the construction of a bridge over the Hudson River at Albany, was considered, and an opinion pronounced by Nelson, J., against the validity of the act. On p. 395, Hall, J., delivered an opposite opinion, and an injunction was refused. The case was then certified to the Supreme Court of the United States. That court being equally divided, the decree of the court below was affirmed, and the bridge was built.

In United States v. Collins, p. 140, creditors of the Collins steamship company had obtained executions in the State Courts of New York, and were proceeding to sell the steamers Atlantic and Baltic. The United States applied for an injunction to restrain the sale, claiming to have liens on the steamers by virtue of certain mortgages given for moneys advanced to build the steamers. It was held, that if the United States had a lien, the creditors had a right to sell the vessels subject to the lien, and a doubt was expressed whether the United States Courts, could enjoin the State Court. There are also many interesting Collision, Charter Party, and Revenue cases.

Of Judge Blatchford's merits as a reporter we need say nothing. He is already well known to the profession, and has fully sustained in this volume his well deserved reputation for carefulness and ability.

United States District Court Reports. Second Circuit. By ROBERT D. BENEDICT. Vol. I. No. 1. New York: Baker, Voorhis, & Co.

1868.

THIS is the first number of a volume which, we trust, will be followed by many more, and which the profession should not allow to be discontinued through want of patronage. The decisions of the most important district in the country — the Southern District of New York- have been reported from 1827 to 1850, except for the years from 1837 to 1843. This number begins with a case decided in September, 1865, and ends with one decided in December, 1866. The publishers propose to give full reports of the cases in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York (into which the old Southern District has been divided) and to include selected cases from the other districts which shall be of importance.

The reports of Blatchford & Howland, Olcott, and Abbott were chiefly confined to admiralty cases, and had necessarily a limited circulation. Now, however, the jurisdiction of the District Courts is greatly increased. It extends to questions arising under the Internal Revenue Act, the National Banking Act,

and the Bankrupt Act. This fact makes their decisions of interest and importance to every practising lawyer, and should greatly extend the circulation of the reports.

The number now before us contains several interesting questions. The Steamer City of Dublin, p. 46, presents a point of great practical importance to merchants. The libellants imported a case of braid composed mostly of gold tinsel, designed for the manufacture of ladies' hats. The vessel arrived on the 17th of September, and proceeded at once to discharge. Through the fault of the delivery clerk the case of braid was sent to a public store, and was not delivered to the libellants until the 20th of October. The braid at this time was in as good condition as when received, but on the 5th of October, the season for disposing of the article to the trade ended, and its market value was less by more than fifty per cent than it was at the time it should have been delivered. It was held, that this difference could be recovered as damages. On p. 89 is an interesting case under the law of 1851, limiting the liability of ship owners. On p. 15 is a case in regard to the power of the court to release property upon bail, when seized for a breach of the Internal Revenue Act. There are also several cases of Salvage, Collision, and Admiralty Practice.

His head-notes are accurate and con

Mr. Benedict has done his work well. cise, and his statement of facts sufficiently full. In cases in rem he has adopted the proper mode of citation at the head of each page, and has followed the same plan in a few instances at the commencement of the case. In more than half the cases, however, he has given the names of the libellants. A suit in rem should be cited simply by the name of the rem, and so good an Admiralty lawyer as Mr. Benedict should know the usage and conform to it.

Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin. With Tables of the Cases and Principal Matters. By O. M. CONOVER, Official Reporter. Volume XXI. Containing all the cases decided before the September Term, 1867, and not previously reported. Madison, Wis. 1868.

THIS is quite an interesting volume, in a good series. There is more of a legal atmosphere about the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, we should judge, than in some longer established tribunals.

We give two or three cases, taken somewhat at random, as there is more matter of interest than we have room to refer to here.

In Klauber v. American Express Co., p. 21, plaintiff's goods, not being secured in cases or by any waterproof covering, were injured by rain in their transfer from the cars to the wagon of the defendant, a common carrier, and thence to defendant's office. Held, that defendant was liable for the damage.

In Boorman v. American Express Co., p. 152, a receipt for goods exempted the carrier from all liability for loss or damage of any package for over fifty dollars, unless the just and true value thereof was stated in the receipt. It seems to have been held, that this would exempt him in the specified cases from losses by his own negligence. But see, on this point, Prentice v. Decker, 49 Barb. 21; Limburger v. Westcott, 49 Barb. 283; American Digest for present number, title "Carrier," 2, 3.

Pfeil v. Higby, p. 248, does justice, at the expense, perhaps, of logic; though,