on a trade separately from her husband. If she is not so trading she is still exempt. In the case above referred to the debtor was at the commencement of the proceedings a spinster, and judgment had been obtained against her for a sum exceeding £200. This was in January last. In February the creditor presented a bankruptcy petition against her, relying on an act of bankruptcy which he alleged she had committed. The petition came on for hearing on the 22nd of February, when the lady admitted the debt and the act of bankruptcy, and the further hearing was adjourned. Then she married, and on the 24th of March, when an order was about to be made, she set up her new state as a ground for excluding the registrar's jurisdiction. He decided against her and adjudicated her bankrupt, but the Court of Appeal have been more careful of the niceties of the law. She was then a married woman, and she was not trading separately from her husband. That concluded the matter and the receiving order was discharged.

THE PAPER on the County Courts read by Mr. PICKSTONE at the meeting of the Incorporated Law Society at Swansea was interesting and instructive. Many of the views therein advocated have, from time to time, been mooted in these columns. During more than fifty years of successful administration of justice, the county courts have steadily risen in public favour until they now, undoubtedly, are regarded as the most accessible and satisfactory (in the sense of prompt decision) legal tribunals we possess. Under these circumstances the demand for an extension of their jurisdiction seems to be reasonable and logical enough. The limit of £50 imposed in common law cases on the jurisdiction of the county courts has, owing to their extended derivative jurisdiction, become quite nominal, and the number of remitted actions annually determined clearly shews that the county courts are gradually developing into general courts of first instance. The county court bench now comprises lawyers who would not discredit the High Court, and who are fully competent to adjudicate upon complicated cases. In the metropolis the county court judges are especially strong, and, in view of their efficient and arduous judicial labours, their claims to promotion and increased remuneration should be recognized.

THE COMPANIES ACT, 1898.

Ir will shortly become a matter of importance, in the case of companies which have issued vendors' shares, to ascertain whether, before the date of issue, a contract was duly filed under section 25 of the Companies Act, 1867, or whether there has been an irregularity in complying with the section so as to make it expedient to apply for relief under the Companies Act, 1898. The Act does not, it may be observed, as originally proposed by the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, repeal section 25, nor does it give the general relief against all past informalities in compliance with the section which the Bill contemplated. Section 25 still remains unrepealed and unamended, and the present measure is confined to enabling the court to grant relief in cases which can be brought within its terms. Section 1, sub-section 1, provides that whenever, before or after the commencement of the Act, shares have been issued as fully or partly paid up for a consideration other than cash, and no contract or no sufficient contract has been filed under section 25 of the Act of 1867, "the company or any person interested in such shares or any of them may apply to the court for relief, and the court, if satisfied that the omission to file a contract or sufficient contract was accidental or due to inadvertence, or that for any reason it is just and equitable to grant relief, may make an order for the filing with the registrar of a sufficient contract in writing, and directing that on such contract being filed within a specified period it shall, in relation to such shares, operate as if it had been duly filed. . . before the issue of such shares." Hence to enable the court to make an order under the Act it is necessary that there shall have been an omission to file a contract or a sufficient contract, and that such omission was accidental or due to inadvertence, or that for any reason it is just and equitable to grant relief. For the present purpose

it is not necessary to pay special attention to cases where no contract has been filed. These are exceptional and it will depend entirely upon the circumstances of each case whether it is one in which the court is likely to grant relief. Ordinarily the omission will have been due to inadvertence, and it may be presumed that relief will be granted. The cases which call for special notice are those where, in conformity with a common practice of recent years, the promoters of the company have filed a supplemental contract in lieu of the original contract by which the issue of the shares was in the first instance provided for.

The possible danger incident to this procedure has been brought into prominent notice by the recent cases of Re Kharaskhoma Syndicate (46 W. R. 37; 1897, 2 Ch. 451) and Re Maynards (ante, p. 308). In the former case the original contract stated the consideration for the allotment of the paid-up shares, and provided that the allotment was to be protected by a dulyregistered agreement under section 25. In intended pursuance of this provision a supplementary contract was filed, which, in reciting the principal contract, stated that "for the considerations therein mentioned the shares were to be allotted as agreed. The consideration for the allotment was not further expressed. The Court of Appeal held that the statement of the consideration was an essential part of a contract complying with section 25, and that it could not be supplied by reference to another contract which was not filed. Hence under the circumstances the filed contract was insufficient, and the issue of shares was not protected. In Re Maynards the filed contract was held to be insufficient for a similar reason. Here, again, it was a supplemental agreement; but, though in reciting the principal agreement it set forth generally the consideration, it did not specify the subjectthe businesses and property mentioned in the first part of the matter of the sale. It simply referred to such subject-matter as schedule" to the principal agreement, and "the leasehold hereditaments, short particulars of which are set out in the second part" of the schedule. KEKEWICH, J., held that a description of the property which constituted the consideration for the shares was an essential part of the contract, and that such description could not, for the purpose of the filed contract, be incorporated by reference to a document not on the file. These cases show the principal matters to which attention should be directed in determining whether a supplemental contract, which has been filed under section 25, is a sufficient contract for the purposes of the section. It is certainly not sufficient unless it discloses in detail the consideration for which the shares are issued, and, where this consideration is the sale of property, the property must be described, if not with all the particularity required for conveyancing purposes, yet sufficiently to shew the real character of the transaction. Wherever the contract which has been filed falls short in either of these respects, steps should be at once taker to obtain relief under the Act.

There remains the question whether the filing of a supplemental contract is in any case sufficient. Such a contract is open to the objection that it is in substance no new contract at all, but simply carries out an arrangement to which the parties are already bound under the principal contract. It is apprehended, however, that it may be assumed, for the present at any rate, that a supplemental contract, provided it fully discloses the essential parts of the principal contract, may be taken to be sufficient." This view is favoured by the judgment of LINDLEY, M.R., in Re Kharaskhoma Syndicate, and, having regard to the large number of cases in which supplemental contracts have been filed, it is unlikely that a merely technical objection to their sufficiency would be allowed to prevail. It is not improbable that the question of their sufficiency will soon arise in the course of applications under the new Act, and it will then be time enough to determine whether it is necessary in all such cases to take steps to file the principal contract. It may be anticipated that the majority of the applications will be in cases where the supplemental contract is deficient in the points noticed above, and inasmuch as, prior to the recent decisions, it was very doubtful what particulars the filed contract must contain, it is probable that no difficulty will be experienced in obtaining relief. The fact that the Act has been found necessary calls for a liberal construction of its provisions.

The

and 8, Rupert-street, above the level of the former buildings standing thereon, over which there was a direct access of light from the south-east, south, and south-west to the plaintiff's premises, should be taken down, and also that defendants should be restrained by injunction from further proceeding with any of the works so as to prejudicially affect the plaintiff's rights of light and air until trial of this action or further order. principle of the cases applied where it had been held that if a defendant pressed on building operatious after notice of an intended application for an injunction had been given to him, a mandatory injunction would be granted. Daniel v. Ferguson (39 W. R. 599; 1891, 2 Ch. 27), Von Joel v. Hornsey (1895, 2 Ch. 774, 44 W. R. Dig. 126), and Lawrence v. Horton (38 W. R. 556) were referred to. For the defendants it was said that it was not admitted that any arrangement had been come to between the plaintiff's and defendants' architects.

CHANNELL, J., in giving judgment, said that in his opinion the principle of the cases which had been cited on behalf of the plaintiff applied to the present case. There must be au iujunction as prayed and also a mandatory injunction for demolition. such injunction however not to come into operation for fifteen days. The mandatory injunction to apply to the work erected since the 8th of September which interfered with the plaintiff's ancient lights. Costs of the motion to be the plaintiff's in any event.-COUNSEL, Alexander, Q.C., and G. B. Rooke; F. Low. SOLICITORS, Rooke & Son; Layton, Son, & Lendon.

[Reported by J. E. ALDOUS, Barrister-at-Law.]

KENNERLEY . THE OWNER OF THE SAILING YACHT "OLGA." 5th Oct.

SHIP-REPAIRS-MARITIME LIEN-ACTION IN REM-LIABILITY OF OWNER OF SHIP FOR DEBT INCURRED BY FORMER OWNER.

.

This was a motion on behalf of Mr. John Schwartz, the owner of the sailing yacht Olga, and the defendant in the action, that this action might be dismissed with costs, and that the writ and warrant of arrest therein might be set aside on the ground that there was no right in rem against The Olga in respect of the matters sued for, and that the writ disclosed no cause of action against the owner of the vessel, or in the alternative that the yacht Olga might be released. In support of the motion the writ and an affidavit of the defendant were referred to, and it appeared that the action was commenced on the 29th of September last, the claim upon the writ being "for a balance amounting to £246 12s. 6d. for repairs, labour and materials supplied to the sailing yacht Olga and other incidentals and necessaries between November, 1896, and the 30th of August, 1898, . and which said yacht Olga is now under warrant of arrest for wages, by order of this honourable court, dated the 28th of September, 1898." The defendant purchased the yacht Olga at public auction at Lloyd's on the 20th of September, 1898. Before doing so he searched the register and found that it was free from incumbrances. On the 22nd of September he paid his purchase-money, £400, and received from Mr. E. Murray, the vendor and the then sole registered owner of the vessel, a bill of sale. The bill of sale was on the same day duly registered at the custom-house, and the defendant then became the sole registered owner of the yacht. On the 28th of September last the yacht was arrested in an action at the suit of the plaintiff for wages. The defendant entered an appearance to that action, and the yacht was released on an undertaking by his solicitors to put in bail. On the 30th of September last the yacht was arrested in the present action. The plaintiff's claims in this action and in the action for wages related to transactions between the plaintiff and Edwin Murray prior to defendant purchasing the yacht. The defendant alleged that he never had any transactions with the plaintiff, and at the time when he purchased the yacht and paid for her he had no knowledge whatever of the claims of the plaintiff either in this action or in that for wages. It was submitted that the res could not be made liable for the debt of the former owner where the ship had changed hands before the institution of the suit. The Two Ellens (L. R. 4 P. C. 161). The Aneroid (2 P. D. 189, 25 W. R. Dig. 267), The Henrich Björn (11 A. C. 270, 34 W. R. Dig. 179) were cited. For the plaintiff, the respondent, 24 Vict. c. 10, Hamilton v. Baker (14 A. C. 209), and 52 & 53 Vict. c. 46, s. 1, were referred to, and it was submitted that the action was one in rem and not against any person.

CHANNELL, J.-It is quite clear that this action is misconceived. It is not an action in rem. Upon the authorities it ought to be dismissed with costs. If it were necessary to give the plaintiff an opportunity of doing something he ought to have done, but has omitted to do, as a matter of discretion I should consider it. But as a matter of discretion I should refuse to grant leave to amend the writ in this action when by amending the first action-i.e., that for wages, he can obtain all relief to which he is entitled. The action must be dismissed. There will be an order for release of the ship. The dismissal is without prejudice to any amendment of the first action.-COUNSEL, F. Laing; Shackleton Hallett. SOLICITORS, Parker, Garrett, & Parker; R. N. Appleyard.

[Reported by J. E. ALDOUS, Barrister-at-Law.]

Lord Herschell, says the Daily Chronicle, has a legitimate grievance against a Canadian reporter. When he was at Toronto he was the guest of the Board of Trade. He discovered the morning after that the chief daily paper bad represented him to have spoken thus: "You remember the words of Bishop Heber, who says of Ireland

Where every prospect pleases, And only man is vile."

Not unnaturally, the Irish population have been deeply perturbed over a sentence of ti is kind coming from the mouth of a statesman whom Mr. Gladstone made Lord Chancellor in his Home Rule administration.

NEW ORDERS, &c.

UNIVERSITY OF WALES. LEGAL EDUCATION.

The following Order has been made by the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, and the Lord Chancellor, under the Solicitors Act. "In pursuance of the powers contained in the Solicitors Act, 1877, and of every other power in this behalf we hereby order as follows: "A Certificate of having passed a Preliminary Examination under the said Act shall not be required from any person who has passed the Matriculation Examination of the University of Wales. (Signed) RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, C.J. "NATHL. LINDLEY, M.R. 'HALSBURY, C.

"Dated the 25th April, 1896."

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66

The twenty-fifth annual provincial meeting of the Incorporated Law Society was held on Tuesday and Wednesday at Swansea, Mr. C. B. Margetts (Huntingdon) occupying the chair. Among those present were Mr. H. Manisty (vice-president), Mr. John Hunter, Mr. B. G. Lake, Sir A. K. Rollit, M.P. (members of the Council), Mr. J. T. Atkinson (Selby), Mr. W. C. Lord (Manchester), Mr. E. C. Sewell (Cirencester), and Mr. J. C. Woods (Swansea) (extraordinary members of the Council); the following presidents of country law societies, Mr. H. H. Gibbons (Liverpool), Mr. W. C. H. Cross (Bristol), Mr. H. Bevir (Gloucester and Wilts), Mr. R. A. Edgar (Manchester), and Mr. A. T. Shepherd (Sunderland); and the following secretaries of country law societies, Mr. C. H. Morton (Associated Provincial Law Societies), Mr. G. Porter (Blackburn), Mr. R. Symonds (Hereford), Mr. A. J. Cleaver and Mr. P. Dobell (Liverpool), and Mr. E. Bramley (Sheffield).

RECEPTION.

On Monday evening Mr. J. AERON THOMAS (the mayor), who is a mem ber of the solicitor branch of the profession, the MAYORESS, and Mr. Jas C. WOODS (president of the Incorporated Law Society of Swansea and Neath) and Mrs. WOODS received the President, Council, and Members of the Society, and the ladies accompanying them, at the Public Library. The building was handsomely decorated for the occasion, music was provided, there was an exhibition of rare Welsh and other books, a Röntgen ray demonstration, and other auxiliaries; and the opportunity was taken to unveil a brass tablet in the reading room to the memory of the late Mr. Gladstone, who opened the institution in 1887. The Mayoress performed the ceremony, and the Mayor, Mr. Woods, and Sir A. K. Rollit were among the speakers. TUESDAY'S PROCEEDINGS.

The business proceedings, which were held at the Royal Institution of South Wales, commenced on Tuesday morning.

The MAYOR gave the visitors a very hearty welcome on this the first occasion upon which the society had come to the Principality, observing that Swansea was the largest Welsh town in point of population and the most typical.

PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS.

which I think very likely to result from this meeting will doubtless be that After some introductory remarks, the PRESIDENT said: One advantage more of our professional brethren practising in Wales will join the society. The society has from its commencement made steady progress in the number of its members and also in its influence and power, and its existence has been of great advantage to the profession in raising its standing, which has been to a large extent effected by the society being entrusted with the control and management of all the examinations, the custody of the roll of solicitors and the business relating to their admission and annual certificates, and the powers conferred by the Solicitors Act, 1888, under which complaints against solicitors, instead of being brought in the first instance before the court and referred to nasters for investigation, are heard and reported on by the Discipline Committee, consisting of members of the Council of the society. The society is regarded by the Legislature, the judges, and the public as the representative of the profession of solicitors. The society is in immediate touch with the provincial aw

societies now established all over the country, and, by its constitution, ten presidents of country law societies are annually chosen as extraordinary members of the Council, and, by a tacit understanding, ten ordinary members of the Council (of whom I have the honour to be one) are chosen from country solicitors, and thus, with twenty (of the fifty) seats on the Council filled by country solicitors, the interests of country solicitors are represented to the fullest extent on the Council, and every solicitor, whether practising in London or the country, derives great benefit by the existence of the society and the work done by the Council. And I venture to hold the opinion that all solicitors, both in London and the country, should be members of the society.

CRIMINAL LAW.

The Legislature has this year passed an Act to enable persons charged with offences and their wives and husbands to give evidence. They are not compellable to do so, and the failure of any person charged with an offence, or his or her wife or husband, to give evidence is not to be made the subject of any adverse comment by the prosecution. This Act effects a very serious and important change in the system of administration of justice in this country, and whether it proves beneficial or the reverse remains for future experience to demonstrate. Many eminent judges, and persons to whose opinion very great weight must be given, were opposed to the alteration of the law on this subject. It is true that the Act does not go to the extent of compelling persons charged, and their wives and husbands, to give evidence, yet it puts very strong pressure upon them to do so, and creates a great temptation to them in most cases to perjure themselves. People of absolutely spotless character do not ordinarily find themselves standing at the bar of a criminal court. If a person charged with a crime is not guilty he has mostly put himself in a suspicious position, and his attempts to explain himself are more likely than not to convict him even if he is innocent. The jury will know the law without being told by the counsel for the prosecution that the person charged can give evidence if he chooses, and I venture to contend with confidence that if the person charged does not go into the witnessbox to give evidence on his own behalf they will nearly always convict. The law of England has hitherto always been fair and just towards accused persons; but I think that it is not fair to a person accused to put him in the position of choosing whether he will certainly be convicted or attempt to make the jury believe his own story, and, too frequently, add perjury to the crime of which he is accused. The terrible position of a wife or husband of a person charged will be even more pitiable, and I think it very hard on them to be placed, as they frequently will be, under the strongest possible temptation to commit perjury. My observations on this subject will probably not be acquiesced in by many gentlemen at this meeting, and I do not pretend to speak for the Incorporated Law Society in making these observations, as the society, at the provincial meeting last year at Sheffield, passed a resolution in favour of the principle of the Act, and the Council presented a petition in support of it, but in writing an address I can only express my own views, which, on this subject, unfortunately differ from majorities of the society and Council, and both Houses of Parliament. I must, therefore, not leave it without quoting some great authorities in support of the view which I take. In the Life of Lord Campbell, in recording a visit to Paris in 1819, he says: "I now paid a good deal of attention to the administration of justice in France, and was frequently present at criminal trials before the Cour Royale. After much deliberation I made up my mind against the French practice of interrogating the accused, which, at first sight, seems so plausible and in defence of which grave arguments may be adduced. I was decided against it chiefly by considering the advantages it gives to quickness and experience, the danger of a jury being misled by the answers of a man of irregular life, though innocent of the particular charge, and the manner in which the practice brings the judge into collision with the accused, making him appear and sometimes feel like an advocate eager for victory. I have seen a practised thief get himself off by a ready answer. I have known men convicted by the improbable lies which they told to account for their being in suspicious situations without evidence to support the particular charge, and I have observed M. Le Président, much irritated by a sparring dialogue with the prisoner, betraying a partizan warmth which in England would be reckoned very indecorous in the counsel for the prosecution." At the Lewes Assizes, in February last, Mr. Justice Grantham, in the course of his charge to the grand jury, said that he wished to refer to one matter which had been mentioned in the Queen's Speech, and formed the subject of much controversy-namely, the proposal to extend to prisoners the right of giving evidence in their own behalf. No doubt the ordinary newspaper reader thought that a criminal trial was a very one-sided affair, in which the prosecution had the advantage of doing all the talking, while the mouth of the unfortunate prisoner was shut, so as to prevent his having a fair opportunity of putting his case before the jury. This was an entirely erroneous view. By statute, the committing magistrates were bound to give a prisoner the opportunity of making his statement, which at the trial was read to the jury. In his experience, if the statement were a true one the prisoner was invariably acquitted. In his judicial experience, and previously as chairman of quarter sessions, he had known of only one man being convicted whom he believed to be innocent, and that was in a case where the prisoner had the opportunity of giving evidence. The prisoner, however, chose to tell a number of obvious and palpable lies, with the result that the jury who tried the case did not believe his evidence. The prisoner was, however, subsequently released by the authorities, owing to certain facts as to the case having come to light. He did not believe that anyone was ever convicted unjustly for want of an opportunity of giving evidence, nor that an innocent man would be the more likely to be acquitted if he had the right to give

evidence in his own behalf. As the law now stood, juries always gave a prisioner the benefit of any doubt they might feel as to his guilt, but once afford prisoners the right of giving evidence, juries would lose their sense of responsibility, and would treat criminal cases as though they were civil actions, and, instead of the onus of proof being upon the prosecution, the prisoner would have to establish his innocence. In his judgment, the giving of evidence by a prisoner would be far more prejudicial to the innocent than to the guilty. Mr. Justice Hawkins has also on several occasions expressed his objections to the principle of the Act.

QUARTER SESSIONS AND ASSIZES.

In many other respects it seems to me that the system of administration of criminal justice requires alteration, and that, as regards the courts of quarter sessions as now constituted, they are entrusted with too large powers; they now have jurisdiction to try numerous crimes which could be more properly tried at the assizes. The courts of quarter sessions are held before justices of the peace, most of whom are laymen, and there is no obligation on them to choose a lawyer as their chairman. The appeals from justices in petty sessions in counties and in boroughs which have no separate commission of the peace are to justices in quarter sessions, and the appeals from the assessment committee, which is often presided over by a justice of the peace, are to the quarter sessions. I think all such appeals should be to a tribunal unaffected by local influences. In former times, when most crimes were punishable with death, and, consequently, could only be tried at the assizes, the jurisdiction of the courts of quarter sessions was more limited, but now they can try very serious offences, and I do not think these courts, when not presided over by recorders or other trained law. yers, are sufficiently strong to properly try them. Another matter of observation with regard to the courts of quarter sessions is that each court is attended by a limited number of barristers, who constitute the bar of the particular court of quarter sessions, with the right to insist on a brief being held in every case by one of such bar; and a barrister who is not a member of it can only appear at the court of quarter sessions on a special retainer, which, I believe, is never less than ten guineas, and he must have associated with him a member of the bar of the court of quarter sessions in question. In some cases the quarter sessions bar comprises a very small number of barristers, sometimes less than ten. The result is that the services of a first-rate barrister, or indeed of any other barrister outside the number of the privileged few, cannot be obtained at quarter sessions without incurring a large extra expense, which results in a hardship on persons charged with crimes or otherwise deeply interested in cases coming before quarter sessions. Apart from the larger question whether every barrister should not be able without any hindrance whatever to practise in every court, I would venture to suggest that every barrister belonging to an assize circuit should have a right of appearing before any quarter sessions in the circuit without any special retainer or the obligation to require that one of those barristers who usually practice in the court should be briefed. Also that the court of quarter sessions in counties, unless merged with assizes as a county criminal court, should be presided over by a recorder appointed by the Queen in the same way as recorders are appointed and act in the courts of quarter sessions for boroughs. As regards assizes, much of the valuable time of the judges is wasted in going on circuit to attend mere gaol deliveries, and the practice of appointing commissioners to assist the judges should be more freely resorted to, and a commissioner should alone attend assizes where the cases happen to be of a comparatively unimportant nature; and where there may be only a very few cases to ba tried they should be transferred to an adjoining county for trial. By this means the public would be spared the ridiculous spectacle, which occur 3 when there is no business, of a Supreme Court Judge arriving in full state at an assize town, being attended by the high sheriff in court dress or uniform, a chaplain, an under-sheriff, and two trumpeters, and being pompously conducted to the court to open the commission, where are the clerk of assize and other officials and a grand jury, and after going through the accustomed forms, the judge makes a complimentary speech to the grand jury, receives a pair of white kid gloves, and the procession returns with a flourish of trumpets. If assizes were more frequently held by commissioners without the presence of judges at all, and judges only came for the trial of civil cases and heavy criminal cases, it would be possible to merge the courts of quarter sessions in the courts of assize, which shoul be held four times a year in every county for gaol delivery, and thus the assize courts would be the only courts for the trial of indictable offences, and for hearing appeals from decisions of justices in petty sessions. It is to be observed that at present the assizes are frequently held within a few days of the county and borough sessions, which involves the summoning of duplicate grand juries and petty juries, and the services of a clerk of assize and a clerk of the peace almost contemporaneously. Sir Harry Poland, Q C., in a letter to the Times last year, suggested the appointment of commissioners or judges of inferior rank to her Majesty's judges, to try assize cases, except murder cases, and others of a grave and difficult" character, which should of course be reserved for the judges, and also to establish a new court in every county on the lines of the Central Criminal Court for the purpose of trying both assize and sessions cases. And the General Council of the Bar have resolved as follow: "(1) That no extension of the jurisdiction of quarter sessions as at present constituted is advisable. (2) That the institution of a county criminal court for each county on the lines suggested by Sir Harry Poland is desirable." Another alteration which I should like to see made in the procedure in criminal cases would be the abolition of grand juries. They are of little or no use, they can do no good, but may do much harm. In every case of an indictment of a criminal, he is first brought before justices

in petty sessions assisted by a solicitor as their clerk, and is only committed for trial it a primâ facie case is made out by the prosecution, and the grand jury is not expected to do more than be satisfied that this is so, and I cannot myself see why it is necessary to have two preliminary inquiries before an accused person is brought to trial before a judge and jury. If the grand jury takes upon itself to throw out a bill of indictment they may probably allow a person to escape who at least ought to be tried. I remember one case of a man being accused of stealing a bank note, with which he had decamped from an inn where he was staying, and as the grand jury had not before them any evidence that the note was found in his possession, they threw out the Bill, and the prisoner joyfully announced when discharged that he had the note in his cap the whole time. A grand jury, when they begin to inquire into a case, have nothing before them but the indictment, with the names of the witnesses endorsed on it; these are sent for and asked what they know, and, as soon as their statements make out the charge, the grand jury find a true bill. In this they do no good, but if they happen not to be satisfied with the charge being made out, and ignore the bill, they may be doing much harm. The form of presenting a bill of indictment to a grand jury as the regular course of criminal procedure might be altered by allowing the indictment to be filed with the clerk of assize or other official; and the language of indictments might be much improved, and made less technical, by stating in ordinary terms what the prisoner is accused of. The office of Director of Public Prosecutions should be further developed, and in every county he should have an assistant who should be entrusted with the conduct of the prosecution of all indictable cases; such assistant public prosecutor should be a solicitor, and I fail to see why he should be precluded from other practice; and with such an official charged with the duty of conducting prosecutions, private individuals would not be put to the trouble and expense of conducting prosecutions on behalf of the Crown, and there would be no pretence for a continuance of the present objectionable practice of the clerk to the committing magistrates conducting the prosecutions before the assizes or quarter sessions. The prosecution of criminals is a matter of public interest, and ought not to be treated as a private suit and thrown on the persons robbed or injured, who now sometimes from fear of being involved in expense fail to prosecute, or appeals are made to their clemency either not to prosecute or not to press the case. All this is wrong in principle, and it would be rectified by the appointment of active and efficient local public prosecutors, paid out of the consolidated fund or the country rate, or partly from one source and partly from the other, as the Legislature might determine.

APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES.

As to the question of appeal in criminal cases, a Bill was brought into Parliament last session for the "Creation of a Court of Criminal Appeal," and in the memorandum it was stated to be a reproduction (with some slight alterations) of the Bill brought in by the Attorney-General (Sir Henry James), the Solicitor-General (Sir Farrer Herschell), and the Home Secretary (Sir William Harcourt), in 1883. The Bill provided that a defendant convicted, upon whom judgment of death had been pronounced, might appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal on any ground, whether of law or fact, or of mixed law and fact, arising in or out of his trial, and that where it appeared to the Court of Criminal Appeal that there was no jurisdiction in the court of trial, or that the indictment combined with the verdict did not disclose any crime in point of law, the Court of Criminal Appeal might quash the indictment and the proceedings thereon; or where it appeared to the Court of Criminal Appeal that there was no evidence given at the trial proper to be submitted to the jury in proof of the crime charged in the indictment, the Court of Criminal Appeal might direct a verdict of not guilty to be entered; that where it appeared to the Court of Criminal Appeal that the verdict was against the evidence, or was not founded on sufficient evidence; or that evidence tendered by the defendant which ought to have been received was rejected, or that evidence tendered on the part of the Crown which ought to have been rejected was received; or that the court of trial misdirected the jury on a matter of law, or came to a wrong conclusion upon a question of law, and that such misdirection or conclusion was adverse to the defendant; or that by reason of some informality or irregularity in the trial, or the non-production of evidence, whether known or not, to the defendant at the time of trial, and material to have been brought forward in the interests of justice; or from any cause whatsoever, there had been such miscarriage of justice as to render it necessary in the interests of justice that a new trial should be had, the Court of Criminal Appeal might order a new trial. In non-capital cases the Bill provided that a convicted defendant might, by leave of the court of trial, or of the Court of Criminal Appeal, as respects questions of fact or of mixed fact and law, or by leave of either of such courts or of the Attorney-General as respects questions of law, have the same right of appeal as if judgment of death had been pronounced on such defendant. The Bill also provided that a defendant, convicted on an indictment upon whom a judgment other than death had been pronounced, might by leave of the Court of Criminal Appeal apply for revision of his sentence only, and the court should confirm or diminish his sentence. The Bill contains other apparently reasonable provisions relating to the constitution and powers of the Court of Criminal Appeal, with which, being matters of detail, I will not trouble this meeting. The Bill was, however, as I consider unfortunately, thrown out in the House of Commons on the motion for its second reading, but such rejection, as the SOLICITORS' JOURNAL observed, does not more than reserve the discussion of the proposed change till next year, and "the project has been too long before the public and has met with too much favour for there to be any chance of its being abandoned." In moving the second reading of the Bill, Mr. Pickersgill said he thought considerable confusion and

PERJURY.

The procedure in conducting a prosecution for perjury might with great advantage be made more simple. At present a person accused of perjury must be tried at assizes; he cannot when before the magistrates at petty sessions plead guilty and be dealt with by them or consent to be tried by them, but must either be committed for trial at the assizes or discharged by the magistrates in petty sessions. I am afraid that perjury is very prevalent on numerous occasions of omparatively small importance, and that an improvement might be effected in this respect if prosecutions for perjury were more fre quent, which would result from their being made more easy and expeditious. And there are many cases of perjury which would be sufficiently punished by a maximum of six months' imprisonment with hard labour, while others of a more grave nature would properly be sent for trial. I should consider it an advantage if procedure in cases of perjury was assimilated to that of cases of larceny, so that by the consent of the accused person the justices in petty sessions could deal with them. The crime of obtaining money under false pretences should also be put on the same footing with simple larceny, so that it might be dealt with in petty sessions by consent. It is not always easy to decide whether an offence is obtaining money by false pretences or larceny by a trick.

CONTENTIOUS BUSINESS.

There is a very general objection by the public to embark in litigation in the High Court of Justice. More particularly in cases where the sum in dispute is small, and the reason for this objection can be easily understood. The costs of the High Court are an important factor in considering the wisdom of suing or defending in a High Court action where the matter in dispute is too large to be dealt with in a county court and the parties will not agree to the action being tried in a county court. A man may have apparently a very good cause of action against another, but, however probable success may be, there is in most cases some possibility of an adverse result, and this, in almost the simplest action tried at the assizes or at the Royal Courts of Justice, means the payment of a large sum in costs. It is difficult to calculate beforehand what costs will amount to, but I think it may be safely stated that in most High Court actions there is at least £300 for an unsuccessful litigant to pay. The possibility of such a liability is one which a solicitor must have prominently before his eyes in advising a client as to commencing or defending an action in the High Court. The payment of the large amount of costs involved in a lost action is often the ruin of a man who has embarked in litigation, and the first duty of a solicitor in advising a client is to consider his rea interest from all points of view, and advise him as to all possibilities which may arise and which ought to be considered, and the chance of losing & large sum in the expense of litigation often deters a man from asserting his just rights, and many often think it better "To bear the ills they have than fly to others that they know not of," and decide not to embar in litigation. But it is not desirable that the public should be practically denied justice by reason of the expense of litigation, and, in my opinion every man should have the law at his own door, and be able to assert hi rights and obtain redress for his wrongs in a court of justice near his ow home and at no risk of ruin from the expenses of litigation. The count courts, which have now been established for over fifty years, suppl exactly what is required. They are presided over by judges who ar chosen from the same profession as the judges of the High Court, and t my mind there is no reason whatever why concurrent jurisdiction with th High Court should not be given to the county court in all actions contract or tort where the debt or damage claimed does not exceed £500 subject to the like powers of the defendant to apply to remove the action and to the like provisions as to costs, which now exist with regard t actions which can be brought in the county court. Such an extension the jurisdiction of the county court would relieve the High Court Justice from trying many actions which now take up much time, an would make it unnecessary to increase the staff of judges, which mult sooner or later be done if the jurisdiction of the county courts is no enlarged. In cases above £500, the matter in dispute being larger, th element of the costs of litigation is less important relatively, and I thin such cases should only be tried in the High Court. I do not agree wit proposals sometimes made to unite the High Court with the county coul so that they should form one court. I do not believe that any advantag would be gained by so radical a change; but, on the contrary, I thin the High Court and the county court should remain separate as at presen subject to the power of appeal from the county court which now exist With the large extension of the jurisdiction of the county courts, which venture to recommend, the salaries of the county court judges should