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of a court or judge, or otherwise, a party entitled to receive costs is liable to pay costs to any other party, the taxing officer may tax the costs such party is so liable to pay, and may adjust the same by way of deduction or set-off, or may, if he shall think fit, delay the allowance of the costs such party is entitled to receive until he has paid or tendered the costs he is liable to pay." The action was brought against two defendants, Hemming and Johnson, upon a bill of exchange, of which Johnson was the drawer, and Hemming purported to be the acceptor. Judgment was allowed by both defendants to go by default, and execution was issued, under which the sheriff seized certain goods in Johnson's house. Hemming applied to have the judgment set aside as against him, on the ground that the writ had never been served on him, and that he had never authorized Johnson's solicitor to appear for him. He alleged that the signature to the acceptance which purported to be his was a forgery. The judgment as against him was set aside by the Divisional Court, and the plaintiffs then discontinued the action as against him, and he signed judgment for his costs of the action, which were taxed at £43. Hemming claimed the goods which the sheriff had seized as his goods, and the sheriff thereupon took out an interpleader summons which was entitled in the action. Under this summons an interpleader issue was tried and Hemming's claim to the goods was barred, with costs to the sheriff and the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' costs of the interpleader proceedings were taxed at £33. The plaintiff's claimed to have these costs due to them from Hemming set off against the £43 costs which were due from them to him. The master allowed the set-off, and his decision was affirmed by Lindley, J. His decision, however was reversed by the Divisional Court (Cockburn, C.J., and Bowen, J.), who were of opinion (28 W. R. 765) that the interpleader proceedings were distinct from the proceedings in the action, and that therefore there could be no setoff of costs. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.). JAMES, L.J., said that the plain meaning of the rule was that the set-off was to be between "parties" not "persons"-that is, parties to the same action and the same proceedings. It did not apply to two distinct actions. The interpleader proceeding was really a distinct proceeding which had arisen collaterally out of the original action. It was a mere accident that one of the persons who was a party to the interpleader proceeding happened to be also a party to the original action. The rule had no application to such a case. BRETT, L.J., said that the rule applied to parties to the same action, not to different actions. The question was whether the costs were incurred in some action to which the two were parties. In point of law the interpleader proceeding was as perfectly distinct as possible. If the rule did not apply, the taxing master could only act according to the two separate judgments, and could not give one allocatur. Of course the rule did not derogate from the old jurisdiction of the court to make a substantive order directing a set-off of costs, but no such order had been made in this case. COTTON, Ĺ.J., said that the rule must be restricted to a plaintiff and defendant in the same action, or to co-defendants, and it could not apply to a plaintiff in an action who was liable in respect of some entirely distinct litigation to pay costs to the person from whom he was entitled to receive costs in the action. The rule must mean only that there should be a set-off between parties to the action, as such parties, of costs relating to the litigation in the action. The proceedings in interpleader were not in respect of any matter which was in litigation in the action, and the rule did not apply. SOLICITORS, Wordsworth, Blake, & Co.; Harper, Broad, & Battcock.

COMPANY-WINDING UP-COSTS OF ACTION BY SHAREHOLDERS-PAYMENT OUT OF ASSETS-COMPANIES ACT, 1862, 8. 98. In a case of In re The Hull Central Drapery Company, before the Court of Appeal on the 6th inst., the question arose whether, in the liquidation of a company, the court had jurisdiction to direct the payment out of the assets of the plaintiffs' costs of an action which had been brought by two shareholders of the company (on behalf of themselves and all the other shareholders, except the defendants) against the vendor of some property and a business to the company, and some promoters, to set aside the agreement for purchase, on the ground that it had been induced by the misrepre

sentations of the vendor as to the value of the business. The company were also made defendants. The other defendants were directors of the company, and it was alleged that they formed a majority of the board of directors, and that they held such a large number of shares that it was impossible for the plaintiffs, and the other shareholders who agreed with them, to take any steps within the company to set aside the agreement. Before the action came on for trial, an order had been made to wind up the company. No application was made to Hall, V.C., who had the conduct of the winding up, for leave to prosecute the action. When the action came on for trial before Malins, V.C., an order was made dismissing it without costs, and the order gave liberty to the plaintiffs to apply to Hall, V.C., to have the costs of the action allowed out of the assets of the company. Malins, V.C., expressed an opinion that the action had been bond file instituted for the benefit of the company, and said that if it had been worth while going on with it, and anything had been recovered in it, the company would have got the benefit of it. He thought, therefore, that the plaintiffs' costs ought to be paid out of the company's assets. This opinion was communicated to Hall, V.C., and he ordered the costs in question to be paid out of the assets. His order contained a recital that it appeared that the action was instituted for the benefit of the shareholders of the company. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that the court had no jurisdiction to order the payment out of the assets. JAMES, L.J., said that in the winding up the court was simply administering the assets of the company for the purpose of paying the debts of the company. It had no discretion, as it had in dealing with the property of an infant or a lunatic, to do that which it might think right or liberal; it could only apply the assets in paying legal or equitable demands against the company. The shareholders who brought the action did so at their own risk, and they had no more right to call on the company to pay the costs than they had to call on the other shareholders who were their coplaintiff's to contribute to the costs of the action. The company had never authorized the action, nor had the court authorized it in the winding up. Leave ought to have been obtained from Hall, V.C., to prosecute the action if it was intended to make the assets of the company responsible for the costs. If the plaintiffs had succeeded in recovering money from the delinquent directors, and the company had taken the money and thus accepted the benefit of the action, the court would, no doubt, have found its way to giving the plaintiffs out of the assets, not only their costs, but all their proper charges and expenses, but the court had no jurisdiction to make A. pay the costs of an action brought by B. BRETT, L.J., said that the action was not brought in the name of the company only because the defendant directors would not bring it. It was brought solely for the benefit of the company, and if it had been successful they would have had all the benefit of it. A court of law would certainly not have had jurisdiction to make those who would have had the benefit of the action, if it had been successful, pay the costs of it when it was unsuccessful; but knowing the jurisdiction which the court of equity had assumed in other cases, his lordship could only express his surprise that it had stopped short of doing that which seemed to him consistent with justice. COTTON, L.J., agreed that there was no jurisdiction to make the order. The proceeds of the action, had it been successful, would have gone into the coffers of the company, but it did not at all follow that the action was brought for the benefit of the company. Section 98 of the Winding-up Act provided that the assets of the company were to be applied in discharge of its liabilities. The costs of the winding up must also be paid, but these costs were in no sense costs of the winding up.-SOLICITORS, Cunliffe, Beaumont, & Davenport; W.

Bohm.

PRACTICE-DISCOVERY-INSPECTION-DISCOVERY OF TITIS -PARCELS OF LEASE-DISPUTE AS TO BOUNDARY.-In a case of The Wayne's Merthyr Company v. Powell's Dufryn Steam Coal Company, before the Court of Appeal on the 6th inst., a question arose as to the right of plaintiffs to inspect the lease under which the defendants held certain mining property. The plaintiffs and the defendants were lessees from different lessors of adjoining properties, under which they were both working coal. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had worked beyond their boundary and had removed coal belonging to the plaintiffs, and they

claimed an injunction, &c. The defendants denied that they bad worked beyond their boundary. The plaintiffs claimed production of the defendants' lease in order that they might see the parcels and the plans contained in it. The defendants resisted production, on the ground that the action was an action of trespass, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to see their documents of title. Hall, V.C., held that the plaintiffs were entitled to production and inspection of the lease so far as the parcels which, in the recitals or the operative part, were concerned, but that the other parts might be sealed up. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.), affirmed this order. JAMES, L.J., said that the plaintiffs had no right to see the defendants' title; anything which created a title was protected from production, unless there was a common title. But if there was anything in a title deed which showed a fact, such as a boundary, or if there were recitals showing the state of a family, that was no part of the title. In the present case the question was what was the boundary be. tween the two estates, and the plans contained in the two leases, if they agreed, would be conclusive evidence as to the boundary.-SOLICITORS, Williamson, Hill, & Co.; Bell, Brodrick, & Gray.

COMPANY DIRECTOR-TRUSTEE-In a case of Wilson v. Lord Bury, in which judgment was given by the Court of Appeal in Lincoln's-inn on the 6th inst., the question arose whether an action could be maintained by a creditor of a company against the directors, on the ground, either that the directors were trustees for him, or that the company was a trustee for him, and the directors had been parties to a breach of trust, and had derived a benefit from it. The company was formed for the purpose of receiving deposits of money from persons in England for a fixed term, and investing the money on mortgages at high rates of interest in the colonies, they guaranteeing interest at the rate of six per cent, per annum to the depositor, and also guaranteeing the repayment of the principal in the event of the mortgage on which it was invested proving deficient. The company derived a profit by means of the difference between the six per cent. interest, which they paid to the depositor, and the interest which was paid by the colonial mortgagor. The plaintiff intrusted £1,000 to the company for five years for investment, and they appropriated to him as security a mortgage bond for a larger sum, which they had upon some property in Natal, and gave him a guarantee for the principal and the interest at six per cent. In April, 1877, the mortgage bond was paid off, and the company's agent in Natal remitted the money to the company in London, mixed with other moneys of the company, by means of a bank post bill. The amount of the bill was received and was paid to the company's general account with their bankers in London. The company did not inform the plaintiff that the mortgage had been paid off, but they continued to pay him interest on his money until the winding up of the company commenced, and he then discovered the fact of the payment off of the mortgage. In the meantime the money had been drawn out of the company's bankers, though it did not appear by whose cheques or for what purpose. The plaintiff, being unable to obtain payment of his £1,000 from the company, brought an action for it against the directors, charging them with gross negligence. At the trial the evidence adduced showed that the defendants were the only directors, and that the steps in the transaction, including the receipt of the money, were mentioned in the minutes of board meetings at which the defendants were present. Cockburn, C.J., upon this evidence, held that there was nothing to fix the defendants with any personal liability. It was then proposed to adduce evidence to show that at the time when the mortgage was paid off the company was insolvent, but Cockburn, C.J., rejected this evidence as immaterial. And he directed the jury to find a verdict for the defendants. The Queen's Bench Division refused to grant a rule for a new trial. The Court of Appeal granted a rule nisi, and the questions in dispute were argued upon cause being shown against the rule. The court (BAGGALLAY, BRAMWELL, and BRETT, L.JJ.) discharged the rule, though BAGGALLAY, L.J., differed from the conclusion of the majority. BRETT, L.J., was of opinion that no relation of principal and agent existed between the plaintiff and the defendants, and that the defendants were not, from the mere fact of their being directors of the company, trustees for the plaintiff. As to the company, they were clearly trustees for the

BRAM

plaintiff of any mortgage which was appointed to him, so long as the mortgage remained in force; but they were not trustees for him of the £1,000. Their obligation was to pay interest on the £1,000 for five years at six per cent.; to repay the £1,000 to the plaintiff out of their own funds at the end of the five years, if it should not be otherwise realized for him; to place in his hands, as soon as possible after the receipt of the £1,000, a colonial mortgage for £1,000, which was not to be effected in his name, and, in case that mortgage should become ineffective before the end of the five years, to replace it by another. These obligations were binding on the company, whether the colonial mortgagors did or did not fulfil their obligations. There was no obligation to keep the plaintiffs' £1,000 apart from the other funds of the company, or to invest it separately. The relation between the company and the plaintiff was one of contract, not of trust, and resembled that between a banker and his customer. And, even if a trust was constituted, there was nothing to show that the defendants were parties to any breach of trust. There was no proof that they ever received any part of the trust money. There was nothing to show that any part of it was applied in paying the directors' fees. Any clerk in the company's office might as well be made liable, on the ground that his salary had been paid out of the mortgage money. WELL, L.J., said that he felt a difficulty in saying that there was not a trust as between the company and the plaintiff, but he agreed that, if there was a trust, and there had been a breach of it, there was no ground for holding the defendants personally responsible to the plaintiff. BAGGALLAY, L.J., was of opinion that the relation of trustee and cestui que trust was established between the company and the plaintiff, that there had been a breach of trust, and that the defendants had been parties to and had aided in the commission of it. He fully recognized, as a general rule, that an agent employed by a trustee was accountable to his principal only, and could not be made responsible as a constructive trustee to the cestui que trust; but he thought that a distinction might be, and ought to be, drawn between the case of a company necessarily acting by its directors and an individual trustee acting through an agent over whose actions he could exercise a control. Whether, however, he was right or wrong in thinking that such a distinction should be drawn, there could be no question that the general rule to which he had referred did not apply when the agent had derived a personal benefit from the breach of trust, and, in his lordship's opinion, it was an important question in the present case whether the defendants had derived any such personal benefit. Upon this question the evidence, which was excluded upon the trial, might have an important bearing. It was alleged that the excluded evidence would show that at the time when the proceeds of the mortgage came under the control of the directors, they must have been aware of the insolvency of the company; that they, nevertheless, mixed the moneys of the plaintiff and of other depositors with their own, and that they from time to time retained or paid themselves large sums by way of dividends on heir shares, and also as fees for their services as directors; and that they must have been aware that the moneys so retained and paid were derived, not from any funds properly belonging to the company, but from moneys intrusted to them by the depositors. His lordship thought, therefore, that the evidence ought to have been admitted, and that the rule for a new trial should be made absolute.SOLICITORS, Hewitt & Alexander; White, Borrett, & Co.; Linklater, Hackwood, & Co.

EXPECTANT HEIR-MONEY-LENDING TRANSACTIONSUNCONSCIONABLE BARGAIN. In a case of Nevill v. Snelling, before Denman, J. (sitting for Fry, J.), on the 7th inst., the question arose whether the principle of the cases in which the court has set aside unconscionable or catching bargains made with expectant heirs, or persons entitled to reversions, was applicable to a caso where loans at exorbitant rates of interest had been made to a young man, soon after he had attained his majority, he being a younger son of a marquis who was a large landed proprietor, and having no property and no expectations, except such as was founded upon the position of his father. The statement of claim alleged that the loans "were made by the defendant to the plaintiff without any hope or expectation on the part of the defendant that the promissory notes (which the plaintiff gave to secure them) would be paid by the plaintiff, but on the credit of

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the plaintiff's expectations as the son of a marquis, and in the hope and expectation that, rather than submit to the exposure attendant upon the plaintiff being made a bankrupt, or being sued upon such notes, the plaintiff's father, who is, and was well known to the defendant to be, a large landed proprietor, or other members of the plaintiff's family, would pay the amounts claimed by the defendant upon such notes." The plaintiff claimed a declaration that the promissory notes should stand as security only for the moneys actually advanced by the defendant, with interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum, and an injunction to restrain the defendant from negotiating the notes, and from proceeding in bankruptcy against the plaintiffin respect of them. DENMAN, J., held, upon the evidence, that the above passage from the statement of claim accurately described the facts. He said that he had had considerable difficulty in making out to what extent the cases relied upon on behalf of the plaintiff were to be considered as wholly or mainly turning upon the point that the person seeking to be relieved from bargain was an expectant heir or reversioner. Many of the cases, no doubt, were based entirely on this ground, coupled with the hardness of the bargain, and could not be considered as authorities applicable to any other case. Yet in many of the cases the court appeared to have proceeded to set aside the transactions complained of on grounds which seemed equally applicable to the case of an improvident young man who fell into the hands of a professional money. lender, and got deeper and deeper into his debt, the moneylender trading upon the probable unwillingness of the young man's relations to let him and his family be exposed by bankruptcy, as to the case of an expectant heir being led into an improvident bargain by a moneylender of the same description. It was very difficult to see any very solid distinction as regarded the morality of the two transactione, and his lordship could not perceive that the moneylender, who traded upon the hope of eating up a large slice of a family estate upon the death of its present owner, was a being at all more unconscionable or worthy of correction by a court of equity than the moneylender who traded upon the dread of exposure of the vices and follies of the children which was likely to force parents of adequate means or honest homes, whether they were rich peers or persons of more moderate estate, to pay interest, however usuricus, rather than see their children figure in the Bankruptcy Court. But it must be admitted that a distinction, and a strong distinction, had been drawn in courts of equity between the one case and the other. After a review, however, of the authorities on the subject, such as Croft v. Graham (2 De G. J. & S. 155), The Earl of Aylesford v. Morris (21 W. R. 424, L. R. 8 Ch. 484), O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke (26 W. R. 239, L. R. 2 App. 814), and other cases, his lordship said that he did not entertain any doubt that, upon the general principle of equity which laid it down that unfair and unconscionable dealings with a person whose position rendered him too weak to resist rapacity or avarice and unfair dealing, were within the jurisdiction of the court and ought to be repressed, he ought to grant the relief claimed. And he gave judgment in accordance with the claim, with costs.-SOLICITORS, Talbot & Tasker; James Davis.

Obituary.

MR. HENRY THOMAS YOUNG.

Mr. Henry Thomas Young, solicitor, late of 9, New-square, Lincoln's-inn, died at Campden-hill House, Staplehurst, on the 25th ult. Mr. Young was born in 1818, and was admitted a solicitor in 1844. Two or three years later he went into partnership with Messrs. John and John Thomas Roumieu and Mr. John Eldad Walters, and he practised in New-square for over thirty years, having been more recently associated with Mr. William Melmoth Walters, and Mr. John Croft Deverell. He had a very large family business, and he was a perpetual commissioner for the county of Middlesex and for the cities of London and Westminster. He took a warm interest in the subject of legal education and in all matters affecting the general welfare of the profession. He was many years a member of the council of the Incorporated Law Society. He was elected

president of the society in 1876, in which year he presided with very great success over the society's meeting at Oxford. He was also a director of the Solicitors' Benevolent Asso ciation, the Law Fire Insurance Company, and the Legal and General Life Assurance Company. Mr. Young retired from practice about two years ago in consequence of failing health. He leaves a widow and several children.

Appointments, Etc.

Mr. THOMAS FITZGERALD CALLAGHAN, C.M.G., governor of the Falkland Islands, has been appointed Governor of the Bahama Islands. Mr. Callaghan is a graduate of Trinity College, Dublin, and he was called to the bar in Ireland in 1854. He was appointed chief magistrate at Hong Kong in 1860, and he was governor of Labuan and consul-general for the island of Borneo from 1861 till 1867, and administrator of the Government of the Gambia from 1867 till 1871, when he was appointed governor of the Falkland Islands. Mr. Callaghan was created a companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George in 1877.

Mr. WILLIAM COCKROFT, solicitor, of Rochdale, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature. Mr. Cockroft was admitted a solicitor in 1869.

Mr. HORACE FITZGERALD, senior puisne judge of the colony of Trinidad, has been appointed to act as Chief Justice of that colony during the absence of Sir Joseph Needham. Mr. Justice Fitzgerald was educated at Trinity College, Dublin, and he was called to the bar in Ireland in 1840. He has been a puisne judge in Trinidad since 1862.

Mr. CHARLES JAMES GRIMWADE, solicitor, of Hadleigh, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature. Mr. Grimwade was admitted a solicitor in 1866.

Mr. THOMAS KERR, judge of the Assistant Court of Appeal in Barbadoes, has been appointed Governor of the Falkland Islands.

Mr. JAMES MOTTERAM, Q.C., judge of the Birmingham County Court, has been appointed a Member of the Standing Committee of Judges for framing County Court Rules, in succession to Mr. John Worlledge, resigned.

Mr. FREDERICK FERDINAND SMALLPEICE, solicitor, of 1, Lancaster-place, Strand, and of Guildford, has been elected Clerk to the Guildford Urban Sanitary Authority, in succession to Mr. Thomas Russell, resigned. Mr. Smallpeice is the son of Mr. Mark Smallpeice, clerk to the Guildford Board of Guardians, the borough magistrates, and the Com missioners of Taxes. He was admitted a solicitor in 1861, and is in partnership with his father and with his brother, Mr. Humphry Percy Smallpeice. He is also town clerk of Guildford and clerk to the county magistrates.

Mr. CHARLES WALTER TAYLOR, solicitor, of 31, Crutched Friars and Farningham, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature. Mr. Taylor was admitted a solicitor in 1875.

DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP. NEHEMIAH LEAROYD and JAMES PEACE, Albion-cham. bers, Moorgate, London, solicitors (Learoyd, Learoyd, & Peace.) June 7. [Gazette, Aug. 10.]

Companies.

WINDING-UP NOTICES.

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

DIRECT FISH SUPPLY ASSOCIATION (LIMITED).-V.C. Hall has by ac order dated July 16, appointed Joseph Andrews, Ironmonger laa, to be the provisional official liquidator INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPANY, LIMITED.-V.C. Bacon has y an order dated July 26, appointed Roderick Mackay, Lothbury, to be official liquidator

JAMES THORNE AND COMPANY, LIMITED.-V.C. Malins has by at order dated July 9, appointed James Ford, Chicapside, to be effical liquidator. Creditors are required on or before Sept 1 to send their

names and addresses and the particulars of their debts or claims to the above. Nov 4 at 12 is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims

OAKHAM COLLIERIES COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by the M.R., dated July 24, it was ordered that the above company be wound up. Denton and Co, Gray's inn sq, solicitors for the petitioners

RIPLEY OLD BREWERY COMPANY, LIMITED.-V.C. Hall has by an order dated July 26, appointed Thomas Leman, Pelham st, Nottingham, to be official liquidator. Creditors are required on or before Sept 30, to send their names and addresses and the particulars of their debts or claims to the above. Nov 2 at 12 is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims [Gazette, Aug 6.] CHRISTIAN SIGNAL PUBLISHING COMPANY, LIMITED.-The M.R. has by an order dated July 13, appointed Robert Yallowly Barnes, Gracechurch st, to be official liquidator EAST PANT DU LEAD MINING COMPANY LIMITED.-The M.R. has by an order dated June 29, appointed Joseph William Brown, Mold, to be liquidator in the place of George William Taylor ESTON ODD FELLOWS BUILDING COMPANY, LIMITED.-The M.R. has by an order dated June 4, appointed John Readman, Lackenby, nr Eston, York, to be official liquidator FAULKNER, TAYLOR, AND COMPANY, LIMITED.-The M.R. has by an order dated July 15, appointed Hugh Shaw, Clegg st, Oldham, to be official liquidator. Creditors are required on or before Sept 15, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims to the above. Oct. 30 at 11 is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims GIFFARD REFRIGERATION COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by V.C. Malins, dated July 30, it was ordered that the voluntary winding up of the above company be continued. Miller and Wiggins, Copthall et, solicitors for the petitioners IMPERIAL HYDROPATHIC INSTITUTION, LIMITED.-The M.R. has fixed Aug 18 at 12 at 12, Staple inn, for the appointment of an official liquidator

LLANRWST LEAD MINING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up presented Aug 9, directed to be heard before V.C. Hall, on Nov 5. Brown, Basinghall st, solicitor for the petitioners LONDON AND COUNTY SUPPLY ASSOCIATION, LIMITED, formerly called The Warehousemen and Clerks' Direct Supply Association, Limited.-V.C. Malins has, by an order dated June 25, appointed John Folland Lovering, Gresham st, to be official liquidator MATLOCK BATH HOTEL COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented Aug 6, directed to be heard before the Vacation Judge, sitting at the court of V.C. Malins, on Aug 18. Rogerson and Ford, Chancery lane, solicitors for the petitioners TRAVELLERS' ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED.-The M.R. has, by an order dated July 5, appointed Mr. James Waddell, Queen Victoria st, to be official liquidator

WITHERNSEA BRICKWORKS, LIMITED.-By an order made by V.C. Malins, dated July 30, it was ordered that the above company be wound up. Weed and White, Draper's gardens, agents for Thorp and Firth, Kingston-upon-Hull, solicitors for the petitioners [Gazette, Aug 10.]

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES DISSOLVED. JESSOP LODGE, 165, Nottingham Ancient Imperial United Order of Oddfellows, Crown in, Codnor Park, nr Alfreton, Derby. Aug 4 [Gazette, Aug 6.] FRIEND-IN-NEED LODGE, No. 36, Independent Order of United Friends, Tredegar Arms, Trelyn, Maesycwmmer, Monmouth. Aug [Gazette, Aug 10 ]

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LORD JUSTICE BRAMWELL ON THE LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS. THE following letter from Lord Justice Bramwell has been published:

"Sir, I think I am right in saying that railway companies have no right to complain of having to pay damages to their if they are injured by negligence. No doubt passengers they would not contract to do so now if they could help it; but they voluntarily contracted so to do when they took their powers and rights from the Legislature. Whether it is wise or right that their powers should be granted on those terms is another matter. It is also another and very different matter whether they have justice done them in relation to the contract to carry safely. I quite agree that they are fixed with liability very often most unjustly; and in such a case as you put, I have used this illustration:-A man hits the target ninety-nine times in 100; the hundredth time he fires wide of it. Is the legitimate conclusion that he is a bad shot, or that he was careless in the last firing? Neither. Yet when the driver overshoots the platform a few yards once in a thousand times, there is evidence of negligence, and the company is fined. I quite agree also that anomalies exist in the law on this head. The only remedy is what you suggest-viz., to make people liable only when they are to blame themselves. I view the proposed law with alarm. I do not think it can be called an evasion of it to agree with your workmen that you shall not be liable to them. The law, when passed, will mean, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, it shall be taken that

the contract of master and servant involves liability for a fellow servant's negligence.' I declare I think this need trouble no conscience. Take a case of tenancy. The law says that in a tenancy from year to year six months is the right notice, unless the parties agreed for another period. There is no evasion of any law if they do so agree. So of numberless other cases. I think the proposed law will produce litigation, quarrels, ill-will, fraud, and other mischiefs, among them, probably, the discontinuance of such useful institutions as your accident fund. --Faithfully yours, "G. BRAMWELL."

Election Petitions.

SANDWICH.

August 10.-LUSH, J., in delivering judgment, said that the election forming the subject of this inquiry was distinguished from all others with which they had had to deal in that the more important provisions of the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act seemed to have been totally dieregarded from first to last. Although the Act providing specially against the giving of ribands and other marks of distinction and the payment of money for flags and banners had been in force for more than a quarter of a century, and the practice had been thought to have died out, yet it had been revived by both parties at this election. A sum of £348 103. had been expended by the respondent's agents in providing these forbidden attractions, and his lordship must observe in passing that £315 10s. of this amount had, in the summary of accounts handed to the returning officer, been charged under the head of clerks and personation agents. That sum of £315 10s. was mainly expended with ten tradesmen in the borough, who supplied 365 dozen rosettes and 3,605 yards of bunting and ribbon. To this were to be added 80 special rosettes for the committee, charged at 28. each, and 500 other rosettes at 1s. each which appeared in a separate account returned by the agent of the sitting member. The summary of the election expenses of the respondent was not delivered until the 3rd inst., and no Vouchers were delivered until the first day of their lordships' sitting there, on the 5th of August, although the poll was declared on the 18th of May. On the other hand, the petitioner's election expenses had not been returned to this day; the person appointed as his election agent was not a professional man, and seemed to be utterly ignorant of his duties. It did not appear that any of Sir Julian Goldsmid's bills had been paid, and it was due to the petitioner to say that he disputed many of them, and his present solicitor said he was not aware until he came there that the accounts had not been filed as they ought to have been. The respondent's expenses, had, it seemed, amounted to a total of £3,153 5s. 3d., and those of the petitioner so far as it had been possible to ascertain £2,669 18s. 10d. ; but it was evident that did not represent all the claims or at least all the outlay at the election, and the respondent's agent said that he had received from his client since he came to Sandwich the sum of £4,000. He told them he had £800 in hand, and yet he said there might be no balance to hand over to the respondent-an explanation which was far from satisfactory. But although the court had been unable to ascertain what amount the election had cost either party, enough had appeared in the accounts and the evidence to show there had been profuse and reckless expenditure on both sides, and that each party had striven to outdo the other in providing attractions which were expressly for bidden by the law. The particular expedients mentioned were not in themselves corrupt practices, and did not of themselves affect the seat, but when their lordships saw a deliberate purpose from beginning to end to set the law at defiance, and win the favour of the constituency by un. lawful means, they could not help viewing with suspicion any matter which was left in obscurity or doubt. His lordship gladly took the opportunity of saying that he found no trace of money having been spent in drink-that common and most demoralizing form of corruption. The act of bribery on which the election must be declared void was the hiring of a large number of public-houses-88 in all.

They could not accept the view put before them by the respondent's counsel as to the object for which that large number of houses was hired, but he believed the real object was to influence the vote of the publican-that the sum of £5 was paid to each of these eighty-eight pablicans with a view to induce him to vote for the respondent-the very essence of bribery. There was no substantial difference between the colourable hiring of houses as committee rooms and the colourable hiring of a voter himself as a messenger; the only difference was in the form of the disguise. The employment of paid canvassers, for which £450 was charged, was another corrupt act; but the hiring of the public-houses was sufficient to avoid the election, and they must certify to the Speaker accordingly. With regard to the question whether they should report that corrupt practices had or had not extensively prevailed, they felt bound from the conduct of the election by both parties to report that there had been extensive corruption. As to the costs of the petition, seeing that the petitioner had by his agents also indulged in the same corrupt practices, the order of the court would be that each party pay his own costs of the inquiry.

MANISTY, J., in concurring, said this inquiry had caused him more than ordinary anxiety, partly owing to the fact that the personal charges of bribery against the respondent were not withdrawn until the last moment. The respondent's agents seemed from first to last to have disregarded both the common law and the statute law against corrupt practices, and to have resorted to every form of corrupt practice with the single exception of treating. The constituency was known to be a dangerous one, and the licensed victuallers, with beerhousekeepers, numbered 200, or one-tenth of the whole constituency. It was an important element to their interest, which the respondent's agent had told them was indispensable; and accordingly he acted upon a system which had been practised largely at other elections, and hired a large number of publichouses. That was the act of bribery upon which the case turned. He quite agreed with his learned brother that the hiring of those houses at £5 each was done for the purpose of influencing the votes of the landlords in favour of the respondent. His lordship referred to the regatta given by the respondent on Whit Monday, and held that it was intended to have a corrupting influence. There seemed to have been a determination to win the election at all hazards, and the whole business was conducted in such a corrupt manner as to substantially interfere with the free exercise of the privileges of the constituency. His lordship hoped this inquiry would be a warning to candidates in the future. If gentlemen would furnish money to agents to an amount which it was impossible to suppose could be spent legitimately, if they would shut their eyes to what was transparent, they must not be surprised to find that the election petition judges took a more severe view of such matters than they had hitherto done. He did not believe anything approaching to purity of election would ever be attained unless the law were altered so as to restrict the number of agents, clerks, and messengers, and to make it illegal for any such person to vote. There was strong reason to believe that the petitioner, by his agents, had been as guilty of corrupt practices as the respondent.

County Courts.

WAKEFIELD.

(Before Mr. Serjeant TINDAL ATKINSON, Judge.)
Aug. 3.-Fawcett v.Glossop.

Contract-Acceptance and part receipt within the 17th section
of the Statute of Frauds-Sale by sample.
His HONOUR, in giving his reserved judgment in this
case, said: In this action, which was tried before me
with the assistance of an assessor on the 22nd of June
and continued on the 7th of July, the plaintiff
seeks to recover the sum of £26 5s., the price of fifteen
quarters of barley sold by the plaintiff to the defendant by
sample at the Wakefield Corn Market, on the 27th of Feb-
ruary last. The plaintiff is a corn factor at Pocklington,
carrying on business at the various corn markets in York-
shire, and the defendant is a brewer and maltster at Hull.
At the time of the sale the barley, the subject of the present
inquiry, was lying in bulk on the farm of the grower at

Hornsea, and was after the sale delivered by him, on the order of the defendant, to the railway station at Hornsea- - namely, on the 6th of March. On the 8th of March the defendant sent a further order to the stationmaster to forward the barley to Ravensthorpe, near Dewsbury. On the 12th the defendant repudiated the sale, on the ground that the bulk did not agree with the sample, and was unfit for malting, the plaintiff, as the defendant alleged, knowing it had bee bought solely for that purpose. The defendant, by his counsel (Mr. Thomas), at the trial rested the defence of his client upon two grounds-first, that there being no evidence of any memorandum in writing or part payment, in order to prove a contract under the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds, the plaintiff must show, which he has failed to do, an acceptance and part receipt of the barley; and, secondly, should the court be of opinion that that defence fails, then, if it is proved that the bulk is inferior to the sample, in that case the contract price must be reduced by the difference in value of the quality of the bulk as compared with the sample. With regard to the first part of the defendant's answer to the plaintiff's claim that in this case there has been no acceptance by the defendant of the whole or any part of the barley, and no actual receipt of it proved, there is no doubt that it is now settled law "that in every sale of goods of the value of £10 and upwards two things must concurthe buyer must accept, and he must actually receive a part of the goods, and that so long as the buyer can without self-contradiction declare that the goods are not to be taken in fulfilment of the contract he has not accepted them; and it is immaterial whether his refusal be reasonable or not. If he refuses the goods, assigning grounds false and frivolous, or assigning no reason at all, it is still clear that he does not accept the goods, and the question is not whether he ought to accept, but whether he has accepted them. The question of acceptance or not is a question as to what was the intention of the buyer as signified by his outward acts." [Blackburn on Sales, 22.] In looking through the numerous cases as to what is required to constitute an acceptance and part receipt of goods within the 17th section, I find that in order to constitute a receipt by the buyer of the thing sold it is necessary that the seller must have placed the goods so far under the control of the buyer as to have lost his lien and also the right in the case of the insol. vency of the buyer, of stopping the goods is transitu. In the present case, by the delivery of the barley to the defendant at the railway station on the 6th of March, to await the defendant's orders, both the plaintiff's lien and the right of stoppage in transitu had been parted with, and on that date, as far as the receipt required by the 17th section was concerned, it was complete. Upon this part of the defence the only question that remains is, Was there an acceptance by the defendant so as to satisfy the statute ? It must be observed that to prove an acceptance there must not only be a delivery of the goods to the vendee with the intention of vesting the right of possession in him, but there must also be an actual acceptance by the latter with an intention of taking to the possession as owner: Phillips v. Bistelli (2 B. & C. 511). The fact of what constitutes such actual acceptance has in some instances become the subject of almost conflicting decisions. In the case of Morton v. Tibbetts (15 Q. B. 428), Lord Campbell, C.J., in giving judg ment, said:"We are of opinion that there may be an acceptance and receipt within the meaning of the Act without the buyer having examined the goods or done anything to preclude him from contending that they do not correspond with the contract," and he goes on further to lay down an important distinction with regard to what is evidence of a contract and that required to sbow its fulfilment by saying, "The acceptance to let in parol evidence of the contract appears to us to be a different acceptance from that which affords conclusive evidence of the contract having been fulfilled." In that case (Morton v. Tibbetts) fifty quarters of wheat of a specified weight had been sold by parol by the plaintiff to the defendant, and delivered by agreement to the defendant's general carrier, who shipped it on board one of his lighters and forwarded it by canal to Wisbeach. Before its arrival, and without previous It was examination, the defendant resold the wheat. afterwards rejected by the intermediate buyer on the

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