Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I would give my personal assurance to the Senator from Oregon, if he is to be absent for only a few minutes, that I would not make such a request, and would not object to the request he has made.

I would object to a request for blanket coverage in the case of objection to the holding of any committee meetings in the future; but if the Senator from Oregon is required to go to his office for a few minutes this afternoon, he has my personal assurance that no request of that sort will be made by me; and I will communicate with him before agreeing to such a request.

Mr. MORSE. I thank the Senator from California.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO

PRIATIONS, 1954

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. 5969) making appropriations for the Department of Defense and related independent agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1954, and for other purposes.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield to me?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, Mr. President, this is the fifth time that I have tried to commence my remarks; but I am glad to yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. President, I was most impressed with the remarks made by the senior Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], for whom I have as much respect as I have for any Member of the Senate or, for that matter, for anyone anywhere else. He pointed out the tremendous amount of money that was being put into the Air Force and into the other services. I agree with him that it is a critical problem with which we have to live.

He also mentioned a paper which he had, showing a great deal about aircraft production. With his approval, I may suggest there is another paper which, with the approval of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I shall be glad to arrange to have the Senator see.

I was so shocked by the testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

with respect to the relative strength of the Soviet Air Force, as estimated by ourselves and our allies, as against the strength of our own Air Force, which showed that in many categories of combat airplanes the Russians have excelled us, that I had a confirming document forwarded to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, which he has in the offices of that committee. The long and the short of it is that it shows, in my opinion, that the Soviet has an air force superior to that of our own. For that reason, I had hoped that, even though a large amount is involved in the program, the program itself would not be retarded. With the approval of the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, I am sure that if any Senator would like to see the confirming document I requested from the Depart

ment of Defense, it would be in order for it to be shown him by the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I may say that the distinguished Senator from Missouri made that suggestion to me yesterday, and I said that, of course, whatever any Senator wanted to see, he would be welcome to see, and that if he desired to use it for any proper purpose he might feel free to do so.

I desire to confine my remarks for a few moments to the Air Force budget. I do not intend at this time to discuss the budget in general, nor do I intend to discuss the language of the amendments, to one of which I object very strenuously.

Mr. President, there has been much public discussion concerning the differences between the Air Force budget proposed by President Truman and that now proposed by President Eisenhower and included in this bill. Let me first and included in this bill. Let me first state just as emphatically as I can state it that I am first and foremost for a strong Air Force, an Air Force both offensively and defensively that can prooffensively and defensively that can protect and maintain our national security. On this point I am sure there is no difference between the proponents and the opponents of the Eisenhower budget. Every one of us wants to protect the Every one of us wants to protect the security of our country. The basic difference is how much money should be included in the appropriations bill we now have under consideration for the

Air Force.

How much money can be practically spent and obligated during fiscal 1954? If we cannot profitably obligate it, then it seems to me obvious there is no reason to appropriate it at this time. The appropriation bill now before you, as recommended by the Appropriations Committee of the Senate, provides $11,247,862,500 of new funds for the Air Force during fiscal 1954. This amount after long and careful consideration by the committee, and only after hearings conducted over a period of almost 2 months, is only $40,137,500 less than the amount requested in the revised estimates submitted by the new administration. It is true, however, that the amount being recommended by the committee is $4,830,137,500 less than the amount in the Truman printed budget.

Of this amount, I particularly desire to speak on $3.095 billion, the reduction in aircraft funding and initial shares. These amounts exclude consideration of any funds for military public works which are not included in the bill now before the Senate, but which represent an additional $700 million in the Truman budget as compared with $400 million in the revised budget request.

Let us consider for a moment what the Eisenhower budget will allow in regard to airpower. For June 1954, the new budget will produce 114 Air Force wings. Under the Truman budget, while 133 were scheduled, the best estimate is that only 117 wings would probably have been attained. This included 17 troopcarrier wings, whereas the new budget only includes 12, thus giving it a higher percentage of combat types.

However, under the new budget we are scheduled to have in 1954 modern airscheduled to have in 1954 modern aircraft for seven Air National Guard and

Air Reserve wings. Air Reserve wings. Under the Truman budget no modernization was contemplated for civilian components.

By June 1955 the new budget will maintain 120 wings. Under the Truman budget, 137 modern wings were scheduled for that time. However, this included 17 troop-carrier wings, whereas the new budget includes only 14. Moreover, the Air National Guard and Air Reserve in the new budget are expected to have about 23 wings equipped with modern, first-line aircraft. No modernization for civilian components was contemplated under the Truman budget.

Air Force combat aircraft scheduled for delivery in the period July 1, 1953, to December 31, 1955, are increased by at least 75 aircraft in the budget submitted by President Eisenhower in May, as compared with the January budget of the previous administration. This is almost enough aircraft to equip a modern fighter wing. Adjustments have been made in support-type aircraft, which include trainers, transports, helicopters, and liaison aircraft, resulting in a net reduction of about 1,150. This has resulted from changes in requirements, elimination of duplication, and elimination of procurement of special mission aircraft.

To summarize, not a combat plane for combat units that we want will be taken out of production in fiscal 1954 or fiscal 1955 due to lack of money. In fact, the number of combat planes scheduled for delivery to the Air Force in the 30-month period ending December 1955 will be higher than in the Truman budget. Such production cuts as occur will be primarily in support types-transports, trainers, helicopters, and so forth-as a result of changes in requirements, elimination of duplication, and elimination of procurement of special mission aircraft.

At this point I wish to refute an argument which has been made that the Eisenhower budget will have fighter planes and B-47's coming off the production line which will have to go into storage. That is simply not so. It is the plan of the Department of Defense this appropriation, first, to equip the to utilize the aircraft being financed by regular forces of the Department of the Air Force; second, to modernize the aircraft assigned to the National Guard and the Air Reserve; and, third, to utilize any additional aircraft of types not suitable for assignment to the Reserve components by assigning these aircraft to the operating squadrons. By this method it will be possible to keep all the new aircraft with operating units where they are needed.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield? Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield to the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. LONG. Will the Senator repeat for our benefit the number of wings of the Reserve and the Air National Guard units contemplated in the budget?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I may anwer that question by saying that, to the best of my knowledge, it will give the Air National Guard and the Air Reserve seven new modern fighter wings. That was not contemplated under the Truman budget.

Of

Mr. LONG. Having had occasion to study the Reserve bill, as chairman of the subcommittee conducting hearings on the Reserve bill last year, it was impressed upon the junior Senator from Louisiana that we would get more defense for our money through the reservists than through any other group. course, they would not be prepared to go out the first day war breaks out, but usually in any long war about 90 percent of those who are doing the fighting, of the frontline fighters, who wind up there, after having been civilians when the war broke out, are reservists or members of the National Guard. Only about 10 percent are in the Regular Establishment of fighting men. It will be found that in order to maintain reserves, it costs only about $1 to maintain a highly trained and ready reservist for every $6 it costs to maintain a regular in uniform.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would say in full answer to the question that the Air National Guard and the Air Reservists are expected to have approximately 23 wings equipped with modern firstline aircraft. No modernization for civilian types was contemplated under the Truman budget.

Mr. LONG. It has always seemed to me that we had no modern aircraft available for the many reservists and other patriotic Americans who are not in uniform day in and day out, but who are -anxious to come to the colors in case we are attacked. I am pleased to hear that it is contemplated that we have modern aircraft for those patriotic persons.

Mr. SALTQNSTALL. I am glad the I am glad the Senator feels that way, because it is the same way I feel.

Mr. President, it is the plan of the Department of Defense to utilize the aircraft being financed by this appropriation, first, to equip the Regular forces of the Department of the Air Force; second, to modernize the aircraft assigned to the National Guard and the Air Reserve; and, third, if the type of aircraft is not suitable for assignment to the Reserve components, to utilize these by assigning extra aircraft to the operating squadrons. By this method it will be possible to keep all the new aircraft with operating units and avoid placing them in storage.

We hear the statement that the Eisenhower budget will weaken a continental defense of the United States. As to that, there is no change expected in the number of interceptor wings in the new budget. There is no reduction either in the budgeting for radar net in either year. Under both the new budget and the Truman budget, the same number of antiaircraft battalions are scheduled for both years, with modernization progressing as guided missiles and new equipment becomes available.

What I have just stated is a brief summary of what the Eisenhower budget will do.

I should like to turn to another question. Let us call it "dollars versus airpower." One of the most obvious yet apparently overlooked facts is that the mere appropriation by the Congress of dollars does not in itself achieve air

power and defense. Many thousands of actions must be taken by the Air Force, by the whole Department of Defense, and by the country itself, before the dollars are translated into the sinews of defense-into airplanes, guided missiles, trained pilots and mechanics, runways, airfields, and all the rest of the hundreds of thousands of things that we must have for effective air supremacy. Perhaps it would be clearer to everyone if we simply said that even if the Congress voted to appropriate a trillion, instead of $11 billion to the Air Force, such an action would not be the same thing as manufacturing the airplanes, training the pilots to fly them, or building the bases on which they can land and take off. These latter things take time, a much longer period of time than it takes for the Congress to pass any appropriation bill. But even more important, if a war should come, as it did to us in 1941, it is not the dollars that win a war; it is the men and materials which a nation can throw into the fray that win a war. This is a fundamental principle of national defense and national economics.

Talking about the things our dollars are buying or have bought we confront the first serious doubt as to whether we have been doing as good a job as we should in building the air power of this country. Let me summarize in this connection what the record shows: Since the start of the Korean war in June 1950, the Congress has appropriated to the Air Force for the 3 fiscal years through 1953 a total of $58,749,081,000. Of this total, new funds made available through fiscal 1953, plus the $3,822,984,805 of funds carried over from years prior to fiscal 1951, the Air Force spent an estimated $34.1 billion. This leaves an unexpended balance on June 30, 1953, of about $28.5 billion. This large unexpended balance clearly indicates how, when a rapid buildup of forces is undertaken, appropriations have exceeded by many months the receipt of and payment for the planes, ammunition, airfields, and other military items which the dollars buy.

It is argued, however, that appropriations must be made by the Congress long enough in advance of actual spending to enable the Government to enter into contracts which will lead to the ultimate procurement of the things the dollars will pay for. This is true, of course, and the Congress has so authorized new obligating authority, but we have also authorized more new obligating authority than has been efficiently and economically used by the Air Force. I believe the record will show that we have literally "overfunded" the Air Force, in the sense that the Congress, in its sincere desire to provide the funds with which to build a powerful air arm, has provided more funds than the Air Force has been able to obligate effectively. The record shows that the Air Force has failed to obligate all of its funds in every single year since Korea. At the end of fiscal 1951, the Air Force failed to obligate as much as $1.1 billion of the total available to it for obligation that year; at the end of fiscal 1952, the unobligated funds of the Air Force amounted to $3.5 billion; and again for fiscal 1953, it is estimated

that the Air Force has failed to obligate $4.9 billion available to it during that year.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield? Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. LONG. Can the Senator tell us in what categories those unobligated funds happen to be? I was under the impression that at least $2 billion of that money was in airbase construction alone.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. As of June 30, 1953, funds continuing available in fiscal 1954 amount to $2,500,000,000 for aircraft and related programs; $7,548,000,000 in programs other than aircraft; and $1,712,000,000 in the acquisition of land and construction. There is, roughly, $4,700,000,000 unobligated.

Mr. LONG. The Senator is familiar with the fact that the rate at which the Air Force has been able to obligate funds for the construction of airbases has been running around a billion and a half dollars a year. So they have in that category almost enough money to last them a year and a half.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I may say to my distinguished friend that tomorrow afternoon the subject will be discussed before the Appropriations Committee because of the request for additional funds for the construction of bases this year.

The Army and Navy tell us they have sufficient money. The House believes the Air Force has sufficient money. But that question will arise.

Mr. LONG. The Senator is familiar with the fact that the statement of Mr. Creedon earlier this year was to the effect that when the Department of Defense made a study of the funds which the Air Force already had available for base construction, the conclusion of the Department at that time was in line with House recommendations.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. That is correct. Mr. MAYBANK. Mr. President, will

the Senator from Massachusetts yield? Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. MAYBANK. Do I correctly understand that the bill referred to by the Senator from Massachusetts is approved by the Budget Bureau and is going to the Armed Services Committee?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The bill which has been submitted for $530 million has been approved by the Bureau of the Budget, I am informed. Testimony brings out the fact that there is $730 million worth of cancellations and rescissions. There are sufficient funds in the Navy construction account and in the Army construction account so that no new money is asked. The President submitted a request for $400 million additional, which the House rejected, saying that the Air Force could use $242 million out of the money now available to build bases, and could then come back next year and ask for more money, if necessary.

Mr. MAYBANK. I have great respect for the President as Commander in Chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, but I do not understand why he is asking for any more funds for that purpose.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would say to my friend that the answer is that under new plans, with new types of airplanes,

new planes for the Navy, jets, and so forth, there are changes in presently authorized bases. There is only one new base involved in the whole request for $530 million.

money is needed, that is all I wish to know. I myself do not believe that any new money is needed.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. MAYBANK. In my appreciation and respect for the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, I only hope he will look into the matter carefully, as he always considers such matters. I respectfully say that I do not believe any additional money is needed.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I am not at all certain that any more new money is needed. I think changes are needed. The Committee on Appropriations will examine into the question carefully and decide whether any new money is needed.

certain about the matter.

Mr. MAYBANK. This subject poses for us a grave question. The Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] and other from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] and other Senators have raised the question on several occasions. Many bases were suggested or recommened that the Air Force itself did not approve or did not initiate.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I thank the Senator from South Carolina for his helpful remarks.

Mr. President, at this point I should like to have printed in the RECORD a table entitled "Estimated Expenditures and Amounts Available for Expenditure, Summary by Service," for the fiscal years 1953 and 1954, in billions of dollars. There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

curement lead time. Let me point out that delivery schedules for selected planes have had or still have slippages. I shall explain the word "slippage."

A time or a goal is set to have a certain number of planes by January 1, 1953, or January 1, 1954. A slippage occurs when that number of planes cannot be finished by the date set. After a slippage has occurred, a date further in the future is set to complete building the same number of planes.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield. Mr. DOUGLAS. Governmental terminology is a strange and wonderful thing. We are constantly inventing new terms, what I believe a Representative from Texas once called "governmental gobbledygook." Would the Senator from Massachusetts say that slippage is a failure to deliver?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Illinois in the matter of clarity of expression. I would simply add that failure to deliver may not mean failure to

Unexpended balance June 30, 1953.

Interdepartmental

Of which unobligated funds are. New obligational authority, as recommended by Senate Committee on Appropriations, H. R. 5969.

28.5 (4.9)

1.0 .6

Total available for expenditure..

Less estimated expenditures, fiscal year 1954.
Less estimated lapsed funds June 30, 1954..

Estimated unexpended balance June 30, 1954...

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, this table shows an overall total available for expenditure in the Department of Defense, as recommended in this budget, including unexpended balances, of $97 billion. Of this amount, $39,700,000,000 is for the Air Force, with an estimated unexpended balance for the Air Force on June 30 next of $24,400,000,000. I mention these figures to show the enormity of the totals involved.

Let us first look specifically at the places from which the cuts in the Eisenhower budget for aircraft procurement and initial spares have come. At this point, I should like to introduce a table which shows a breakdown of the entire $3,095,000,000 cut which I now want to discuss further.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Differences in funding for Air Force aircraft and initial spares between the Jan. 9, 1953, budget and the revised budget now before Congress

Differences in funding for Air Force aircraft and initial spares between the Jan. 9, 1953, budget and the revised budget now before Congress-Continued

[In millions]

3. Elimination of a trainer model which was marginal to the Air Force requirements and was in any case being eliminated by the Air Force_‒‒‒‒

4. Reduction in B-47 aircraft for training units_.

5. Reduction in financing of excessive lead times___

6. Elimination of increment A in January budget____.

7. Reductions by Air Force in jet spare engines____

Subtotal of eliminations or reductions__.

Items added:

1. Excess lead time left in revised budget.

2. Additional preproduction costs put in revised budget__.

$250

372 1, 602

233

165

4, 098

847

100

3. Contingency for procurement of long-lead-time items put in revised budget_--Subtotal of items added---- 1,003

56

Net reduction from January budget for "Aircraft and related procurement"---- 3,095 Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, the greatest part of the reduction is made by cutting out overfinanced pro

The total amount of eliminations or reductions shown in the table which I have just placed in the RECORD equal $4.098 billion: $1 billion for elimination of funds for aircraft not ready for production; $476 million for a reduction in the number of support-type aircraft; $250 million for the elimination of a trainer model which was marginal to the Air Force requirements; $372 million for the reduction in B-47's for training units; $1.602 billion reduction in financing of excessive lead times. But instead of cutting out $4.098 billion, the President's budget has only cut out $3.095 billion, leaving a billion dollars of what the Secretary of Defense believes is excessive lead time still in the revised budget.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. DOUGLAS. If the reduction in "slippage" is not so great as the Secretary of Defense has figured, this alleged economy will be purely a paper economy, is not that true?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Oh, no. I would say to my colleague that it is just the

other way. It has been figured that the slippage and the things that have been given up amount to a reduction of $4,095,000,000, but to play safe the budget has been dropped only $3,098,000,000.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Do I correctly understand that the Secretary of Defense has found more slippages than he did a while ago?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. He believes that he has $1 billion in aircraft procurement, for safety purposes. In other words, the slippages may be less than he has figured.

Mr. DOUGLAS. But he has figured a liberal slippage.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. He has figured the slippage on the basis of experience and what he knows up to the present time.

Mr. DOUGLAS. In other words, he is counting on the inefficiency of American producers to reduce the saving which otherwise would occur.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would add this remark: Of course, a certain part of these figures is based upon actual experience, and a certain part on calculations based upon experience.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Does my distinguished friend from Massachusetts know what kind of operation has suddenly transformed the inefficient plants under the recent administration to efficient plants under the new administration? As a former manufacturer I would be very much interested to know about that. Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would be very happy if I felt I could tell my colleague the answer to his question, which I would term a somewhat prejudiced question.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Would it be in order to ask whether the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts is as ignorant of this problem as I am, as to how this difficulty is to be corrected?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. A certain amount of these figures is based upon experience from last October through January of this year.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a further question?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. While the Senator was absent the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] pointed out that one of the chief slippages was in the former company of the new Secretary of Defense. Is it not fair to feel that if he could improve the other companies he could also improve his own?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I think I know what the Senator is coming to. I should say that I hope, now that the Secretary of Defense is out of all companies, that he will put the same pressure on every company.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I cannot specifically detail just what is happening on each production line for aircraft procurement, but I am convinced that Mr. Wilson and his associates will see that modern aircraft are produced within this budget efficiently and on time to build the greatest Air Force in the world

training rate in conformance with the higher end strength.

Senator SALTONSTALL. But the pilot-training rate could be increased in 1955 and 1957 and still have enough pilots in 1957 to take the 143 wings.

General PICHER. That is possible.

toward what the new Joint Chiefs of Staff decide is an adequate goal. Even the advocates of the Truman budget have admitted in essence that their original budget figure was too high and now believe that $353 million additional for aircraft procurement and initial spares is the proper figure to be added to the appropriations bill now before us. I respect their judgment. I know that they desire what I desire-the protection and security of our country through air power integrated with our other services. But I most respectfully point out in here to train the necessary pilots.

that I am confident the figures and facts. which I have stated do not bear out their contention that this additional appropriation is needed at the present time.

The question has also been raised by

opponents of the Eisenhower revised budget as to whether the appropriation for personnel in the Air Force has been cut too far. The revised budget called for $3.3 billion. The House cut this by $30 million, and this $30 million was restored by the Senate committee. You thus have before you in this bill the full revised estimate. This amount would pay, clothe, and feed an average of 970,000 people, starting with a strength of 980,000 and ending with a strength of 960,000. It calls for a pilot training program of 7,200 pilots. One of the questions which has been very much upon my mind is whether this personnel appropriation would be sufficient to train enough pilots to adequately handle the 120-wing interim Air Force, which is provided in this overall budget. Therefore, I took the opportunity in the hearings to ask Major General Picher, assistant for programing office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, whether in his opinion a 7,200 pilottraining rate as provided in this appropriation was sufficient. Before quoting the conversation which I had with General Picher, I might point out that it requires 62,600 personnel in direct support of a 7,200 pilot-training rate. I would now like to quote my conversation with General Picher-page 1342, hearings before Subcommittee on Appropriations of the Committee on Appropriations, 83d Congress:

General PICHER. The 7,200 pilot rate which we are now running at is adequate to furnish the pilot resources and crews that we need tied to the 120-wing interim program that we now have before us in this budget. The 143-wing force would require a pilot training rate of 12,000 a year and that would level off at 8,000 a year about 2 years after we had reached the built-up position.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Then carrying out your thought, if you reach the 143 wings by 1957, you will have built up to 12,000 pilots training a year to get that up there, somewhere between 1955 and 1957, would you not? General PICHER. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that by keeping it at 7,200 this year, we are not endangering the 143-wing goal by the time the airplanes are on the ground.

This conversation assured me in my own mind that there is sufficient money

Speaking of personnel, I would like to point out that the important thing in any of the military services is to see that the manpower which is provided in this effectively, and economically used for or any other appropriation is efficiently, purposes which are strictly military in nature and necessary. Today, for instance, the Air Force has 54.6 air police per thousand personnel based on a budget base of 1,061,000 personnel, which was the target as of approximately a year ago. This compares with 28 per thousand for the Army. In the Air Force it takes 150 people for each 100 men in training. In the Navy, the comparable figure is 67 for each 100 men in training, including flight training. In the Army, 42 for each 100 in training. I do not for a minute say that the Air Force should not properly have more men serving in a training capacity than the other services, but I certainly believe the ratio is too high in both these cases. I believe there are too many bands in the Air Force and I understand these are being drastically reduced. Of course bands are fine to have, but they take manpower and money and we have got to cut out wherever we can without impairing our national defense. This is one place where I believe this can be done. Some of the other categories that can be reduced are chauffeurs and maintenance personnel at bases, such as groundskeepers and grasscutters. I do not mean maintenance men on planes. If we do this, and do it with a real will, there will certainly be enough personnel to run the Air Force.

Having just mentioned the question of pilot training, I would like to touch on proficiency flying, as the House cut this program down to a point where it became very questionable as to whether its usefulness was not really destroyed. The Senate has restored this program, so that instead of the 48 hours a year allowed by the House, there will be a hundred hours a year. Certainly a hundred hours is the very minimum which enables a pilot to keep his hand in to fly any such complicated mechanism as a modern plane. Certainly we should not ask pilots to endanger their own lives and their crews' by not giving them sufficient proficiency flying, and by profipilots for the 143-wing Air Force by the ciency flying I do not refer to pilots who time you reach it; would we not? are charged to operations, or students, or any others in training. The eligible Senator SALTONSTALL. And still cut down pilots are merely officers with flying to the 7,200 this year? status who in order to get flight pay General PICHER. We are holding that. It must do at least 100 hours a year under is not a cutback. That is where we are. the Senate bill. I believe that it is exSenator SALTONSTALL. That we can do.

Senator SALTONSTALL. If we cut this way, we could build up the training program so that we would have the necessary number of

General PICHER. Yes.

General PICHER. We can hold the 7,200 tremely important to retain this proviwhich is adequate for the 120 wings.

If it

is decided that we are going to a higher rate then we would have to increase the pilot

sion. The Secretary of the Air Force has stated that he would carefully analyze the present regulations in order to

cut down on people who never would fly and therefore should not be entitled to flight pay. He has stated that he believed perhaps $15 million could be saved by these regulations. However, the Senate committee has seen fit to restore to the Air Force all of the $70 million which the House cut out for proficiency flying. It has also restored to the Navy $18 million, which is all the Navy is asking for proficiency flying. I believe that these sums are important and necessary, and I certainly hope that they will be kept.

In that connection, Mr. President, I may say that the so-called Strauss report, on flying pay and the number of flying hours, is available for any Member of the Senate who would like to see it. It was submitted to the Committee on Armed Services.

Before I close I would like to discuss the appropriation for maintenance and operation of the Air Force. The Eisenhower budget called for $3.2 billion, just over a billion dollars under the Truman budget. The House cut the Eisenhower budget by $150 million. The Senate has in effect restored all of this in the following manner: $120 million in cash for a total of $3.170 billion, and elimination of a bookkeeping item for Germany for $30 million. The proponents of the Truman budget have suggested that $600 million should be restored to the House cut. The Senate has already restored, as I stated, $120 million, which I believe is sufficient at the present time. If the President feels that it is not, he can come back in January, and in the meantime have the appropriation spent at a greater rate thn $3.170 billion.

In considering this appropriation, I would like to point out this: We have accumulated during the last several years large stocks of supplies and spare parts. Many of these have been financed through the budget item so labeled, others through the appropriation headed "aircraft and related procurement."

Even after the Korean consumption, there would still be $9.5 billion of aircraft spares and spare parts on hand or on order without taking into account spares which were on hand for World War II aircraft at the beginning of

fiscal 1951.

Mr. President, let us think about that $9.5 billion of aircraft spares. I want to see how many of these spares can be used before new ones are ordered.

By keeping this appropriation down at what might be called the very minimum, I hope we will see the Air Force more carefully than heretofore try to find out just what spares they have and use those which become necessary rather than simply continue to order more, which a careful survey would show were not needed. I believe particularly that bet

ter supply distribution can be extremely

helpful in cutting this item. The whole question of spares is one which must be very carefully studied and looked into during the recess by the proper committees of the Congress, and I intend to the best of my ability to see that such an examination is made.

In 1953, the last fiscal year, the Air Force requested to the Secretary of Defense $5.8 billion for maintenance and operation. The budget request submitted was $4.4 billion. The House cut this by $627 million. The Air Force appealed to the Senate for the restoration of the entire $627 million. The Senate became even more convinced than the House that this money was not needed and cut an additional $222 million, thus providing the Air Force with $3.6 billion, rather than the $4.4 billion requested in the budget.

The actual outcome was that the Air Force only used $3.2 billion of this amount, and approximately $400 million became available for transfer to meet additional military personnel costs. think this very recent experience is enough to convince me that the Eisenhower revised budget is sufficient to cover this item.

I

I have not attempted to discuss the appropriations for the Army and the Navy, as there was very little opposition to the recommendations of the House.

Eastland Ellender

Ferguson Flanders Frear

Goldwater Gore

I know the Senator from Michigan Fulbright [Mr. FERGUSON] has discussed the point. What the Senate Appropriations Committee did was to put back some of the funds requested in each instance, enough in the opinion of the committee to take care of their needs, even though the amounts are less than their full justification.

I should like briefly to discuss a paragraph which I believe is very important and which, it seems to me, has been generally overlooked.

Before concluding, and in relation to the item I have just discussed, and other items, I would like to point out that the President is, first, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States; second, has the power under this appropriations bill to order expenditures at such rate as he deems is consistent with the national security; third, has the power to submit to the Congress supplemental budget requests on any item

when the Congress is in session; and fourth, can call Congress into special session whenever he feels the security of our country requires it. In other words, while we debate a budget which is on an annual basis, the President, as Commander in Chief, can spend money at a faster rate if he deems it is necessary to do so.

Green Griswold

Maybank

McCarran

Hayden

McCarthy

Hendrickson

McClellan

Hennings

Millikin

Hickenlooper

Monroney

Hill

Morse

Hoey

Mundt

Holland

Neely

Humphrey

Pastore

Mr. SALTONSTALL. the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES] is absent because of illness. The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. BUTLER] and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] are necessarily absent.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I announce that the Senator from Iowa [Mr. GILLETTE] is necessarily absent.

The Senator from West Virginia [Mr. KILGORE] and the Senator from Montana [Mr. MURRAY] are absent by leave of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PAYNE in the chair). A quorum is present.

Mr. President, I advocate strong airpower. I advocate an Armed Force for this country that can meet the enemy offensively and defensively. I am convinced that the budget now presented to the Senate is consistent with these aims. Should the new Joint Chiefs of Staff develop different objectives that require further action by the Congress, then let us without hesitation carefully consider that action at that time. I hope, Mr. President, that the budget as clerk, announced that the House had

presented by the Appropriations Committee will be passed in the form presented, with one exception; and I move that the amendment on page 58 of the bill, lines 15 through 20, offered in the committee by the distinguished Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK], be stricken from the bill.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Maurer, its reading

disagreed to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 5728) to authorize the disposal of the Government-owned rubber-producing facilities, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. SHORT, Mr. ARENDS, Mr.