be reviewed only upon appeal, when the entire transcript of the record can be brought up for consideration. It would paralize and defeat the enforcement of criminal law if writs of prohibition were issued on account of irregularities where the trial court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person of the defendant. In other words, a writ of prohibition can not be used for the purpose of appealing cases upon the installment plan. For these reasons we will not consider the question as to whether or not the action of the trial court in appointing Hon. R. Y. Nance as Special County Attorney was regular or irregular; but ramit patitioners to their right to bring this case on appeal upon the entire record when all questions involved can be settled in one decision. The writ of prohibition being an extraordinary remedy can only be invoked in extreme cases; and, to prevent irreparable injury, the writ of prohibition is therefore denied. ARMSTRONG, P. J., and DOYLE, J., Concur. GEORGE FAIRGRIEVE, Appellant, VS. STATE of OKLAHOMA, Appellee. No. A-1681 (Rendered September 9, 1913.) Appeal from County Court of Garfield County. W. Scott, trial Judge. Reversed and Remanded. Where the State relies upon the testimony of an accomplice to secure a conviction the trial court, if requested, must instruct the jury that they cannot find the defendant guilty, upon such evidence, unless it is corroborated by other evidence, which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and that the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof. See section 5884 Revised Laws, 1910. (Syllabus by the court.) D. W. Buckner, for Appellant. Smith C. Matson for the State. Opinion of the Court by FURMAN, Judge. Appellant was convicted in the county court of Garfield County, charged with the offense of selling intoxicating liquors. Upon the trial of the cause, the state placed one Lee Crews upon the stand, who testified that he was in the employment of appellant, when the intoxicating liquors in question were sold, and as such employe he sold the liquors in question. When the cause was submitted to the jury, counsel for the defendant requested the court to instruct the jury with reference to accomplice's testimony as follows: "You are further instructed that if you find that any person who has testified in this case is the acaccomplice, then you would not be at liberty to convict the defendant on the uncorroborated testimony of such accomplice and this corroboration must extend to every essential element necessary to be proven as to the defendant's guilt." Which instruction was properly refused by the court. It is not the law that the testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated in every essential necessary to be proven as to defendants guilt. See Alderman v. Territory, 1 Okla. Cr. 562. Section 5884, Revised Laws 1910, covers this question as follows: "A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless he be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commiss of the offense dr the circumstances thereof." The court therefore did not err in refusing to give ths instruction requested; but as the attention of the court was directed to this matter it was his duty to charge the law correctly. See Morris v. Territory, 1 Okla. Cr. 617. If this had been done the conviction in this case would have been affirmed, as in the light of the evidence the other errors committed were not material; but the law with reference to the testimony of an accomplice is a material part of the statutes of this state; whenever the state uses the testimony of an accomplice the court has not the right or power to refuse to charge the law laid down in the statutes upon any material question. It matters not how anxious a jury may be to believe the testimony of an accomplice, they are prohibitied by law from convicting a defendant upon such evidence unless it is corroborated by other testimony tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and such an instruction must be given when requested in cases where the state relies upon such evidence. The judgment of the lower court is therefore reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Armstrong, P. J., and Doyle, J., Concur. FRED HUNTER, Appellant, VS. No. A-1657 STATE of OKLAHOMA, Appellee. (Rendered September 16, 1913.) Appeal from County Court of Oklahoma County. J. W. Hayson, trial Judge. Affirmed 1. (a) The doctrine of a strict construction of penal statutes has no place in the criminal jurisprudence of Oklahoma; but on the contrary such statutes will be lib erly construed so as to enable them to reach and destroy the evils at which they are aimed. (b) In prosecution against a father for wilfully failing to supply his children with necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance, his wife is a competent witness against him. 2. Where the testimony of a wife is received without objection against her husband, such matter cannot be complained of upon appeal. 3. Where a father is upon trial charged with having failed to furnish his child with necessary food and cloth ing, it is no defence to show that such food and clothing were not necessary because they were voluntarily furnished by other persons. (Syllabus by the Court.) G. A. Paul and O. H. Lee, for Appellant. CLAUDE HERRELL, Appellant. VS. STATE of OKLAHOMA, Appellee. No. A-1801 (Rendered September 16, 1913.) Appealed from County Court of Tillman County. T. M. Campell, trial Judge. Affirmed 1. Where there are no endorsements on an information or indictment of names of the witnesses for the prosecution, and the defendant goes to trial without taking any action to secure the endorsements of such names as directed by statute, he can not be heard to complain that the names were not so endorsed. And an objection to the testimony of a witness upon the ground that it was not so endorsed should be overruled. Syllabus by the court.) Mounts & Davis, Gray & McVay, for Appellant. Statement of the Case. Appellant was convicted in the County Court of Tillman County charged with having willfully, and without lawful excuse, failed to furnish the necessary food and clothing for his minor child; and his punishment was assessed at confinement in the county jail for the period of six months and a fine of $300.00. Opinion of the Court by FURMAN, Judge. The names of the witnesses to be used by the state a gainst the defendant were not endorsed on the informa tion as directed by law. Defendant, however, did not make any complaint at this, or file a motion requesting the Court to direct the County Attorney to endorse the witnesses for the prosecution on the indictment or the information. The object of the law in requiring the endorsement of the names of the prosecuting witnesses on the information or indictment, is to inform the defendant what witnesses will be used against him; and thereby better enable him to prepare for trial. The right to know the names of the witnesses to be used against him in a criminal prosecution is one which a defendant may either assert or waive. See State v. Frisbie, 8 Okla. Cr. Rep. p. 406. In the case at bar defendant not only went to trial with out objecting to the fact that the names of the witnesses were not endorsed on the information; but did not interpose any objection upon this ground until the state's witness, Mrs. Claude Herrell, was placed upon the stand, and the objection was then made for the first time, that her name did not appear upon the amended information The record shows that the information was verified by the affidavit of Mrs. Claude Herrell, and that defendant thereby had actual notice that she was to be a witness against him. Under these conditions to sustain the objection made would place form and ceremony above justice. Our statute expressly forbids this court from reversing any conviction upon a technical error which did not deprive the defendant of some substantial right. It is not contended that the defendant was suprised or in any way injured by the action of the trial court in permitting this witness to testify, or that he did not have full notice of her testimony before the case was tried. If he did not have such notice he could have easily have acquired the information by requesting the Court to direct the County Attorney to endorse the names of the witnesses upon the information before he was required to proceed to trial. |