father the deed became irrevocable, and the tenant in tail took subject to the debts. Synnot v. Simpson (5 H.L. cases 121) followed. Garrard v. Lauderdale distinguished.-Priestley v. Ellis, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 489 ; 76 L.T. 187.

Ship :(i.) C. A.—Collision-Bye-Laws for Regulation of River Tyne, 1884, Art. 20.

- The distance from mid-channel which vessels must keep in entering the Tyne is not one to be measured on the chart, but must be such as to leave reasonable room for vessels to pass out of the river.—The John

O’Scott, L.R. [1897] P. 64; 76 L.T. 222. (ii.) C.A.-Damage—River Ribble Navigation-Hired Tugs-Liability. The

corporation of Preston under their powers do the towage of the river Ribble, and for this purpose charter tugs. Held, that the corporation were responsible for the efficiency of the hired tugs and for the competence of the crews supplied by the tug owners.—The Ratata,

L.R. [1897] P. 118; 76 L.T. 224. (iii.) P. D.-Salvage—Tug and Tow--Negligence-Contributory Negligence

Unfair Bargain.—A barque went ashore while being towed for a fixed sum by a tug which steered its own course and took no soundings. While the barque was ashore another tug offered assistance for £500, successful or not. This was accepted and the barque was got off by the two tugs. The owners of tug No. 1 claimed salvage and the owners of the barque counterclaimed for damage. Held, that, on the evidence, tug No. 1 was the cause of the disaster and therefore was not entitled to salvage; that as the master of the barque had not checked the course of the tug, the barque owners were guilty of contributory negligence and could not succeed on the counterclaim; and that £400 was sufficient remuneration for the second tug as the master of the barque entered into the agreement under compulsion and the

tug ran no risk.—The Altair, L.R. (1897] P. 105; 76 L.T. 263. (iv.) C. C.-Insurance -- Master Part Owner—Mortgage–Barratry.-- Where

the master of a ship is part owner an act barratous against his co-owners is barratous against his mortgagee. The fact that a master has scuttled a ship his part share on which he had mortgaged, is no defence to an action by the mortgagee on a policy of insurance on the vessel.–Small and Others v. United Kingdom Mutual Insurance Co.,

L.R. (1897] 2 Q.B. 42; 76 L.T. 326. (v.) P. D.-Salvage—Services Rendered by Request without Benefit.—A vessel

which stands by another upon request, is entitled to salvage remuneration, though no benefit is produced to the salved ship.—The

Cambrian, 76 L.T. 504. (vi.) P. D.-Collision-Arrest and Sale of Ship Abroad-Action in England

to Limit Liability-Life Claimants.-Owners of a British steamship, which had sunk a German vessel and been sold in Holland under a judgment of the local Court for less than enough to satisfy all claims, commenced an action in the English Admiralty Court for limitation of liability. Held, that the claimants who had recovered in Holland were not estopped from proving in the limitation action, and that life claimants were entitled to interest on the sum representing £7 per ton on the tonnage of the steamship_from the date of collision.—The

Crathie, L.R. (1897] P. 178; 76 L.T. 534. (vii.) C. C.-Marine Insurance—General Average.—The master of a ship in

taking measures to repair damage on a voyage caused damage to the cargo. Held, that the ship and cargo were in peril; that the master's

act was a general average act, and the loss to cargo a general average

loss.—McCale & Co., Limited, v. Houlder & Co., 76 L.T. 469. (i.) C. A.-Charter-Party-Timber-Custom of Port of London.-A clause

in a charter-party that timber should be taken from alongside the ship at merchant's risk and expense” is not inconsistent with the custom of the Port of London, under which it is the duty of the shipowner to lower timber into a barge brought alongside to receive it. -- Aktieselskab Helios v. Ekman and Co., L.R. (1897] 2 Q.B. 83; 76 L.T. 537.

Solicitor :(ii.) C. D.-Practice--Costs—Agency Charges— Taxation-Solicitors Act, 1843

(6 & 7 Vict., c. 73), s. 37.-In a case in which the facts were similar to those reported in Vol. 22, p. 80 (ii.), the Court made an order for taxation of a solicitor's bill after the expiration of twelve months from its delivery, where agency charges, amounting to £15 in a bill of £146, were treated as disbursements.-In re Pomeroy and Tanner, No. 2, 76 L.T. 149.

Specific Performance :-
(iii.) C. D.-Public-house--Sale-Licence “ Affected”-9 Geo. IV., c. 61, ss.

11, 14—5 and 6 Vict., c. 44, s. 1.-An agreement for the sale and
purchase of a beer-house, with the off-beer licence attached, contained
a proviso that if the licence should be endorsed or “otherwise affected ”
before completion, the proposed purchaser could terminate the
agreement. He applied to the magistrates, without consulting the
vendors, for authority to carry on the business till the next transfer
day in the name of a nominee. The magistrate refused the application,
On his claim to have the contract set aside, it was held, that the licence
had not been “affected” within the meaning of the contract, and
specific performance was decreed on a counterclaim. Tadcaster Tower
Brewery Co. v. Wilson, L.R. (1897] 1 Ch. 705; 76 L.T. 459.

Trade Mark:(iv.) C. D.- “Magnolia" — Geographical Name Character of Goods

Assignment-Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Acts, 1883 (s. 70), and 1888 (s. 10).-A representation of a Magnolia flower, and the word

Magnolia,” notwithstanding that several towns in America are so named, may be available for trade marks; but the word cannot be used as the trade mark of goods made of a metal known as Magnolia, and a representation of the flower cannot be assigned as a trade mark of metal bearings by a foreign assignor who had a goodwill in the metal only.-In re Magnolia Metal Co.'s Trade Mark, 76 L.T. 190.

Vendor and Purchaser :(v.) C. D.---Sale as Going Concern--Negotiations after Date fixed for Com

pletion-- Title and Draft Conveyance Approved -- Reasonable Notice to Complete.--Where the time fixed for the completion of the purchase of a public-house as a going concern was past by six weeks, a notice from the vendor, after the title and the draft conveyance had been approved, to complete in ten days, was held to be a reasonable notice.--Smith v.

Batsford, 76 L.T. 179. (vi.) C. A.-Contract Founded on Letters—Uncertainty of Date--Specific

Performance.-Decision of Court below (see Vol. 22, p. 61 (iii.)) affirmed.
--Simpson v. Hughes and Armstrong, 76 L.T. 237.

(i.) C. D.-Partnership-Judgment for Dissolution and Sale-Purchase by

one of other's Share-Copyholds conveyed as Freeholds-Compensation.--On an enforced dissolution of partnership between two persons in a brewery business, one bought the other's moiety by tender. It was agreed that the title to tied houses should be accepted as it stood. Some which were conveyed as freeholds turned out to be copyholds, and the purchaser sought repayment of half the cost of enfranchisement. Held, that the principle laid down in Mortlock v. Buller (10 Ves. 315), and Castle v. Wilkinson (5 Ch. 536), that when a vendor contracts to sell more than he possesses the purchaser is entitled to compensation, applies only where the vendor knows the title and the purehaser does not. The point whether compensation could be enforced by a purchaser after the money had been paid and the conveyance executed did not therefore need decision.-Hopcroft v. Hopcroft, 76 L.T. 341,

(ii.) C.D.-Mortgage to Building Society-Power of Sale-.Whether transferred

to Assignee.-A power of sale on a mortgage to a building society is not, according to Bradford v. Belfield (2 Sim. 263), transferred to the assignee of the mortgage debt not named in the power, and it was held that a good title had not been shewn by such an assignee to a purchaser

from him.-In re Rumney and Smith's Contract, 76 L.T. 343. (iii.) C. D.--Specific Performance--Insufficient Description-Parol Evidence

Statute of Frauds.-An agreement provided for the sale and purchase of "twenty-four acres of land, freehold, and all appurtenances thereto, at T.," without any words of ownership. Held, that the description was insufficient, and that parol evidence was not admissable to shew that the land referred to was the plaintiff's. — Plant v. Bourne, 76 L.T. 349.

(iv.) C. D.-Settled Land-Power of Tenant for Life-Judicature Act, 1873

(36 & 37 Vict., c. 66), 8. 25, sub-s. 4.--A tenant for life, after he had agreed to sell part of the settled estate, granted it to a trustee for years, on trusts, to secure a valuable consideration, and subject to those and to the term, to the use of his son, who was the succeeding life tenant, his heirs and assigns. Held, that having regard to sect. 25 (4) of the Judicature Act, 1873, and to the fact that it was for the benefit of the son that the father's life estate should be kept alive, this life estate was not merged and extinguished, and that the father had power to make a valid conveyance to his purchaser.—The Barry Railway Co. and Lord Wimborne and the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, 76 L.T. 489.

(v.) C. A.–Voluntary Settlement — Bankruptcy—Title of Purchaser. - A

voluntary settlement is void under sect. 47 only from the time the title of the trustee, on the bankruptcy of the settler, accrues; and a bonâ fide purchaser before that time will have a good title against the trustee. In re Briggs and Spicer ([1891] 2 Ch. 127; 64 L.T. 187) overruled.—In re Carter and Kenderdines Contract, L.R.[1897]1 Ch. 776; 76 L.T. 476.

Vexatious Legal Proceedings :(vi.) Q. B. D.-Vexatious Actions Act, 1896 (59 & 60 Vict., c. 51), s. 1

Retrospective Operation.--The Act is retrospective, and the Court will consider the general character and result of actions alleged to be vexatious, whether brought before or since the passing of the Act. E. p. The Attorney-General ; in re Alexander Chaffers, 76 L.T. 351.

6

Will:(i.) C. D.-Construction-Settlement-Bequest on “same” Trusts—Accretion

-Hotchpot.—Where, in a will bequeathing money upon and for the same trusts” as those expressed in a marriage settlement, there was no context to shew that, by the use of the word "same," an accretion to the trust fund was intended, it was held, that a hotchpot clause in the settle

ment was not applicable.--In re North; Meates v. Bishop, 76 L.T.186. (ii.) C. D.-Construction-Whether Repairs and Outgoings Chargeable to

Corpus or Income.-Trustees were directed to manage the testator's estate and to apply the income derived from leaseholds for the benefit of a tenant for life. Held, that “income derived” meant after payment by the life tenant of repairs and outgoings accrued since the death of the testator.-In re Redding; Thompson v. Redding, L.R.[1897]

1 Ch. 876 ; 76 L.T. 339. (iii.) C. D.-Construction-Charitable Purposes.---" Grants for or towards

the purchase of advowsons or presentations " do not fall within charitable purposes. In re Hunter; Hood v. Attorney - General,

L.R. (1897] 1 Ch. 518; 76 L.T. 386. (iv.) C. D.--Construction—Gift of Realty and Personalty to Spinster and her

Lawful 188ue—Rule in Wild's Case-- Personal Representative.—A testator gave real and personal property “ for life to my ward E.” “and to any lawful issue she may have, such issue taking a vested interest in my said property upon attaining the age of 21 years." E. survived the testator, but died unmarried and intestate. Held, that the word " issue

as used was a word of purchase and not of limitation; and that the heir-at-law of E. took the realty and her personal representa

tive the personalty.--In re Wilmot; Wilmot v. Betterton, 76 L.T. 415. (v.) C. D.-Construction—Illegitimate Child.—A testator gave & specific

legacy to a person described in the will as my said wife's nephew J. W. R." and gave a moiety of residue to “all and every the nephew and niece and the nephews and nieces of my said wife.” Held, that J. W. R., although he was illegitimate, was entitled his share in the

residue.-In re Parker ; Parker v. Osborne, L.R. [1897] 76 L.T. 421. (vi.) C. D.- Construction—Tenant for Life and Remainderman-Rule in

Howe v. Dartmouth.—A testator directed that the rents and profits of the residue of his freeholds and leaseholds should be paid to his wife for life, and after her decease he gave and devised the said residue to persons named, subject to payment of certain annuitants to whom he gave a power of distress. Held, that neither the direction as to rents and profits, nor the power of distress shewed any intention of the testator that the leaseholds should be enjoyed in specie, and that therefore the rule in Howe v. Lord Dartmouth (7 Ves. 137) applied.

In re Game; Game v. Young, L.R. (1897] 1 Ch. 881 ; 76 L.T. 450. (vii.) C. A.-Residuary Legatee-Fund to be taken as Part of Residue-Hotch

pot Clause... Where a will directed that a fund is to be taken by a residuary legatee as part of his share of residue, a hotchpot clause operates as a gift to the legatee of the testator's interest in the fundHumphreys v. Gadsden, L.R. [1897] 1 Ch. 325.

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INDEX.