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PROXIMATE CAUSE. Defendant kindled a fire upon his land for purposes of husbandry. Two days later, a violent wind arose, and carried some of the fire sixteen rods, to the plaintiff's woodland, where it became unmanageable. Held, that defendant was liable for the damage, if it was owing to a want of ordinary care on his part, either in the time or manner of kindling, or in the means used to prevent the spreading of the fire. Hewey v. Nourse, 54 Me. 256.

PUBLICATION. — See WILL, 1.
PUBLIC USE. — See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE; Way.

. RAILROAD. 1. Plaintiffs had received from the legislature a grant of the exclusive right of transportation between the cities of New York and Philadelphia." The several defendants were subsequently granted the right of transportation between different points, remote from plaintiffs' road, and all lying between said cities. By mutual connections, the defendants were carrying between said cities, as well as way freight and passengers. An injunction against such through carriage was granted; but an abatement of any part of defendants' roads was refused, as not per se a nuisance to plaintiffs. Held, further, that the defendants' way transportation did not infringe plaintiffs' rights, as the roads were remote from each other, and the exclusive grant to the plaintiffs only covered through transportation. - Del. & R. Canal & C. & A. R. & T. Co. v. Rar. & Del. Bay R. Co. et als., 1 C. E. Green, 321.

2. A railroad company, by agreement with another company owning a track not fenced as required by law, ran trains over said track, by one of which trains stock was injured. Held, that the company running the train was liable for the injury, though caused by the want of a fence, and though the company owning the track might have been also liable if sued. — Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Kanouse, 39 Ill. 272.

3. A railroad company is bound to use reasonable care only, toward third persons not passengers. The infancy of such a third person does not change the degree of care required, nor enhance the measure of damages in case of his injury. – Bannon v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co., 24 Md. 108. See State v. Same, ib. 84.

4. The plaintiff, being lame and unable to take charge of his baggage personally, gave it in charge to the defendants station master at the end of his journey, to be kept until sent for. It was lost before it was delivered to the plaintiff. Held, that defendants' liability as a common carrier continued up to the time of loss. – Curtis v. Avon, G., & M. M. R.R. Co., 49 Barb. 148.

See CARRIER, 1; DAMAGE, 1; FIXTURE, 3; MASTER AND SERVANT, 1, 2; ROBBERY.

RATIFICATION. — See BROKER, 1.
RECOUPMENT. — See CORPORATION, 2.

REGISTRY. — See Ship.
REGISTRY OF DEEDS. - See DEED, 1.

RELEASE. — See AssUMPSIT, 2.

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SLAVE. 1. A partition of an intestate's estate, consisting of land and slaves, which was made and confirmed, without objections then taken, by decree of the Court of Equity in 1864, allowed only slaves to complainants, but no land. Held, valid. Slaves did not become free, either de jure or de facto, by the Emancipation Proclamation in 1862. — Pickett v. Wilkins, 13 Rich. S.C. Eq. 366. See Mitchell v. De Schamps, ib. 9.

2. Testamentary depositions which, when the will was made and the testator died, were void as conflicting with the statutes against manumission, remain void, notwithstanding the subsequent abolition of slavery by the Constitution of 1865. (In this case the testator made his will in 1861 and died in 1863.) – Cobb v. Battle, 34 Ga. 458.

3. A testator who died in 1864, by will dated 1857, gave their freedom to certain slaves. This was void by an act of 1860. The will contained gifts "to the above-named liberated slaves.” The slaves being liberated by the result of the war, held, that they took the gifts under the will (BATTLE, J., dissenting). - Hayley v. Hayley, 1 Phillips, N.C. Eq. 180. See Whedbee v. Shannonhouse, ib. 283.

4. A homicide was committed by the prisoner when a slave, and he had since become free. Held, that this did not operate a pardon. - State v. Brodnat, 1 Phillips, N.C. 41. See AWARD; WARRANTY.

SOLDIER. 1. Soldiers in the service of the United States are not exempt because of such service from trial and punishment by State courts for violation of State criminal laws. — Huggins v. People, 39 III. 241.

2. The giving of a bail bond, with security for appearance to answer a charge of felony or other crime, does not exempt the party giving the same from the performance of military service whenever required, although such service might make an appearance impossible. — McCluskey v. Brock, 34 Ga. 206.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 1. Specific performance of a contract for a lease which did not specify the duration of the term, was refused. — Myers v. Forbes, 24 Md. 598.

2. Specific performance was enforced against a purchaser of land by a decree for the payment of the purchase-money. – Hopper v. Hopper, 1 C. E. Green, 147; Springs v. Sanders, 1 Phillips, N.C. Eq. 67.

3. Specific performance of a contract to convey land at a “fair price," may be enforced against the alienee of the covenantor without proof of actual notice when he derives his title from the deed containing the covenant, although the same is unrecorded. But when the covenantee has stood by and allowed said alienee to acquire title, take possession, and pay the purchase-money without any intimation of his claim or willingness to purchase, and since delayed (sixteen years) asserting his right, his right is gone. — Van Doren v. Robinson, 1 C. E. Green, 256.

See CONFEDERATE MONEY, 1.

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Tax. Land in the possession of the Freedman's Bureau is not exempt from city taxation, merely because the State in the annual tax law expressly excepts it from the tax thereby imposed on land. — Martin v. City Council, 13 Rich. S.C. Eq. 50. See CONSTITUTIONAL Law, 2, 3; NATIONAL BANK.

TENANT IN COMMON. - See TROVER.

TOMB. — See NUISANCE, 1.

TRADE MARK. 1. Plaintiffs made cement from lime-beds near Akron, Erie County, known and sold as “ Akron Cement” and “ Akron Water Lime ;” the packages being marked “Newman's Akron Cement Co. Manufactured at Akron, N.Y. The Hydraulic Cement, known as the Akron Water Lime.” Defendants not being inhabitants of Akron, but owning lime-beds near Syracuse in Onondaga County, and knowing that plaintiffs' cement was sold by above names, named their beds “ Onondaga Akron Cement and Water Lime," and afterwards sold their cement in the places where the plaintiffs' was sold, in packages marked “ Alvord's Onondaga Akron Cement, or Water Lime. Manufactured at Syracuse, New York.” Held, that the word “Akron ” was a trade mark, and the use of it was enjoined. — Newman v. Alvord, 149 Barb. 588.

2. The plaintiff was a manufacturer of pencils near Nuremberg. They were made round, with black varnish, stamped with gilt numerals and the maker's name; and they were wrapped by the dozen and gross in papers similar to those used by twenty other makers in that neighborhood. The defendants, of the same name and place, made similar pencils, with like marks and wrappers. An injunction was refused by SUTHERLAND, J. — Faber v. Faber, 49 Barb. 357.

TROVER. A tenant in common of land, on which was a marine railway, having sold said railway to the defendant, and the latter having removed the same and laid it down on his own land: held, that the other tenant in common might maintain trover for his share of the same, and that the vendor's claim to retain the purchasemoney for services, &c., as general superintendent could not be considered in such action. — Strickland v. Parker, 54 Me. 263.

Trust. — See CONFEDERACY, 2; CONFEDERATE MONEY, 5; SURETY, 3.

TRUSTEE PROCESS. N. employed F. to do a job for $300, payable when the work was completed, and not before. Before the work was completed, N. was trusteed in an action against F. The latter thereupon abandoned the work, and N. was compelled to employ others to finish it. Held, that N. was not chargeable as trustee. Otis v. Ford, 54 Me. 104. UNITED STATES, STATUTES OF. – See LEGAL TENDER; LIQUOR LAW;

NATIONAL BANK; SHIP; STAMP.

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