OFFICE AND OFFICERS (Continued).

COMMISSION TO PRESCRIBE RULES.-Under the charter of the county of Los Angeles, which went into effect on June 2, 1913, the civil service commission of the city of Los Angeles is without jurisdiction to transfer a deputy county clerk to the office of registrar of voters, where the commission had not, as required by section 34, article IX, of such charter, prescribed rules under which it might make transfers from one position to a similar position in the same class or grade, and there existed no other provision in the charter empowering the board to make the transfer. (People ex rel. Lyons v. McAleer, 135.)

6. OFFICE OF REGISTRAR OF VOTERS - MANNER OF APPOINTMENT.— Under the provisions of section 14 of article IV of the charter of the county of Los Angeles, the registrar of voters of such county is an appointive officer, and the office not being in the unclassified civil service named in article IX, section 33, appointment to the office must, as required by subdivision 1, section 11, of article III, be made by the board of supervisors from the eligible civil service list, consisting of three persons certified by the commission as standing highest in accordance with the general rule prescribed by the commission for the creation of such list. (Id.)

7. CHARACTER OF OFFICE-CHARTER.-The office of registrar of voters of the county of Los Angeles is, under the charter of that county, an independent office, as distinct and separate from that of county clerk as is that of auditor or recorder, and since it is specified as one of the offices to be filled by appointment to be made by the board of supervisors from the eligible civil service list, it cannot, under the pretense that it was of a like grade and class with that of deputy county clerk, be filled by the act of the civil service commission under the guise of transferring a deputy county clerk in charge of the registration department to such independent and distinct office.

8. PUBLIC OFFICE

(Id.)

PERFORMANCE OF DUTY BY DE FACTO OFFICERMANDAMUS BY TAXPAYER.-A writ of mandate will not issue at the instance of a city taxpayer to compel an alleged de jure city assessor to perform the duties of such office, where the same are being performed by a county assessor under claim and color of right with the acquiescence of the city council and the city assessor de jure, as the question of the right to the office is one for litigation in a direct proceeding between the parties directly interested. (Hamilton v. Mallard, 470.)

See County, 3, 4; District Attorney; Municipal Corporations, 2;
Sheriff.

OPTION. See Vendor and Vendee, 1.

ORDINANCE. See Municipal Corporations. 33 Cal. App.-55

PARENT AND CHILD.

1. SUPPORT OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD-ACTION BY MOTHER-SUPPORT PENDING APPEAL.-In an action brought by a mother of an illegitimate child to compel its alleged father to pay a monthly sum reasonably necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the child, the trial court has no inherent power, as in actions for divorce where the marriage is admitted, to compel the father to pay to the mother the costs necessary to resist an appeal taken by the father, or to compel the father to support the child pending the appeal, as no such obligation arises until the paternity of the alleged illegitimate child is established. (Schallman v. Haas, 28.) 2. CONSTRUCTION OF CODE PROVISIONS.-Section 196a of the Civil Code, requiring the father of an illegitimate minor child to give it support and education suitable to his circumstances, and authorizing a civil suit in behalf of the child by the mother to enforce such obligations, and giving the court power to enforce performance of such obligations the same as under sections 138, 139, and 140 of the Civil Code, in a suit for divorce by a wife, does not, by making the latter named sections a part of section 196a, impose the obligations provided by such sections upon the defendant in an action to compel the support of an illegitimate child, but the sole purpose of such incorporation was to provide a full and complete remedy for the enforcement of the obligations when established. (Id.)

See Divorce; Criminal Law, 58-62.

PARTIES. See Elections, 3; Husband and Wife, 1.

PAYMENT. See Corporation, 5, 6; Insurance, 2; Promissory Note, 1; Sale, 11.

PETALUMA, CITY OF. See Municipal Corporations, 4.

PLACE OF TRIAL.

1. CONTRACT-REMOVAL TO CORPORATION'S PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS. A defendant corporation is entitled to have removed to the county of its principal place of business for trial, an action on a contract made in that county and to be performed there. (L. & E. Emanuel, Inc., v. Oberlin Bros. Co., 235.)

2. ACTIONS BETWEEN COUNTIES-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CODE PROVISION. Section 394 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1915, relative to the place of trial of actions between counties, cities, and cities and counties, is not unconstitutional, as class legislation, since it does not appear from the statute that an arbitrary selection has been made from among a large number of persons between whom and the persons favored (cities, counties, cities and counties) there is no reasonable distinction or substantial difference

PLACE OF TRIAL (Continued).

justifying the inclusion of the one and exclusion of the other from such privilege. (Mono Power Company v. City of Los Angeles, 675.)

3. MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE-AFFIDAVIT OF MERITS AND WRITTEN DEMAND NOT REQUIRED.-A motion for change of place of trial under section 394 of the Code of Civil Procedure need not be made at the time when the defendant answers or demurs, nor need it be accompanied by an affidavit of merits and a written demand for change of place of trial, as required by section 396 of such code. (Id.)

See Criminal Law, 7.

PLEADING.

See Claim and Delivery, 2; Contract, 4; Corporation, 3, 4, 12; Damages, 1; Guaranty; Husband and Wife, 6; Injunction, 2; Judgment, 2; Landlord and Tenant, 14, 17, 19; Mechanic's Lien, 1; Negligence, 14; Parties; Sale, 9.

PLEDGE.

1. CONSIGNMENT OF GOODS TO FACTOR-TRANSFER TO PURCHASERS APPARENT OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY.-Under section 2991 of the Civil Code, which provides that one who has allowed another to assume the apparent ownership of property for the purpose of making a transfer of it, cannot set up his own title, to defeat a pledge of the property, made by the other, to a pledgee who received the property in good faith, in the ordinary course of business, and for value, a factor to whom is consigned a carload of eggs, receives the property for the purpose of making a transfer, notwithstanding that customers have been obtained therefor prior to the consignment. (Fairmont Creamery Company v. Los Angeles Ice & Cold Storage Company, 414.)

2. PLEDGE OF CONSIGNMENT EXAMINATION OF BILL OF LADING BY PLEDGEE UNNECESSARY REQUIREMENT.-Where such a consignment is pledged by the factor as security for the repayment of a loan of money, it is not necessary in order to entitle the pledgee to hold the goods as against the real owner, that the pledgee should have examined the bill of lading. (Id.)

3. CONDITIONAL SALE-RIGHTS OF PLEDGEE.-Where the pledgee of an automobile purchased under a conditional contract of sale assumes the obligations of the purchaser under the contract and his assumption is recognized by the seller, he is entitled to all the rights and is subject to all the liabilities of the contract, and a wrongful taking of the possession of the machine by the purchaser, and assignment of his interest in the contract to a person who had sufficient notice to put him upon inquiry as to the wrongful taking, is illegal, as against the pledgee. (Manor v. Dunfield, 557.)

POLICE POWER.

1. REDLIGHT ABATEMENT LAW-FORFEITURES AND PROCEDURE-ACT CONSTITUTIONAL. The "Redlight Abatement Law" of 1913 (Stats. 1913, pp. 20-22), which in its general object is no different from that of sections 315 and 316 of the Penal Code, and which differs in a general sense from those sections only in that its design was to establish a summary method, through the civil processes of the law, for putting a stop to the maintenance of houses of ill fame and other places where acts of lewdness and prostitution are habitually practiced and carried on as a business, is a valid exercise of the police power, and the provisions contained in such act as to forfeitures and procedure do not violate any of the constitutional guaranties of property owners. (People ex rel. Bradford v. Barbiere, 770.)

2. NATURE OF ACTION UNDER STATUTE-USE OF BUILDING FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF PROPERTY OWNER. — The action authorized by the statute is in rem, or against the property used in the maintenance of the nuisance, as well as in personam, or against the person maintaining it, and while, therefore, the owner, having no actual knowledge of the business carried on in his building, might not personally be bound for the costs, the building and furniture may nevertheless be proceeded against and subjected to the forfeitures prescribed by the statute. (Id.) 3. DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDER OF ABATEMENT-CONTEMPT-PUNISHMENT. The provision of the statute authorizing the punishment as for contempt of any person guilty of disobedience to the order of abatement or the permanent injunction is not void, because, in point of severity, it conflicts with section 1218 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which fixes a penalty for contempts generally. (Id.)

POSSESSION. See Forcible Entry and Detainer; Fraudulent Conveyances; Public Lands.

PRACTICE. See Appeal; Deposition; Execution; Findings; Instruction; Judgment; New Trial; Parties; Place of Trial; Prohibition; Summons.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. See Agency.

PROHIBITION.

HEARING OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-MOTION ALREADY HEARD DISMISSAL OF APPLICATION.-While the superior court is without jurisdiction to entertain a motion for a new trial of a case on appeal from a justice's court where the trial was had upon a stipulation of the facts involved, yet where the court has heard and granted the motion after the granting of an alternative writ

PROHIBITION (Continued).

of prohibition (there being no order in force requiring the court to desist from further proceedings), the writ will not be made peremptory, as no purpose could be served thereby. (Kaye v. Superior Court, 269.)

See Elections, 3.

PROMISSORY NOTE.

1. ACTION ON PROMISSORY NOTE-DEFENSE OF PAYMENT-AMENDMENT OF ANSWER AT TRIAL-DISCRETION.-Where in an action on a promissory note the answer failed to deny that the note was unpaid, it will be presumed that the court properly exercised its discretion in refusing the defendant leave at the close of the plaintiff's case to amend the answer by alleging payment, in the absence of any showing of facts excusing the failure to allege the same in the first in stance, or of any affidavit or other matter of record from which could be inferred a reasonable probability that the defense could have been sustained. (Francis v. Independent Electrical Supply Company, 482.)

2. TRANSFER-WRITTEN INDORSEMENT NOT ESSENTIAL.-A formal indorsement or assignment in writing is not necessary to the transfer of a promissory note. (Shoenhair v. Jones, 545.)

3. CONSIDERATION SURRENDER OF PRIOR UNPAID NOTE.-The surrender of an unpaid promissory note is sufficient consideration for the making of a new note. (Id.)

4. ASSIGNMENT FOR COLLECTION WANT OF CONSIDERATION DEFENSE NOT AVAILABLE.-In an action on a promissory note assigned for the purpose of collection, the defendant is not entitled to plead that the note was without consideration as against the assignee, where his assignor became the holder of the note in good faith and for value before its maturity. (Dean v. Game, 722.) See Corporation, 5, 6.

PROSTITUTION. See Police Power.

PUBLIC LANDS.

1. RECOVERY OF POSSESSION-ADVERSE DECISION OF LAND DEPARTMENT -ATTACK FOR EXTRINSIC FRAUD.-Where in an action to recover the possession of public land based upon a certificate of entry issued by the register and receiver of the land office, the defendant in addition to alleging adverse possession at the date of the inception of the claim upon which the plaintiff's certificate of entry was founded, alleged a contest between them and a determination therein adverse to the defendant, he cannot attack the decision of the Land Department upon the ground that the plaintiff testified falsely in such contest. (Elliott v. Robbins, 577.)