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answerable to the payers, is local tyranny which no free country ought to bear. To allow men, wholly unlearned and irresponsible, to inflict numerous contradictory laws on their countrymen at haphazard, is a state of things that reflects disparagingly on the wisdom of the British people.

Our main object here, is to bring to the notice of our readers the administration of the law by magistrates as one especially deserving their consideration. We are perfectly aware of the immense difficulties which on all sides encompass the subject; but we believe that the most inveterate stickler for the magisterial system, cannot gainsay nor controvert this standing maxim"That no one should be invested with the power of administering the law without first giving satisfactory proof that his knowledge of the law is sufficient to enable him to discharge such duty justly and satisfactorily." Were the law which the Justices have to administer, simple, clear, and explicit, still its administrators could not perform their functions without some preparatory study and practice, of which the public should demand sufficient evidence. But the laws which come especially within the cognizance of magistrates are often intricate and contradictory, hard to understand, and difficult to apply. We will quote, in conclusion, a passage from the preface of Mr. Arnold's useful work, mentioned at the head of this article. He says-"Perhaps I may be permitted here to express an opinion, how desirable it seems that all the law relating to the duties of a Justice-of-thepeace should undergo a thorough revision and consolidation. The 19 and 20 Vict. c. 64 (the Statutes not in Use Repeal Act), passed in 1856, swept away, it is true, a great mass of obsolete rubbish, which, though still law, had long fallen into desuetude. There is still, however, a large quantity remaining, especially in connection with summary convictions. Few persons out of the trade, and perhaps not many in it, are aware of the stringent regulations still in existence with reference to the nearly obsolete ornament of metal buttons. With regard to the offence of simple drunkenness, I have ventured to express a doubt whether such an offence any longer exists; but, if it does, it is clear

that the penalty attaches to every case of private drunkenness, as well as to those of a public character, where the offence may be considered as a scandal to morals and decency. Profane cursing and swearing is still an offence punishable by fine, or, in default, by imprisonment with hard labour. If it be expedient, as possibly it may be, that irreverence and vulgarity in language should be put down by act of parliament, the law ought to be strictly enforced, otherwise it becomes worse than a dead letter, and exists merely as a trap in which the unwary may occasionally be caught. By the 19 Geo. II., c. 21, not only is the offender, that is, the utterer of profane curses and swearing, liable to a penalty according to his degree; but, should the offence be committed in the presence of a constable, he also is liable to a penalty of forty shillings if he does not apprehend the offender if unknown, and bring him before a Justice, or proceed to summon him if known; and further, should the swearing take place in the presence of a Justice, and he does not at once convict the offender, the Justice in his turn becomes liable to a penalty of five pounds, recoverable by action by any common informer." Mr. Arnold here adds a practical note to the following effect:-" If a Justice-of-the-peace should ever so -"If far forget himself and the penalty of the law, as to utter a profane oath or curse, it seems he ought, as a matter of honesty, following the example of Marmaduke Magog, to fine himself. That he should do so would be at least a matter of policy if the oath were uttered in the presence of another person; the penalty for the offence being only five shillings, but the penalty for not inflicting that penalty being five pounds, besides the costs of the action."

The author further observes:-"Not only does it seem advisable that there should be a revision of existing statutes, but it would be as well that there should be some sort of supervision of future acts of parliament; so as not only to insure greater harmony between them and former laws which are not meant to be interfered with, but also to provide against blunders and inaccuracies which too frequently disfigure the statute book.

But until a Minister of Justice, or some analogous officer, shall be established, it would be hopeless to expect so useful and necessary a reform."

Let us, however, add to these remarks of Mr. Arnold, that it will be of small advantage to reform our laws as suggested, and render them rational, consistent, and plain, unless we can, at the same time, secure for the public that our magistracy shall be intelligent, instructed, and capable.

ART. V.-CRIMINAL LAW OF FRANCE.

Histoire du Droit Criminel, des Peuples Modernes.—Considéré dans ses Rapports avec les Progrès de la Civilisation. Par Albert du Boys. Paris: Auguste Durand.

THE

HERE has been latterly, as we know, a tendency in the works of French political historians, to examine the sources whence that principle of over-government and of over-centralization has sprung, which has been the bane of France, politically speaking, for the last two centuries at least, and manifestly since the time of Cardinal de Richelieu's rule. We are not aware that a similar tendency has been shown, or a similar object pursued, by any of the legal writers of France; yet here, more than in any other sphere of study, would it be interesting to watch the growth of a centralization which has little by little paralyzed all the several springs of individual activity in the nation. It is next to impossible to separate the political from the legal condition of a country. Its government will necessarily be more or less reflected in its laws. The chief evil is, and an evil singularly active and visible among our neighbours, that law, instead of being the result of the workings of the national mind, results simply from the decisions of the governing body. This has been so persistently the case with Frenchmen, that if there is one thing they dislike and seek to elude, it is the action of the law.

This is not denied by any of their thinkers or writers. It is on all hands so much an admitted fact, that one of the great characteristics which distinguish the French from the Saxon and AngloSaxon races, is to be found in this circumstance, that whilst the latter respect their laws, honour them, and obey them cheerfully, the former seem to conceive they have well merited of humanity when they have resisted them. France is one of the few countries on the face of the globe, where the law is held to be incompatible with a large amount of freedom. Now this, be it remarked, is precisely the reverse of our English system; our notion is, that the law is that which is right; whereas, to the French mind, it is that which is tyrannical. This is not a particular opinion personal to ourselves; it is the plain statement of a fact which we are not aware it ever came into any body's head to dispute. The French dislike, and seek by every means to elude, and resist, and overthrow the law. This is a simple fact. They have done so under every succeeding régime; as much under the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV. as under the imperial despotism of Napoleon; yet not less under the two republics of 1793 and 1848--the one so terrible, the other so mild and careless-than under the restoration, or the parliamentary government of Louis Philippe. Whatever the political form of their government, the French nation has evinced an equal amount of repugnance for its laws; an equal desire not to submit to them. When Englishmen think it is their duty to oppose sturdily and steadfastly any measure of the executive, the firmest ground which they choose for making a stand upon is the law; their "rights" are represented by the law. When Frenchmen are hurried away into a revolution, the very first thing they rise against, the very first thing they determine to overthrow, is the law.

We have dwelt upon this, repeating, as our readers will see, more than once our well-founded convictions upon the subject; because the fact of a great country living in dislike of its laws, repudiating them, attacking and abolishing them whenever it finds an occasion of so doing, seems to us a condition of things

VOL. VIII. NO. XVI.

Y

that cannot be too attentively considered, and that has not ever been sufficiently meditated upon by those writers who, amongst ourselves, have made France the object of their study.

If

We would, at the same time, call our readers' attention to another point. The law being more disliked in France than in any other country we could mention, we are also obliged to admit that in France, more than any where else, the law is marked by absolute uniformity. If we turn our eyes homewards we find, on the contrary, that the law, which is better liked in England than in, perhaps, any other part of the civilized world, is characterized precisely by the largest amount of variety. political institutions, to be durable, ought to be nothing more than the gradual and perfect development of national requirements and manners, laws, to be easily submitted to, and regarded as really tutelary, should be chiefly the consecration of customs-national and local. Whenever law is the consecration of a long-standing custom, that law has for its existence a reason beyond all the arguments of the laws of most "learned doctors;" and it is so thoroughly in such cases self-made by the population, that the infringer of it stands alone, and has the population against him; whilst in all instances where laws spring simply from the combinations and decisions of mere theorists, the individual who infringes them is sure to attract to himself the sympathies of the community; and whenever this occurs (as it invariably does in France), the law, in its dignity and in its power of doing good, is the sufferer.

The first thing that occurs to a French jurisconsult when referring to the subject of English law, is to express unmitigated astonishment at the circumstance of any nation being able to put up with so hopelessly intricate and confused a mass of regulations. "You have no 'code,' as we have; no unique and uniform code,' applicable to all men and all delinquencies!" is his first cry of despair; and the fact of not treating sentient human beings as mathematical quantities, appears to him a sign of unmistakable inferiority. The existence, for example, of what he denominates certain "idiosyncrasies" in the laws of Scotland, seems to him

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