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Railway:(i.) R. & C. C.—Carriage of Goods—Duty of Company to Disintegrate

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Charges—Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, s. 33, sub-s. 3.—Sect. 33, sub-sect. 3 of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, requires a railway company to distinguish in an account rendered the charge for conveyance from terminal charges whether the total claim exceeds or falls below the maximum authorised for conveyance alone; but if it falls below, it is sufficient for the company to state formally that no part of the claim is for terminals.—New Union Mill Co. v. Great Western Railway Co., 74 L.T. 791.

R. & C. C.—Increase of Rate–Cartage—Jurisdiction of Railway Commissioners—Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1894, s. 1, sub-s. 1.—The Railway Commissioners have jurisdiction to determine a complaint against a railway company of the unreasonableness of an increase in its rates or charge for cartage since the last day of 1892.—The Mansion House Association on Railway Traffic v. London and North-Western Railway Co., L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 273; 74 L.T. 463.

C. A.—Level Crossing–Obligation to Build Bridge—Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, ss. 46,61.—The Railway Clauses Act does not impose on a railway company whose line crosses a public footpath the obligation to carry the path over the line or the line over the path by means of a bridge.—Reg. v. Bexley Heath Railway Co., L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 74; 74 L.T. 540.

Q. B. D.—Accommodation Works—Fence Constructed more than Five Years after Opening of Railway —Railway Clauses Act, 1845, ss. 68, 73. —Where damage had arisen through the defective state of a fence erected by a railway company more than five years after the opening of the railway, it was held that sect. 73 of the Railway Clauses Act did not relieve the company from the obligation to keep the fence in repair.—Dizon v. Great Western Railway Co., L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 333.

Rating :(v.) H. L.—Poor Rate–Appeal to Quarter Sessions—Assessment Committee

as Respondents—Consent of Guardians Necessary-Union Assessment Committee Amendment Act, 1864, s. 2.—If an assessment committee appear as respondents in an appeal to quarter sessions against a rate they will not be entitled to costs unless they have previously obtained the consent of the guardians to their appearing.—Assessment Committee of West Ham Union v. London County Council and Others, 75 L.T. 1.

(vi.) Q. B. D.—Poor Rate–Joint Occupation for Crown Purposes and for

Local Purposes—Ratability.—Buildings occupied jointly for purposes of a county council and for Crown purposes are ratable in so far as they are not occupied for purposes of the Crown.—County Council of Middlesex v. Assessment Committee of St. George's Union, L.R. [1896]

2 Q.B. 143; 75 L.T. 153.

Rent Charge:– (vii.) Q. B. D.—Ecclesiastical Augmentation—Rent Charge Greater than

Annual Value.—Where a rent charge has been granted in augmentation of a curacy under 1 and 2 William IV., c. 45, the owner of the land is liable for the full amount of the charge, even if it should exceed the annual value of the land.—Pertwee v. Townsend, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 129; 75 L.T. 104.

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Riparian Rights:-
(i.) C. A.—Rirer Bed-Alteration—Adjoining Lands–Accretion.--A portion

of the bed of a river, which becomes dry during part of the year, does

not by accretion become the property of the adjoining riparian owner. —Hindson v. Ashby, L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 1; 74 L.T. 327.


(ii.) Q. B. D.-Postage Stamps—Possession of Die - “Lawful Excuse”—

Post Office (Protection) Act, 1884, s. 7.—The respondent, whose bona fides was admitted, had in his possession, for purposes of illustration, a die capable of making a representation of a current colonial postage stamp. Held, that he had no “lawful excuse,” and was liable to the penalty imposed by sect. 7 of the Post Office (Protection) Act, 1884. —Dickens v. Gill, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 310; 75 L.T. 32.

(iii.) Q. B. D.—Income Tax-Colliery–Contributions to Strike Compensation

Fund-Income Tar Act, 1842, s. 100, sch. D.—The Court disallowed a claim of colliery owners in income tax returns to deduct from profits the average excess of their contributions to a strike indemnity fund over the amounts received by them as indemnities.— The Rhymney Iron Co., Limited v. Fowler, L.R. (1896] 2 Q.B. 79.

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tide Traveller Revenue Act, 1867, ss. 1, 3, 17.—The respondents were secretaries of provincial “watch clubs,” the members of which paid a weekly sum, and in consideration the successful drawer at a periodical ballot received a watch from the proprietors who were London tradesmen. Held, that the respondents came within sect. 17 of the Revenue Act, 1867, as persons who “solicit, take, or receive any order” for excisable articles without a licence, and did not come within the exemption as bond fide travellers.–Killick v. Graham; Linton v. Burchell, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 196; 75 L.T. 29.

. B. D.—Stamp Duty on “Annuity or Sum Periodically Payable”— Stamp Act, 1891, Schedule.—By an agreement terminable by three months' notice the manager of an hotel was to receive all the profits on paying a weekly sum to the proprietor. Held, that the “sum periodically payable” within the terms of the Stamp Act was the sum payable for one week only.—Clifford and Another v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 187; 74 L.T. 699.

. B. D.—Stamp Duty—Licence to Use Patent in one of the Colonies— Stamp Act, 1891, s. 59, sub-s. 1, sch. 1.—A share of a patent and of a licence to use the patent in New South Wales was held to be an interest on property within the meaning of sect. 59, sub-sect. 1, of the Act.—The Smelting Company of Australia v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue, L.R. [1896] 2 Q.B. 179; 74 L.T. 694.

C. A.—Dog Licence-Exemption—Jurisdiction of Justices—Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1878, 8.22—Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, s. 16. —The granting of a certificate of exemption to the owner of a dog is within the discretion of the commissioners, and the justices have no jurisdiction to review their decision. The refusal to take out a dog licence is not an offence of a trifling nature within sect. 16 of Summary

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H. L.-Income Tax-Trade exercised within the United Kingdom— Assessment through Agent—Income Tax Acts, 1853, sch. D.; 1842, s. 41.Where orders were obtained within the United Kingdom by an agent there resident for a merchant in France who shipped the goods thence at the purchaser's risk, issued the invoices in his own name, and generally received the purchase money direct, it was held (reversing the judgment of the Court below—see Vol. 20, p. 54, iv.–Lord Morris dissenting), that the foreign merchant did not exercise his trade within the United Kingdom, so as to bring him within sched. D. of the Income Tax Act, 1852.—Grainger d: Son v. Gough, L.R. [1896] A.C. 325; 74 L.T. 435.

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H. L.—Portions to Children.—The rule of English law against double portions to children is not applicable to Scotland.—Johnstonev. Haviland, L.R. [1896] A.C. 95.

Settled Land:—

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C. D.—Power to Trustees to purchase particular Land–Settled Land Act, 1882, 8.33.—A power to trustees to purchase certain land at the request of the life tenant renders personal property in their hands “liable” to be so laid out within the meaning of sect. 33 of the Act.— Im. # Settled Estates; Hill v. Pilcher, L.R. [1896] 1 Ch. 962; 74 L.T. 460.

C. D.—Tenant for Life Lunatic—Annuity to Remainderman Overpaid— Claim for Return by Representative of Life Tenant.—By orders in lunacy an annuity was ordered to be paid out of settled estate to a remainderman for a limited period. The annuity was continued in error beyond the period and the remainderman mortgaged his estate. Held, that the personal representative of the life tenant was entitled to retain the overpayments with interest, notwithstanding the mortgage.—In re Langham; Otway v. Langham, 74 L.T. 611.

C. D.—Jointure—Portions.—A power of jointuring does not cover the creation of a rent charge in favour of the wife during the life of the husband. But a power conferred on the husband to charge the settled estate with portions for the children and with interest thereon by way of maintenance, may enable him to charge the estate, with payment to himself as guardian of the children of interest on their expectant portions.—In re De Hoghton; De Hoghton v. De Hoghton, L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 385; 74 L.T. 613.

C. D.—Will–Incumbered and Unincumbered—Estates Devised as a whole–Tenant for Life and Remainderman.—Where a testator devised incumbered and unincumbered estates as a whole to a tenant for life who mortgaged his interest to an insurance company who foreclosed, the company were held not to be entitled to give up the incumbered portions which were profitless, but to be bound to apply the income of the whole to paying off the interest of the mortgages on the incumbered parts.–Frewen v. The Law Life Assurance Co., L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 511; 75 L.T. 17.

Settlement :—

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Ch. D.—Mortgage for a Term-Premature Repayment with a ForfeitRights of Tenant for Life and Remainderman to Accretion.—The trustees of a fund, which was settled on a person for life with remainder in fee to others, invested it on mortgage with a covenant that it should remain undisturbed for a fixed period. By agreement it was redeemed before the period had expired on payment of a forfeit of one year's interest, in addition to the interest accrued due. Held, that the additional sum was capital and belonged to the remaindermen, –In re Searancke ; Simonds v. Huntington, 74 L.T. 339.

(i.) P. D.-Variation of Settlement-Extinguishment of Divorced Parents' Interest—Acceleration of Infant's Interest.—The Court on the ground that as infant's interest would be thereby accelerated, extinguished the interest on a marriage settlement of a husband from whom the wife had obtained a divorce with custody of the only child, notwithstanding that there was a power to her in such circumstances to raise a sum

which would nearly exhaust the value of the entire estate.—Creagh v. Creagh, 74 L.T. 430.

(ii.) C. D.—Determinable Life Interest—Settlor Subsequently Bankrupt— Forfeiture.—By a marriage settlement the settlor assigned property to trustees upon trust to pay to him until he should die, become bankrupt or assign or incumber the income, or do anything whereby any part of it would become payable to any other person. He became bankrupt after the sole surviving trustee had advanced to him part of the trust funds on a covenant to repay and indemnify. After the bankruptcy the trustee was compelled to make good the trust fund. On a question arising, it was held that the settlor's life interest had not determined previously to his bankruptcy.–In re Brewer's Settlement; Morton v. Blackmore, L.R. [1896] 2 Ch. 503; 75 L.T. 177.

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(iii.) C. A.—Collision—Raising Wreck—Expenses of Harbour Board and Conservators—Basis of Calculation—Damages in Nature of Demurrage.— The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board who were also the Conservancy Commissioners of the Mersey, were held entitled to recover as part of their damages the cost price of raising a lightship and a dredger, their property, which had been sunk in the harbour of Liverpool by the negligence of the defendants, and it was also held that interest on the original cost to the Board of their plant employed in the work was to form part of this cost price. But no allowance was made to them for the loss of use of the dredger while it was disabled. The rule laid down in the case of The Harrington followed.—The Emerald; The Greta Holme, L.R. [1896] P. 192; 74 L.T. 645.

(iv.) Q. B. D.—Charter Party—“Safe Port”—Evidence of Custom.—By a charter party a ship was to discharge all her cargo at one port to be named by the charterers, which was to be a safe port where she could enter dock safely and lie afloat at all times. The ship was ordered to discharge at Gloucester, but being of too great a draught to proceed thither, discharged all her cargo at the nearest safe point. Held, that the port named was not “safe" within the meaning of the charter party, and that evidence of custom of similar ships to lighten before proceeding to Gloucester was inadmissible.—Reynolds & Co. v. Tomlinson and Another, L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 586; 74 L.T. 591.

(v.) C. A.-Marine Insurance—Perils of the Sea-Judgment in Salvage

Suit—Evidence.—At the request of the master of a steam-vessel which

had consumed nearly all its coal, but which could have proceeded

under sail, towage was rendered to the incapacitated steamer. Salvage || || services were subsequently recovered. Held, that there had not been | | | | a loss by perils of the sea within the meaning of a time policy of - insurance; and that a judgment against a shipowner for salvage award is not evidence of loss by perils of the sea.—Ballantyne & Co. v. | | | | |

Mackinnon, 75 L.T. 95.

(vi) C. A.—Collision—Compulsory Pilotage—London District—Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854, s. 379 ' 1894, s. 625 (3)—Privy Council Order, Dec. 21st, 1871.—A British ship, loaded at Cardiff for the River Plate, and on the return voyage landed cattle in London, and took the rest of the cargo to Rotterdam. Held, that she was within the terms of sect. 625, sub-sect. 3, of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, as trading from a

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port in the London district to a port in Europenorth and east of Brest, and, therefore, was exempt from compulsory pilotage.—The Rutland, 75 L.T. 48.

(i.) P. D.—Shipwrecked Passengers–Forwarding by other Vessels—Salvage —Agency of Master.—Where at the request of the master of a stranded vessel the passengers were conveyed to their destination by other vessels, it was held that the life salvors had no claim against the owners of the stranded vessel, who were not under any obligation to forward the passengers to their destination after the ship was disabled, and that the master made the request as the agent of the passengers.—The Mariposa, 75 L.T. 54.

(ii) Q. B. D. & C. A.—Light Dues—Horses and Cattle on Deck– Measurement—Merchant Shipping Act, 1876, s. 23.—Horses and cattle carried on deck come within the words “other goods” in the 23rd sect. of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1876, and from vessels arriving in port so freighted the Trinity House are entitled to light dues calculated on the rectangular space occupied by the animals.— Richmond Hill Steamship Co. v. Corporation of Trinity House, L.R. [1896] 1 Q.B. 493; 2 Q.B. 134; 74 L.T. 380 and 75 L.T. 8.

(iii.) P. D.—Practice—Separate Salvors—Joinder of Claims—O. xvi., r. 1.— The practice of the Admiralty Court permits several salvors to join their claims in one action.—The Maréchal Suchet, L.R. [1896] P. 233; 74 L.T. 789.

(iv.) P. D.—Wages—Master's Lien-Mortgagee in Possession.—A master's lien for wages does not take priority of a mortgage debt the payment of which he has personally guaranteed.—The Bangor Castle, 74 L.T. 768.

(v.) P. D. & C. A.—Marine Insurance “at and from ”–Vessel Lost before Arrival at Loading Port.—An insurance was effected on freight “at and from ” any port on the west coast of South America. The policy was “to cover the freight from the time of the engagement of the goods, or after a shipping order has been issued, by the agent or his broker.” While on her way to load at a port within the terms of the policy, the ship was lost by perils insured against. Held, that the engagement clause must be construed, subject to the “at and from clause,” and as the vessel had not arrived at a loading port, the risk had never attached.—The Copernicus; Liverpool, Brazil and River Plate Steam Navigation Co. v. Holmes, L.R. [1896] P. 154, 237; 74 L.T. 431, 757.

(vi.) P. D. & C. A.—Collision-Bye-Laws of Harbour of Newport, 1894, Arts. 12 & 13–Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Art. 16.— Although an inward bound steamer had committed a breach of the bye-laws of the harbour of Newport in failing to enter the harbour as directed by Art. 13, it was held that this had not contributed to a collision which took place with an outward bound steamer, and that the latter was alone to blame. The Winstanley, 74 L.T. 432 and 75 L.T. 133.

(vii.) H. L.--Charter Party—Duty of Charterer to be Ready with Cargo.— A charterer is not bound in all cases to be ready with cargo to meet the possibility of an opportunity occurring for a ship to load out of her turn.—Little v. Stevenson & Co., L.R. [1896] A.C. 108; 74 L.T. 529.

(viii.) Q. B.—Marine Insurance—Life Salvage.—The crew, but no part of cargo, were rescued from a vessel which was insured in a Shipowners’ Protection Association against such risks as were not capable of being assured against by the usual form of Lloyd's policy, and the owner had to pay a sum of money to the life salvors. Held, that simple life salvage is not covered by the ordinary Lloyd's policy of

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