the testator's wearing apparel which the lord of the manor might select. This was not assented to. An important question of law was, whether in the absence of custom a lord of the manor could compel an applicant to pay money instead of a heriot? Here the only heriot that could be given was clothing, inasmuch as the deceased was not the absolute owner of the stock or the business. The deceased had no jewels. Unfortunately this point as to whether the lord's claim to a heriot could be satisfied with a gift of clothing in lieu of the best beast or money was not decided, the case being settled on the foregoing point of practice. The general rule is that on the death of a copyholder the lord can claim the best beast or best chattel whether consisting of a jewel or piece of plate, or anything else, or can seek some pecuniary gift in place of them. Heriots, as is well known, were formerly a tribute to the lord of the manor, of the horse or habiliments of the deceased tenants, "in order that the Militæ Apparatus might continue to be used for the purpose of national defence by each succeeding tenant." When military tenures declined, the heriot became commuted for the tenant's best beast or best chattel, or, in default of them, to pay a money fine. Heriots from freeholders are now rare, but heriots from copyholders are not so. Novelists like to write about this kind of feudal service, as shown by the following dialogue in "Edwin Brothertoft," by T. Winthrop :-"It was in my lease,' said Sam, ' to pay a mare colt every year over and above my rent, besides a sixyear old mare for a harriet, whenever the new heir came in.' Heriot, I suppose you mean, Sam.'"

Authorities to Sign Contracts.

The fact that an owner of property places his house upon. the books of a firm of public-house brokers does not give them any authority to sign a contract of sale on behalf of the owner. The owner of such property might give

particulars of the house to a dozen different brokers, and they could not all be authorized to enter into and sign contracts of sale. In this case of Wilkins v. Bennet, the plaintiff had sought to recover £500 damages for breach of a contract to sell a public-house, but for the defence it was contended that the public-house brokers, who signed the contract of sale on behalf of the defendant (the vendor), were not authorised so to do, and the Queen's Bench Division supported this view. The facts shewed that the defendant, being the proprietor of a tavern and desirous of selling it, placed it upon the books of a firm of publichouse brokers, and they were told at the same time who the defendant's broker was, as he had one of his own, but the defendant agreed to pay them £100 in the event of their introducing a purchaser. The plaintiff had, it appeared, been taken down to view the house by the public-house brokers with a view of his purchasing it, and the defendant signed a document giving the plaintiff the option of purchasing it for £12,500 within 10 days. The plaintiff subsequently attended at the office of the publichouse brokers and signed a contract for the purchase of the house for the sum named and paid a deposit. The contract was signed by the public-house brokers on defendant's behalf, but they did not immediately inform the defendant of that fact. Defendant argued that some considerable time elapsed before he heard of the signing of the contract and the payment of the deposit, and in the meantime he had sold the house elsewhere at a higher price. On the deposit being returned to the plaintiff, he sought to recover damages for non-completion. Mr. Justice Bigham considered, however, that the fact that the defendant had placed his house upon the books of this firm of public-house brokers did not give them any authority to sign a contract of sale on behalf of the defendant. The fact of offering an agent a sum of money on introducing a purchaser did not give them an authority to sign anything.

The case went, therefore, in favour of the defendant. It was pointed out that no doubt the reason why the publichouse brokers failed to inform the defendant of the signing of the contract was that they themselves doubted whether they had authority from the defendant to act on his behalf. The defendant's story, that he had not heard of the contract until long after the plaintiff's option had expired, was therefore accepted, and also that he (the defendant) had in the meantime sold his public-house to someone else.

Repairs to Tied Houses and Assessments under Schedule A. Is schedule A the proper schedule under which to assess income tax in respect of tied houses owned by a brewery company? This was the point in the case of Brickwood and Co. v. Reynolds. There the appellants contended that the assessment should be under schedule D, when they could deduct the whole cost of repairs, whereas, under schedule A, only one-sixth of the gross income could be so deducted. Both the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal held that the assessment was rightly made under schedule A, and the brewers could not make the deduction claimed. The brewers had an assessment made against them of £20,900 under schedule D in respect of profits of their trade. They claimed to have this assessment reduced by an amount expended by them in repair of the licensed houses owned by them, and let to tenants, after deducting one-sixth of the annual value of such houses under schedule A. The brewers, it appeared, had, in order to increase their business, bought the licensed houses from time to time and had let them to tenants on the condition that the tenants bought all their beer from the brewers. The brewers, therefore, earned their profits in some measure through selling their beer to the tenant of these tied houses, and the profits were of course increased in that way. All these profits were included in the assessment. It was, however, on the question of repairs on which the

disputants could not agree. All repairs to the tied houses were done by the brewers. The houses were occupied by their tenants in part for their trade and in part for their residence. The repairs were done to both parts of the houses. The contention of the brewers was that the owning and letting of these houses was a part of their business by which their profits were partly earned. The repairs, too, were a necessary outlay without which the profits would not be earned, and this outlay was a proper deduction to be made in estimating the balance of profits. The Inland Revenue Commissioners being upheld by the Divisional Court, and the latter by the Court of Appeal, it must be taken that the expense of the repairing tied houses cannot be deducted.

Misprints in Legal Books.

A curious misprint in legal text-books has been brought to light in a case heard by his Honour Judge Selfe at Deal County Court. A resident of Sutton lost a number of fowls from his yard, and, suspecting the thief to be a fox, set up a spring gun, which shot a dog belonging to another resident of the same parish, In resisting a claim for damages, it was contended for the defendants that the act of setting up a gun was perfectly legal, as, according to "Addison on Torts," a "gun or trap" could be set. On the other side, counsel quoted "Chitty's Statute Law," which gave the word as "gin or trap." His Honour, having consulted a third authority, found the word to be "gin" and not “gun," and, in giving judgment, said the case had been the means of discovering a very serious misprint, which, if not brought to light, might have led him to give a different decision to what he was about to pronounce; the setting up of a spring gun was an illegal act, and, defendants being liable for the consequences, he awarded the plaintiff £5 and costs.

T. F. UTTLEY.

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Reviews.

A NEW SERIES OF CRITICAL REVIEWS CONCERNING NEW LAW BOOKS OR BOOKS CONNECTED WITH THE LAW, AND NEW

EDITIONS OF OLD BOOKS.

Of the making of law books there is no end: and the supply of them seems to pour forth in a great stream which somewhat overflows the banks of the demand. Let us examine the reason of this.

Men who must needs be otherwise idle, because no grist is coming to the mill, write law books pour passer le temps and to provide themselves with necessary employment. Such writing is not undertaken for its own sake. It is the oakum-picking of our self-chosen prison-a mere test of industry. Not that such books are not often valuable: for men who make work for themselves often succeed better in it than in the work which others employ them to do.

"You," said

Many again write books to teach themselves. the late Baron Martin to an unemployed barrister who was his friend, "had better write a book upon discovery." "But I know nothing about discovery," was the answer. "No," said the Baron, "but you will by the time you have written the book."

Others there are who have some little practice, perhaps in a particular line, but who are in sore need of more. They have shewn themselves able lawyers to some small section of solicitors or of the public: but they wish to shew the world at large that they are able lawyers. They therefore write a book to prove it. There are men eminent in the profession, who trace the source of their success to such a book.

Some are already eminent, but spare their few leisure hours to the work of giving their learning to the world; for the men who are busiest in one way are usually those who make themselves busy in every sphere which their powers enable them to dominate.

Others are legal authors by profession, and make it their whole livelihood: others watch the market and cut in from