ALEXANDER & SHEPHEARD, LONSDALE BUILDINGS, CHANCERY LANE, W.C State a Arden. H Arnott v Avery's Rankes v Bannaty graph ( Barker v Re, 10 Cox, Patters Dickson v Gre Co, 123 Dyott v Nevill Easton Londo Easy, Re, Ex pa Galstrom v Tall Gowany Wright. Hall v Bromley, 4 Hamill v Lilley, 3 Harris v Rothwe Harsant v Blain 558 Harwood, Re, 442 Hastings, Re, Hal Helmore v Smith, Hockey Hume, Re. 232,93 Indus, The, 123 Irwell v Eden, 321 Kurtz v Spence, 62 Knight y Coales, 567 Ladywell Mining Co well Mining Co v H Lancashire Cotton Ex parte Conelly, 4 Lea Facey, 642 Lever v Goodwin, 492 Linwood v Andrews, ' Journal , Allcard v Skinner, 634 Apthorpe v Apthorpe, 461 Little, Re, (91 REPORTS OF CASES. London Celluloid Co, Re, 10 Vincent v Vincent, 252 Walbrook & Co, v Jones and Lewis, CO Mallet v Hanley and Another, 141, 343 Arbitration between Secretary of Maple & Co v Earl of Shrewsbury, State and Fletcher, Re, 200 Arden, Re, 675 Arnott v Hayes, 676 Avery's Patent, Re, 263, 643 Bankes v Small, 591, 624 Bannatyne v Direct Spanish Telegraph Co, 76 Barangah Oil Refining Co, Re, 607 Barnetts, Hoares, & Co v South Lon- Birmingham and District Land Co v Biscoe v Jackson, 410 Blake v Mayor and Corporation of Bolton v Natal Land and Colonization Co, 703 Boswell v Coaks, 811 Bray v Gardener, 231 Buckmaster v Buckmaster, 281 Calvert v Thomas and Lloyd, 557 Campbell v Campbell, 378 Casebourne & Co v Houston & Co and Avery & Co, 659 Challender v Royle, 676 Clarke, Re, Coombe v Carter, 676 Clough, Re, Bradford Commercial Joint-Stock Banking Co v Cure, 269 Coleman v Llewellyn, 75 Collier v Chadwick, 27 Commercial Bank of South Australia, Re, 10 Counsell v London and Westminster Loan and Discount Co, 702 Cox, Patterson, & Co v Bruce & Co, 108 Crears v Hunter, 612 Crompton v Anglo-American Brush Electric Light Corporation, 363 Crosby, Re, Munns v Burn, 231 Crossley, Re, Munns v Burn, 347 Crowther v Elgood, 252 Croydon Union, Guardians of v Guar dians of Reigate Union, 507 Dadswell v Jacobs, 200 Davies Brothers & Co v Davies, 691 Dickson v Great Northern Railway Dyott v Nevill, 253 Easton v London Joint-Stock Bank, 76 Esdaile v City of London Union, 642 Falcke v The Scottish Imperial Assurance Co, 109 Furber v Cobb, 330 Gapp v Bond, 477 Goldstrom v Tallerman, 60 Goring v Lloyd, 316 Gowan v Wright, 141 Grey, Re, Acason v Greenwood, 316 Hall v Bromley, 442 Hamill v Lilley, 362 Harris v Rothwell, 392 691 Martin, Re; Land, Building, Investment, and Cottage Improvement Co v Martin, 232 Marrett, Re, Chalmers v Wingfield, 575 Mills' Estate, Re, 41 Mineral Water Bottle Exchange an 1 Trade Protection Society v Booth & Co, 703 Morgan, Re, Owen v Morgan, 477 Morgan v Hardy (Fothergill, third party), 346 Mowatt v Castle Steel and Ironworks Muffett, Re, Jones v Mason, 442 Mysore Reefs Gold Mining Co, Re, 10 Nathan, Newman, & Co, Re, 253 New City Constitutional Club, Re, 232 Newman & Co v Pinto & Sons, 558 Newport (Monmouth) Slipway Co v Paynter, 45 Norman and Another v Ricketts, 124 North Central Wagon Co v Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Co, 124, 300 North and South-Western Junction Official Receiver (as Trustee of Izon, a Oriental Bank Corporation, Re, 507 Owens College, Manchester v Overseers of the Poor of Chorlton-upon-Medlock, 200 Palliser v Gurney, 643 Parker, Re, and Beech's Contract, 252 Picker v London and County Banking Co (Limited), 315 Pike, Sons & Co v Ongley and Thorn ton 377 Platt, Re, 607 Price, Re, 201 Proctor v Bennis, 691 Purkiss v Holland; Cooper, Claimant, 702 Purser v Worthing Local Board, 477 Reg. (on the Prosecution of J. Pritchard) v the Mayor and Corporation of Bangor, 108 Reg. v Judge of the Chelmsford Reid v Explosives Co (Limited), 441 Harsant v Blaine, Macdonald, & Co, Sailing Ship Garston Co v Hickie, Bor 558 man & Co, 27 "Sara," The, Baker v Owners of Ship "Sara," 574 Schneider v Bond, 426 Sheppard v Scinde, Punjaub, and Sion College, Re, Ex parte Corporation of London, 378 South Wales Mineral Railway Co v Davies, 110 Spencer's Will, Re, 691 Strangways, Re, Hickley v Strangways, 75 Swanston, Re (an Infant), 427 Swindell and Another v Bulkeley and Commercial Bank of South Australia, Another, 124 Symonds v Symonds, 591 Van Duzer's Trade-Mark, Re; Re Critchley's Trust's, Re, 575 395 Darlington Forge Co, Re, 217 Direct Spanish Telegraph Company (Limited), Re, 142 District Bank of London, Re, 427 Dudley's, Countess of, and London and North-Western Railway Co's Contract, Re, 317 E. C. Powder Co (Limited), Re, 443 Easton v London Joint Stock Bank, 812 Eden v Weardale Iron and Coal Co, 302 Edmonds v Blaina Furnaces Cɔ, 553 Falcke v Scottish Imperial Insurance Fairlamb and others v Beaumont, 272 Fawcett v Urwin, 331 Fenessy v Rabbits & Sons, 316 Foli v Devonshire Club, 592 Fox v Rothwell, 303 France, Re, France v Clark. 23 Fraser v Province of Brescia Steim Fusee Vesta Co, v Bryant & May, 201 Gaulard and Gibbs' Patent, Re, 181 Gibbons' Trusts, Re, 677 Goodfellow v Prince, 201 Goodman v Robinson, Brown, Janson, & Co, 127 Gray, Re, Acason v Greenwood, 28 Great Western Steamship Co (Limited), Re, 61 Gregson, Re, Christison v Bolam, 592 Gregson's Trusts, Re, 94 Grimmett's Trusts, Re, 269 Guilbert-Martin v Kerr & Jubb, 62 Hall v Comfort, 29 Hanley and Another v Mallett, 61 Hargrave v Kettlewell, 110 Harris, G (deceased), Re, Harris v Harris, 443 Harris v Rothwell, 27 Harrison, Re, Parry v Spencer, 126 Harrison v Harrison, 319 Hartley, Re, Stedman v Dunster, 303 Harvey v Oliver, 644, 679 Hastings, Re, Hallett v Hastings, 60 Keily v Stevens, 125 y Mayor of Liverpool, 318 Reeve v Fowle, 29 Keswick Old Brewery Co (Limited), Reichel v Bishop of Oxford, 184 Kewney v Attrill, 142 King v Chamberlayne, 679 Knight, Re, Knight v Burgess, 285 Lambert, Re (deceased), 125 Land, Building, Investment, and Cot- Leigh v Leigh, 91 Leslie v Cave, 11, 380 Lever & Co, v Goodwin Bros, 110 London and Provincial Electric Light- London and Yorkshire Bank (Limited), London, Mayor and Corporation of, Ex Lysaght, Re, Blythev Baumgartner, 233 591 Rhodes, Re, Rhodes v Rhodes, 677 Richards, Re, Shenstone v Brock, 592 Roberts, Re, Evans v Thomas, 558 Ruddiman's Trusts, Re, 271, 331 St Botolph without Bishopsgate Parish Schmidt's Trade-Mark, Re, 234 Scott (otherwise Sebright) v Sebright, 62 Neath Harbour Smelting and Rolling Thomas v Exeter Flying Post Co, 365 Works (Limited), Re, 427 Newbegin (deceased), Re, 660 New Hollingbourne Paper Mills Co, Newport (Mon) Slipway Co (Limited', Nixon, Edward, Re, 91 North Brazilian Sugar Factories (Limited), Re, 125 Northumberland, Duke of, v Bowman 479 Oakey & Sons v Dalton, 591 Olley v Fisher, 95 Ongley v Chatham Local Board, 576 Parkinson, Re, In the Matter of a Partington, Re, Partington v Allen, 704 Payne, Re, Rea v Ashmead, 317 Pearce, Re, McLean v Smith, 285 Thompson, In the Goods of, 181 Toogood's Trusts. Re, 493 Turner, In the Goods of, 112 Union Bank of London v Kent and United Telephone Co, v Walker, 155 Veale & Co, v Automatic Boiler Feeder Vernon v Hallam, 111 Warden, Re, Browett v Warden, 234 Petre (Lord), Re, Lord Petre v Petre, Whiteley v Barley, 364 Penny v Hanson, 318 Pereira, Re, 560 --v Andrews, 217 Phipps v Jackson, 286 Phosphor Bronze Co, v Gospel Oak Pierce v Williams; Jones, Claimant, 29 Pilsen Joel and General Electric Light Pommery v Apthorpe, 143 Purret and Green v Duke of Bedford, Reg. v Judge of City of London Court, 95 Whistler and Richardson, Re, 559 Williams, Re, Jones v Williams, 678 York, Re (deceased), Atkinson Solicitors' Cases. Allen, Re, 78, 185 V Blair and Girling v Cordner, 560, 662 Brown v Great Western Railway Co, Castle (G.), Re, 560 Corsellis, Re, Lawton v Elwes, 256 Curtis and Betts, Re, 578 D'Aragon, Ex parte, In the Matter of Ford v Incorporated Law Society, 450 Grey's Brewery Co, Re, 219 Herbert, Re, 235 Hester v Hester, 203 Hettihewage Siman Appu v Queen's Re, 479 Litchfield v Jones, 693 London, Mayor, &c, of, Ex parte, Re Macdougall v Knight, 332 Park, Alfred (Solicitor), Re, Ex parte Pretty and Others v Fowke, 693 Solicitor, In the matter of a, 63 Sykes, Re (Deceased), 185 Bankruptcy Cases. V Broderick, Ex parte, Re Beetham, 349 Lindsey, Ex parte, Re Bates, 560 Nelson, Ex parte, Re Hockaday, 203 Fassett, Re, Wells v Dearle, 799 Firth, Re, Firth v Clarke, 781 Forest Iron and Steel Co, (Limited) v Hallett v The Marquis of Bristol, 731 Howe Machine Co (Limited), The, 762 Jonas v Long, 717, 727 Law (WF) and John Nichol's & Co, Longbottom v Woodhead, 796 Middlesex Manufacturing Co (Limited) Munson v Odiam; Munson v Jordan; Pedder v Eiloart, 705 Preston v Etherington; Etherington Shingleton Ice Co (Limited), Re, Bett 744 Taunton v Falla, 762, 772 Thompson v The Mayor and Corporation of Stratford-upon-Avon, 772 Timson v Wilson, 745 Tucker v Prior, 784 West of England Paper Mills Co (Limited), Re, 714 Wood's Ships' Woodite Protection Co (Limited), Re, 726 CASES REPORTED THIS WEEK. Co In the Solicitors' Journal. Blaiberg v. Beckett 9 ། Commercial Bank of South Aus tralia, Re 10 Cadman v. Cadman V on of Elmley Hubbard, Ex parte. In re Hardwick Lewis v. Ramsdale Reg. v. Inhabitants of Southampton LONDON, OCTOBER 30, 1886. CURRENT TOPICS. MR. ROBERT SEPPINGS GODFREY has been appointed a Registrar of the Supreme Court, to act in the Chancery Division, in succession to Mr. FARRER, resigned. THE CONSOLIDATED Bankruptcy Rules were published towards the close of last week. They constitute a bulky volume of 200 pages, and are, in the main, an incorporation of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1883, and the rules subsequently made under the Bankruptcy Act. We were enabled to point out in advance the only changes of any importance, in our articles, 30 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, pp. 781, 793. The Consolidated Rules came into operation on Monday last, and although the alterations made in the previous rules are trifling, we think that the profession has some reason to complain of the very short interval which elapsed between the publication of the rules and their coming into opera tion. WE PUBLISH elsewhere a new order, made on Monday last, as to fees and percentages in respect of proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, in substitution for the order issued at the close of 1883. As soon as that order appeared we pointed out the large increase in many of the charges upon the amount charged upon similar proceedings under the Act of 1869. Several of the fees to which we then drew particular attention are now modified. Thus, the fee on applications for discharge is now reduced from £2 to £1 10s., which is to include the expense of Gazetting; and the ad valorem fee upon an application to the court to approve a scheme or composition has been reduced to 2s. 6d. on each £25 of estimated assets or amount of composition above £5,000. But the greatest change is in the portion of the scale relating to the celebrated £6 per cent. on the net assets realized or brought to credit by the official receiver. This fee is now to be estimated on a sliding scale, falling from £5 per cent. on the first £1,000 to £1 when above £10,000; and it is to be chargeable on the net assets after deducting sums paid to secured creditors in respect of their securities. There is added another sliding scale percentage on the amount distributed as dividend by the official receiver when acting as trustee under adjudications, schemes or compositions; and fees are added for the official receiver acting as interim receiver, and for the official receiver supervising a special manager, or the carrying on of a debtor's business. The provisions of the direction as to stamps affixed to the former order are now altered and amplified by a separate order. THE LAMENTED DEATH of Lord MONKSWELL will not render necessary any further judicial appointments. It is upon the death of two paid members of the Judicial Committee, not upon the death of one, that such appointments may be made. The Judicial Committee Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 91), provided for the appointment of four paid members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The power to appoint successors was limited 6 to two years after the passing of the Act; but the Appellate 7 Jurisdiction Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 59), s. 14, provides that, whenever any two of these paid judges shall have died or resigned, her Majesty may successively appoint a third and fourth Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, to serve in the House of Lords as official peers and salaried judges to reinforce the two "Lords of Appeal in Ordinary," who, under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, sit in the House of Lords. The four paid members of the Judicial Committee originally appointed were Lord PEACOCK. The first double vacancy was created in 1881 by the MONKSWELL, Sir M. SMITH, Sir JAMES COLVILE, and Sir BARNES retirement of Sir M. SMITH subsequent to the death of Sir JAMES COLVILE in 1880. Lord MONKSWELL is only the first of the second pair of paid Judicial Committee judges, and the practical union of the House of Lords and Judicial Committee into one court, so far as the personnel of judges obliged to sit is concerned, which it was the object of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act to bring about, will not be consummated until Sir BARNES PEACOCK should complete the second double vacancy. THE CONTROVERSY to which Lord MONKSWELL'S appointment gave rise, though dating so far back as 1871, will still be fresh in the minds of our readers. The Judicial Committee Act provided that the person appointed should be "specially qualified" by being or having been "judge of one of the superior courts." Sir R. COLLIER sat a few days in the Court of Common Pleas for the mere purpose of gaining a qualification, and the late Lord Chief Justice of England the Act. strenuously and properly contended that this was an evasion of Sir R. COLLIER, we may remark, sat long enough to deliver two reported judgments (see Townshend v. Marylebone Overseers (7 C. P. 143) and Ford v. Boon (1b. 150), both of them registration cases. Singularly enough he seems never to have been made a serjeant. His name finds no place in the list of serjeants to be found in Pulling's "Order of the Coif," at p. xvii., though, curiously enough, we believe that he was described in the Gazette as serjeant. THE ANXIETY to obtain an allotment of shares in "Arthur Guinness, Son, & Co., Limited," has led to much discussion as to the duty of the directors in allotting the shares among the numerous applicants. It has been contended that the direc tors have no discretion in the matter, but are bound to allot the shares pro ratá among all the applicants. The advocates of this view appear to rest their contention on the notion that the prospectus constitutes an offer of shares, which offer is accepted, and a contract constituted, by the application for shares. But in Re Richmond Hill Hotel Co., Pellatt's case (2 Ch. 527), Lord CAIRNS said, "that where an individual applies for shares in a company, there being no obligation to let him have any, there must be a response by the company, otherwise there is no contract." The prospectus is, in fact, nothing more than an invitation for offers to take shares (see Spencer v. Harding, 5 C. P. 561). It appears to be forgotten that a discretion as to allotment of shares is almost always expressly vested in the directors by the articles of association of a company. The articles of "Arthur Guinness, Son, & Co." provide (article 7 (2)) that, "The authorized share capital of the company (and forfeited or surrendered shares) may be issued by the board to such persons, at such times, and on such terms, as to discount or otherwise, and for such purposes of the company, as they see fit." THE " OBJECTS CLAUSE in the memorandum of association of "Arthur Guinness, Son, & Co., Limited" (perhaps owing to the decision in Guinness v. Land Corporation of Ireland, 22 Ch. D. 349), certainly does not err on the side of restriction. There are no fewer than fifteen "objects" specified, in addition to the usual general clause at the close of the specification. They include power to "act as bankers"; to "undertake, subscribe to, or otherwise aid undertakings for purposes of opening out trade or making experiments or investigations in connection with any of the objects of the company, or any class or department of its business, directly or indirectly"; and a cla use, the like of which we have not seen before, which provides that one of the objects of the company shall be:"To provide for the welfare of persons in the employ ment of the company, or formerly engaged in any business acquired by the company, and the wives, widows, and families of such persons, by grants of money, pensions, or other payments, and by providing or subscribing towards schools and places of recreation or otherwise, and hospitals, dispensaries, medical and other attendance, and other assistance as the company shall think fit, and to form, subscribe to, or otherwise aid benevolent, religious, scientific, national, or other institutions or objects which shall have any moral or other claims to support or aid by the company by reason of the locality of its operations or otherwise." THE RETIREMENT of Mr. ANDERSON, Q.C., from the office of Official Referee seems to render it open to the authorities to reconsider the number of the Official Referees. By section 83 of the Judicature Act, 1883, it is provided that "there shall be attached to the Supreme Court permanent officers called official referees, for the trial of such questions as shall, under the provisions of this Act, be directed to be tried by such referees. The number and the qualification of the persons to be so appointed from time to time, and the tenure of their offices, shall be determined by the Lord Chancellor, with the concurrence of the presidents of the divisions of the High Court, or a majority of them (of which majority the Lord Chief Justice of England shall be one) and with the sanction of the Treasury"; and by section 84 "all officers assigned to perform duties with respect to the Supreme Court generally "-which term appears to include official referees-"shall be appointed by the Lord Chancellor." When the Act of 1873 came into force there were established five divisions of the High Court, but on the occasion of the merger of the Common Pleas and Exchequer Divisions into the Queen's Bench Division under Order in Council of December, 1880, it was provided that the Lord Chief Justice of England should exercise all the powers formerly exercised by the presidents of the merged divisions. The number and qualification of the official referees, therefore, seems to rest with the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, and the President of the Probate, &c., Division, with the sanction of the Treasury, while the appointment is to be made by the Lord Chancellor. SIR WILFRID LAWSON tells "the whole body of brewers," through the columns of the Times, that he "sees no reason whatever to alter his practice in dealing with applications for licences; that practice being to refuse them all, unless evidence is laid before him which convinces him that by granting them he should be benefiting the public, whose servant he is, and not the servant of the brewers," and we are probably entitled to assume that no evidence would convince Sir WILFRID LAWSON that he would be benefiting the public The by granting a licence for the sale of intoxicating liquors. The question as to how far justices of the peace are justified in refusing to consider whether a discretion ought to be exercised in a particular way upon the ground that they conscientiously believe that to exercise it in that way, though according to law, would be undesirable, appears to be conclusively answered by Reg. v. Boteler (12 W. R. 466), in which justices were compelled to issue a distress warrant in a case in which they had declined to do so on the ground that the statute (2 & 3 Vict. c. 84) empowering them to act was unjust, COCKBURN, C.J., pointing out that the justices had no business to enter into any such consideration. particular question arising upon the construction of the Licensing Acts, which is not quite so clear, has two branches, that connected with the refusal of (1) the general licence, to which Sir W. LAWSON's more recent declarations apply; and (2) the occasional licence, out of the refusal of which the controversy originally sprung. As to the general licence, this, by section 1 of the Licensing Act, 1828, is granted to such persons as the justices in the execution of the powers of that Act, and in the exercise of their discretion, deem fit and proper." It is clear from Reg. v. Walsall Justices (3 C. L. R. 100) that every applicant for a licence is entitled to a hearing, and that to refuse a licence merely in pursuance of a general resolution to grant no more licences is so far illegal that a mandamus will issue to compel the justices to hear and determine the application at another meeting, but so long as each applicant has a formal hearing, the reasons of the bench for refusing the general licence appear to be quite immaterial in point of law. As to the occasional licence, the words of the statutes (25 Vict. c. 22, s. 13, and 26 & 27 Vict. c. 33, e. 20) are different, and are bare of judicial interpretation. By these enactments "it shall be lawful for the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, whenever they shall think it conducive to public convenience, comfort, and order, and with the consent in writing of a justice of the peace usually acting at the petty sessions for the petty sessional division within which the place of sale is situate," to authorize an excise officer to grant an occasional licence authorizing the holder to sell upon other than licensed premises, and " upon the occasion of any public dinner or ball to sell liquors during such hours, before or after sunrise or sunset, as shall be allowed and specified in that behalf in the consent " to be given by the justice for the granting of such occasional licence. In this case the Inland Revenue authorities take the initiative, and the justice of the peace has first a veto, and secondly, in the case of a dinner or ball, the power of extending a special privilege. In either case the functions of the justice of the peace appear to be ministerial rather than judicial, and it may be doubted whether, even if the most anti-liquor reasons were avowed by the non-consenting justice, a rehearing could be forced from him, or a selection of ball and dinner hours could be enjoined upon him by any legal proceedings whatever. 66 THE RECENT CASE before the Liverpool magistrates, in which the sons of a woman, divorced on the ground of her adultery and without any provision for maintenance, were ordered to contribute to the support of their mother, has drawn attention to the provision of 43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 7, that" the father and grandfather, and the mother and grandmother, and the children of every poor, old, blind, lame, and impotent person, or other poor person not able to work, being of a sufficient ability, shall at their own charges relieve and maintain every such poor person." The Liverpool bench do not seem to have agreed with Serjeant SELLON's remark (4 East. 79) that the obligation to maintain imposed by the statute is "founded on the law of nature," and they are reported to have expressed an opinion that the case was a hard one for the sons, probably because the mother had not bestowed on them the usual maternal attention and oversight, and had by her own act forfeited the right to support by the father, who is still living. But it is to be remembered, on the other hand, that the statutory obligation is mutual, and that if the cases had been reversed, and the "impotent persons" had been the children, the mother, if "of sufficient ability," would have had to contribute to the support of children who might have cast her off. A case of even greater hardship came before the court in R. v. Munden (1 Stra. 190), where an order had been made by justices to compel a husband to support his wife's mother. This iniquitous order was reversed |