Page images
PDF
EPUB

IN BOROUGHS.

tion as possible, and to permit the court in its after time to grow in discipline and strength, and in the perfection THE OCCUPATION FRANCHISE of its arrangements." But even in its rudimentary condition there are signs that the bantling is not of the right breed. One great object was to hatch a scheme which should free the commercial public from the solicitors. As the president remarked at the meeting in February last, the object was "to avoid another Charybdis-that, was they might fall into the hands of solicitors." How is it then that the very first act of the promoters of the scheme is to appoint a solicitor registrar of the court? This solicitor is to prepare, and attest the execution of, the prescribed "form of submission or agreement," which is to be the first step in any proceeding before the tribunal. Here is Charybdis No. 1: a document prepared by a solicitor and presumably costing as much as, or more than, a writ. Charybdis No. 2 is the "concise statement in writing of the dispute" which is to be submitted to the arbitrator or arbitrators by each of the parties. No prudent man, and certainly no busy man, will prepare for himself the statement which is to define his claim and to marshal the facts on which it rests. He will go to his solicitor, and the document will, in all probability, cost as much as an ordinary statement of claim in an action. As to the subsequent trial before the arbitrators, it is not very likely that a Manchester merchant or manufacturer will devote his valuable time to the task of preparing evidence, or examining or cross-examining his witnesses, or arguing his case before the arbitrators. Here is a further large Charybdis: the merchant or manufacturer will "fall into the hands" of a solicitor to an indefinite extent. Then the arbitrators are also to fall into the hands of solicitors, for by rule 6 it is provided that, "having taken all necessary evidence, the arbitrator or arbitrators shall proceed with all convenient despatch to consider his or their decision, and shall thereafter give full instructions to some solicitor to draw up his or their award, which shall be published by notice from the registrar to the respective disputants." We presume that the solicitor who draws up the award is to be paid by the litigants for this troublesome and responsible duty, and that the registrarsolicitor will also have to be paid for publishing the notices. It appears probable that before the suitor has completed his career before the new tribunal he will discover that decisions according to the light of nature cost as much to obtain, and are far less satisfactory when obtained, than the much-decried process of the courts of law.

THE RECENT NEWSPAPER DISCUSSION as to the propriety❘ of Sunday harvesting will have drawn attention to the state of the law on the subject of Sunday labour. By the Lord's Day Observance Act (29 Car. 2, c. 7), s. 1," No tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer or other person whatever, shall do or exercise any worldly labour, business, or work of their ordinary callings upon the Lord's-day, or any part thereof (works of necessity and charity only excepted), and every person being of fourteen years or upwards, offending in the premises shall for every such offense forfeit the sum of five shillings." In Cleworth v. Justices of Leigh (12 W. R. 375), the Court of Queen's Bench quashed a conviction under this Act in a case where the defendant, who was a farmer, had assisted his labourers in getting in his hay on a Sunday. The decision proceeded on the ground that a farmer is not within the Act. COCKBURN, C.J., said that a farmer was not ejusdem generis with the persons named in the statute; and CROMPTON, J., said “a farmer cannot be said to be a 'labourer'; he may work or not, as he pleases." The Lord Chief Justice, however, admitted the force of the argument which had been principally relied upon by the counsel for the respondents, and described it as an "inconvenience and scandal" that the labourers should be subject to a fine while their employer was exempt.

A POINT to which we some time ago called attention
appears likely to become the subject of much discussion
at the approaching revision of the lists of borough voters.
A circular was recently sent out to the overseers of
parishes reminding them of their duties with regard to
the insertion in the lists of persons who occupy parts of
houses separately as dwellings. The history of the legis
lation on this subject is somewhat curious. The Reform
Act gave the borough franchise to persons who occupied
houses of the value of £10. The question arose what
constituted a house for this purpose. The courts came
to the conclusion that something in the nature of a house
structurally severed from the rest of the building was
necessary to constitute part of a building or house, as in
the case of flats and sets of chambers, but that the occu
pation of a part or parts of a house not structurally
severed, as where a person occupied one floor or one room
on one floor, and one on another, would not qualify. It
seems to us that this conclusion was a reasonable one.
These questions of degree no doubt are capable of being
put in an absurd light. It might be urged that a build-
ing standing quite alone, consisting of one room capable
of being used as a dwelling, must be a house; that the
particular mode of severance cannot be material; there
fore, it might be said, why should a room which, if it
stood alone, would be a house, because it is associated
with other rooms under the same roof, be the less a
house? The answer seems to us to be that these things
are not a matter of logic, and cannot be solved after
this fashion; it is a question of the ordinary practical
meaning of language. No one would in ordinary con-
versation call a room in a house a house. It may be
that you must, in construing a statute, so far extend the
meaning of the word "house" as to include things so
nearly analogous in their nature and purposes as flits
and sets of chambers structurally severed; but it does not
seem to us therefore to follow that you are to go the
length of saying that one garret is a house because a
person might live in it. We believe that the original
decision of the Court of Common Pleas was, on the whole,
better sense than the subsequent legislation on the sub-
ject. In the Representation of the People Act, the word
"house 33
was interpreted as including a part of a house
occupied as a separate dwelling and separately rated
to the poor.
Much discussion took place with regard to
this definition. Some of the judges held that it was not
intended in any way to modify the old law as to the
necessity for structural severance, while others again held
that it was intended under this new definition that any
part of a house, as, for instance, one room, should, if
occupied as a separate dwelling and separately
rated, constitute a house for the purposes of the
franchise. By the Parliamentary and Municipal
Registration Act, 1878, the definition was again altered,
and now apparently the necessity for separate rating is
altogether done away with, and any part of a house
separately occupied as a dwelling is to qualify.

We expressed our opinion at the time that this mod:5cation of the franchise in an Act dealing with the mere machinery of revision was most improper. Whether intentionally or not, the effect of this kind of legislation is, or may be, as it were, to smuggle provisions through the Houses of a far more essential character than those who pass them suppose. The result of this alteration of the definition, it is stated, will be in some of the metropolitan constituencies to add thousands of electors to the register, some of them being of the most unsatisfactory class. Moreover, a great anomaly, as we have before pointed out, is created. By the Representation of the People Act the lodger franchise was established, and for that franchise a yearly value of £10 was required. bat if a room is a house, as there need be no particular value in the case of the inhabitant householder, the occupier

of any room as a dwelling is qualified. But the distinction between the occupier of a room as a dwelling and a lodger is in many cases almost impossible to draw. At the same time it is clear that the Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act did not mean to merge or abolish the lodger franchise, for the Act contains many provisions concerning that franchise. Even the definition section refers to it, for it says that "the term 'dwelling-house' shall include any part of a house when that part is separately occupied as a dwelling, and the term 'lodgings' shall include any apartments or place of residence, whether furnished or unfurnished, in a dwelling-house." Could any legislation be more slipshod and unsatisfactory? It would have occurred to any person, one would have thought, however ignorant of the subject, or careless, that on the face of this definition there was a confusion of the "dwelling-house" and the "lodgings" together, inasmuch as the first part of the definition includes the same thing as the last. But what the Legislature have not done we take it the revising barrister must do. On the true construction of the Acts, taken as a whole, we apprehend a distinction must be presumed to exist between a lodger and a householder. We believe that there is practically a distinction between the lodger and the occupier of a room or rooms as a householder, though the limits of the two classes are very hard to define. We think that there will probably be decisions on the subject before long. In the meanwhile it is impossible to lay down anything like an absolute rule, for the combination of circumstances in different cases will be manifold.

Three points of considerable importance in determining the relation of the parties in each case will be-first, whether the landlord resides in the house; secondly, to whom does the furniture belong; thirdly, does the landlord provide attendance of any sort ?

We should be strongly disposed to think that when the landlord resides in the house, and provides the furniture and attendance, the lodger qualification is generally the only one available. The distinction, roughly put, is between one who is an inmate of another's household, and one who, though living under the same roof, must be considered as having a separate household. When the furniture is the landlord's, and he provides attendance and lives in the house, it will generally be found that practically the landlord reserves a general right of control and supervision over the room or rooms, so as to negative the supposition that they constitute another's house within his house. On the other hand, if the occupier of the room or rooms brings his own furniture and provides his own cooking and attendance or attends on himself, even though the landlord lives in the house, it would seem such occupier would be not a lodger but a householder. It must be remembered that the Act expressly provides that the joint use of some part of the house, such as kitchen or staircase, shall not prevent the part that is separately occupied from qualifying, so that the occupier of a room or rooms as a dwelling will not be disqualified because he has the use for some purposes of some other part of the house. So if a man rented rooms or a room unfurnished, and retained the entire control over the rooms or room, attending on himself or providing his own attendance, so far as the care of the rooms was concerned, the fact that, by arrangement, the landlord might supply him with meals cooked in the landlord's kitchen, would not in anywise interfere with the qualification. It is impossible to discuss all the possible combinations; but we have endeavoured to indicate roughly, according to our notion, the lines upon which the distinction between the lodger and the householder in respect of part of a house must be drawn.

A question may arise as to the effect of this alteration of the definition of a dwelling-house with regard to the provisions which make the being rated, and having paid the rates, essential to the qualifica

tion. Here, again, great confusion and anomaly arises. The definition of dwelling-house pointedly omits the words of the former definition, which required separate rating, and it is expressed to be in substitution for the former definition, "but not so as to affect any of the other provisions of the said Act with regard to rating." Nice questions, as it seems to us, might arise on the effect of this legislation. It is practically impossible for the overseers to rate separate rooms. Great troubles arose under the Representation of the People Act by reason of the abolition of the compound householder, and the provisions as to separate rating of parts of house. But the rating of the whole house, and the payment of the rates up to the 5th of January, would seem to be sufficient, in the case of the part of the house separately occupied, to satisfy the "other provisions of the Representation of the People Act," referred to in the interpretation clauses of the Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act, though it is very difficult properly to apply the language that was really applicable to entire houses in the case of the occupation of parts of a house. It might perhaps be argued that separate rating of the part of a house is still necessary, notwithstanding the abolition of the definition which expressly made it so. The natural construction of the original provisions with regard to rating certainly pointed to the rating of the occupier of the subject-matter of the qualification in respect of such subject-matter, and to the payment of the rate by such occupier. Can the rating of the landlord with respect to the whole house be considered as the rating of the occupier of part with respect to such part? The provisions of the Poor Rate Assessment and Collection Act (32 & 33 Vict. c. 41), s. 19, seem to get over this difficulty, for it would seem to be the overseer's duty to enter the names of the occupiers of parts of the house in the rate-book, and if so, their failure to do so does not affect the qualification; and in Wright v. Town Clerk of Stockport (5 M. & G. 35), it was held that where the names of the landlord and of the several occupiers of parts of a factory were all inserted in the occupiers' column of the rate-book, and the rate was paid by the landlord, each occupier must be deemed to have been rated for the whole, and therefore for his part, and each must be taken to have paid the rate for the whole, and consequently for his part.

Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act in respect

The effect of carrying out the provisions of the

to the occupiers of parts of houses, as the overseers are now called upon to do, will, at any rate in London, be to throw greatly increased labour and expense on the parochial authorities.

Before the Scarborough Court of Summary Jurisdiction on Monday, September 5, Sarah Hatfield was charged under the Licensing Act, 1872, with selling champagne without a license. Shirley (barrister) appeared for the defendant. On the chief constable for the borough com. mencing to examine the first witness for the prosecution, Shirley said, "May I ask if the chief constable proposes to conduct the case for the prosecution ?"-The Chief Constable: "Yes, I do."-Shirley objected, and submitted that the case ought to be conducted by a legal practitioner.— The Chief Constable: "As the prosecutor in the case, I have a right to conduct it."-Shirley quoted Jervis's Act11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 12-which stated that a case of this kind should be conducted by "counsel or attorney." He did not know whether the chief constable came within either of those descriptions. If he did, of course he had a right to conduct the case. After a short consultation, the magistrates thought that the chief constable was com. petent to conduct the case. After two witnesses had been examined for the prosecution, the chief constable offered himself as a third witness. Shirley: "The chief constable has laid the information, and conducted the case for the prosecution, I submit that he cannot also give evidence for the prosecution. Perhaps he would like to decide the case too." The magistrate, however, overruled the objection, and the chief constable was sworn.

THE LAW OF LICENSING.

III.

PROTECTION ORDERS AND TRANSFERS.

A PROTECTION order is perhaps best known to the legal profession as that form of order under which a married woman, who has been badly treated by her husband, obtains protection for the earnings of her industry. For the licensed victualling world the term has a peculiar meaning of its own. For cases where a license drops during its currency by the removal, &c., of its holder, the Licensing Acts provide eight "special sessions” in the year to which application may be made for transferring the license to a new holder. As any sale under the license of another person would be (except in the case of a sale by executors, or trustees in bankruptcy, which is specially protected from the general penalties for sale without license by section 3 of the Licensing Act, 1872) a sale without license (for a license is always both personal and local), provision is made for an immediate resumption of sale pending the recurrence of the next special sessions. This provision is to be found in 5 & 6 Vict. c. 44. The first section (which is an exceedingly long one) of this Act enacts as follows:

[ocr errors]

"At any petty sessions of justices of the peace, at any time when no special session shall be holden, it shall be lawful in those cases where justices of the peace assembled at a special session are empowered," by 9 Geo. 4 c. 61, "to transfer or grant licenses before the expiration thereof to sell exciseable liquors by retail jin the same house or premises, in respect of which any person had been theretofore duly licensed, for the majority of the justices then present, by indorsement of any license, to authorize (if they shall deem it proper so to do, after examining upon oath all necessary parties) any person not disqualified by the said Act, to whom it shall be proposed

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

to transfer or grant any such license, to use the business of a licensed victualler at the same house, and the authority so granted shall continue and be in force until the then next ensuing special session which shall be holden, and no longer; at which special session the justices then and there assembled, upon application made to them pursuant to the said Act, touching any transfer or grant of license to the party or parties to whom such authority ahall have been so given at petty sessions as aforesaid, shall hear and dispose of such application according to the provi

sions of the said Act."

Upon this enactment it is to be observed (1) that no notices of any kind are necessary; (2) that the holder of the protection order must be the future holder of the license proposed to be transferred; (3) that the justices have absolute discretion to grant or refuse the protection order; and (4) that the granting or refusing the protection order in no way concludes the case or limits the discretion of justices at special sessions.

The cases in which transfers may be applied for are defined by the 4th and 14th sections of 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, the latter of which is the most involved and cumbrous enactment ever placed on the Statute-book. Strictly speaking the 4th section applies to transfers properly so called-i.e., to transfers inter vivos; while the 14th section applies to transmissions in case of the death, bankruptcy, &c., of the original holder. Attempts have been frequently made to separate the two sections, and to these attempts some colour is given by the interpretation of "transfer of a license" in section 72 of the Act of 1872, as meaning a "transfer made in exercise

of the power granted by the fourth section" of 9 Geo. 4, c. 61. And separable no doubt the sections are to some extent. Yet neither of them can be read into sense without the other. The 4th section directs the appointment of not less than four, nor more than eight special sessions in each year

"At which special sessions it shall be lawful for the justices then and there assembled in the cases, and in the manner, and for the time hereinafter directed, to license such persons intending to keep inns theretofore kept by other persons

being about to remove from such inns as they, the said justices, shall, in the execution of the powers herein contained, and in the exercise of their discretion, deem fit and proper persons, under the provisions hereinafter enacted, to be licensed. ..."

The 14th section (we fear we must trouble our readers with almost the whole of it) is on this wise :

[ocr errors]

"If any person duly licensed under this Act shall (before the expiration of such license) die, or shall by sickness or other infirmity be rendered incapable of keeping an inn, or shall become bankrupt, ...or if any person so licensed, or the heirs, &c., of any person so licensed shall remove from or yield up the possession of the house specified in such license; or if the occupier of any such house, being about to quit the same, shall have wilfully omitted or shall have neglected to apply at the general annual licensing meeting... for a any person duly licensed as aforesaid, shall be or be about to license, or if any house, being kept as an inn by be pulled down, . . or shall be, by fire, tempest, or other unforeseen and unavoidable calamity, rendered unfit for the reception of travellers, and for the other legal purposes of an inn; it shall be lawful for the justices assembled as aforesaid, at a special session holden under the authority of this Act, in any one of the above-mentioned cases, and in such cases only, to grant to the person's heirs, &c., of the person so dying, or to the assigns of such person becoming incapable of keeping an inn, or to the assignee or assignees of such bankrupt, or to any new tenant or occupier of any house having so become unoccupied, or to any person to whom such heirs, &c., shall by sale or otherwise have made over his or their interest in the occupation and keeping of such house, a license, or to grant to the person whose house shall as aforesaid have been pulled down, or have become unfit for the reception of travellers,

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[merged small][ocr errors]

But we will spare our readers the proviso. It is nearly as long as the section itself, its object being to prescribe a preliminary notice in case the application be "for a license to sell exciseable liquors by retail to be drunk or consumed [what is the difference between drinking and consuming liquors ?] in a house or premises thereunto belonging in which exciseable liquors shall not have been sold by retail to be drunk or consumed on the premises, by virtue of a license granted at the general annual licensing meeting next before such special session."

Returning to the section itself, upon which there have been many decisions, we think we may say that so special are the facts of each case, and so brief is each judgment, that no useful purpose would be served by examining them. Two points, however, of very great importance stand out as decided by authority. First, that the two sections can only operate upon current licenses, and if a license has been suffered to drop, the jurisdiction of the justices to transfer is gone, was decided in Simpkin v. Justices of Birmingham (L. R. 6 Q. B. 781). And it seems to have been held in Reg. v. Rowell (L. R. 7 Q. B. 490) that, in all cases arising under the 4th and 14th sections, the discretion of justices to grant or refuse a transfer is absolute. We should be disposed to question the correctness of the latter decision, and, at any rate, to hold the opinion that, upon applications for transfers, the grounds of refusal must be confined to grounds affecting the character of the applicant. And, as the point was decided in the days before an appeal lay, we should not be surprised to see it come up for review before our present Court of Appeal.

The difficulties under the transfer section which have

not been touched by legal decision are many and various. For instance, there appears to be distinct power to transfer to more than one person in the case of executors. If three executors hold a license, are they equally liable for penalties? What is the status of a female holder of a license who marries during its currency? Ought she, or ought she not, to apply for a transfer to her husband? And if she should apply, have the justices jurisdiction to make the transfer? The case is a casus omissus, and it must be remembered that a transfer is authorized only

in the cases enumerated.

[ocr errors]

What are the legal purposes

of an inn beyond its being ready for the reception of travellers? How near the old premises must the "other fit and convenient house be? These and many other questions might be asked, but it is more easy to ask than answer them. Instead of attempting an answer, we will state and endeavour to solve a difficulty which is more likely to arise in practice than any of them. We allude to the question how far notices are required.

The 40th section of the Licensing Act, 1872, is as follows:

"Every person intending to . . . apply for the transfer of a license shall publish notice of such application as follows:

"In the case of a transfer of a license he shall, fourteen days prior to one of the special sessions appointed by the justices for granting transfers of such licenses, serve a notice of his intention to transfer the same upon one of the overseers, &c. This notice shall be signed by the applicant or his authorized agent, and shall set forth the name of the person to whom it is intended that such license shall be transferred, together with the place of his residence, &c."

The difficulty we have in view is whether this requirement of preliminary notice applies only to transfers inter vivos by way of sale-that is, to transfers properly so called-or whether it applies to cases of transmissions also. Transmissions are included in the words "every person intending to apply for the transfer of a license," but the words "his intention to transfer the same" seem to point to a living transferor. On the other hand, the necessity for public knowledge of the antecedents of a proposed new holder seems to be as great in the case of a transmission as in the case of a transfer, and it would be no great straining of words to read "his intention to transfer the same as if they had been "his intention to cause the same to be transferred." The practice is, we believe, to dispense with notices in the case of transmissions, and to require them only in the case of transfers properly so called. On the whole, however, we incline to the opinion that transmissions are included. The words " every person,' &c., are affirmative and comprehensive, and do not seem to us to be deprived of their natural meaning by the words "his intention to transfer the same," which grammatically will just include "his intention to cause a transfer."

CORRESPONDENCE.

[ocr errors]

THE COURT OF APPEAL. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-A learned judge of first instance, in his first letter, speaks of miscarriage of justice in the Court of Appeal. In his second letter he says he did not mean by such an expression to exclude the House of Lords, though the latter, notwithstanding the fact of it being an appellate court, is not known by the name of "The Court of Appeal," and he adds that his intention was to question the expediency of the proposed change of the Court of Appeal. The learned judge recommends that, at any rate, some of the Lords Justices should go on circuit, and speaks of the success of the existing Court of Appeal as a ground for no alteration taking place. As he draws a distinction between the common law and equity courts, I would ask, Does he think it wise that judges selected from the common law bar should preside to reverse the decisions of Vice-Chancellors, and does he think that all the judicial members of the House of Lords should have acquired practical experience by having been accustomed to courts of assize?

London.

A RETIRED SOLICITOR.

A NOVELTY.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir, I send you the enclosed cutting from the Morning Post of the 27th of August, as a novelty. Would not a barrister negotiating for business in the way suggested be liable to be disbarred ? INQUIRER.

[The following is the cutting referred to by our correspondent:

LAW.-To Barristers commencing Practice.-The nucleus of a Sound Business can be secured by the advance of about £500 for an agreed term.-Address, in confidence,

CASES OF THE WEEK.

WATER COMPANY-DISPUTE A8 TO MEASUREMENT— CUTTING OFF SUPPLY-INJUNCTION.-In the case of Bingham v. Sheffield Waterworks, before Kay, J., Vacation Judge, on the 9th inst., a motion was made to restrain the defendants from cutting off or interfering with the supply of water to the plaintiff's house until the trial of the action. The plaintiff was an inhabitant of Sheffield, and the dispute between him and the company was as to the mode of measurement for the water supplied for use in the baths in the plaintiff's house, and also at whose cost the apparatus for measuring the supply should be furnished. On the 11th of November, 1880, Jessel, M.R. (his decision being subsequently confirmed by the Court of Appeal), held that the company were entitled to charge by measurement for water supplied to baths in addition to their water rate for ordinary domestic purposes. The question in the present action was not however then determined. The company now insist that consumers must either pay for water supplied to baths by a rate fixed by them, or by measurement to be ascertained by meter fixed at the cost of the consumer. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the company have no power to force him to pay the cost of a meter. As the company had threatened to cut off the plaintiff's supply unless he paid them the rate demanded this motion was brought. KAY, J., eventually directed the motion to stand to the trial, the plaintiff undertaking, without prejudice to any question, to pay until the trial the rate demanded by the company, and the company undertaking to repay the excess (if any) if the decision should be against them, and not to interfere with the plaintiff's supply in the meantime.-SOLICITORS, Pitman & Son.

[ocr errors]

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT SALE AGREEEENT FOR PUBLICATION-REVISING PROOF.-In a case of Hudson v. Remington, also before Kay, J., on the 9th inst., a motion was made to restrain the defendant from infringing the plaintiff's copyright, and from publishing certain articles written by the plaintiff. The action was one for penalties and damages under the Copyright Acts, the plaintiff_being the author of a series of articles called "The Convict Prisons in 1880." The defendants were the publishers of a periodical called "The Burlington," and they had published one of the plaintiff's articles in their August number. It appeared that the plaintiff had forwarded the articles to the defendants for approval by them, but they had not returned them, and had not made any arrangement as to payment. A proof of the article which appeared in the August number was, however, sent to the plaintiff for correction, and was returned by him revised to the defendants. The defendants now contended that that the arrangement with the plaintiff was one usual with magazines—namely, to pay him according to the regular scale of the magazine, and that by his returning the proof he had assented to such terms, and had disentitled himself to an interim injunction. KAY, J., on the whole considered that the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction, and he directed the motion to stand to the trial, the plaintiff undertaking to keep an account.-SOLICITORS, W. H. B. Pain; H. M. Pike.

PRACTICE REDEMPTION ACTION-DISMISSAL OF ACTION -FORECLOSURE-BILL OF SALE-DELIVERY OF MORTGAGED

PROPERTY-INTERIM RECEIVER-DAMAGES.-In a case of Payne v. Jacobs, before Kay, J., Vacation Judge, on the 14th inst., the action was one to redeem the property comprised in a bill of sale, and an interim receiver was appointed. After the writ all matters in dispute were referred, and the arbitrator by his award found a large sum due to the defendant, and he ordered, upon payment, a re-conveyance and re-assignment of the property comprised in the mortgage, and in default, on the 22nd of August, that the action should be dismissed. The plaintiff had failed to pay the money found due, and the defendant now moved for an injunction to restrain the plaintiff from using or dealing with the property comprised in the bill of sale, and for a receiver. The defendant alleging that the whole of the plaintiff's stock-in-trade was comprised in the bill of sale, and that he was dealing with the same improperly, had obtained the appointment of an interim receiver. The motion now came on to be heard. The plaintiff alleged that the bill of sale did not comprise any after-acquired property, that the defendant could have taken possession of the mortgaged property without any necessity for the motion, and asked that it might be dismissed. He also contended that the appointment of the interim receiver of the whole of the plaintiff's stock-intrade, had injured the plaintiff's business, and asked for an inquiry as to any damages sustained by him. KAY, J., as the plaintiff was willing to give up possession of the property comprised in the bill of sale, made an order for him to do so. He also discharged the receiver, and gave the parties liberty to apply as to the costs of the motion, as to damages inflicted on the plaintiff, and generally. SOLICITORS, Bower & Cotton; W. R. Steele.

AGREEMENT NOT TO PRACTISE AS AUCTIONEER-COLLECTING RENTS - BREACH-INJUNCTION.-In a Newdick v. Gibbons, also before Kay, J., on the 14th inst., a case of motion was made to restrain the defendant from carrying on the business of an auctioneer within ten miles from Staines in breach of an agreement with the plaintiff. It appeared that the defendant had for some time been collecting rents within the above radius, and it was submitted that he was thereby committing a breach of the agreement, an auctioneer's business being partly the collection of rents. For the defendant it was contended the rent collecting was not part of an auctioneer's business any more than it would be of an accountant or a solicitor, and that no injunction should be granted. KAY, J., was rather in favour of the defendant on the construction of the agreement, but in order not to prejudice the question he would allow the motion to stand to the trial.-SOLICITORS, Terrell; Deane, Chubb, & Co.

INJUNCTION-BREACH OF AGREEMENT TO GRANT RIGHT OF WAY-RECTIFICATION-In a case of Vargues v. Royal London Panorama, also before Kay, J., on the 14th inst., the action was for the specific performance of an agreement (inter alia) to give the plaintiff a right of passage from the defendants' premises to a restaurant kept by him. The defendants' premises were completed in July, but they had not giver the plaintiff, as he alleged, his right of way, and only permitted the public to pass on payment of one shilling each, the price of entry to their panorama. The plaintiff now moved for an injunction to restrain the defendants preventing him having access until the trial. The defendants had filed affidavits raising a case of mistake as to the agreement and circumstances showing that they would have a right to have it rectified. KAY, J., on these grounds, and having referred to the uncertain character of the agreement, said he could not grant any injunction, and directed the motion to stand to the trial.-SOLICITORS, Carr, Fulton, & Carr.

We are requested again to state that at the Inter mediate Examination, to be held in November next, and at future examinations, candidates will be examined, as heretofore, on Stephen's Commentaries on the Laws of England, but omitting book 4 on Public Rights, forming portions of volumes 2 and 3.

OBITUARY.

MR. HENRY LATHAM, JUN.

Wood, Latham, & Bigg), of 6, Raymond-buildings,
Mr. Henry Latham, jun., solieitor (of the firm o
the 4th inst.
Gray's-inn, was killed near Grindelwald, Switzerland, on
Latham, one of the registrars of the Chancery Divi
Mr. Latham was the son of Mr. Henry
sion, and was
solicitor in 1874, and he had been for the last few years in
born in 1849. He was admitted a
partnership with Mr. Charles Oliver Bigg, the firm having a
Latham started for a vacation tour to Switzerland, and he
very extensive agency connection. About a month ago Mr.
had made several successful ascents. On Sunday, the 4th
inst., he started alone from Grindelwald, with the intention
in the evening, a search was made, and, early the next
of ascending the Bourg. As he did not return to the hotel
morning, his dead body was found buried in the snow. It is
supposed that his fall was caused by a slip on the ice or loose
stones near the summit of the mountain.

MR. FREDERICK CURREY, F.R.S.

Mr. Frederick Currey, barrister, F.R.S., died on the 8th inst. Mr. Currey was the son of Mr. Benjamin Currey, many years Clerk of the Parliaments, and was born in 1819. He was educated at Eton and at Trinity College, Cambridge, called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Easter Term, 1844, and where he graduated as a senior optime in 1846. He was had practised for many years as an equity draftsman and conveyancer. Mr. Carrey was, however, best known as an eminent botanist. He was a fellow of the Linnean Society, to which body he was secretary from 1860 till 1880, when he became vice-president and treasurer. He was also a fellow, and a member of the Council, of the Royal Society. He had formed a celebrated and valuable collection of fungi, which he is understood to have bequeathed to Kew Gardens.

COMPANIES.

--

WINDING-UP NOTICES.
JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

LLAY HALL COAL, IRON, AND FIRE BRICK COMPANY, LIMITED.-
Petition for winding up, presented Sept 7, directed to be heard
before the Vacation Judge on Sept 21. Davidson and Morriss,
Queen Victoria st, solicitors for the petitioner

ST. JOHN'S STREET (BRADFORD) THEATRE AND CONCERT HALL
COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by Cave, J, dated Aug
31, it was ordered that the above company be wound up. Layton
and Jaques, Ely pl, agents for Neill, Bradford, petitioner's solicitor
ST. MICHAEL'S GAS COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up,
presented Aug 30, directed to be heard before the M.R. on Nov 5,
Webb and Co, Queen Victoria st, solicitors for the petitioner
[Gazette, Sept 9.1
BELGRAVIAN ICE COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up,
presented Sept 6, directed to be heard before the Vacation Judge,
at Rolls yd, Chancery lane, on Sept 21. Rogers and Chave, Queen
Victoria st. solicitors for the petitioner

GROSVENOR CO-OPERATIVE STORES, LIMITED.-Creditors are re

quired, on or before Oct 14, to send their names and addresses and
particulars of their debts or claims to John Howard, 8, Old Jewry.
Oct 27 at 12 is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the
debts and claims

LONDON AND PARIS DRESS AND MILLINERY ASSOCIATION, LIMITED.
-The M.R. has, by an order dated Aug 4, appointed Edward
Lewellyn Ernest, Queen st pl, to be official liquidator

SILVER VALLEY MINES, LIMITED.-By an order, dated Ang 96,
made by Cave, J, it was ordered that the above company be
wound up. Beall and Co, Queen Victoria st, solicitors for the
petitioner

SOCIETY OF AFRICAN TRADERS, LIMITED.-Petition for win ling up, presented Aug 30, directed to be heard before the Vacation Juke on Sept 21. Miller and Vernon, Moorgate st, solicitors for the petitioner

TURNBULL PATENT PONTOON DOCK AND SLIPWAY COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented Sept 6, directed to be heard before the Vacation Judge, at Rolls yd, Chancery lane, on Sept 21. Hickin, Serjeants' inn, Flect st, agent for Wray, Bridlington Quay, solicitor for the petitioner

[Gazette, Sept. 13.]

UNLIMITED IN CHANCERY. MIDDLESBROUGH, REDCAR, SALTBURN-BY-THE-SEA, AND CLEVELAND DISTRICT PERMANENT BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETY.-Kay, J, Las fixed Sept 16 at 1.15, at the chambers, Rolls yd, Chancery land, for the appointment of an official liquidator

[Gazette, Sept. 9.]

« PreviousContinue »