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(i-) R. & C. C.—Carriage of Goods—Duty of Company to Disintegrate Charges—-Railway and Canal Trafiic Act, 1888, s. 33, sub-s. 3.—Sect. 33, sub-sect. 3 of the Railway and Canal Traflic Act, 1888, requires a railway com any to distinguish in an account rendered the charge for conveyance rom terminal charges whether the total claim exceeds or falls below the maximum authorised for conveyance alone; but if it falls below, it is suflicient for the company to state formally that no part of the claim is for terminals.——New Union Mill Co. v. Great Western Railway Co., 74 L.T. 791.

(ii.) R, 8; C, C,—Increase of Rate—C'artage-—Jurisdiction of Railway Commissioners Railway and Canal Trafilc Act, 1894, s. 1, sub-s. 1.—The Railway Commissioners have jurisdiction to determine a complaint against a railway company of the unreasonableness of an increase in its rates or charge for cartage since the last day of 1892.—-The Mansion House Association on Railway Trafiic v. London and North-Western Railway Co., L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 273; 74 L.T. 463.

(iii.) C, A.—Leuel Crossing—Obligat-ion to Build Bridge—Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, ss. 46, 61.—The Railway Clauses Act does not impose on a railway company whose line crosses a public footpath the obligation to carry the path over the line or the line over the path by means of a bridge.——Reg. v. Bexley Heath Railway Co., L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 74; 74 L.T. 540.

(iv.) B. D.—Accomniodotion Works—Fence Constructed more than Five Years after Opening of Railway —Railway Clauses Act, 1845, ss. 68, 73. —Where damage had arisen through the defective state of a fence erected by a railway company more than five years after the opening of the railway, it was held that sect. 73 of the Railway Clauses Act did not relieve the company from the obligation to keep the fence in repair.—Di:von v. Great Western Railway Co., L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 333.

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Rating:—

(v.) H, L.-Poor Rate—Appeal to Quarter Sessi0ns—/lssessinent Committee as Respondents— Consent of Guardians Necessary—Union Assessment Committee Amendment Act, 1864, s. 2.—If an assessment committee appear as respondents in an appeal to quarter sessions against a rate they will not be entitled to costs unless they have previously obtained

the consent of the guardians to their appearing.--Assessment Committee of West Ham Union v. London County Council and Others, 75 L.T. 1.

(Vi-) Q- B- D-—Po0r Rate—Joint Occupation for Crown Pu/rposes and /or Local Purposes—Ratability.—Buildings occupied jointly for purposes of a county council and for Crown purposes are ratable in so far as they are not occupied for purposes of the CIOWn.—-County Council of Middlesaz v. Assessment Committee of St. George's Union, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 143; 75 L.T. 153.

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(vii.) Q. B, D,—Ecclesiastical Augmentation—Rent Charge Greater than Annual Value.—Where a rent charge has been granted in augmentation of a curacy under 1 and 2 William IV., c. 45, the owner of the land is liable for the full amount of the charge, even if it should exceed the annuaé value of the land.—Pertwee v. Townsend, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 129; 75 L. . 104.

Riparian Rights :

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C. A.—Rirer Bed—Alteration—Adjoining Lands——Accretion.-- A portion of the bed of a river, which becomes dry during part of the year. does not by accretion become the property of the adjoining riparian owner. —Hindson v. Ashby, L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 1 ; 74 L.T. 827.

Revenue :

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- B. D.—Postage Stamps—Possession of I)ie- "Lawful E.ccu.se”—Post Ofiice (Protection) Act, 1884,11. 7.—The respondent, whose bonafide: was admitted, had in his possession, for purposes of illustration, a die capable of making a representation of a current colonial postage stamp. Held, that he had no “ lawful excuse,” and was liable to the penalty imposed by sect. 7 of the Post Office (Protection) Act, 1884. —Dickens v. Gill, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 310; 75 L.T. 32.

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Fund—Inco1ne Tam Act, 1842, s. 100, sch. D.—The Court disallowed a claim of colliery owners in income tax returns to deduct from profits the average excess of their contributions to a strike indemnity fund over the amounts received by them as indemnities.— The Rhymney Iron Co., Limited v. Fowler, L.B. [1896] 2 Q.B. 79.

to Watch Club—Liability—Bomi fide Traveller Revenue Act, 1867, ss. 1, 3, 17.—The respondents were secretaries of provincial “ watch clubs." the members of which paid a weekly sum, and in consideration the successful drawer at a periodical ballot received a watch from the proprietors who were London tradesmen. Held, that the respondents came within sect. 17 of the Revenue Act, 1867, as persons who “solicit, take, or receive any order" for excisable articles without a licence, and did not come within the exemption as bond fidc travellers.—Killick v. Graham; Linton v. Burchell, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 196; 75 L.T. 29.

Duty on “ Annuity or Sum Periodically Payable "Stamp Act, 1891, Schedule.—By an agreement terminable by three months‘ notice the manager of an hotel was to receive all the profits on paying a weekly sum to the proprietor. Held, that the “sum periodically payable” within the terms of the Stamp Act was the sum payable for one week only.-—Clifi'ord and Another v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 187; 74 L.T. 699.

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Stamp Act, 1891, s. 59, sub~s. 1, sch. 1.—-A share of a patent and of a licence to use the patent in New South Wales was held to be an interest on property within the meaning of sect. 59. sub-sect. 1, of the Act.—The Smelling Company of Australia v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 179; 74 L.T. 694.

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(viii.)

Inland Revenue Act, 1878, s. 22—Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, I. 16. —The granting of a certificate of exemption to the owner of a dog is within the discretion of the commissioners, and the justices have no jurisdiction to review their decision. The refusal to take out a dog licence is not an offence of a trifling nature within sect. 16 of Summary g:1:‘[lJSg:l0l3l]I.:)Zl Act, 1879.—Phillips v. Evans, L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 305; . . 3 .

H. L.—Incomc Tax-Trade exercised within the United Kingdom— Assessment through A gent—I ncome Taa: Acts, 1853, sch. D. ; 1842, s. 41.~— Where orders were obtained within the United Kin_dom by an agent there resident for a merchant in France who shippe the goods thence at the purchaser’s risk, issued the invoices in his own name, and

generally received the purchase money direct, it was held (reversing the judgment of the Court below—see V01. 20, p. 54, iv.-Lord Morris dissenting), that the foreign merchant did not exercise his trade within the United Kingdom, so as to bring him within sched. D. of the Income Tax Act, 1852.—Grainger ¢fi' Son v. Gough, L.R. [1896] A.C. 325; 74 L.T. 435.

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(i.) H, L,—Po'rtions to Children.—The rule of English law against double portions to children is not applicable to Scotland.—Johnstone v. Haviland, L.R. [1896] A.C. 95.

Settled Land :—

(ii.) C. D.—Power to Trustees to purchase particular Land—Settled Land Act, 1882, s. 33.—A power to trustees to purchase certain land at the request of the life tenant renders personal property in their hands “ liable” to be so laid out within the meaning of sect. 33 of the Act.In I1‘*eT£IZ5l’s Settled Estates; Hill v. Pilcher, L.R. [1896] 1 Ch. 962; 74 . . 0.

(iii.) C. D,— Tenant for Life Lunatic—Annuity. to Remainderman 0verpaid— Claim for Return by Representative of Life Tenant.——By orders in lunacy an annuity was ordered to be paid out of settled estate to a remainderman for a limited period. The annuity was continued in error beyond the period and the remainderman mortgaged his estate. Held, that the personal representative of the life tenant was entitled to retain the overpayments with interest, notwithstanding the mortgage.—In re Langham ; Otway v. Langham, 74 L.T. v61_1.

(iv.) C, D,—Jointnre—Portions.—A power of jointuring does not cover the creation of a rent charge in favour of the wife during the life of the husband. But a power conferred on the husband to charge the settled estate with portions for the children and with interest thereon by way of maintenance, may enable him to charge the estate, with payment to himself as guardian of the children of interest on their expectant portions.—In re De Hoghton ; De Hoghton v. De Hoghton, L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 385; 74 L.T. 613.

(v.) C. D.—Will—Incumbered and Uni1wumbered—Estates Devised as a whole—Tenant for Life and Re1nainderman.—Where a testator devised incumbered and unincumbered estates as a whole to a tenantfor life who mortgaged his interest to an insurance company who foreclosed, the company were held not to be entitled to give up the incumbered portions which were profitless, but to be bound to apply the income of the whole to paying ofl the interest of the mortgages on the incumbered parts.--Frewen v. The Law Life Assurance Co., L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 511; 75 L.T. 17.

Settlement :

(vi.) Ch, D,—Mortga_qe for a Term—Premature Repayment with a ForfeitRights of Tenant for Life and Remainderman to Accreti0n.—The trustees of a fund, which was settled on a person for life with remainder in fee to others, invested it on mortgage with a covenant that it should remain undisturbed for a fixed period. By agreement it was redeemed before the period had expired on payment of a forfeit of one year’s interest, in addition to the interest accrued due. Held, that the additional sum was capital and belonged to the remaindermen. +11» re Searanche; Sintouds v. Hzuitington, -74 L.T. 339.

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P, D,— Variation of Settlement—E.1:tinguiehment of Divorced Parents’ Interest—Acceleration of Infant’s Interest.—The Court on the ground that as infant’s interest would be thereby accelerated, extinguished the interest on a marriage settlement of a husband from whom the wife had obtained a divorce with custody of the only child, notwithstanding that there was a power to her in such circumstances to raise a sum which would nearly exhaust the value of the entire estate.—C1-eagh v.

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C. D.—Determinabls Life Interest——Scttl0r Subsequently BankruptForfaiture.—By a marriage settlement the settlor assigned property to trustees upon trust to pay to him until he should die,bec0me bankrupt or assign or incumber the income, or do anything whereby any part of it would become payable to any other person. He became bankrupt after the sole surviving trustee had advanced to him part of the trust funds on a covenant to repay and indemnify. Alter the bankruptcy the trustee was compelled to make good the trust fund. On a question arising, it was held that the settlor’s life interest had not determined previously to his be.nkruptcy.—-In re Brewer's Settlement ,- Morton v. Blackmore, L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 505; 75 L.T. 177.

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C. A.—Collision—Raising W reck—Ea:penses of Harbour Board and Conservat0rs—Basis of C'alculation—Damage: in Nature of Demurrage.-— The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board who were also the Conservancy Commissioners of the Mersey, were held entitled to recover as part of their damages the cost price of raising a lightship and a dredger, their property, which had been sunk in the harbour of Liverpool by the negligence of the defendants, and it was also held that interest on the original cost to the Board of their plant employed in the work was to form part of this cost price. But no allowance was made to them for the loss of use of the dredger while it was disabled. The rule laid down in the case of The Harrington followed.——The Emerald; The Greta Holme, L.R. [1896] P. 192; 74 L.T. 645.

Q. B. D.—Charter Part'y—-“ Safe P0rt”—Evidence of Custom.—By a charter party a ship was to discharge all her cargo at one port to be named by the charterers, which was to be a safe port where she could enter dock safely and lie afloat at all times. The ship was ordered to discharge at Gloucester, but being of too great a draught to proceed thither, discharged all her cargo at the nearest safe point. Held, that the port named was not “safe ” within the meaning of the charter party, and that evidence of custom of similar ships to lighten before proceeding to Gloucester was inadmissible.——Reynolds 0'1 Co. v. Tomlinson and Another, L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 586 ; 74 L.T. 591.

C, A,—-Marine Insurance—Perils of the Sea—Judgment in Salt-u_:;e Suit~Eridence.——At the request of the master of a steam-vessel which had consumed nearly all its coal, but which could have proceeded under sail, towage was rendered to the incapacitated steamer. Salvage services were subsequently recovered. Held, that there had not been a loss by perils of the sea within the meaning of a time policy of insurance; and that a judgment against a shipowner for salvage award is not evidence of loss by perils of the sea.—Ballantyne di Co. v.

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C. A.—C'0Zlision—Co1npuls0ry Pil0tage—London District—MercI1ant Shipping Acts, 1854, s. 379 (3 ; 1894, s. 625 (3)—Privy Council Order, Dec. 21st, 1871.—A British s ip, loaded at Cardifl for the River Plate, and on the return voyage landed cattle in London, and took the rest of the cargo to Rotterdam. Held, that she was within the terms of sect. 625, sub-sect. 3, of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, as trading from a port in the London district to a port in Europe north and east of Brest, and, therefore, was exempt from compulsory pilota.ge.—The Ruvtland, 75 L.T. 48.

(i.) P. D.—-Shipwrecked Passengers—Forwarding by other Vessels—Salvage —Agency of Master.-—Where at the request of the master of a stranded vessel the passengers were conveyed to their destination by other vessels, it was held that the life salvors had no claim against the owners of the stranded vessel, who were not under any obligation to forward the passengers to their destination after the ship was disabled, and that the master made the request as the agent of the passengers.—The Mariposa, 75 L.T. 54.

(ii.) Q, B, D, & C. A,—Light Dues—Horses and Cattle on Deck—— Measurement—Merchant Shipping Act, 1876, s. 23.——Horses and cattle carried on deck come within the words “other goods” in the 23rd sect. of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1876, and from vessels arriving in port so freighted the Trinity House are entitled to light dues calculated on the rectangular space occupied by the animals.— Richmond Hill Steamship Co. v. Corporation of Trinity House, L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 493; 2 Q.B. 134; 74 L.T. 380 and 75 L.T. 8.

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(iv-) P. D.— Wages—Master’s Li'eh—Mortgagee in Poasession.—A master’s lien for wages does not take priority of a mortgage debt the payment of which he has personally guaranteed.-The Bangor Castle, 74 L.T. 768.

(V-) P. D. 85 C. A,.—Ma1-inc Insurance “ at and from "—Vessel Lost l)efn1‘6 Arrival at Loading Pm-t.—An insurance was efiected on freight “at and from ” any port on the west coast of South America. The policy was “to cover the freight from the time of the engagement of the goods, or after a shipping order has been issued, by the agent or his broker.” While on her way to load at a port within the terms of the policy, the ship was lost by perils insured against. Held, that the engagement clause must be construed, subject to the “ at and from clause,” and as the vessel had not arrived at a loading port, the risk had never attached.—The Copernicus; Liverpool, Brazil and Rn-er Plate Steam Narigation C0. v. Holmes, L.R. [1896] P. 154, 237; 74 L.T. 431, 757.

(Vi-) P. D. & C. A.—Collision—Bye-Laws of Harbour of Newport, 1894-, Arts. 12 §" 13—Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Art. l6.— Although an inward bound steamer had committed a breach of the bye-laws of the harbour of Newport in failing to enter the harbour as directed by Art. 13, it was held that this had not contributed to a collision which took place with an outward bound steamer, and that the latter was alone to blame. —The Winstanley, 74 L.T. 432 and 75 L.T. 133.

(Vii-) H. L.——Charter Purty——-Duty of Charterer to be Ready with Cargo.— A charterer is not bound in all cases to be ready with cargo to meet the possibility of an opportunity occurring for a ship to load out of her turn.—Little v. Stevenson §/' Co., L.R. [1896] A.C. 108; 74 L.T. 529.

(viii-) Q. B.—M¢t1'ine Insurance—L|fe Saluage.—The crew, but no part of cargo, were rescued from a vessel which was insured in a Shi owners’ Protection Association against such risks as were not capab e of being assured against by the usual form of Lloyd’s policy, and the owner had to pay a sum of money to the life salvors. Held, that simple life salvage is not covered by the ordinary Lloyd‘s policy of

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