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of Nations has been worked out, no steps can be tolerated which would render that law at once inapplicable by falsifying its fundamental assumption. So we have to consider whether the principle of territorial sovereignty is seriously impaired by the recognition of the legality of landing troops or sailors, though in small numbers, in foreign dominions upon emergency. Unbiassed consideration-unless an admiration of the system by which various forms of human activity can exist and develop side by side, each in unquestioned security, can be termed a prejudicewill probably lead to the conclusion that it is. In the first place, the spectacle of a foreign military force exercising authority, under whatever circumstances and for whatever purposes, on the soil of a State, is enough to create, in the minds of the subjects of the latter, an impression that their own Government is not really independent. They feel that it has not that unlimited authority which they have attributed to it, but that it is liable, upon occasion, to the interference of foreign officials, and that not as an act of war, which everyone can understand, but as a measure of public order taken, to all appearance, in the exercise of some regular reserve jurisdiction.
The mass of the population do not draw delicate distinctions. Foreigners, they notice, step in and keep order when matters come to a head. The inevitable conclusion is that, when it suits them to do so, they will step in
The authority of the State is at once lowered, if not undermined, in the estimation of the unreflective body over whom its maintenance is of the utmost importance. Besides this, although the symbolic influence of the absolute immunity of territory upon the populace is surely, in these days, important enough—there is a further consideration of practical gravity. This lies in the unfortunate tendency of armed forces, when once they have obtained a footing on land to remain there. Examples, not few nor unimpressive, of this danger are the commonplaces of history. That of late there have been less frequent occasions of its occurrence is due to the very fact that nations have now for many years regarded the presence of foreign troops within their jurisdiction with peculiar jealousy. But it is still possible to instance cases in which a purely temporary occupation has run out into one to which no definite limit can be put. France threw troops into Chantabûn during the difficulty with Siam, to secure the fulfilment of a temporary purpose, which was carried out years ago; yet the tricolour still floats there. The forces of the same nation entered Tunis to exact satisfaction for an outragethey remain there until the French Government and the Bey recognise by common consent that the Government of the latter is capable of maintaining order; i.e., so far as appears, until the Tunisian calends. Lastly, there is the case of Corea ; there the Russian troops which were landed to guard the consulate of that empire must surely have been an important, if not a decisive, factor in the events which have given to Russia a share with Japan in the suzerainty of the distracted Hermit kingdom. In fact, the consequences arising from the admission of troops are nowhere more strikingly illustrated than in the whole course of proceedings in Corea from the moment that Japan claimed the right of sending soldiers there. China's treaty troops, Russian marines, detachments from miscellaneous collection of Western ships of war, all combined to overshadow whatever genuine Government Corea possessed.
It may be objected that these instances are all concerning States which are outside the inner circle of European diplomacy. Still, this does not affect the facts. The proposition that the intrusion of an armed force for a limited or temporary purpose is dangerously likely to lead to its use as a political engine, or to result in the undue
prolongation of its visit, would remain the same if such States as Corea and Tunis—not to speak of Siam-had absolutely no rights at all. And the most narrow interpreters of the scope of International Law will scarcely refuse to these nations the right to exist.
To turn to the other side of the question, foreigners who visit a strange country have usually the option of remaining at home; they go, as a matter of fact, prepared to take the risks of travel and those of residence in a land of unfamiliar customs and uncertain tranquillity ; or, if they rely on their knowledge of the place, and on their own favourable opinion of its safety, they can blame themselves alone, if their opinion turns out to be incorrect, and their knowledge limited. Such residents abroad have probably some idea that their own Government will do what it can to induce the authorities of the foreign State to treat them fairly, but they cannot expect that it will furnish them with direct protection by the use of force in the actual territory of the latter.
As to the protection of consulates similar remarks apply. These offices are, to a large extent, mere business agencies, and no harm can be done to them so serious as to justify the step of taking the duty of protecting them out of the hands of the territorial authority. The risk of confusing the limits of State jurisdiction which arises when organised bodies of foreign troops take it upon them to enforce order in a disturbed district, makes the advantages of such a proceeding seem small in comparison. The immediate effects of the presence of the force may be beneficial, but the ultimate results are anarchic.
Besides, foreign detachments might work without objection, under the supervision and at the orders of the executive authorities of the place.
In this case they might be accompanied by the latter, or in some other open way make it clear that their action is subject to their controlling direction ; for instance, by making frequent reports to them, or by displaying the national cockade. Upon this suggestion, however, the question arises whether such a loan of troops would be legal if made to a State which happens to be at war with another; and the point may at the same time be considered whether an unasked landing of troops for the suppression of disturbances is compatible with the duty which the Government which takes such a step owes to abstain -from affording military assistance to the enemies of the State in the dominion of which the disturbance has arisen.
The problem is essentially the same in either case. If the interference of the neutral was unasked it is more likely that the step was not taken out of an unfriendly spirit to the other belligerent; but this is not a matter of any importance, for a State is bound not to assist another which is at war with a third.
Whether these considerations have any bearing upon the events at present occurring in South-Eastern Europe, it is not intended here to discuss. The fundamental position of the existence of war between Greece and the Porte is itself matter for a volume. The present paper is only directed to pointing out two sources of danger which may become serious if steps are not taken to settle the law in their regard.
IV.-MASTERS IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION
OF THE HIGH COURT.
the chief clerks into the older title of Masters, will probably, looking at the history of the substituted title, not be received with unmixed feelings of satisfaction, yet it is most likely intended thereby to convey to the public that the holders of the title are in only a limited sense clerks; while, like the somewhat similar officials, the Masters in the Common Law Divisions, "the old faces under a new name,' exercise a jurisdiction of much importance to the suitors entitled to the property valued at many millions of pounds, which, as the expression is, is “in Chancery.” One difference between the new and the old “Masters" is unquestionably that while, at any rate during the later period of their existence, the former Masters were barristers, the chief clerks have been invariably selected from the solicitors' branch of the legal profession.
“The man in the street" has, generally speaking, been rather nebulous as to the principles, officials, and procedure of the equity side of the Courts, but a reference to its history shews that the Masters have attracted a considerable share of public attention, and, it must be confessed, that the reasons for the interest of the public in the office have been little creditable to the holders of it, or to those having authority to confer it upon them. Its history is one, however, commencing in remote antiquity. The assertion has been made, whether on reliable authority may perhaps be doubted, that the earlier Masters advised the Saxon Witan and the Council under the Normans and earlier Angevin sovereigns of the country. Coming to a later period and more dependable authority it may be stated that all