has been considerable discussion and difference of opinion as to the dare upon which it came into force. Section 7 provides that, "This Act shall come into operation on the expiration of two months from the passing thereof," and the Act received the Royal Assent on the 12th of August. Now, it is clear that two months have completely to intervene between the passing of the Act and its coming into operation, and that we have to begin to reckon the two months from the 12th of August. The two months, therefore, must include either the 12th of August or the 12th of October. The period cannot include both the 12th of August and the 12th of October, for that would be two months and one day. If space were in question, and a mile had to be measured "from" a given place, no part of the place could be included in the mile. Hence, if time is to be measured "from" a given day, no part of that day can be included in the time. If this reasoning is correct, it follows that the two months which had to expire did not expire till the 12th of October had passed, and that the Act came into force on the 13th. This is precisely the argument of DAY, J., in the case of The South Staffordshire Tramways Co. v. The Accident Assurance Association (1891, 1 Q. B. 402), in which the court held that a policy of insurance against accidents "for twelve calendar months from the 24th of November, 1887," covered an accident which happened on the 24th of November, 1888. On whichever day, however, the Act came into force, it will practically be first put to the test all over the country next week at quarter sessions. It is a little unfortunate that the difficulties which exist in the construction of the Act should have to be dealt with first of all by unprofessional judges like the chairmen of quarter sessions, before the judges of the High Court have had an opportunity of expressing their opinions or of giving any sort of guidance. The provision that will probably give the most trouble is that which allows the prisoner to be cross-examined as to his past career, if the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution. To say that a witness has committed perjury seems to be a grave imputation on his character. Probably in a majority of cases, however, a guilty prisoner who gives evidence denying the truth of the evidence given against him will be driven to make this charge of perjury. A plain fact of a damnatory nature is sworn to against him, a fact about which there cannot be a mistake; the prisoner must often either deny the truth of this or admit his guilt. If he denies it, he may then be asked whether he alleges that the witness has perjured himself. He will be almost forced to make the charge of perjury. It is possible that the High Court may hold that this sort of imputation is not within the words of the Act, but it is hard to see grounds for such a possible decision. It seems to us that whenever this imputation of perjury is made, the prisoner may be cross-examined as to his previous crimes and convictions. This will admit such cross-examination in an enormous number of cases, probably in far more than was dreamt of when Parliament considered this section.

1

THE DOUBT as to the date for the commencement of the Criminal Evidence Act, above referred to, resulted in a curious diversity of practice on Wednesday, and the report of criminal proceedings held on that day should be a warning to draftsmen who are tempted in the future to indulge in indefinite phaseology. In some courts no doubt seems to have been felt that the Act was already in operation. At the Mansion House notices to that effect were posted in all the cells and waiting-rooms, prisoners being informed that every person charged with an offence might on his own application be called as a witness. No one, however, availed himself of the privilege. At the Guildhall a prisoner was allowed to give evidence and raised a doubt which led to his discharge. So, too, at the Norwich Quarter Sessions a prisoner took advantage of the Act to deny the statements of the prosecutor and was acquitted, the recorder remarking that the result was sufficient to justify the passing of the Act. At the Greenwich police-court a prisoner was less successful, and his wife, who was called on his behalf, was unable to save him from 40s. or fourteen days. At other courts a contrary view of the operation of the Act was taken. At the Croydon Borough police-court the mayor, who

is a solicitor, was clear that it did not come into force till Thursday, and declined to depart from the strict letter of the law. At the County of London Sessions the difficulty was avoided by putting back till the following day all prisoners who pleaded not guilty. It may be noticed that the chairman, Mr. MCCONNELL, Q.C., viewed the inauguration of the new system without any of the forebodings to which we have been accustomed. The Acts by which prisoners have already been permitted to give evidence have, in his opinion, worked well. There is little reason to doubt that a similar verdict will soon be passed on the present Act.

IN THE Times of Thursday there appeared an extremely lucid account, by Sir GODFREY LUSHINGTON, of "l'affaire Dreyfus" from its origin down to the present time. It requires such a summary in order to place in their proper relation the remarkable series of events which has so completely shaken confidence in French ideas of justice, and the outcome of which cannot yet be foreseen. Were there nothing against the trial of Captain DREYFUS except that it was held in secret, the rest of the world would not have troubled itself over the matter. Such a procedure, however foreign to our notions, may be justified in another country by considera tions of State or military necessity. But so much has happened since that it is impossible for anyone outside France to have any faith in the justice of the conviction and sentence. Until there has been a public trial no unprejudiced person would now believe that the bordereau on which DREYFUS was ostensibly condemned was in his handwriting; the mystery attending the document alleged to have been sent from the German to the Italian Embassy, and containing the expression "Ce canaille de D- devient trop exigeant," has never been cleared up, though it is probable that upon the faith of this the verdict was actually given; and the later document which was put forward by the military authorities in the course of M. ZOLA's trial as proof absolute, and was again insisted upon by M. CAVAIGNAC, the Minister of War, in the Chamber in July last, was confessed by Colonel HENRY to be his own forgery. In addition the French Government have to face the fact that the German and Italian Governments have repudiated any connection on their part with Captain DREYFUS. To the insular mind it is inconceivable why there should be any prejudice against the convict; why, on the other hand, popular sympathy should not all be on the side of the man who, it is clear, was irregularly condemned, and as to the substantial justice of whose condemnation subsequent occurrences have raised so much doubt. Frenchmen cannot be surprised if the rest of the world sides with the minority amongst themselves and holds Captain DREYFUs to be an innocent man until the contrary has been publicly proved.

BUT THE name of Captain DREYFUS is only one of those which staud prominent in Sir GODFREY LUSHINGTON's summary. There seems to be every chance, if the better feeling of Frenchmen does not assert itself, that Colonel PICQUART will have a similar measure of injustice dealt out to him. At the time of the DREYFUS trial Colonel PICQUART was in the Intelligence Department attached to the French War Office. Shortly after the trial he became head of the office. He had the misfortune to believe in the innocence of Captain DREYFUS, and he attributed the bordereau to Commandant ESTERHAZY. Correspondence upon the matter passed between him and General GoNSE, Assistant Chief of the Staff, and he warned General GoNSE of the scandal that was likely to ensue and urged him to avoid it. For answer he was removed from his post, sent on service to Africa, and his correspondence intercepted and examined. The suspicion under which he fell induced him to obtain leave to return to Paris, and he went for advice to an advocate, M. LEBLOIS. He placed in M. LEBLOIS's hands the correspondence which had passed between himself and General GONSE with regard to ESTERHAZY, and this brought trouble both upon advocate and client. In the present year Colonel PICQUART was tried by court-martial on various charges connected with papers relating to the DREYFUS case, and while most of them were

The

doubt the correctness of Mr. Justice KEKEWICH's decision. necessities of the case were fully met by the appointment of an additional trustee, and it would be a very strong measure to insist upon the appointment of a judicial trustee in opposition to the wishes of the tenant for life merely because the tenant for life was also sole executor or trustee. If, however, no suitable trustee could be found, we presume the court would not hesitate to appoint a judicial trustee. The actual order made was that the summons should be amended by entitling it under the Trustee Act, 1893, and that a trustee should be appointed under that Act, with a reference to chambers to make the appointment.

But from the point of view of solicitors the main feature in the report of Re Ratcliffe is the intimation it affords of the objection felt by the officials at the courts to the appointment of solicitors as judicial trustees. In the first place it is difficult to reconcile such a feeling with the express provision of the Judicial Trustee Rules (r. 5 (1)) that the court is not to be excluded by any existing practice as to the appointment of trustees from appointing any person to be a judicial trustee by reason of his being a solicitor to the trust or to the trustee or to any beneficiary. Solicitors, therefore, are definitely put forward as being eligible for the office. But, apart from this, there can be no doubt that in deciding between an accountant and a solicitor the preference should, in the interest of the efficient management of the trust estate, be given to the solicitor. In point of security, of course, there is no ground for distinction. It is of the essence of the system that the safety of the corpus of the trust property should not be left to the honesty of the trustee. All title-deeds and other documents shewing the title of the trustee to the trust property have to be deposited in such custody as the court directs, and, unless this requirement is especially dispensed with by the court, the trustee must give security for the due application of the trust property. Putting aside the actual custody of the estate, the matters which have to be attended to in the course of its administration fall more properly within the scope of the business of a solicitor than that of an accountant. The keeping of the accounts of a trust estate is a matter of no difficulty and certainly requires no greater training in such matters than any man must go through for the purpose of conducting his ordinary business. The main points with which the judicial trustee is concerned are the arrangements that have to be made with the beneficiaries on the one hand, and the assistance that has to be obtained from the court on the other, and in both directions it is the services of a solicitor that will be the most efficient. They are services similar to those which he is continually rendering in the course of his employment as solicitor to ordinary trustees, and, so far as the court is concerned, they are services in which legal training and qualifications will be of great advantage.

If accountants were otherwise most fitted for the office, it would perhaps be no objection that the practice under the Judicial Trustee Rules allows of their appearing personally in chambers to obtain the direction of the court. It is one of the features of the new system that the judicial trustee shall have easy access to the court, and, whoever he may be, he must have the right of obtaining directions without the necessity of obtaining legal assistance. But while admitting this, it is important to point out that the matters upon which direction will be required will usually require for their decision a knowledge of the law of trusts, and in discussing them it will be far more convenient for the officials of the court to have to deal with a lawyer than with a business man whose experience does not carry him out of the realm of figures. The system of judicial trustees is still in its infancy, and it may be that the tendency to exclude solicitors is not so marked as our correspondent supposes, and as it was assumed to be by the advisers of the applicant in Re Ratcliffe. If, however, any such unwritten rule is in process of establishment we cannot but think that it has been adopted without sufficient consideration. It would certainly be remarkable if, after the encroachments which have taken place of recent years on the domain of solicitors, the authorities responsible for the administration of the Judicial Trustees Act should determine to exclude them from an office for which they are peculiarly fitted. Any such course would deserve the prompt attention of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society.

REVIEWS.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

BIRRELL, Q.C., M.P. With Portraits and Illustrations. Smith, Sir Frank Lockwood: a Biographical Sketch. By AUGUSTINE Elder, & Co.

Men; based on Lectures delivered in the Inner Temple Hall at the Company Law: a Practical Handbook for Lawyers and Business request of the Council of Legal Education. With an Appendix containing the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1898, and Rules, &c. By FRANCIS BEAUFORT PALMER, Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition. Stevens & Sons (Limited). Price 12s. 6d.

The Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 36), with Notes. By WILFRED BAUGH ALLEN, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. And a Short History of the Act by Sir HARRY BODKIN POLAND, Q.C. Butterworth & Co; Shaw & Sons. Price 5s.

Digest IX. 2: Lex Aquilia. Translated, with Notes. By C. H. MONRO, M.A. Cambridge University Press.

The Land Transfer Acts, 1875 and 1897, and the Land Transfer Rules and Forms. With Notes. By W. AMBROSE, Esq., Q.C., M.P., and W. B. FERGUSON, Esq., M.A., Barrister-at-Law. Butterworth & Co.

CORRESPONDENCE.

SOLICITORS AND THE JUDICIAL TRUSTEES ACT, 1896. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-From my own experience, and evidently from that of the solicitors acting for the applicant for the appointment of a judicial trustee in Re Ratcliffe (1898, 2 Ch. D. 352), there seems to be no doubt their minds, if not to refuse, certainly to place every obstacle in the that the masters of the Chancery Division have one and all made up way of the appointment of solicitors as judicial trustees, and it seems right, therefore, that attention should be drawn to what may in time become recognized as an unwritten rule which will not only work a hardship, but will cast a grave and unmerited slur upon the members of our profession.

How or under what circumstances it came to pass that solicitors inquire, but that such a feeling existed, and still exists, in the minds were invariably objected to as suitable trustees we need not stop to of the judges there is not the slightest doubt.

When the Judicial Trustees Act was passed it was, however, recognized that, by reason of the fast growing responsibility of trustees, of the technical nature of the duties they were called upon to perform, and of the ever-increasing difficulty in obtaining, in these days of rush and hurry, suitable and competent friends to undertake the onerous task, the former objection to the appointment of solicitors should cease to exist, and the rules accordingly provided that solicitors should be competent for election as trustees. One would have thought that the rules having so stated, the masters would, in all proper and reasonable cases, have loyally recognized the rights of

solicitors in the matter, and would have assisted rather than hindered their appointment. Such, as I have stated and as the report of the above case shews, is not the case.

Solicitors are officers of the court, they are subject to the discipline and rules of the Law Society, they pay large fees for the privilege of being allowed to practise, to say nothing of what they have paid for the privilege of being allowed to enter the profession; they can be struck off the rolls for professional misconduct, they can be prosecuted for fraud, they can be sued like ordinary mortals, and yet they are told by the masters (who, being former members of the same branch, ought to know better) that they are not as fit to be judicial trustees as, forsooth, butchers, bakers, accountants, and so forth. And, be it remembered, when appointed, they would have to deposit all securities as ordered by the court, they would have to render accounts twice a year and comply with various strict requirements, and for all this would get only such remuneration as the masters thought fit to allow.

Well may our President say our prospects are gloomy, well may we begin to wonder why our professional duties are becoming less and less every year, well may we see accountants becoming more and more successful and prosperous, while we become more and more unnecessary to the community.

And having mentioned accountants, let me call attention to the Act again. It will be observed that the judicial trustee, when appointed, is at liberty to communicate direct, either by letter or drawn the Chartered Accountants' Society saw, what our society did interview, with the master, and when the Act and Rules were being not see, that in cases where accountants were appointed trustees they would have a right of audience in chambers without the intervention of a solicitor for the first time in their existence. Where appointed

receivers they have not this right, but now that they have got in the thin edge of the wedge, there is not the slightest doubt that they will never rest content until they have a similar right of audience in regard to receiverships, and possibly other matters; and who knows where the thing may end. Having regard to the large percentage of legal questions asked at their intermediate and final examinations and the insidious way in which they are gradually creeping into the pastures hitherto grazed upon by us legal sheep, it is only a question of time, and a continuance of that modesty on all questions affecting our interests which characterizes the dear old gentlemen on our Council, for Mr. Margett's prophecy as to our future to become an uncomfortable and realized fact.

Before the Vacation Judge.

Re COMPANIES ACTS, 1862-1893, AND Re THE GEE FLOOR SCRUBBING MACHINE CO. (LIM.). 12th Oct.

COMPANY WINDING UP PETITION-LOCUS STANDI OF PETITIONER-CONTRIBUTORY-CALLS IN ARREAR-REPUDIATION OF SHARES.

This was a petition of Mr. Frederick Arthur Hyndman, of 21, Montpelier, Weston-super-Mare, a contributory of the company, that the company might be compulsorily wound up. Upon behalf of the company and of creditors opposing the petition it was said that there was a preliminary objection to the petition. The petition was presented by a shareholder who had not paid calls upon his shares. The petitioner had only paid in respect of his 100 shares the moneys which were payable on application, the other moneys due thereon were long since overdue, having been payable 8s. per share on allotment, 5. per share on the 15th of November, and 58. per share on the 15th of December, 1897. The petitioner had not paid any of those moneys although he was continually called upon to do so during the company's existence, and although he, on or about the 30th of December, 1897, by his solicitor, claimed the right to repudiate his shares, he never took any further proceedings for repudiating the same until the 30th of April, 1898, and the proceedings had been abandoned by him, his solicitors having given notice that they did not intend to proceed with the Fame. Upon the authority of Re Crystal Reef Gold Mining Co. (Limited) (40 W. R. 235; 1892, 1 Ch. 408), it was submitted that the petition ought to stand over till the calls were paid into court. In support of the petition it was submitted that Re Crystal Reef Gold Mining Co. (Limited) was in favour of the petitioner. In that case North, J., said that "there might be circumstances under which the court ought not to require this to be done." The petitioner alleged fraud. The petitioner could be a shareholder so far as he had paid up his shares, and at the same time say he was not liable for further calls.

CHANNELL, J.-In order to set up fraud the petitioner must repudiate the shares and say he is not a shareholder. The facts in the present case are, I think, less favourable to the petitioner than those in Re Crystal Reef Gold Mining Co. (Limited). There will be an order that the petition stand over till the first petition day after the petitioner pays into court to the credit of the matter the amount of the calls due from him as a contributory. -COUNSEL, Hodges; Whinney; D. Stewart-Smith. SOLICITORS, Blachford, Riches, & Co.; Ashurst, Morris, Crisp, & Co.

[Reported by J. E. ALDOUS, Barrister-at-Law.]

NEW ORDERS, &c.

TRANSFER OF ACTIONS.

ORDER OF COURT.

Monday, the 3rd day of October, 1898. 1. Hardinge Stanley, Earl of Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, do hereby order that the actions mentioned in the Schedule hereto shall be transferred to the Honourable Mr. Justice Wright.

SCHEDULE.

Mr. Justice KEKEWICH (1898-B.-No. 2,992).

Schedule to this notice annexed were paid into the hands of the Treasurer of the Island of Jamaica, there to remain subject and liable to any Order of the Court of Chancery of the said Island, and that the said several sums of money so remain in such matters, causes, or suits in the books of the office of the said Treasurer, and that no proceedings have been had in the said matters, causes, or suits in respect thereto for twenty years last past, period of twenty years. nor any application for the payment of the said sums respectively for a

And notice is hereby further given, that if no claim be made or right to such moneys substantiated to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court of Judicature of Jamaica within two years from the date of the first publication of this Notice in Great Britain the said moneys will become the absolute property of the public of the said Island. Dated at Kingston this 21st day of June, 1898.

LAW SOCIETIES.

BRISTOL INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

The following are extracts from the report of the council: Auctioneers' Commissions.-It will be remembered that in the last annual report reference was made to the absence of uniformity in the commissions received by auctioneers on sales by auction, and the members of the profession were reminded of the scale agreed upon in the year 1882 between the leading auctioneers then practising in Bristol and the society. With the view of ascertaining whether the time had come for revising this scale, a committee was appointed to inquire into the remuneration paid to the auctioneers and estate agents elsewhere and to report to the council. A circular accordingly was sent to all the law societies in the country, and replies from between fifty and sixty were received, with the result that the diversity of practice prevailing throughout the country in this matter appeared so great that the committee decided to make no recommendation.

New County Court Rules.-The new County Court Rules as finally settled have not yet been published, but it is understood that in consequence of the reports made by the law societies the demand for security for costs will be withdrawn, and with it the interposition of the registrar of the debtor's district.

Rules under the Land Transfer Act, 1897.-In response to the request of the chief society, the draft of the general rules to be made by the Lord Chancellor under the provisions of the Land Transfer Act, 1897, were considered by the council of the society, some of whose suggestions were adopted by the Council of the chief society in their report to the Lord Chancellor.

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.

LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETIES.

BIRMINGHAM LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY.-The autumn session of the society opened last Tuesday evening, when a debate took place on the following moot point (No. 876): "That this society disapproves of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898." Mr. H. A. Pearson, M.A., barrister-atlaw, presided over a very large attendance of members. Mr. A. H. McBean opened the discussion in the affirmative, and was supported by Messrs. L. T. C. Meek, T. C. Brookes, and A. F. Lovatt, solicitor. Mr. H. Eaden replied in the negative, and was followed by Messrs. F. H. Argyle, A. H. Davies, C. H. Smith, and W. Somers. After the openers had replied the chairman summed up and then put the question to the meeting, when it was decided in the negative by 16 votes to 3. A hearty vote of thanks to Mr. Pearson for presiding terminated the proceedings.

October 11.-Mr. Robert Noble, barrister-at-law, delivered a lecture upon "The Law of Libel and Slander" to the members of the society. There was a very large attendance. The lecture was the first of a course of four which Mr. Noble has kindly consented to deliver to the members

Mr. Justice ROMER (1898-B.-No. 3,871).

In re The British Type Foundry, Limited Edward Reuben Alexander ▾ The British Type Foundry, Limited HALSBURY, C.

JAMAICA CHANCERY DEPOSITS.-NOTICE. Pursuant to an Act of the Legislature of Jamaica, 19 Vict. c. 5, s. 5, notice is hereby given that the several sums of money mentioned in the