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Chancellor held that an acknowledgment of title to land, Riven after the title has teen barred by twenty years adverse possesion, operates to restore the title, and to deprive the person who makes the acknowledgment of the benefit of the title which he has acquired under the statute. And his lordship w>\s of opinion that the case of Stamjeld v. Eobion (1 W. R. 216, 3 De G. M. & G. 620) was an authority for this conclusion. Jessel, M.R., said that, when the judgments in Stansfield v. Hob&on were looked at, it was clear that the point in question had not been decided there. And the case of In re Alison (27 W. R. 389, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 284) was a direct authority to the contrary, but that case was not cited to the Vice-Chancellor. Tbe effect of the Statute of Limitations was to extinguish the right, not merely to bar the remedy, and alter the extinction of the right an acknowledgment could not revive it. But in the particular case the court held that the evidence led to the oonclnsion that tbe statutory period had not rnn, and on this ground they affirmed the Vice-Chancellor's decision. Jesskl, M.R., said that, if a tenant had continued to pay bis rent regularly for thirteen years, it would be almost impossible, by any amount of evidence, to induce a jury tn hold that he had, for a previous period of twenty years, paid no rent. The inference would be that he had always paid it.—Solicitors, Williamson, EM, <b Co.; Gold <fc Son.
Bailor And Bailee—Jus Teeth—Sale By Bailee For Bailor After
NOTICB OF ADVERSE CLAIM—RlGHT TO Peoceeds OF SALE—TRUSTER IN
Bankruptcy — Auctioneer — Court Of Bankruptcy — Jurisdiction — Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 72.—In a case of Ex parte Davies, before the Conrt of Appeal on the 21th nit., a question arose as to the right of an auctioneer, who, with full knowledge of an adverse claim by a bill of Bale holder, bad sold the goods comprised in it at the instance, and by the instructions of the trustee in tbe liquidation of the grantor, to prevent the proceeds of sale being paid over to tbe trustee. A printer filed a liquidation petition in a county court on the 14th of May, and on the 16th of May a receiver was appointed, who the same day took possession of the debtor's stock-in-trade, and left an auctioneer's man in possession of it for him. The next day the auctioneer was instructed to take possession of the stock-intrade on behalf of a person who claimed it by virtue of a registered bill of aale executed by the debtor. Shortly afterwards, the auctioneer advertised the property for aale by auction on tbe 30th of Hay, on behalf of the bill of sale holder. On tbe 26th of May the receiver obtained from the county court an order restraining the bill of sale holder nntil the 6th of June from telling the property, and directing that he, his agents and servants, should forthwith withdraw from possession. Af'er this order was made the auctioneer's man remained in possession on behalf of tbe receiver. On the 2nd of June the first meeting of the creditors under the petition was held, and a trustee of the debtor's property was appointed, and he, on the 4th of June, directed the auctioneer to hold possession of the property for him. Some communications took place between the auctioneer and the trustee, and, ultimately, the auctioneer advertised the property for sale on the 14ih of June, tbe bills which gave notice of the tale and the catalogues of the goods being beaded, "In liquidation—by order of the trustee." Tbe property was) sold, and the proceeds of sale were received by the auctioneer. The bill of sale holder claimed the money from him, and the trustee, not being able to obtain payment, served the auctioneer with a notice of motion in the county court for an order to pay the money to him. No notice of the tbe application was given to the bill of sale holder. Before the motion was heard the auctioneer sent to the trustee an account of the proceeds of sale, in which he charged him with possession money from the 3rd to the 15th of June. On the 24th of June the motion was beard by the registrar, when an order was made by consent that the proceeds of sale should he paid into conrt, that the further hearing should be adjourned to July 5, and that, in the meantime, notice 6hould be given by the trustee to the bill of sale holder. Notice was served on the bill of sale holder on July 1, but this was Dot a four clear days' notice as is required by rule 50 of the Bankruptcy Rule*, 1870. The further hearing of the motion took place before the judge on July 5. The bill of sale holder did not appear. He had meanwhile commenced an action against tbe auctioneer to recover the proceeds of the sale. The judge ordered the money in court to be paid out to the trustee, and this order was affirmed by Bacon, C.J. Before the Court of Appeal it was urged that it would be nnjutt to leave the auctioneer expos-d to the ri-k of having to pay the money over again to the bill of sale holder ; that the order of the registrar as to notice to tbe bill of sale holder ought to have been carried out; and that, as it was not, an adjournment should have been directed to enable proper service to be effected; that the auctioneer was acting as an officer of the oourt and was entitled to its protection, and that the court would not allow the trustee, who was its own officer, to obtain an unjust advantage, even if he was technically in the right. It was also said that tho trustee's claim against the auctioneer was a mere money demand against a stranger tn the liquidation, and that, according to the principle of Ex parte Dickin (26 W. R. 731, L, R. 8 Cb. D. 377), tbe Court of Bankruptcy ought not to exercise its extraordinary iurisdiction under section 72 of the Bankruptcy Act, but ought to leave the matter to be determined in an action in the High Court. The Court of Appeal (jessel, M.R., and Baooallat and Lush, L.J J.) affirmed tho order apI ealed from. Jessel, M.R., said that, as a general rule, a bailee of goods could not dispute the title of his bailor. If the goods were taken from bim by tbe title paramount of a third person, and he himself had been in no way in fault, that would be a defence to the claim of his bailor. But if the bailee, knowing of an adverse claim, agreed to sell tbe goods for his bailor, and to hand over the proceeds to him, be could not afterwards set up against his bailor the title of the adverse claimant, because he had acted with his eyes open. In the present case the auctioneer had precluded himself by his own bargain with the trustee from setting up against him the title of the bill of sale holder. And, moreover, in any event, the bailee could not succeed without proving tbe paramount title of the adverse claimant, and this the present appellant had not dope. It was not enough
simply to say that an adverse claim had been made. As to the question of jurisdiction, no doubt the words of section 72 were large enough to give the court jurisdiction. But tho Court of Appeal bad held that, when a mere money demand was made by a trustTM in bankruptcy against a stranger to the bankruptcy, who asserted a right to have the matter investigated by the ordinary tribunals, it would not be proper for the Conrt of Bankruptcy, even if it possessed jurisdiction, to exercise it. But here the auctioneer did not at first express any wish to have an action brought against him ; on the contrary, he consented to an order to pay the money into the Court of Bankruptcy. The judge might, no doubt, have adjourned the hearing if he had bad reason for thinking that the bill of sale holder's claim was a bond fine one. But where the question was whether the judge should exercise an extraordinary or extrajudicial discretion, it was not an immaterial circumstance to consider that the bill of sale holder had had actual notice of the application, though the notice was one day short. And, if the court was satisfied, as the judge seemed to have been, and as the Master of the Rolls was, that the bill of sale bolder bad no intention of coming forward, there was no reason for departing from the strict rule. Baooallay, L.J., said that, on the money being paid into court, the full jurisdiction of the Court of Bankruptcy attached. Lush, L.J., said that the auctioneer, with full knowledge of the adverse claim, elected to take the part of the trust»e and to sell the goods as his, and.be was, therefore, estopped from denying the trustee's title. If he had not place! himself in that position it wonld have been open to him to show a better title in the bill of sale holder, an eviction, as it was called, of the trustee by title paramount. But in fact there was not a tittle of evidence of the title of the bill of sale holder. The present case was distinguishable from that of Biddlc v. Bond (13 W. R. 561, 6 B. & S. 225), for there the auctioneer had no opportunity of electing before the sale, and, moreover, be proved that tbe adverse claimant had a better title than his own bailor. In the present case the auctioneer deliberately elected with a perfect knowledge of the nature of the adverse claim, and he had not shown a better title in the adverse claimant.—Solicitors, M, G. Field; J. $ E. Scott.
Trustee In Bankruptcy—Disclaimer Of Lease—Leave Of Court— Appeal—Disclaimer Executed Before Notice Of Appeal—Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 23—Bankruptcy Rules, 1871, R. 28.—In a case of Ex parte Sadler, before the Court of Appeal on the 24th nit., the question was raised whether, after the Court of Bankruptcy had given leave to a trustee in bankruptcy to disclaim a lease of the bankrupt, and a disclaimer had been actually executed, tbe Court of Appeal could, at the instanoe of tbe lessor, alter the order by imposing on the trustee certain terms whioh tbe court below had refused to imposn on him. It was sought to distinguish the case from that of Ex parte Ditton (24 W. R. 1008, L. R. 3 Cb. D. 459), on the ground that there the person who appealed from the order allowing the disclaimer was a mortgagee of the lease, who wished to put an end to the disclaimer, and the oourt said that he was too late because, by force of tbe disclaimer, the term was at an end, whereas in the present case the appellant did not seek to affect the disclaimer, but only to impose some terms on the trnstpe. The Court of Appeal (jessel, M.R., and Baggallay at.d Lush, L.JJ.), however, held that this was not a valid distinction, and that the principle of Ex parte Ditton applied. Jessel, M.R., said that, whether the leave to disolaim was granted conditionally or unconditionally, an alteration of the order would amount to a withdrawal of the leave, and the leavn could not be withdrawn after the net which it permitted had been done. The appellant ought to have applied to stay tho execution of the disclaimer pending an appeal, or to have got an order made permitting the trustee to execnte the disclaimer after snoh a date as would allow of an appeal.—Solicitors, Deans, Chubb, <t Co.; W. Sturt.
Action Against Partners—Firm Dissolved Before Issub Of Writ— Service Of Writ On One Partner—Judgment Bv Default—Debtor's Summons Against Partner Not Served With. Whit—Ord. 9, K. 6— Ord. 12, R. 12—Ord. 16, R. 10—Ord. 42, R. 8.—In a case of Ex parte Young, before the Court of Appeal on the 28th ult., an important question was raised as to the etfect of the Judicature Rules, which provide for the suing of partners in the name of the partnership firm, and for the service of the writ and the issuing of execution on a judgment against the firm. By ord. 9, r. 6, "Where partners are sued in the name of their firm, tho writ shall be served either upon any one or more of tbe partners, or at the principal place within tbe jurisdiction of the business of the partnership, upon any person having, at the time of service, the control or management of the partnership business there; and, subject to the rules hereinafter contained, such service shall be deemed good service upon the firm." By ord. 12, r. 12, "Where partners are sued in the name of their firm, they shall appear individually in their own names. But all subsequent proceedings shall, nevertheless, continue In the name of the firm." By ord. 16, r. 10, "Any two or more persons claiming or being liable as co-partners may sue or be sued in the name of their respective firms, if any ; and any party to an action may in such case apply by summons to a jndge for a statement of the nau.es of the persons who are co-partners in any such firm, to be furnished iu such manner, and verified on oath or otherwise, as the judge may direct." And ord. 42, r. 8, provides that, "Where a judgment is against partners in the name of the firm, execution may issue in manner following :—(a.) Against any property of the partners as snch ; (/..) against any person who has admitted on the pleadings that he is, or has been adjudged to be a partner; (c.) against any person who has been served, as a partner, with the writ of summons, and has failed to appear. If the party who has obtained judgment claims to be entitled to issue execution against any other person as being a member of the firm, he may apply to the court orajudge lor leave to to do; and the court orjulge may give such leave if the liability be not disputed, or, if such liability be deputed, may order tbftt the liability of such person be tried uud determined iu any manner in which any issue or question in an action may be tried end determined." The qneation arose thus : a firm consisting of several partners was dissolved as to one of them on the 17th of December, the business being thenceforth continued by the other partners under the old firm and at the old place of business. On tbe 18th of December a creditor of the old partnership, whose debt bad been contracted before the dissolution, and who was not aware of the dissolution, commenced an action for the debt against the firm, and sued in the name of tbe firm. On the 21st of December the writ was served on one of the continuing partners at the place of business of the firm. It was never served on the outgoing partner, and he was ignorant of the action until the following May. No appearance was entered to the writ, and on the 29th of Deoember the plaintiff signed judgment against the defendants for tbe amount claimed and costs. A ft. fa. was issued, and the sheriff attempted to levy exeoution on the goods of the firm, but found none. No application was made to the court for leave to issue execution against the retired partner. In May, 1881, the plaintiff served on him particulars of demand of the judgment debt, this being the first notice he bud of tbe action. He did not comply with the demand, and on the 14th of June the plaintiff served him with a debtor's summons in respect of the judgment debt. He denied his liability and applied to the court to dismiss the summons, and his application was refused by the registrar. On the appeal it was contended that rule 10 of order 16, and the consequential provisions of the other rules, apply only to the case of a firm existing at the time when the action is commenced, and do not authorize the suing in the name of the firm the persons who have been the partners in it before its dissolution. Consequently, it was said, the appellant had never been served with the writ and the judgment did not bind him. The court (Lord Selborne, C, and Brett and Cotton, L.JJ.), differed in opinion, Lord Selborne and Cotton, L.J., holding that the debtor's summons ought to have been dismissed, and Brett, L. J., holding that the registrar's decision was light. Lord Selborne said that the argument had not convinced him that the effect of a dissolution of partnership was to put an end to the partnership relation between the members of the dissolved firm as to their joint liabilities and assets, or as to transactions in dependence at the date of the dissolution, or that the name of the firm under which the business had been carried on might not, according to that mercantile usage of which the law did and ought to take notice, still continue to be applicable for any purposes for which the partnership relation might be said to continue. And, if that were so, the language of rule 10 of order 16 would seem prima facie to be applicable to a joint partnership claim or liability, by or against the members of a dissolved partnership. This question, however, was one of large and general importance, and would be much more properly tried in some proceeding in the High Court (particularly by an application under rule 8 of order 42 for leave to issue execution) than npon a debtor's summons. Thinking the question open to serious doubt, his lordship was of opinion that the registrar might have done well to stay all proceedings on the summons for such time as might be requisite for such a trial. If, however, the determination of the appeal had depended only on rule 10 of order 16, and the rules as to service and appearance, it might be going too far to say that the registrar was not competent to decide the question. But tho question depended also on rule 8 of order 42, which seomed to show that judgment against a firm was not and ought not to be held conclusive of the liability of any person who had neither admitted on the pleadings, nor had been adjudged to be a partner in the firm sued, and who had not been served as a partner with the writ. It appeared to his lordship that it would be improper in any case of disputed liability, in which, on an application for leave to issue exeontion under this rule, the court could not properly give leave without the trial and determination of the question of liabilility by some proceeding at law, to grunt a debtor's summons, and afterwards to refuse an application by the person summoned either to dismiss it, or to stay proceedings under it for such time as might be necessary for the trial of tbe question. If this was so, the inference whioh his lordship drew from rule 8 of order 42 (in connection with the other rules) was that, in a case like the present, the judgment was not per se binding on a person in the position of the appellant, so as to constitute a debt on which he could be made bankrupt, and that something more was necessary to make it so. If tbe rules did apply to a dissolved pirtnership, such a state of the law would appear to his lordship to be very convenient and reasonable, particularly wben, as in tbe present case, an old firm name continued to be used by anew partnership, so as to make the application of the firm name so far equivocal and uncertain tbat it conld not be ascertained by anything which appeared on the record. Cotton, L.J., said that, by the English law previously to the rules under the Judicature Act, a firm had no such existence as enabled it to sue or made it liable to be sued. It was a mere name under which certain persons carried on their business, and the individual partners, as such, were alone capable of suing and being sued. The Judicature Rules had, no doubt, varied the liw in this respect, but tbe question was to what extent. In bis opinion, the rules applied only to persons who were, at tbe time of action commenced, partners in an existing firm, not to persons who had been partners in a firm which had been dissolved. Such persons could no longer properly be called partners. The partnership was at an end by the dissolution, and, though the persons who were members of it had authoiity to deal with matters in which the partnership was at the time of its dissolution engaged, for the purpose of winding them up, until those affairs were wound up, yet this was not because they were still partners, but because the authority of agency, which was given by the partnership contract, continued, notwithstanding the dissolution, as regarded matters commenced duriug the continuance of the partnership. Brett, L.J., thought that the firm name mentioned in rule 10 of order 16 was tbe name of tbe firm which existed when the debt sued for was contracted, and that tbe firm so named existed for the purpose of being sued at the time of the is-uing of a writ in respect of a debt contracted while the firm was in full force, though for other purposes the firm bad ceased to exist. The service of the writ was, therefore, by virtue of rule 6 of order 9, a good service on the appellant, and
ho was bound by the judgment. His lordship was of opinion that, under rule 8 of order 42, execution could not issue on the judgment against the appellant without the leave of the court. But it did not follow that other remedies on the judgment—e.g., a debtor's summons—might not be enforced against him. The Legislature bad only thought it safer to bridle tbe power of exeoution, which was a drastic remedy, put in force at the will of the judgment creditor, and was irreparably misobievous if wrongly issued.—Soilictors, W. Moon; Keene, Marsland, fa Bryden.
Personal Covenant—Breach—Enforcing Bt Injunction—InterlocuTory Application—Delay.—In a case of Mapleson v. JSutehineon, before Chitty, J., on the 25lh ult., a motion was made to restrain the female defendant, a married woman, from singing at any concerts in England, in breach of her contract with the plaintiff. In August, 1879, the female defendant, then a spinster, agreed with the plaintiff to proceed to sing for him in America during the American season, commencing in October, 1879, and ending in March, 1880. The agreement contained a proviso for renewal upon the same terms for the American seasons, 1880-1 and 1881-2. The agreement contained no provision as to when the notice of renewal should be given. The female defendant duly performed her engagement for the winter of 1879, and the notice of renewal was given for the season 1880-1 in July, 1880, and such notice was acted upon, and the engagement duly performed during the winter of 1880. Notice of renewal for the season 1881-2 was given by the plaintiff to the female defendant at the end of June, 1881. The female defendant, since the original agreement, had married the defendant Hutchinson, and such defendant, immediately on receiving tbe last notice, wrote to the plaintiff stating that the notice bad been given too late, and the engagement could not be carried ont. The plaintiff thereupon gave notice that in case of any breach by the defendants he should at once move for an injunction. According to the contraot the female defendant was to proceed to London, early in October, for rehearsals, and subsequently cross over to America. The plaintiff, having recently heard that the letuale defendant was advertised to sing at various concerts in England, at once commenced this action, and gave notice of motion for an injunction. The female defendant, in answer to the motion, made an affidavit stating that according to the custom of the theatrical profession, and to enable her to make her arrangements for tbe future, the notice of renewal should have been given at the end of the American season in Marob, 1881. The plaintiff contended that the defendants, by entering into the contract in August and by accepting the previous renewal in July, had shown that the notice could be given later than March. For the defendants it was also submitted that there had been delay on the plaintiff's part, and that be could have at cnce moved for an injunction when the defendant had refused to perform her contract. Chitty, J., said that the plaintiff was bonnd to establish his contract with the defendant, and his title to sue for the injunction, and he was not satisfied that the notice of renewal, so as to constitute a binding engagement on the defendant, had been given in time. There was evidence wbjch was uncontradicted that, according to the custom of the theatrical profession, the notice should have been given in March, and in that state of the evidence he did not see bow he could grant an interlocutory injunction, whatever case the plaintiff might be able to establish at the trial. It was only a matter of observation, and not conclusive, thst the previous renewal had been later, and that the contract bad been entered into in August. He was also of opinion, on the question of delay, that the plaintiff had disentitled himself to an interlooutory injunction. The motion must be refused, and the costs would be costs in the action.—SoliciTors, J. <fe W. Gole; Lindo $ Co.
Practice — Petition — Evidence — Statutory Declaration Made Abroad.—In a case of Se Vaugfum's Trusts, before Chitty, J., on the 26th ult., a question arose on a petition whether, under the Statutory Declaration Aot (5 4 6 Will. 4, c. 62) a statutory declaration made in Fiji before a notary publio was receivable in evidence in a petition. The deponent was alive, and Cbitti, J., said there was no reason why he should depart from the regular practice and not require an affidavit from the person who had made the statutory declaration. Tbe case must be mentioned again when the proper evidence had been prooured.—Solicitors, R.Beale ; Surr, Oriiole, <fe Co.
Practice—Interim Injunction—Disclosure Op Material Facts— Discharge.—In a case of French v. Chatterton, before Cbitty, J., on tbe 28th ult., a motion was made to disoharge an interim injunction granted on the 26th, to restrain the performance of a play in a London theatre on tbat day. The plaintiff in bis affidavit stated he was mortgagee in possession and sole proprietor of the right of representation, but the defendant in an affidavit filed in support of his motion Bet out the document of title nnder whioh the plaintiff claimed. By that document, whioh was dated the 21st of June, 1878, the defendant deposited the manuscript of the drama with the plaintiff in consideration of a loan then made to him, and he thereby empowered the plaintiff to receive all moneys for tbe performance of the drama until the loan and all other sums owing had been repaid. The defendant was n bankrupt, and bis trustee bad oonsented to the performance on the 26th, and had directed the royalty to be paid to the plaintiff direot. The defendant also alleged that the drama had been performed sinoe the 21st of June, 1878, and the proceeds paid to the plaintiff in reduotion of his debt. Chitty, J., was of opinion that there had been a material suppression on tbe plaintiff's part in the affidavit upon which he had obtained the ex parte injunction. It should have set out or exhibited tbe peculiar document of title nnder whioh tbe plaintiff claimed, and if that had been done he should never have granted the interim injunction sinoe the plaintiff by no means clearly showed big right to restrain the represents,tmtion of the drama. Without going farther into the merits, he should discharge the injunction simply because the document bad not boen referred to. The plaintiff ought to hare an opportunity of answering the defendant's affidavit, and therefore'the motion oonld be mentioned again on the question of oostson Friday the 2nd Deoember—Solicitors, Fan Tromp; Bolton $ Mole.
Company—Sale or Assets—Sanctionof Bondholder's Meeting—StatuTort Majority—Companies Arrangement Act, 1870.—In the case of Rt Madras Irrigation and Canal Company (Limited), before Cnitty, J., on the 29th alt., an application was made under theCompanies Arrangement Act, 1870, that a meeting of the bondholders of the company, which is now in liquidation, might be directed to be held to consider a proposal for the sale by the company of its assets to the Secretary of State for India. The offer, in a similar form, had been before two previous meetings; at the first the liquidat >r bad held certain proxies which the court held he eoold not do, not being a bondholdur, and therefore the result of the meeting was set aside, and a fresh meeting directed on the 3rd of August, 1881. At the latter meeting a majority in number of the bondholders assented to the sale, but the majority in value was by some £10,000 short of the statutory amount The Secretary of State had made a fresh offer, open to the end of the year, and this application was now made on the ground that various mistakes bad been made in counting the votes at the meeting of the 3rd of August, and that certain bondholders who had then voted against the proposal had since changed their minds, and that in effect there was now the statutory majority in favour of the proposal. Chttty, J., said he should, in exercise of his judicial discretion, direct a further meeting to be called. He looked upon the renewal of the offer by the Secretary of State as, in effect, a new offer, which the bondholders ought to have an opportunity of considering. As, however, the proposal was the same as before, he should not have sent it back to be considered by a third meeting, nnlass be saw that there had been a bona fide change of opinion since the last meeting. Having regard to the analysis of the voting at the last meeting, and the present state of opinion in the company, he considered that the applicants had shown a fair prima facie case that there was at present a statutory majority in favour of tbe scheme. He should direct the meeting to be held on the 15tb of December, and the liquidator would have leave if the proposal were then accepted to take out a Bummons returnable before him on the 19th to confirm the result—Solicitors, W. Rawlins; Aihurst, Morrie, 4; Co.; Solicitor to the Treasury.
Registration Op Voters—Lodger's Claim—Prima Facie Evidence Of Qualification—41 & 42 Vict. C. 26, s. 23.—In a case of Nuth v. Tamplin, which came before the Queen's Bench Ditision on the 21th of November, and which was an appeal against a decision of the revising barrister for the borough of Marvl-bone, the question was whether the 23rdMotion of 41 & 42 Vict c. 26 applied to persons claiming the lodger franchise for tbe first time, as well as to those who have already asserted their claim. By section 23 of the Act, " In the case of a person claiming to vote as a lodger the declaration annexed to his notice of claim shall, for the purposes of revision, be prima facie evidence of his qualification." The appellant claimed the lodger franchise under section 4 of 30 A 31 Vict. 0. 102 for the first time, and made his claim in accordance with form H., No. 2, in the schedule to the Act of 1878. The claim was duly published by the overseers in tbe list of lodger claimants, but the claimant did not appear personally in support of his claim, nor was any evidence tendered in suppott thereof. It was argued on bis behalf that tbe declaration annexed to the notice was sufficient evidence of bis qualifioacation. The revising barrister held that section 23 of the Act of 1878 did not apply to persons claiming the lodger franchise for the first time, and that, the sec ion not applying, the appellant should have given further evidence in support of his claim. The oourt (desman and Bowbn, JJ.) allowed the appeal, being of opinion that tbe 23rd section applied to old and new lodgers alike. It was admitted that section 25 applied to both, and as the language was identical in both sections the court could not put a limited construction on on« and exclude new lodgers. Appeal allowed.—Solicitors, B.T.Ives; Tamplin, Taylor, $ Joseph*.
.registration Of Voters—Qualification For Borough And County Votes—Duplicate Entry—2 Will. 4, c. 45—41 & 42 Vict. C. 26, s. 23, Sub-bection 14.—In a case of Chilcott v. Bullen, which was an appeal against a decision of a revising barrister, heard in the Queen's Bench Division oa the 24th nit., a question arose as to the construction of 41 & 42 Vict. c. 26, a. 28. The respondent occupied a leasehold house, and owned and occupied a freehold tenement, both premises beiog situated within the borough of Truro. The respondent's name appeared twice in tbe list of borough voters in respect of bis two properties. Ou the revision of the list of voters for the borough, the revising barrister placed against the entry of the respondent's name in respect of his freehold qualification a note, to the effect that the respondent was not entitled to vote in respeot of that qualification, in accordance with 41 & 42 Vict. e. 26, s. 28, sub-section 14, and left him the right of voting as an occupier. The respondent claimed to vote for the county, by reason of his freehold property, and that claim was allowed by tbe revising barrister, although the property was situate within the borough. The court ( Denman and Bowes, JJ.) allowed the appeal, as it was clear that by 2 Will. 4, c. 45, no person cou. 1 vole for tbe county in respect of property occupied within the borough, and the law had not beeo altered by the provisions of 41 & 42 Vict c 26. Appeal allowed.—Solicitors, Fox; Bartrum.
It is stated that the list of actions entered for trial at the London sittings consists of 330 causes, of which number about 130 are marked for special Of the general list over 30 causes are already struck out as settled, about 300 to be tried,
LEEDS INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.
The annual general meeting of this sooiety was held on the 7th ult, at the Law Institute, Albion-place, Leeds.
Present :—Mr. T. Simpson, president, in the ohair; Messrs. J. W. Middleton, vice-president; J. D. Kay, hon. treasurer; G. H. Nelson, E. M. Jones, F. H. Barr, G. W. Morrison. J. Rider, W. B. Craven, J. C. Maloolm, R. S. Wigan, E. Weston, A. L. Booth, J. Soott, J. W. Harland, T. G. Teale, J. R. Ford, E. Wilson, and T. Marshall, hon. secretary.
The hon. secretary read the report of tbe oommittee.
The President, in moving the adoption of the report, called attention to those parts of it whioh dealt with the reporb of the Committee on Legal Procedure, dispensing orders from the preliminary examination and the Incorporated Law Sooiety.
Mr. Kay seconded tho motion for the adoption of the report.
After some discussion on the points referred to by the president, in which Messrs. Barr, Rider, Nelson, Kay, Wilson, Marshall, Teale, and Booth took part, it was resolved—" That the report as read be adopted."
Messrs. \V. Clarke, A. L. Booth, J. R. Ford, and G. W. Morrison were eleoted members of the committee in the place of Messrs. W. Clarke, J. C, Maloolm, A. L. Booth, and F. H. Barr, who retired by rotation, Messrs. Clarke and Booth having beeu nominated for re-eleotion.
The treasurer's acoonnt was presented and adopted.
Mr. T. Marshall was elected secretary for the year, and Mr. J. D. Kay was eleoted treasurer for the year.
Messrs. H. Armstrong, C. Lnpton, and W. Postlethwaite were elected members of the sooiety.
A vote of thanks to the chairman concluded the business of the meeting.
The following are extracts from the report of the committee :—
Members.—The present number of members is seventy-one, and there are eight subscribers to the library.
Amendment of the Law of Bankruptcy.—The Council of the Incorporated Law Society having made various suigestions for the amendment of the law of bankruptcy, in anticipation of a Bankruptcy Bill, these suggestions were examined by your committee, and a report on them waa presented to an extraordinary general meeting of the society, held on the 6th of January last, and adopted. The Bill subsequently presented to Parliament by Mr. Chamlain, the President of the B >ard of Trade, was also considered by your committee; but a committee having, in the meantime, been appointed by the Associated Provincial Law Societies to report on the subject, it was thought better to unite with the other country law societies in their recommendations than to frame an independent report. The representatives of the chief country law socie iea, including your own, met at Leeds in the month of July, examined the Bill, and sgreed on a report upon it. This report was sent by the honorary secretary of the Associated Provincial Law Sooieties to the President of the Board of Trade, who has promised to consider it when the question aga'n comes before Parliament.
Report of the Committee on Legal Procedure.—This committee was appointed by the Lord Chancellor for the purpose of considering what changes might be expedient and practicable in the practice and procedure of tbe three divisions now forming the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice. Their report was issued about three weeks ago, and your committee immediately met to take it into consideration. The report deals with the following subjects :—(1) The abuse occasioned by the resort to many modes of procedure cumulatively; (2) the oppressive use of the power of discovery, and the expense caused by proof of facts about which there ought to be no dispute; (3) diminution of appeals in interlocutory matters; (4) debtors'summonses; (.')) amendment of tbe mode of trial, including such matters as the appointment of official shorthand writers, the right to new trial, and the procedure to be adopted 11 obtain it; (6) costs in actions under £200, and costs generally.
(1) On the first of these subjects your committee think it essential that parties should be brought to a definite issue before trial. Whether tbis be done by short pleadings, or by notice in lieu of pleadings, is a matter of secondary importance. In most cases an indorsement on the writ of the nature of the claim, notice of defence, and notice of any matter by way of reply will be sufficient, and no further pleadings should be allowed except by judge's order. If further particulars are wanted they can be obtained. The practice of making long garbled statements in the form of pleas, and supplementing them by summonses for particulars, is an abuse which should, be checked. At a certain stage iu the pleading the proposed summons for directions will be useful, and the same may be said of the suggestion that a separate su mmons for each separate matter shall be discontinued.
(2) Tbe committee approve of suggestion No. 6 in the report as to discovery, but that (No. 7) requiring a party, under penalty of costs, to admit speci fio facts on notice before trial is of more doubtful policy. It will often be difficulty to sty what is "reasonable cause," within the meaning of the rule, and in practice it will be found that parties will refuse admission and run the risk of costs.
(3) As to interlocutory appeals, your committee approve the recommendations of the oommittee Nos. 8, 9, and 10. A suggestion has been made that a practice court should be established to heir appeals from masters and district registrars as well as appeils on taxation of costs. The use of such a court in fixing tho practice cannot be disputed; on the other hand, an appeal to it would bo muoh more costly, and it is probable that a court would decline to entertain appeals not on mat-rs of principle.
(4) The committee approve tbe suggestion as to debtors' summonses (No.
(5) The proposed amendments of procedure in matters relating to trial (Nos. 12 to 15) are of great importance. They embrace a power to the master to direct, on summon" for directions, > motion for judgment where the rights of the parties are found to depend wholly or in part on matter of law, and when there is no ferious controversy aa to the facts. But before a case is directed to be tried by a jnry, the master must be satisfied that the case is one which can onnveniently be so tried, subject to certain excepted case" in which the right of either party to a trial by jury is to be absolute. Your committee have approved this suggestion, considering that the decision of the master, that the question can be conveniently tried by a jury, will preserve that mode of trial in cases to which it is applicable; the mode of trial by official referees has not, in their opinion, worked well, and should be discontinned. Your committee agree that applications for new trial, appeals from inferior courts, and the other matters specified in No. IS, should be by notice of motion without any mle niii, On the question of new trial, the only observation your committee have to make is that an appeal from the deoision of the arbitrator should be allowed wherever there is a reference to an abitrator, and not only where the arbitration is compulsory, aa is suggested in No. 24.
(6) On the question of costs, the proposal (No. 20) that when the amount recovered In an action for a mere money demand, or for damages only, is less than £200, the plaintiffs costs shall be'taxed on a lower scale, is disapproved by the committee.
Your committee have further to report upon this subject that a meeting of the Associated Provincial Law Societies was held in London, on the 27th of October, and attended by the vice-president and honorary secretary on behalf of the society, at whioh the report of the committee was fully considered. The resolutions passed at that meeting do not differ in any material respect from those at which your own committee have arrived ; and yonr committee propose to support the recommendations of the meeting referred to, with such variations and additions as further discussion may show to be requisite.
Conveyancing and Law of Properly Act, 1881.—The committee need do no more than refer to this important Act, which comes into operation on the 1st of January, 1882. It should be read in connection with the statute next mentioned.
The Solicitors' Remuneration Act, 1881.—Under thia Aofc, the Lord Chaneel lor, the Lord Chief Justice of England, the Master of the Bolls, the president for the time being of the Incorporated Law Society, and the president of one of tbe provincial law societies, as defined in section 1, are authorized to make general orders for regulating the remuneration of solicitors in oonveyanoing and other non-contentions business. The addition of the president of one of the provinoial law oooieties to the body empowered to make general orders, was made in the Bill at a late stage, at the suggestion, and maidy by the influence, of the Liverpool Law Society, to whom the thanks of the profession are due for this amendment. Your committee hope that the exertions of the Liverpool Society will be recognized by the selection of its president, in the first instance, as a member of the Eule Committee under the Act. The framing of general orders will be a work of much responsibility and difficulty, even under the wide powers liven by section 4. Tbe committee will take care to make their views known to those to whom the framing of the orders is intrusted.
The Adminittration of Justice.—This title refers to a subject to which the attention of your society was strongly directed at the close of last year by the Liverpool Law Society. The assize arrangements for Lancashire are known to be quite inadeqnate, and foar or five country sooieties, including Leeds, were invited to Liverpool on the 22nd of December last, to consider what better arrangements could be made for the trial of actions in the counties in which the pressure of business was chiefly felt. Your committee preferred that the matter should be discussed in the first instance by the general body of the Associated Law Societies. It was so discussed on the 19th of January last, and referred to a committee, of which your president was a member. That committee met in Manchester, and presented its report on the 5th of May last, recommending that in the first instance the attempt to obtain continuous sittings for the trial of actions should be confined to the county of Lancaster. In this recommendation your society, through its representatives, acquiesced.
Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1881.—The 22nd seotion of this Act extends the qualification for the office of district registrar, in registries where important business is transacted, to solicitors generally. The clause, as originally framed, made barristers also eligible. Against this proposal to carry the patronage of tbe bar into one of tbe few official legal appointments to whioh solicitors are eligible, your society, in conjunction with the Incorporated Law Society, and most of the provinoial law societies, strongly protested. A petition against the clause was presented to tbe House of Commons, nod the words to whioh exoeption was taken were eventually struck out by the Government. Attention is called to the 27th ■eotioD of this Act, which removes doubts which some judges had felt as to the validity of the County Court Rules and Orders made under 19 & 20 Viot. o. 108, s. 32.
Notices of Incumbrances to Trustees and others.—As a consequence of the decision in The Saffron Walden Second Benefit Building Society v. Rayner, (L. R. 14 Ch. D. 406), the committee recommended that the practice of solicitors to trustees, mortgagees, and others, accepting service of notice of incumbrances or other assurances, should be discontinued. This recommendation was communicated to members by circular on the 27th of December last.
Dispensing Orders.—At the annual meeting, held on the 27th of October, 1876. the following resolution was passed:
"That it is undesirable for members of the society to sign any memorial for dispensing with the preliminary examination in general knowledge, under the rjth section of the Attorneys' Act (23 & 24 Viot, 0. 127), or any part of such
examination, unless such memorial be first submitted, to and approved of by the
Since this date seven petitions for dispensing orders have been referred to the committee, five of which have been granted, and two refused. The committee have always felt embarrassed in dealing with these applications. The examination in general knowledge required by the regulations of the Incorporated Law Society, comprises writing from dictation, writing a short English composition, elementary arithmetic, the geography of Europe and history of England, elementary Latin, and two languages (to be selected by the candidate out of six). This examination, with the exception of the lastmentioned subject, is one which no clerk, however continuous his office labours may be, need find any difficulty in passing. Were the applications for dispensing orders usually restricted to an exemption from examination in the two languages forming tbe last of the subjects, there would iu most cases be little objection to them. But those which have come before the committee have invariably asked for dispensation from the whole of the subjects of examination. The committee think that tbe facilities given have been abused, and that many clerks who could easily have prepared themselves by taking a little trouble, have applied for and obtained dispensing orders to save themselves that trouble. The regnlation has, moreover, been in force for so many years that any clerk wishing to become a solicitor has a'opla notice of what is required. The committee have, therefore, decided that it is inexpedient in any case to approve an application for a dispensing order from ths whole of the subjects of examination.
HULL INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.
Tbe annual meeting of this society was held in the large hall of the society on the 25th ult.
The Peebident (Mr. Laverack), in moving the adoption of the report of the council, congratulated the members on their meeting for the first time in premises of their own, and alluded to this and other eventslwhich bad transpired, as Tendering the past year one of the most memorable in the history of the society. He explained how the financial position of the society had been affected by the changes which had taken place, and expressed a confident belief that the result would be as successful pecuniarily as it would be advantageous in every other respect. Having alluded to the aotion of tbe council with respect to the Bankruptcy Bill, and their suggestions to the Lord Chancellor's Committee on the reform of legal procednre in the common law division of the High Court, and pointed out the effect of the new Act with regard to professional remuneration, he concluded by moving the adoption of the report.
Mr. Pbakce seconded the motion, which, after some remarks by Dr. Rollit and others, was put and carried unanimously.
Mr. W. J. Reed moved, and Mr. Farrell seconded, a vote of thanks to the officers and council for their services during the past year, which was carried with acclamation.
The Secretary (Mr. Wood house) moved a resolution to separate the offices of secretary and treasurer, which had hitherto been combined. This was seconded by Mr. J. A. Jackson and carried.
The election of officers for the ensuing year was then proceeded with, and the result of the balloting was as follows :—President, Mr. F. Lowe; vicepresident, Dr. Rollit; hon. secretary, Mr. J. T. Woodhouse; hon. treasurer, Mr. J. J. Thorney ; council, Messrs. H. Birks, R. Middlemiss, J. Leak, J. L. Jacobs, J. Cook, and C. S. Wake. The officers and ex-president are ex officio members of the council. Messrs. T. Pearce and J. B. Sibree were re-appomted auditors.
Mr. Lowe then thanked the members for bis election ss president, and said that it must ever be a legitimate source of satisfaction and pride to any member of bis profession to be elected to that office, and he felt that in his case the hononr was enhanced by their unanimous vote, and by the election being made in view of the visit, during his year of office, of the parent society. Some of them had with himself witnessed the magnificent hospitality which bad been extended to them by their brethren in other towns. He felt the responsibility of tbe position, but relying on their aid, and particularly that of their indefatigable secretary, he hoped he should ha able to receive the members of the chief Bociety with hospitality, dignity, and success.
Mr. A. Rollit regretted that Dr. Rollit had been compelled to leave the meeting, and, on bis behalf, he thanked the members for electing bim vicepresident.
Mr. Woodhouse also thanked tbe members for unanimously re-electing him. n
Mr. J. Cook moved, and Mr. Birks seconded, an alteration of the artioles of association, so as to admit gentlemen practising within forty miles of Hull, but not in Hull, as subscribing members at a reduced subscription, withi limited privileges, and after considerable discussion, the motion, slightly amended, was carried.
Several other topics of interest to the profession were discussed, after which the meeting terminated.
The following are extracts from the report of the council:— Unqualified, Practitioners and Debt Collectors' Charges.—The council have bad under their consideration complaints of misconduct by professional and unqualified practitioners, and they have communicated to the Council of tbe Incorporated Law Society in London the facts and circumstances relating thereto, for that society to take such action as they might bt advised. Tn 1 prac tice complained of in the last report of so-called accountants filing dtutors' petitions for liquidation has, the council believe, become much les» prevalent, if not altogetuer ceased, and they feel that this is due to the action of the society aud to the assistance rendered by the registrar. The council
have observed with satisfaction that the Court of Appeal have overruled the decision of a coonty oourt judge in the South, who held a commission agent entitled to recover court fees paid at his employer's request, ai well ns reasonable reward for services rendered oat of court. The facts were that an agent or debt collector took out a county conn summons on behalf of another person, and appeared personally before the court and obtained judgment. The judgment proved abortive, and the debt collector sued his employer for the recovery of £2 2s., made up as follows :—
Paid for summons 9 0
Hearing fee 16 0
Attending court, waiting upon defendant several times both in
Ktading and Erleigh 17 0
2 2 0
Bankruptcy Bill.—Amongst the most important measures which the council considered was the Bankruptcy Bill introduced by Mr. Chamberlain, the President of the Board of Trade. Tbis Bill was first brought before the society in general meeting and referred to the council, who bestowed mm h time in considering its details and drawing up sugge-tions for its improvement and amendment. These suggestions were forwarded in a lengthy report to the Associated Provincial Law Societies, to the Conncil of the Incorporated Law Society, to the President of the Board of Trade, and to the borough members. The most objectionable feature of the Bill appeared to the council to be the principle of official administration which it embodied. A special meeting of the associated societies was held in London, to consider the measure, and your president attended specially as a delegate, the result of the deliberations being that a committee was appointed to meet at Leeds, and draw np a joint report to submit to Mr. Chamberlain. Your society's representative was plsced upon this committee. The Bill was subsequently withdrawn, owing to pressure of businoss, and the council hope that when it is re-introduced next session many of the modifications suggested by the society will appear in the Bill.
The Conveyancing and Late of Properly Act.—This Bill, introduced by Lord Cairns, after passing the House of Lords, was in the House of Commons referred to a Select Committee of the most eminent lawyers in the House, who were advised in revising it by conveyancing counsel of the highest repute. The Bill, omitting some of the original clause*, then became law, and comes into operation on the 1st of January next. An opportunity will, no doubt, be given to the society at an early date to oonsider the Act, with a view of adopting uniformity of practice with respect to the optional portions thereof.
Solicitor? Remuneration Act.—This is, perhaps, the most important Act affecting the profession that has been passed for some years, and was a necessary supplement to the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, One of the moat pleasing features in the Act is that, for the first time, Parliament has recognized the existence of provincial law societies by providing that the Lord Chancellor may nominate, from time to time, the president of one of tbe provincial law societies to serve during the term of his office as one of the body appointed to regulate the scale of costs. The council have receivtd en elaborate report 'rom the Conncil of the Incorporated Law Society on the subject of tbe scale of remuneration to be provided under tbe Act, and a letter inviting any suggestions by this society to be submitted to the authority constituted by the Act, and the same are now under consideration. It wonld facilitate the council's arriving at a decision if members would send into the secretary their opinions on the following points, viz. :—(1) Whether the ad valorem commission should not be exclusive of disbursements, or, if not, what disbursements it shonld include; (2) what, any, and what scale of ad valorem commission should be proposed for marriuge sediments; and (3) what ought to be the terms of the general order to be made under the Solicitors' Remuneration Act with respect to such non-contentious business as would be made the subject of an ad valorem commission.
Administration of Justice.—In January last a committee of the judges and others was appointed by the Lord Chancellor to consider what changes might be expedient in practice and procedure in the common law division of the High Court of Justice. A series of important suggestions to amend the practice and procedure were received and considered by the oouncil, who forwarded their report thereon to tbe committee. The report of the committee has now been made pnblic, and the council are pleased to observe that several of their 1 have been adopted by the committee.
At the usual monthly meeting of the direotors, held at the hall of the Incorporated Law Society, Chancery-lane, on Thursday, December 1, the following being present—viz., Mr, Desborougb (chairman), and Messrs. Boodle, Barges, Desborougb, jun., Sidney Smith, Styan, and A. B. Carpenter (secretary), grants of £16 were made to the widows of two non-members, one new member was elected, and the ordinary general business was transacted.
LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.
INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.
Adcock, Arthur Hugh | Almond, Frederick William
Armstrong. Walter Scott
Atkinson, Ernest Darley
Bainbridge, Robert William
Bartlett, Elward Whiteley
Batey, William Simpson
Beaumont, Richard Henry
Beavan, Samuel Sydney
Bender, Alfred Philipp
Benyon. Winsor Oeorge Norman
Black, James Henry
Bliss, William Herbert Wray
Roase, Arthur James
Bobbett, Lewis Albert
Bourne, James Edwin Dawson
Bradbury, John Henry
Bradbury, John Henry
Brady, Noel Philip Wentworth
Brandon, Edgar Morris
Brandon, Edward Tjrrel Horace
Brewer, Harris Heal
Broadbent, John William
Brown, Alfred Edward
Brown, George Augustus Human
Brown, John Hau^h
Casebourne, William Henry
Johnson, Edward William
Morioe, Wi liam Ogilvie Marshal
Morris, Frederick Temple
Morris, Walter Edward
Nesbitt, Thomas Tliorburn
Nutting, Louis Walter Bligh
Ormond, Edward Brooks
Parrott, Francis Hay ward
Pascoe, George Wiliam
Pattinson, Hubert Foden
Pinfold, Charles Edward
Poole, Charles Edward Hamilton
Powell, Wadham Locke
Price, Thomas Prothero
Riyner, John Fawcett
Reed, Arthur Lincoln
Kiogrose, Bernard John
Roberts, William Pierpoint
Rouse, Percy Fitzroy
Russell, Charles T.
Rylaud, Arthur Latham
Samuels, Samuel Ormes
Sauluy, Alfred Harrison
Suhmidt, Lindsay Warren
Shaw, Arthur Hugh
Shires, James Edward
Sbotter, Stanley George
Sixsmitb, Richard Msssey