The Solicitors' Journal. CURRENT TOPICS. LONDON, OCTOBER 28, 1882. MR. JUSTICE PEARSON attended at Judges' Chambers on day, and made several orders both in the Chancery and Queen's Bench Divisions. time, and took occasion to point out certain limits to which it must be considered subject. A case has lately been decided which exactly confirms the view which we suggested as the correct one Wednes-viz., Reg. v. Lee (L. R. 9 Q. B. D. 394). We pointed out that prosecuting authority would not disqualify, yet it must not be although the mere fact that the justice was a member of the supposed that a member of the prosecuting authority who had actually taken part in initiating the prosecution could afterwards sit as judge in the case. It has been held in the case to which we allude that where a justice was a member of the sanitary committee of the town council who authorized the prosecution, he could not sit to hear the case. This decision is a very obvious one; it would be monstrous if it were otherwise, but it is, perhaps, just as well that this decision should have authoritatively prevented any misconception as to the true limits of the doctrine of Reg. v. Handsley. THE ROYAL COMMISSION on the Ecclesiastical Courts will, it is understood, intermit their sittings for a time owing to the illness of the Primate. We have reason to believe that the report of the Commission is not likely to be presented for several months to come. A MEETING of the Rule Committee of Judges was held on Monday last to consider the proposed new Rules of Court consequent upon the Report of the Legal Procedure Committee. We believe, however, that there is no prospect of the new rules being brought into operation until after the meeting of Parliament next year. WE PUBLISH elsewhere an order, dated Tuesday last, transferring Mr. Justice KAY's list of causes to Mr. Justice PEARSON, for the purpose only of trial or hearing. It will be observed that no writs are to be marked for the latter learned judge, who, to adopt a phrase used by Mr. Justice FRY when occupying the same position, will "live on transfers only." CODIFICATION, now begun in earnest with the new Bills of Exchange Act, must always raise the difficult question of how far the existing law, when subjected to the process of codification, should be amended. The Bills of Exchange Act is no exception to this rule. From many quarters notes of disapproval have been sounded, and not without reason has complaint been made that the so-called " days of grace" have been retained. It would, perhaps, have been too much to expect that in a codifying measure the now purely formal and rigid "days of grace" should have been wholly expunged, but there is one modification of the existing law which we might reasonably have looked for, and that is a simplification of the rule as to the day of payment of bills, when the day fixed for payment falls upon a dies non. Unfortunately, however, the law has been left in its old confusing state. When the day of payment falls upon a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday, or public fast or thanksgiving day, the bill is payable on the preceding day, and when the day of payment falls on a bank holiday, is a bank holiday, it is payable on the succeeding day: 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 14, sub-section 1. But in Scotland the rule as to payment is more confusing still, owing to the complication arising from Christmas Day and Good Friday, hitherto "bank holidays" across the border, being promoted by this Act to the other class of holidays-namely, those which necessitate the prepayment instead of the post-payment of bills which fall due on those days. We should have supposed that the presence of practical business men upon the committee which sat to consider the new Bills of Exchange Act, would have led to one general simple and easily remembered rule being adopted for the payment of bills when payment falls upon a blank day. WE REPORT this week two cases of forging deeds by solicitors' clerks, which will recall to our readers' recollection the DIMSDALE and Downs frauds in 1878. In non-register counties this is a very tempting form of crime, and it is unfortunately difficult to say how, under present conditions, it can be effectually guarded against. It will be remembered that in the DIMSDALE case, the or the last day of grace is a Sunday, and the second day of grace forgery was discovered by the care of a solicitor who examined into the accuracy of the descriptions of the attesting witnesses to the deeds; and Downs had the impudence to attempt to excuse himself before the magistrate on the ground of the ease with which the money was obtained on the forged deeds, for which he considered the solicitors of the mortgagees to blame. But it is practically impossible, in the pressure of daily work, to make the minute and anxious investigations which led to the discovery of DIMSDALE'S fraud. The only practical remedy is a general system of registry of deeds, and the report of the Land Transfer Committee of 1879 showed that this protection against fraud might be afforded without the evils of delay and expense which have brought the system, as practised in Middlesex, into discredit. THERE HAVE BEEN RECENTLY several cases decided in which the question has been discussed, what amount of interest disqualifies a magistrate for exercising jurisdiction in a case. One of these cases was Reg. v. Handsley (L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 383), where it was held that the fact that a justice of the peace for a borough, who is a member of the town council, has a pecuniary interest in the result of an information merely in the sense that the fine inflicted would go to the borough fund, or that the corporation of which he is a member are the prosecutors, does not disqualify him from sitting. This decision was one of considerable practical importance, as in boroughs so many of the justices are members of the town council that if all such justices were disqualified ipso facto, great difficulty would arise. The court took the sensible view that there must be some substantial interest such as might be likely to create a real bias; that what may be called a scintilla of interest would not disqualify. We commented at some length on this decision at the RECENT LEGISLATION has tended in the direction of leaving to the discretion of the court or judge many points which formerly would have been provided for by express enactment. Instances of this occur in two Acts passed during the past session of Parliament. In the Bills of Sale Act (45 & 46 Vict. c. 43), s. 7, after giving power to grant relief in certain cases, the clause concludes with a general power to the court or judge to make such order "as may seem just." In the Bills of Exchange Act (45 & 46 Vict. c. 61), s. 57, sub-section 3, it is enacted that where interest is recoverable as damages, such interest may, "if justice require it," be withheld. To the discretion thus conferred no reasonable objection can be made, but to the terms in which the giving of this discretion is worded a protest may fairly be entered. "Justice" is not what a particular court or judge may consider to be justice, for justice is not what A., B., C., or D. individually may regard as justice, but what A., B., C., and D. collectively, and in the abstract, regard as justice. What " may 66 seem just" to one man may not seem just to another, and what one man may consider to be " "justice," another may regard as positive injustice. The expressions "as may seem just," and "if justice require it," have been employed in these two Acts to do duty for the well-known expression "as to the court or judge it may seem fit," a form of expression well established, and about the meaning of which no shade of doubt could arise, conferring as it does a purely personal discretion from which there can be no appeal. But suppose a case to come before a judge having a power to make a certain order "if justice require it," and suppose that the judge, as is easily possible, should take a harsh view of the matter before him, and make an order in accordance with the view he takes, can an appeal be entered on the ground that "justice" did not require such an order to be made? Yet such a right of appeal ought strictly to follow, if expressions such as "if justice require it are to be interpreted as if they were correctly employed. It seems, therefore, a pity that terms such as these, savouring of theoretical rather than of practical jurisprudence, should be adopted, when other expressions more suitable, if perhaps more prosaic, are equally available. THE STATUTE LAW REVISION COMMITTEE prepared the Bill which has at length passed into the new Municipal Corporations Act so long ago as 1878, and it was introduced but dropped in four successive sessions. It was intended to be a "pure consolidation Bill," but a reference to "amendments" has been inserted both in the title and the preamble. Of these amendments we will speak presently, but will first deal with the Act itself. As might be expected, it is a very long one, containing 260 sections and nine schedules, the sections being frequently split up into numerous sub-sections and the schedules into parts. All the Acts usually known as Municipal Corporation Acts-except the Borough Funds Act, which is omitted, and rightly so, as being applicable to other bodies besides municipal corporations are repealed. The phraseology and arrangement of the old statutes are entirely altered, and in very few cases is the exact language copied. With the exception of that portion of the Act which deals with elections, the consolidation has been admirably effected, the arrangement being good, the language clear, and the headings well chosen. In dealing with elections, the plan of incorporation, or rather part incorporation, by reference, which made the old Acts often difficult to understand, has been too faithfully followed. The Parliamentary Registration Acts, the Ballot Act, the Parliamentary Corrupt Practices Prevention Acts, are all, "so far as applicable," or with "modifications," read into the Act by indirect incorporation and with no reference to particular sections. This is especially confusing as regards corrupt practices, in relation to which, at municipal elections, the Act imposes penalties of its own. Turning to the amendments effected, they may be described as many and minute. They are of two classes, either (1) affirming the results of cases, and so more clearly expressing what the courts had held to be implied before; or (2) making new law altogether. Amongst the first class may be mentioned the affirmance of Reg. v. Mayor of Exeter (L. R. 4 Q. B. 114) by the insertion of the words " joint or several" in section 9, where qualification for enrolment by occupation of a house is dealt with; and of Stanford v. Keble (L. R. 9 Q. B. 549) by inserting "local" in section 136, which empowers trustees under Acts of Parliament, to transfer their rights to municipal corporations. In no case which we have been able to discover has a decision been reversed. As to amendments of the second class, it must first be remarked that so great a change of phraseology and arrangement has been effected that only the most careful comparison of the new with the old can justify an assertion whether a change is made or not. We think, however, we are correct in stating the following provisions to be new, though the list is, of course, not intended to be exhaustive :-The requirement of a written resignation for a corporate office (section 36). The power of a town clerk to appoint a deputy (section 17). The prohibition of a room in any house licensed for the sale of intoxicating liquors being used as a justice's room (section 160), the former prohibition (section 100 of the Act of 1835) applying only to a house licensed for the sale of liquor to be drunk on the premises. The allowing the salary of a recorder to be increased without resignation and re-appoint ment (section 163, sub-section 7); whereas, under the old law, increase of salary necessitated a new appointment. The restriction of the numbers of the Watch Committee to onethird of the whole council (section 190). The power to amend a "scheme" for a charter (section 218). The power of borough constables to take bail by day (section 227). The provision that no defect in the appointment of a deputy shall invalidate his acts (section 237). The provision that unless councillors actually vote at a meeting they are absent from it in law (schedule 2, rule 10). The provision that "where a person subscribes more nomination papers than one, his subscription shall be inoperative in all but the one which is first delivered" (schedule 3, part 2, rule 10). THE NEW BILLS OF SALE ACT. I. To protect debtors and creditors at the same time from the disasters resulting to both from the impecunious condition of the former is an object not unworthy of a benevolent legislature. And it is the object of the Act which we have to consider. The purpose of the original, but now repealed, Bills of Sale Act of 1854, was to protect the creditors of persons who, by remaining in possession of chattels which they had assigned to someone else, were able to obtain a general credit to which their circumstances did not entitle them. The Act of 1878 (the greater part of which still remains in force) further developed this policy, and except in so far as it contained a provision requiring bills of sale to be attested by a solicitor, which was intended to prevent improvident assignments, that Act had no other policy. But the new Act ("The Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act, 1882") is at least as careful of the supposed interest of the debtor as it is of that of the creditor. It is, as we shall presently see, difficult to judge from the terms of the Act itself what precise object the persons who are responsible for its form and substance intended to accomplish by it. Nevertheless it contains at least evidence of a general intention. That intention may be described as being, on the one hand, to fix once for all, in the interest of borrowers and to the confusion of money-lenders, the most important of the terms (other than the time of repayment and the rate of interest) upon which money may be lent on the security of chattels, and to prevent any loans of sums below £30 upon such security. On the other hand, it seems to be intended, in the interest of general creditors, to further develop the policy of the former Acts by invalidating, except as against the grantor, all mortgages of after-acquired property; by increasing the publicity of registration through the establishment of additional registers in the county court offices; and by withdrawing the protection which the Act of 1878 gave to goods comprised in a registered bill of sale, so that they could no longer be treated, in bankruptcy, as in the order and disposition of the grantor. In addition to these provisions, denoting a specific policy in one direction or the other, are to be noticed the important alteration effected by the Act in making void as against every one, or, in certain cases, as against every one but the grantor, instead of as against special classes of creditors, bills disregarding its requirements, and the new regulations for attestation by a credible witness instead of by a solicitor. With the merit or demerit of the policy of the Act we have no special concern. It is sufficient to point out that if the above description of the intention of the Legislature is correct, a new departure of the utmost significance has been taken. No doubt it might be argued that the object of the new Act is really identical with the objects aimed at by the old, for that the provisions apparently enacted in the interest of the borrower are, in reality, merely fresh attempts to prevent contracts which may injure general creditors. But we need not discuss the point. Whether these startling prohibitions against mortgages of chattels are to be ascribed to a care for the rights of general creditors, or to a paternal regard for the welfare of lodgers and small householders, it is clear that they involve a principle distinct in kind from any hitherto applicable. To compel persons who have specific claims against a trader or other debtor's goods to publish the fact, or to prohibit specific claims against goods which were not his property at the time he purported to charge them, is one thing. To forbid an owner of chattels to charge them at all when they are of small value (which is the effect of the avoidance of bills when the consideration is under £30), or, where their value is greater, to allow him to do so only upon terms which may be fatal to his chance of raising money upon them, is a different matter altogether. Such changes may be beneficial if their permanence can be relied upon. The small householder hereafter legally obliged to sell when in want of money, may, perhaps, object to seeing his neighbour in his urgent want, and with no better credit, under no such legal obligation simply because the goods of the latter are rather more valuable. And the passions and influence of the small householder have to be reckoned with in imposing any disabilities which suggest the least suspicion of class legislation. But, whether permanent or not, the new order of things created by the Act is one of such wide-reaching effect upon the habits of the people that it might at least have been expected that it should be brought about by a clear and well-considered Act of Parliament. clauses of its own (sections 8 and 10) requiring that " every bill of sale" shall be duly attested and shall be registered within seven days after its execution, otherwise it shall be void (that is, void absolutely instead of void as against special persons), and directing that the attestation shall be by one or more credible witness or witnesses not being a party or parties to the bill. Are we to disregard the words above quoted of section 3, and suppose that the new provisions as to attestation and registration are to apply to all bills of sale, relying upon the fact that, in spite its defining clause some of its sections speak (as do these sections 8 and 10) of “ 'every bill of sale," and others of a "bill of sale" given by way of security for money or a "bill of sale to which this Act applies"? Or, are we to suppose that, although the old law is repealed without qualification, the repeal is not to extend to documents which are not mortgages ? Or, are we, finally, to give effect to every part of the Act, and suppose that it was intended to abolish the old law entirely, and, whilst making new provision as to bills given by way of mortgage, to leave other bills subject to no regulation as to registration, or, in other words, to restore them to the position which they occupied before 1854? Again, we can only say that it is impossible to tell. To make the new law generally applicable is to suppose that a man purchasing and paying for goods by means of an inventory with a receipt attached must, under all circumstances, register unless he removes the goods on the spot; otherwise at the end of seven days the transaction will be void, even against the vendor of the goods. On the other hand, to treat the repealing clauses as of only partial operation is to imagine that the farce of protecting the grantor by requiring the bill to be explained and attested by a solicitor is to be continued in those cases of absolute assignment in which no human being ever imagined that protection of any kind was necessary. Whilst to adopt the last supposition-namely, that mortgages are the only documents now requiring registration of any kind—is to make the new Act repeal by implication nine-tenths of the old, in so far as the latter applies to bills of sale which are not mortgages. The courts will, in our opinion, probably adopt the view that the repealed sections are only partially repealed, and that bills which are not securities for money must be attested and registered as at present. It may be doubted, however, whether any statute has ever compressed into such small compass so much inconsistent and incomprehensible language as the new Bills of Sale Act which comes into operation on the 1st of November next. The question of most immediately pressing importance with regard to it will be that arising upon the words in section 3, declaring that the Act, "unless the context otherwise requires, shall not apply to any bill of sale duly registered before the commencement of this Act, so long as the registration thereof is not avoided by non-renewal or otherwise." What upon these words is to happen to a bill of sale made but not registered before the 1st of November? The Act is absolutely silent. It avoids every bill not fulfilling its conditions, without reference to the time of execution. The bills to which we refer may be old bills in respect of which the time for registration has already, or will on the 1st of November have, passed, but which have, nevertheless, under the present law, a qualified validity; or they may be new bills executed within seven days of the 1st of November, and, therefore, still capable of being registered. To bills of the first kind the Act surely cannot refer to abolish vested rights in so casual a way would be monstrous. With regard to bills of sale executed between October 25 and November 1, can an Act which (by section 2) is to "come into operation on the latter day affect a mortgagee holding a bill made a week before, so as to subject him to the restrictive and avoiding clauses of the Act? We cannot tell. According to section 3 above quoted it would seem that the Act is applicable; but according to every rule of reason and justice it would seem that it should have no effect until it comes into operation. In support of the latter view it may be noticed that, whether or not the new law is applicable, the old law certainly is. For the bill must still be attested by a solicitor-the section abolishing the necessity for this and providing a new method of THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT. attestation, not coming into operation until the 1st of November. On the whole it can only be said that holders of these bills will only be safe if they have observed the form required by the new Act and the attestation prescribed by the old; and that even then they will probably have to ascertain by litigation what their rights are in respect to the realization of their security; for it will, in any case, be impossible to determine whether section 7, defining the events upon which the mortgagee may seize the goods, is applicable or not. But the darkness deepens even before we get to the end of section 3. It proceeds: "The expression 'bill of sale,' and other expressions in this Act, have the same meaning as in the principal Act, except as to bills of sale or other documents mentioned in section four of the principal Act, which may be given otherwise than by way of security for the payment of money, to which last-mentioned bills of sale and other documents this Act shall not apply." That is to say, all absolute assignments, declarations of trust, or other documents which are not in form or effect mortgages, are not dealt with by the new law. Then what is the position of such documents? Section 8 of the Act of 1878, which contains the present law upon the subject, directs that bills of sale shall be attested and registered, and that otherwise they shall be void as against the particular persons specified, so far as regards goods remaining in the possession or apparent possession of the grantor; and section 10, sub-section 1, of the same Act goes on to require that the attestation shall be by a solicitor and shall be in a specific form. But the new Act absolutely repeals section 8 and section 10, sub-section 1, and contains new But surely a wondering public may ask the question, "Why are these elemental principles only discoverable by the aid of a court? Is consecutive and consistent thought and the use of the English language no longer possible to draftsmen and legislators?" III. OUR readers will find in another column a letter from a correspond ent upon a point raised in our last article. As the matter is one of fact, that a married woman who had contracted was bound by her contract. But the proper application of the maxim is to cases of equitable conversion, in which the need for our significant restriction, so far as possible, does not appear. It also happened that, in Smith v. Lucas, no obstacle was presented by the circumstances. But what comfort does our correspondent think could be got out of the maxim, in an action, or "other proceeding," against a married woman who had got possession of the fund and spent it? Even if she had not spent it, we are in perplexity to see how, if she had got hold of it, it could be got out of her. We think it far from obvious that a decree for specific performance, followed by attachment, could be made against her; and if it could not, all our doubts and difficulties about the relevant procedure seem to be let in. We might even add that the Act has done something to make matters worse in this respect than they were before it. Before its commencement, a married woman had prima facie no title to deal with property coming to her, but after its commencement she will clearly have a prima facie title. May we not reasonably surmise that this change, making her sole receipt a prima facie discharge, may make property more likely to get into her hands than was formerly the case? It would be very difficult, and it is certainly not usual, to serve notice of the settlement upon every person who may possibly bequeath anything to a married woman. With regard to the words in section 19, which our correspondent refers to, we may remark that, in our opinion, the words, " any settlement or agreement for a settlement," properly refer to the distinction between settlements executed and settlements executory; which latter phrase seems rather to refer to what are commonly called "marriage articles," than to such nebulous matters as contracts to settle something which, regarded as the contractor's property, is not yet in rerum naturâ. The words "agreement for a settlement" have all the appearance of having been intended to bear, in section 19, this meaning which we attribute to them; and if they are taken to include a covenant to settle after-acquired property, some curious and doubtful consequences will follow. Are we to suppose that by such a trifling and perfunctory phrase, thus huddled away into a corner, the Act meant utterly to except from its operation the whole future property of all women married either before or after its commencement, who should at any time enter, or have entered, into such a covenant?—that is to say, the whole future property of nearly all the married women of the classes in which women have any property worth mentioning. If this was intended, ought it to have been done in such a way? 66 Resuming our observations upon the Act, we remark, with regard to section 3, which disables a wife from proving for loans made to her husband in the latter's bankruptcy, until all the creditors for value have been satisfied, that the provision is in itself a fair one; but it introduces the anomaly that, if the fund had been, under a settlement, vested in trustees who had made the loan, the amount could be proved for in competition with the creditors, though the rights of the parties do not seem, in point of equity, to differ in the two cases. We suppose that bankruptcy will be held to include liquidation; but either the present Act has, in this respect, been very remiss, or else some other recent and highly-important Acts have been very superfluous in defining bankruptcy as including liquidation. Section 4 is probably intended to enact, what seems to be fairly well established as the modern rule of law, that creditors of a married woman shall have priority over volunteers taking under a general power of appointment exercised by will. The application of this principle to married women seems to follow so reasonably from the extension of their proprietary rights, and there was, even previously, such strong authority for laying it down as the rule, that the enactment was probably not strictly necessary; but its insertion displays commendable caution. Passing by several sections, relating to stocks and shares standing in the names of married women, and the taking out of policies of assurance by them, which either repeat the existing law, or extend it with reference to the general scope of the Act, we pause before section 12, to which we have already briefly adverted; which gives to a married woman power to take civil and criminal proceedings for the protection of her property, but, as to criminal proceedings against her husband, not while living with him, and subject to certain other precautionary restrictions. The judiciousness of the provisions contained in this section is certainly open to question; yet it is difficult to see how a Legislature which was willing to accept the rest of the Act could, without altogether failing in courage and consistency, have hesitated to enact them. But they might without difficulty and with great advantage have been expressed in much clearer language and more agreeable grammar. One of the obscurities of the section, touching husbands and wives suing one another "for a tort," has been pointed out in a previous article. The curious phraseology, "shall have the same civil remedies for the protection property belonged to her as "the same of her property, as if such a feme sole," seems to mean, as she would have if she were a feme sole and the property belonged to her." Subsequently, the section enacts that "in any proceeding under this section a husband or wife shall be competent to give evidence against each other." Here we will only point out, that if the section is strictly construed, nohusband or wife can be summoned as a witness by the other; because that would make them, as the Act would probably have said, "competent to give evidence in each other's favour." For some mysterious reason, the section (section 16) which treats of the wife's liability to criminal prosecution is separated from that which treats of the husband's by three intervening sections, none of which has any obvious title to prior consideration. We conjecture that the promoters of the Act had the grace to wish to leave it out altogether, and only found a hasty and ill-considered place for it, under the late pressure of their own intense logicality or of somebody else's interference. These intervening sections (sections 13-15) which treat of the liability of wife and husband respectively for the wife's antenuptial debts, and of suits respecting the same, seem not to require from us any detailed examination; but we may mention that section 14, which regulates the extent of the husband's liability, has avoided an ambiguity contained in the corresponding section of the Act of 1874, by allowing the husband to deduct from the amount for which he is held liable, any sums for which judgment may have been bonâ fide recovered against him; whereas the former Act, instead of deducting such sums from his liability, only enacted that he should not be liable for them "in any subsequent action." It was very recently contended, in Fear v. Častle (30 W. R. 271, L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 380), that an action was not a subsequent action unless the writ had been issued subsequently to the judgment in the previous action. It is evident that, if this contention had succeeded, any number of practically concurrent actions might have been maintained against the husband, and the total aggregate of his liability might greatly have exceeded the amount of any property received by him through his wife. The question could not arise under the present Act. Sections 18 and 24, taken together, enable a married woman to act as executrix or administratrix, to the same extent as if she were a feme sole entitled absolutely to her separate estate; and section 19, in a rather clumsy fashion, sets some reasonable limits to the rules laid down by the old Court of Chancery touching the extent of the "protection" afforded to the property of a married woman by a clause in restraint of anticipation. The last section that calls for particular notice on the present occasion is section 23; which we have already cited for the purpose of suggesting a few necessary interpolations. Its matter is sufficiently important to induce us to cite it again : "23. For the purposes of this Act the legal personal representative of any married woman shall in respect of her separate estate have the same rights and liabilities and be subject to the same jurisdiction as she would be if she were living." This section, if it does not, strictly speaking, raise doubts, omits, as it ought not to have done, to take the opportunity of settling some doubts raised by its brother sections. How far does the Act affect the rights of a husband with regard to the personal estate of his wife dying intestate? We have already adverted to this question in connection with the language of section 1. Section 23 contributes nothing to remove this uncertainty. It is probable that neither this section, nor the Act as a whole,offers any obstacle to the right of the husband to take out administration to his deceased and intestate wife; and that, as administrator, he would have, the same right as formerly to keep the property to himself. of it. The rule in Pike v. Fitzgibbon, that a married woman cannot But this interpretation admits of doubts, and we are disposed to anticipate, with no little confidence of expectation, that the above-mentioned question, and also the question respecting the husband's right to curtesy, to which we called attention in a topic some few weeks ago, will sooner or later find their way into court. We do not ourselves feel much doubt in either case; but it is highly improbable that an adverse claimant would acquiesce in anything but a judicial decision. REVIEWS. 66 bind future property, does not apply to engagements by a woman before marriage, though they relate to property acquired during the marriage, and it has been held in many cases (among others Butcher v. Butcher, 14 Beav. 222, where similar language was used to that in Smith v. Lucas) that the covenant of a woman before marriage to settle afteracquired property will bind her separate estate. And Davidson, vol. 3, part 1, p. 202 (edition, 1873), treats it as a matter of course that separate property under the Married Woman's Property Act 1870, would be bound, unless expressly excepted. I fail to see sufficient difference between the wording of sections 7 and 8 of that Act and section 5 of the new Act to make a different rule prevail in the latter case, especially as the words of the Master of the Rolls show that the covenant is not merely personal, but binds the property, and would, therefore, have been a settlement within the 19th section of the Act, even if the words agreement for a settlement," which of course include a covenant for a settlement, had not been inserted. I presume they were overlooked INDERMAUR'S SELF-PREPARATION FOR THE INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATION. when it was stated that a covenant for a settlement was not a settlement Second Edition. Stevens & Haynes. within the Act. Where the covenant is only by the husband, it will not affect separate property (whether under the Act or otherwise); the last case on this point is Dawes v. Tredwell (L. R. 18 Ch. D. 354); so, in connection with that, no difficulty will arise. Of course (although I am not aware of any case in which the covenant was so framed), if the husband covenanted that the wife should settle her future property, and there was no agreement and declaration that she should settle it which would be equivalent to a covenant by her (see Butcher v. Butcher), it is possible he might incur damages on account of her refusal to settle her separate property. But the court would be reluctant to interpret the covenant in that way (see the Master of the Rolls in Davies v. Tredwell, L. R. 18 Ch. D. 360), and the question might just as easily have occurred J. W. E. INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATION. We placed this work in the hands of an acute member of the class for whose benefit it is intended, and we subjoin his report derived from practical experience:-This is a very carefully-prepared little work, full of useful hints and suggestions, embracing concisely the entire range of subjects necessary for self-preparation. The plan adopted by the author of giving a number of carefully-selected and arranged questions on Stephen's Commentaries, with references to the volumes and pages where the answers may be found, and thus leaving the student to work out the answers for himself, is excellent, and cannot fail to be of advantage to the student. The author has also given the answers to the questions which have been put on Stephen's Commentaries at the preceding examinations, with like references to the volumes and pages. THE CONVEYANCING ACT, 1882. THE CONVEYANCING ACT, 1882, TOGETHER WITH THE GENERAL ORDER Barristers-at-Law. Butterworths 1882. before the Act. Lincoln's-inn. [See the remarks at the beginning of our article this week on the Act. -ED. S. J.] REMUNERATION ORDER. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-At the time of the publication I read your remarks, p. 687, on rule 12 of Schedule I., but having regard to the light which has been thrown on the other rules through the discussion in your journal, I am induced to ask whether your construction of the Order is the correct one may charge a lesser amount. Surely we did not want the framers of the scale to legalize that, and surely there must be some other construction than the one you have suggested. I, however, know of none. This little work shows many signs of the same painstaking carefulness which we noticed with satisfaction in the larger work by the same authors upon the Act of last year. The notes are in general accurate, intelligent, and clear; and there is not much to be said on the Act which has been left unsaid. It would perhaps seem ungracious to com-viz., that if a solicitor is entitled to charge according to the scale, he plain that the authors have given us too much, yet we cannot help the intrusion of a doubt whether section 3 either deserved or required a note of more than eight pages. At page 32, commenting upon section 7, the authors call attention to 66 an inconsistency between sub-sections (3) and (5), "which," they say, "would appear to have arisen from somewhat careless drafting." We have no undue tenderness either for the Act or its drafting, and we concur in thinking that the latter is somewhat careless," but we fail to detect the inconsistency which is here complained of. The phraseology seems to us to be only clumsy, not contradictory, and we should have thought it fairly intelligible; but if it has failed to make itself clear to the present careful editore, we regard this as a proof that it falls below the proper standard of perspicuity. " Can you or any of your readers inform me what, after the 31st of December, I shall be entitled to charge for a document I have drawn today-viz., an agreement, not for a lease, but letting a ground-floor of offices in the City at £225 per annum ? A SUBSCRIBER. London, October 23. correct. The meaning is, as Mr. Rubenstein puts it in his useful little [Our correspondent will find that our interpretation of rule 12 is work, "that if a solicitor, being entitled to certain allowances, chooses to take less, he can do so." As to our correspondent's question, will not the agreement be considered as a lease, and the costs of the lessor's solicitor, for preparing it, &c., be £10 12s. 6d. ?—Ed. S. J.]. CORRESPONDENCE. THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-In your second article on the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, you have raised a question as to the effect of the usual covenant to settle after-acquired property contained in a marriage settlement of a woman married before the Act on property acquired after the Act. It seems clear that it would be the same as its operation before the Act on separate property. What this is when the covenant is by the wife as well as the husband appears from the judgment in the case of Smith v. Lucas (L. R. 18 Ch. D. 531). In the settlement in that case it was "agreed and declared" that the intended husband and wife, and all other necessary parties, should settle the after-acquired property of the wife. The Master of the Rolls said, p. 543: "The next question is, What is the effect of such a covenant in equity? It has been said that the effect in equity of the covenant of the wife, as far as she is concerned, is that it does not affect her personally, but that it binds the property-that is to say, it binds the property under the doctrine of equity, that that is to be considered as done which ought to be done. That is, in the nature of specific performance of the contract, no doubt. If, therefore, this is a Covenant to settle the future-acquired property of the wife, and nothing more is done by her, the covenant will bind the property." This shows that the refusal of the wife, if she was of age at the time of the marriage, to settle the property would make no difference in the disposition “A CLEVER AND CONSCIENTIOUS SOLICITOR." I think it is deserving of some comment in your valuable journal. Watford. Mr. John Sedgwick, a well-known solicitor of that town, and Professor Frederick Pollock will give an introductory lecture on Juris. prudence, at University College, London, at six p.m. on Tuesday next, t› which the public will be admitted without payment on tickets. |