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certificate, and Mr. G. B. ALLEN, who was a member of the Inner Temple, took out his first certificate in the year 1847. The fact that he enjoyed a very considerable practice until quite recently, in spite of the destruction of most of the old technicalities of pleading, of itself shews how much his great skill in his own branch of legal business was valued. Many a man in good practice to-day studied in his chambers and owes much of his success to what he there learned. His loss will be mourned by many friends, but by none more sincerely than by his many old pupils, by one and all of whom he was regarded with much affection.
THE NEW Vaccination Act continues to trouble the metropolitan police magistrates, and, notwithstanding their conference on the subject, the practice in the different courts presents considerable variation. In some courts the mere statement by the applicant that he has a conscientious objection to having his child vaccinated is considered sufficient to require the magistrate to grant his certificate. In others, and notably in that presided over by the latest addition to the metropolitan bench, the grounds of the objection are enquired into, and if on cross-examination the applicant’s objection appears to be based on hearsay or on the fact that vaccination involves temporary illness or discomfort, or on similar unsubstantial grounds, the application is refused. The difficulty, of course, arises out of the use of the word “conscientious” in connection with such a subject as vaccination. It is difiicult to conceive that any person can object to vaccination per ea on religious or moral grounds: these can have no bearing in the matter, and if they be eliminated what meaning can be ascribed to “conscientious”? How, in other words, can a man’s conscience be affected by the question whether his child is to be vaccinated or not ? But as the word is in the Act of Parliament, some interpretation must be given to it; it clearly does not mean the same as “ reasonable ” ; the conscience of an individual may be affected by the most unreasonable considerations, so that the reasonableness or otherwise of the objection to vaccination does not come before the magistrate for decision. On the whole the true view appears to be that the grounds of the objection, if it is stated by the applicant to be one of conscience, ought not to be enquired into, for the inquiry cannot result in laying bare so impalpable a thing as a man’s conscience : its workings are known to no one but the man himself, and his statement that his objection proceeds from its operations seems to be the best evidence obtainable of that fact.
Ix THE RECENT case of Reg. v. Wlzitmarsk, at the Central Criminal Court, there was an uncommon instance of the admission in evidence of a dying declaration. The declaration was really in the form of a deposition, and was taken down by a magistrate in answer to questions by him of a most leading character. It was not, however, admissible as a deposition, as the accused person_ was not present or represented. Counsel for the prisoner objected to the admission of this statement of the deceased on the grounds—(l) that she was not, when she made it, in that “settled, hopeless, expectation of death” which, according to numerous decisions, must exist in order to make a dying declaration admissible; and (2) that the statement was made in answer to questions. As to the first ground, all that need be said is that it is a question of fact for the judge whether or not the deceased was in such a condition as to make her declaration admissible. The principle is well established that a dying declaration is not admissible if there was any hope of recovery in the mind of the deceased. As to the second ground, however, much more can be said. It has been held more than once that a declaration is not inadmissible merely because made in response to leading questions. But obviously in such a case, as a general rule, the weight of such a declaration will be affected; and it is most important to have in evidence both question and answer, and to have proof that_the deceas_ed’s mind was perfectly clear, and that assent to leading questions was not given merely through weakness. Whether made in answer to questions or not, the deceased is not likely to wilfully make a false statement in the immediate‘
value to any statement, and upon this really depends the admissibility of such statements. If, however, a dying person is to be closely questioned and something in the nature of a deposition taken, it is most advisable that this should be taken in the presence of a magistrate, as was done in the recent case. A magistrate of experience, assisted by a medical man, will not under such circumstances be likely to put down _any answers unless the deceased quite understands their moaning. It is clear, however, that such a statement taken_ by an irresponsible person, or by one likely to be biassed in any way, should be received with the utmost caution.
\V1Ti1 THE coming into force of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, a somewhat novel restriction will be placed upon the liberty of speech of counsel. Hitherto, in a case where a prisoner might have given evidence in his own behalf but has refused to take advantage of his privilege, such refusal has commonly been criticized by the prosecuting counsel. Under the new Act, however, it is provided that “the failure of any accused person to give evidence shall not be made the subject of any comment by the prosecution.” Tliere is no attempt to limit in any way the discretion of the judge to comment upon such failure, and if we may form an opinion from their past procedure, some of the judges will comment very severely upon the failure of a prisoner to deny upon oath a charge made against him when he is permitted so to do. A few of the judges, however, have studiously avoiied reflecting upon such failure. We may. therefore, expect to find among their lordships some difference of opinion as to how strictly the prohibition of comment by counsel ought to be interpreted. May a prosecuting counsel in his reply draw the jury’s attention to the plain fact that the prisoner might have gone into the witness box, but has not done so ? This plain statement of a fact cannot well be called a “comment,” but some judges may consider it an infringement of the spirit of the Act. Again, is there anything to prevent counsel in the opening speech from impressing strongly upon the jury that the only satisfactory answer to the evidence he is about to lay before them must be the explanation of the accused himself? At this time counsel does not in the least know whether the prisoner intends to give evidence or not, and such an opening cannot be said to be a comment upon a failure to give evidence. If, however, subsequently the prisoner fails to enter the witness-box, such an opening will have the same effect as a comment in the minds of the jury. In any event this attempt to restrain the liberty of speech of caunsel will very soon be useless, even if it has some efiect for a short time. Very soon it will be common knowledge throughout the country that an accused person may, if he chooses, give his own explanation of the facts proved against him. Such explanations will be curiously and eagerly read in the papers, and will in a short time be looked for as a matter of course. When this state of things comes about (as it inevitably must), every juryman will naturally look to the prisoner to explain away, if he can, the facts proved against him. If the prisoner, then, when his opportunity comes, fails to give any explanation, every juryman will draw his own inference, and probably that inference will be the same whether or not counsel comments upon the failure.
THE RECENT judgment of KEKEWIOH, J., in Pm-ins v. Bellamy (46 W. R. 682) strikes us as one of the most interesting which has yet been delivered on the curiously-worded enactment of section 3 of the Judicial Trustees Act, 1896. A remarkable feature of the section is the manner in which it accumulates the various requirements which must be satisfied before the court can grant to a trustee relief from the consequences of a breach of trust. It must appear to the court that the trustee has acted honestly and reasonably, and that he ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust and for omitting to obtain the directions of the court. As KEKEWICH, J., points out, honesty in cases under the section can hardly be in question. In the large majority of cases which come before the court the trustees have acted honestly, and, when it is otherwise, the
expectation of death. Such an expectation must give a peculiar ,
breach of trust becomes of secondary importance because the
dishonesty puts it out of sight. Honesty is a condition precedent for relief under the section, but it is not, to use the learned judge's words, “the gist of the position.” The governing word in the section is “reasonably.” Given a breach of trust, the trustee must be able to shew that he acted reasonably. If he fails in this he is outside the benefit of the section; if he succeeds, then it is not clear what further elements he must import into the case for the sake of proving that he ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust and for omitting to obtain the directions of tho court. Mr. Justice Knxnwrcrr holds that in practice the requirements are satisfied by proof that the trustee has acted reasonably, and that the court is not bound to consider separately whether he ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust unless some special case in that respect is made out against him. The provision as to omitting to obtain the directions of the court appears to the same authority to be superfluous. “I do not understand how a trustee is to be excused for a breach of trust without being excused also for not obtaining the directions of the court.” It is suggested that the words were added to the Act without due consideration. “If the trustee,” continued Mr. Justice Knxnwrcn, “has acted reasonably, I cannot myself see why, having come to the conclusion that he has acted reasonably, one should go on to consider independently whether he has omitted to obtain the direction of the court or not.” To insist, indeed, on this requirement would seriously mar the efliciency of the section. It may be surmised that the Legislature intended to sanction reasonable breaches of trust, and the burden of proving the reasonableness is thrown on the trustee. But, according to the present judgment, beyond this the trustee is not ordinarily bound to establish his case.
In Perrim v. Bellamy the trustees were able to satisfy this test of reasonableness, and so they obtained relief. In 1879 leasehold property, held for terms the unexpired residues of which ranged from 52 to 73 years, was settled upon trust to pay the income to the settlor’s wife for life, then to his two daughters for life equally, with an ultimate trust in favour of the children of the daughters. The wife died in 1895. Upon her death the trustees had to find a sum of £600 for estate duty, and their attention was turned to the leaseholds as a possible means of raising the money. Professional advice was obtained, and this was in favour of disposing at once of the whole property, and not only, as was originally contemplated, of the part held for the shortest terms. The trustees acted in the belief that they had a power of sale, and adopting the advice, which depended upon the state of repair of the property and the large outlay which it would need to bring it up to modern requirements, they put up the whole for sale in eleven lots. The purchasers of nine of the lots completed, but as to the other two lots it was objected that the trustees had no power of sale, and upon a summons taken out for the purpose the objection was upheld. The trustees had sold without consulting the daughters who were then tenants for life. Subsequently one of the daughters and her two infant children sued the trustees for breach of trust. With respect to the children, Kaxawron, J., held that no case could be made out. The realization of leaseholds with only short terms to run was from their point of view necessarily beneficial. The only persons who could be damnified would be the tenants for life. But although the action was sustainable by the daughter of the settlor, yet in the opinion of Mr. Justice Knxawrcn the Act of 1896 was against her. The key to the position seems, in his view, to have been the fact that the trustees believed they had a power of sale. Assuming such a power, then what they did was reasonable, notwithstanding that they did not consult the tenants for life. They acted upon competent professional advice and they adopted a course which, in the interests of the remaindermen, was strictly proper. As a result, the children were provided with a substantial sum in lieu of a wasting property which, by the time they came to enjoy it, might have considerably diminished in value. It seems to follow that although, apart from the Act, trustees commit a breach of trust at their own risk, yet, under the Act, a bomifido belief that the transaction impugned was within their legal powers may be a good excuse, provided the
IN theory a register which is intended to shew the dealings with land ought to be a faithful index to all matters affecting the title, but under the County Registry Acts this has been by no means the result in praclice, and the recent case of Ra Calcott and .Elvz'n’s Contract (46 W. R. 457) furnishes a new instance where a transfer of land in a register county can he effected without any notice, so far as the register is concerned, to subsequent purchasers. Putting aside devises by will, as to which there is no question, the Middlesex Registry Act, 1708, requires a memorial to be registered of “ all deeds and conveyances . . . of or concerning, and whereby any . . . lands, tenements, or hereditaments in the said county may be in any way affected in law or equity.” To the term “conveyance” a wide interpretation has been given. “There is,” said Lord GAIRNB, L.O., in Oredland v. Potter (L. R. 10 Ch. 8), “ no magical meaning in the word ‘conveyance’; it denotes an instrument which carries from one person to another an interest in land.” Hence, under the corresponding provision in the old West Riding Registry Act (2 & 3 Anne c. 4), it was held that a further charge in favour of the mortgagee of land required registration, and that, in the absence of registration, it was to be postponed to a subsequent registered mortgage taken without notice of the further charge. But under the Yorkshire Registry Acts formerly, and under the Middlesex Registry Act still, registration is not necessary unless there is an instrument in writing. Hence it is not required in the case of an equitable mortgage by deposit unaccompanied by memorandum (Sumpter v. Cooper, 2 B. 8: Ad. 223), or to protect the lien of a vendor for unpaid purchase-money (Keltlawell v. Watson, 26 Ch. D. 501). "Such cases,” it was said in Kditldwfill v. Watson, “e.re not provided for by the statute”—here, too, the repealed West Riding Registry Act—“and it is not competent for this, or indeed any, court to hold a transaction to be within the provisions of a statute when its language clearly does not apply to the transaction in question.”
Under the existing statute applicable to land in Yorkshire—the Yorkshire Registries Act, 1884—this rule is altered. By section 14 all “ assurances ” entitled to be registered under the Act are to have priority (save only in case of fraud) according to the date of regitration, and by sections 3 and 7 every lien or charge on land is brought within the category of assurances entitled to be registered under the Act. Hence for a person in whose favour a lien or charge exists to secure the benefit of it as against persons subequently entitled, it is necessary that a memorandum should be signed by the person against whom the lien or charge is claimed, and that it should be registered (see Re Hobson, 44 W. R. 615). But though the Yorkshire Registries Act extends the obligation of registration in this manner, it still falls short of requiring registration of all instruments affecting land, and the definitions given to “ assurance ” and “ conveyance ” do not bring within the scope of the Act an agreement relating to the land which is not under seal (Rodger v. Harrison, 1893, 1 Q. B. 161).
The recent case of Ra Caloott and EIm'n’s Contract (supra) turned upon the meaning of the word “ conveyance” in the Middlesex Registry Act. The lessee of premises in Middlesex under a lease for forty-one years made in 1881 was adjudicated bankrupt in 1887, and at the same time an order was made under section 1'21 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, for the summary administration of his estate. By two indentures of mortgage
made by the lessee in 1894, when the lessee was still an undischarged bankrupt, he mortgaged the leapehold premises to secure the repayment of sums of money" advanced by the same mortgagee. The lessee made default in his payments under the mortgage deeds and in 1897 the mortgagee, in exercise of his power of sale, sold the premises. The two mortgages were duly registered in 1894 in the Middlesex Registry, but no memorial had been registered to shew the title of the official receiver to the premises under the bankruptcy. Notwithstanding this want of registration, the purchaser objected that the title of the official receiver had priority over that of the mortgagee and he refused to complete. A summons was taken out for the purpose of determining whether, under the circumstances, the mortgagee could make a good title.
The difliculty, it is to be observed, arose because the bankrupt’s estate was being administered summarily. In ordinary cases the property of the bankrupt vests only temporarily in the oflicial receiver, and on the appointment of a trustee it passes to and vests in the trustee by virtue of section 54 of the Bankruptcy Act. The same section provides, by sub-section (4), that “ the certificate of appointment of a trustee shall, for all purposes of any law in force in any part of the British dominions requiring registration . . . of conveyances or assignments of property, be deemed to be a conveyance or assignment of property, and may be registered . . . accordingly.” Hence wherea trustee is appointed it is clear that his certificate of appointment is to be treated as a conveyance within the meaning cf the Registry Acts, and if the bankrupt’s estate includes land in a register county, the certificate of appointment should be registered. But when a summary order is made under section 121 of the Bankruptcy Act this provision of section 54 has no application. The official receiver is, by virtue of section 121, the trustee in the bankruptcy, and since he requires no certificate of appointment such as is necessary in the case of an ordinary trustee, there is no instrument which, under the provision just quoted, requires registration.
It was urged on behalf of the mortgagee in Re Oalcott and Elvin’: Contract that, apart from any such express provision, the order of adjudication was a conveyance requiring registration, and this view was adopted by KEKEWIOH, J., who regarded the order as equivalent to a vesting order under the Trustee Act, 1893. Under the Act, he observed, the estate may be vested directly by the order, or a person may be appointed to convey. Such a conveyance is of course within the Registry Acts, and the learned judge treated a vesting order, and also an order of adjudication under the Bankruptcy Act, as analogous. The distinction may be a fine one, but according to the decision of the Court of Appeal (46 W. R. 673) the vesting order and the adjudication order must be placed in distinct categories. The immediate intention of the vesting order is to pass the estate from one person to another, and it comes within the ordinary meaning of “conveyance.” But the immediate intention of the order in bankruptcy is to adjudicate the debtor bankrupt and to provide for the administration of his estate. It is only incidental that his property is vested in the oflicial trustee, the latter result being an effect added by statute. In the words of Cnrrrr, L.J., “it is by force of the statute that the property passes and not by virtue of the order as if it were a conveyance."
That this is the correct view is further shewn by the insertion in successive Bankruptcy Acts of the provision already noticed for the registration of the certificate of appointment of a trustee. The provision dates as far back as 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 66, where it occurred in section 37 (see Anon., 1 D. & C. 349), and the requirement of such registration indicates that the registration of the order of adj udication is not intended. There is, indeed, as LINDLEY, L.J., pointed out, no necessity to register it for the purpose of preventing secret dealings with property, which is the object of the Registry Acts, inasmuch as the fact of the order of adjudication having been made is readily ascertainable. The Court of Appeal accordingly held that the order of adjudication did not require registration, and hence, upon the circumstances in Re Calcott and E/vin’s Contract, the title of the oflicial receiver, although not registered, had priority over the registered title of the mortgagee, and the latter was not able to make a title to the purchaser.
REVIEWS. BOOKS RECEIVED.
A Guide to the Law of Licensing so far as it affects the Sale by Retail of Intoxicating Liquors in England and Wales, with an Appendix of Statutes and Forms of Licence. By B. STEPHEN FOSTER, Barrister-at-Law. \Vaterlow & Sons (Limited).
The Licensing Acts: Being the Acts of 1872 and 1874, togetlur with all the Alehouse, Beerhouse, Refreshment House, Wine and Beerhouse, Inland Revenue, and Sunday Closing Acts relating thereto. With Introduction, Notes, Forms, and Index. By the late JAMES PATERSON, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. Twelfth Edition. By WILLIAM MCKENZIE, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. Shaw & Sons; Butterworth & Co.
Shaw’s Manual of the Vaccination Law: containing the Vaccination Acts, l867, 1871, 187-1, and 1898, with Introduction, Notes, and Index. By a Barrister-at-Law. Sixth Edition. Shaw & Sons; Butterworth & Co.
The Law relating to Commission Agents, and more particularly Auctioneers, Estate and House Agents, and Public-house Brokers. By H. M. GIVEEN, B.A., Barrister-at-Law. Clement Wilson.
Two Chapters in the Law of Torts: (1) The Reasonable Man; (2) The Unknown Workman. By FRANCIS Tsvnoa PIGGOTT, Barristerat-Law. William Clowes & Sons (Limited).
Specification for Architects, Surveyors, and Engineers when specifying, and for all interested in Building. Revised and enlarged. Quarterly—~No. 2 (1898). Builders’ Journal and Archz'tccturul Record.
CORRESPONDENCE. THE TREASURY SOLICITORSHIP. [To the Editor of the Solicitors’ J0u1"nal.]
Sir,~By reason of the death of a brother, the Solicitor to the Treasury has succeeded to a peerage. It may therefore he assumed that the office of Treasury Solicitor will shortly become vacant, if it is not already so.
The just claims of solicitors to occupy solicitors’ appointments has been pressed upon the authorities again and again, and it is hoped the present Government will realize the injustice of appointing anyone other than a practising solicitor to a solicitor's oflice. The voices of individual members of the profession are as “ voices crying in the wilderness,” but solicitors expect the Council of the Incorporated Law Society to continue on this occasion the representations made in former instances, and they can only hope that the just claims and aspirations of the solicitor branch of the profession will be recognized on the present occasion, and that a solicitor will be appointed to the ofice which a solicitor alone is qualified and entitled to fill. Hsavav Gmrrox.
8, New-inn, London, W.C., Sept. 19.
Mr. Skewes-Cox, M.P., solicitor, was successful in carrying through Parliament one of the very few Private Members’ Bills which were passed last Session. It was the Act to amend the Metropolitan Commons Acts, and the Richmond Town Council have unanimously passed aresolution “ thanking Mr. Skewes-Cox for his able and persistent efforts in the matter.” They have also thanked Sir Robert Hunter, solicitor, for drafting the measure.
It is announced that a special service will be held in Westminster Abbey on Monday, the 24th of October next, the first day of the Michaelmas sittings, when the Lord Chancellor, her Majesty's judges, Q,ueen’s Counsel, and members of the legal profession will attend. It is understood that the arrangements will be the same as those of last year, when thiplspécial service was first held. The service at the Abbey will begin at . .
The first sitting of the Manchester County Court since the attempt upon the life of his Honour Judge Parry in July last took place on the 15th inst., when the business was taken by Mr. W. Goldt orpe, deputy j udge. Before commencing the business, the depigy-judge said: All who practised in that court knew the great ur ity of Judge Parry, and his desire to do that which was right to all parties. He was sure they all deplored extremely the reason which prevented his honour from fulfilling his duties in that court. It only seemed to him a few years since Judge Parry came amongst them absolutely unknown. By his ability and his kindness and his general conduct, he very soon endeared himself to the members of the bar, andto all who came within his sphere. Everyone would rejoice at the recovery which he was making, and he (the deputy judge) hoped that before very long they might see him again in court, discharging the duties of his ofilce with the same ability that had always distinguished him.
This was a motion on behalf of the plaintiff, Mr. A. B. Hutchings, that an injunction might be granted restraining the defendants, their workmen, servnnts, and agents, until the trial of this action or further order from committing any trespass on the lands of the plaintiflf adjoining the high road leading from Seaford to Eastbourne, both in the county of Sussex, and known as the Sutton estate, and from opening the soil or laying pipes thereunder. In support of the motion it was said that the plaintiff was, and had for upwards of fifteen calendar months been, the absolute owner in fee simple of an estate situate in the parish of Suttoncum-Seaford, near Eastbourne, in the county of Sussex, commonly known as the Sutton estate. Part of such estate adjoined the high road leading from Seaford to Eastbourne, and on that road a sewer had recently been laid. Parallel with the high road there ran another road, known as the Sutton-drove, and a road called Hindover-road ran into it at an angle. All the land between the high road and Sutton-drove was the plaintiffs property. A drainage scheme was in progress at Seaford, and as part of the scheme it was desired to drain certain houses on the Hindover-road which were at present drained by a cesspool arrangement. On the 23rd of August, 1898, the defendants served the plaintiff with the following notice, dated the 22nd of August, 1898 : “ Take notice that the urban district council for the urban district of Seaford, in the county of Sussex, intend under and by virtue of the powers in that behalf conferred upon them by the Public Health Act, 1875, to carry a sewer into, through, or under certain lands in the district of which you are the owner—-that is to say, across the lands situated between Sutton-drove and Eastbourneroad, in the parish of Seaford, from points A and B as shewn on the enclosed plan.” On the 29th of August the defendants acted upon the notice by entering upon the plaintiffs land and commencing the works. The only report made by the defendants’ surveyor to them as to the necessity for carrying the sewer through the plaintiffs land was in the following terms : “The cesspool into which the houses in Hindoverroad drain has again filled and requires emptying. I have had great diificulty in finding a place for the disposal of its contents and have had to cart it nearly half a mile. I consider it very necessary that the property should be drained into the main system which is now laid sufliciently far to connect in Sutton-road. The course should be across the fields into Sutton-road at right angles.” It was submitted that the notice, being only a five-day notice, was not a reasonable notice as required by the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), s. 16, and, further, that the report made by the surveyor did not shew that it appeared to be necessary that the sewer should be carried through the plaintiffs land as required by the section. The report merely said that the course “should” be across the fields; not that that route was necessary. By the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), s. 16: “Any local authority may carry any sewer through, across, or under any turnpike road, or any street or place laid out as, or intended for, a street, or under any cellar or vault which may be under the pavement or carriage-way of any street, and, after giving reasonable notice in writing to the owner or occupier (if on the report of the surveyor it appears necessary), into, through, or under any lands whatsoever within their district.” lcwis v. Kuhn-supn-Hare Local Board (37 W. R. 121, 40 Ch. D. 55) was referred
CHANNELL, J .—I have no doubt that in this case the real question is merely one as to the amount of compensation to be paid by the defendants. There is no ground for granting an injunction. Personally, I think that the action is misconceived. I see no necessity for an interim injunction. The defects in the notice and report (if they exist) could be remedied in a very short time, and the injunction must be refused. As to costs, they will be costs in the action. Motion 1'Qfl1B€d.—COUNBBL, Maugham; Alexander, Q,.C., and Seddon. SOLICITORS, Webb, Nc'cIioI.s, 5- Allimron ; Ooode, Kingdon, Q Cotton, for I. Vinall, Lewes.
On Monday, the 3rd of October, Mr. J. Aeron Thomas, the Mayor of Swansea, and the Mayoress, and Mr. James C. Woods, president of the Incorporated Law Society of Swansea and Neath, and Mrs. \Voods, will receive the President, Council, and members of the society, and ladies accompanying them, at the Public Library, from 8 to 9 in the evening.
On Tuesday, the 4th of October, the members will be welcomed at the Royal Institution of South Wales by the Mayor at 11 a.m. The President of the Incorporated Law Society (U.K.), Mr. C. B. Margetts, of Huntingdon, will deliver his inaugural address, which will be followed by the reading and discussion of papers. Luncheon will be provided from 1.30 to 2.30 at the Albert Hall, Craddock-street, to which members are invited by the president and members of the Incorporated Law Society of
Swansea and Neath. Tickets must be previously obtained at the Inquiry Oifice, Guildhall, as admission will be by ticket only. The reading and discussion of papers will then be resumed, and will continue till 4.30. At 7 p.m. a banquet will be given at the Albert Hall. The chair will be taken by Mr. James C. “Foods, the president of the Law Society of Swansea and Neath. _ _
On \Vednesday, the 5th of October, the annual meeting of the Solicitors’ Benevolent Association will be held at the Royal Institution of South Wales at 10 a m. At 11 a.m. the reading and discussion of papers will be continued. Luncheon will be 8:-ovided at the Albert Hall as on the previous day, after which the rea 'ng and discussion of papers will be resumed until 4.30, when the business of the meeting will be closed. In the evening there will be a performance of “ The Little Minister ” at the Grand Theatre, Singleton-street, which will be placed at the disposal of visitors provided with tickets, to be obtained of the honorary secretaries.
On Thursday, the 6th of October, there will be two alternative excursions. The first will be to Margarn Abbey, formerly the principal country seat of Mr. Christopher Rice Mansel Talbot, M.P., for many years Lord Lieutenant of the County of Glamorgan, and “ Father of the House of Commons,” and now of Miss Talbot. It is situate near Port Talbot, on the east side of Swansea Bay, and is one of the most beautiful residences in South Wales. Visitors will leave Swansea by special train from the Great Western Railway Station, High-street, at 11.30 _a.m. for Port Talbot, where brakes will be provided. They will on arrival pay a vii-it (weather permitting) to the new docks at Port Talbot, which are now being constructed, and inspect the same, by permission of the Port Talbot Railway and Docks Co. They will l.I16D_ drive to lllargam Abbey, and will be entertained at luncheon by Miss Talbot in the orangery. After luncheon they will inspect the ruined abbey, gardens, and grounds, and will afterwards be entertained to afternoon tea by M_iss Talbot, returning from Port Talbot at 4.30 p.m. The second excursion will be to Pennard, including Pennard Castle, the caves of Gower, and the Gower coast. Brakes for this excursion will leave Swansea, the Mumbles, and Langland Bay, arriving at Pennard Burrows at about 1 p_.m. Visitors will be entertained at luncheon by the Incorporated Law Society of Swansea and Neath in a marquee on Pennard Burrows at 1‘ 30 p.m., and can afterwards, at their option, visit the bone caves and cliffs, Pennard Castle, and the sands and rocks of Three Cliffs Bay. Afternoon tea will be provided. The brakes will leave Pennard so as to arrive at Langland Bay, the Mumbles, and Swansea about 5.30 p.m.
Various public institutions and places of interest will be opened to the visitors, including St. Mary’s Parish Church, the Castle, the Royal Institution of South Wales (members having free use of the reading-room, museum, and premises during the meeting), and the Public Library. The docks and harbour, the parks, and the Mumbles are amongst other attractions which will repay a visit.
During the vacation until further notice, all applications “which may require to be immediately or promptly heard,” are to be made to the judges who for the time being shall act as Vacation Judges. _
_CoL'ar_Bvsrnass.—l\l_r. Justice Channell, one_of the_ Vacation Judges, will, until further notice, sit in the Lord Chief J iistice s Court, Royal Courts of Justice, at 11 a.m. on Wednesday in every week, commencing on Wednesday, the 21st of September, for the purpose of hearing such applications of the above nature as, according to the practice in the Chancery Division are usually heard in court.
No case will b’e placed in the judge's paper unless leave has been previously obtained, or a certificate of counsel that the case requires to be immediately or promptly heard, and stating concisely the reasons, is left with the papers.
The necessary papers, gellating to everly applicatiop mad; ts: t1li<;tVac_a€l; tion Judges (see notice e ow as to ju ges’ papers , are e e wi the cause clerk in attendance, Chancery Registrars’ Ofliice, Room 136, Royal Courts of Justice, before 1 o'clock on the Monday previous to the day on which the application is intended to be made. When the cause clerk is not in attendance, they may be left at Room 136, under cover, addreissed tp hbim, flltd giaé-k_ed opttside ChancerytVa)cation _Paé)et;'s,tp1r iéhsy may e sen y pos u in ei er case so as 0 e receive y e ime aforesaid. ’
Uaosivr M.\TTE1iS wi-rim Juncn N01.‘ PRESENT IN Covii_'r on Ci-iairaaas.— Aplplioatipn mayl be madedin any cam of gayfincggil tobthef jugge, perlsonialily, or y pos or ra prepai accompanie y _o rie o counse _o ce copies of the atfidavits in siipport of theapplication, and also by a minute, on a_separate sheet of paper, signed by counsel, of the order he may consider the applicant entitled to, and also an envelope, sufllciently stamped, capable of receiving the papers, addressed as follows: “ Chancery Ofllcial Letter: To the Registrar in Vacation, Chancery Registrars’ Olflce Royal Courts of Justice, London W.C.”
On hpghcatiorgs fear lI;jlll10tElO11B, an addittipln t<£ the ‘above, a copy writ an acerti ca eo wri issue , mus so esen .
The papers sent to the judge will be returned to_the registrar.
The address of the judge for the time being acting as Vacation Judge can be obtained on application at Room 136, Royal Courts of Justice.
CHANGER‘! Ciiauasa Busnnss.—The chambers of Mr. J _ustice_ Stirling will be open on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Fnday in every
week, from 10 to 2 o'clock. Mr. Justice Channell will, until further notice, hear urgent summonses which may be adjourned to him in his pp-rivate room, No. 370, Royal Courts of Justice (Temple Bar entrance), on
cdnesday in every week, commencing on Wednesday, 21st of September, at 10.30 a.m.
Quaau's Bawcu CHAMBER BL'su\'nss.—Mr. Justice Channell will, until further notice, sit for the disposal of Queen's Bench business in judges’ chambers on Tuesday and Thursday in every week, at 10.30 a.m., commencing on Tuesday, 20th of September.
Paonsrn sun Drvoncs.—Notice of any motion before the Vacation Judge must be served on the opposite parties four clear days previously to the hearing of such motion.
Case, copy of notice, and afiidavits must be filed at the registry two clear days previously to the hearing.
A summons before the Vacalion Judge must be entered at the re istry, and a copy must be served on the party summoned one clear day iefore the summons is returnable.
Decrees nisi will be made absolute in court on \Veduesday, the 5th of October.
Junox's Psraas roa Us: r.\' Couar.-Chancery Division.—The following papers for the Vacation Judge are required to be left with the cause clerk in attendance at the Chancery Registrars‘ Office, Room 136, Royal Courts of Justice, on or before 1 o'clock, on the Monday previous to the day on which the application to the judge is intended to be made :
1.—Ccunsel’s certificate of urgency, or note of special leave granted by the judge.
2.—-Two copies of writ and two copies of pleadings (if any), and any other documents showing the nature of the application.
3.—T\vo copies of notice of motion.
‘ 4.)— Oflice copy allidavits in support, and also aflidavits in answer (if any .
.V.B.—Solicitors are requested when the application has been disposed of, to apply at once to the judge’s clerk in court for the return of their papers.
NOTICE T0 SOLICITORS.
The Chancery Registrars’ Oflice will he open daily. On Monday, the 15th of August, and on the same day in every succeeding week during the vacation, the registrar in attendance will see solicitors requiring alterations necessary in orders to be aclerl on by the paymasler.
LEGAL NEWS. OBITUARY.
Mr. THOMAS Per-ran Crxrrrra, solicitor, of Manchester. died on the 14th inst. at the age of eighty-six years. Mr. Cunliife is believed to have been the oldest solicitor in Manchester. He was born in Buryin the year 1812, and was one of the three sons of the late Mr. Robert Ellis Cnnlifie. All these three sons were solicitors, and the firm to which Mr. Cunliife belonged goes back in direct succession for over a hundred years. Mr. Cunlifle was admitted in Hilary Term, 1835, and went into partnership with his father. On that gentleman’s retirement in 1840, he joined the firm of Humphreys, Cunllifes, Charlwood, & Bury,inwhich his elder brother, Mr. Ellis Cunliffe, was already apartner. From that time to his death the late Mr. Cunlilfe has been a member of the firm, and had been senior partner since 1862. He attended to business up to nearly the end of last year, and paid his last visit to the ofice on Christmas Eve. Mr. Cunlitfe leaves two children, a son and a daugher. The son, Mr. Robert Ellis Cunlifie, was a partner with his father in the present firm of Cunliffes & Greg.
Mr. W. J . Cowl-an, solicitor, of Newbury, died on Monday last. He was seized with a fainting fit while coming downstairs at his residence and suddenly expired, death being attributed to heart disease. Mr. Cowper was admitted in 1846, and was for many years deputy coroner for South Berkshire.
Mr. Msurrx Ancuaa Si-ran, Q.C., died at Brighton on the 15th inst., at the age of ninety-four years. Mr. Shee, who was the oldest surviving son of Sir Martin Archer Shee, President of the Royal Academy, was called to the bar in 1839, and was made a Queen's Coimsel in 1868.
The death is announced of Mr. J our: WILLIAM S1-snnow, solicitor, of Norwich, after a long illness, at the age of seventy-two years. Mr. Sparrow was admitted in 1847, and was formerly registrar of the Guildhall Court of Record at Norwich.
A Massachusetts lawyer is reported, says the Alhany Law Journal, to have said in course of his argument: “This man, your honour, with all dun rcspscf to you, is the biggest fool 1 ever saw.”
Mr. Fordham, the new metropolitan magistrate, has taken his seat at Southwark police-court, Mr. Fenwick having been, on his own application, transferred to Marlborough-street, as a colleague of Mr. de Rutzen.
A strange spectacle, says the Paris correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, was witnessed in the Assize Court of the Seine on Monday, when Bené Simard, aformer huissier, or law agent and process server, was led in a prisoner between municipal guards. The man had fallen from prosperity to poverty through his own extravagance, and had turned the machinery of the law against himself owing to his dishonesty. Four years since Simard bought the business of a huissier in Paris for about £6,000. For
a time he paid due attention to work, but, becoming addicted to pleasure, he was soon obliged to borrow at ruinous interest. Some months since Simard had to sell his business, and paid some of his creditors, but it was discovered that he had embezzled several hundred pounds entrusted to him by persons with whom he had dealings. He was condemned to three years’ imprisonment, and was struck off the rolls of the writ-servers, who form an important semi-oflicial body in Paris.
At a recent meeting of the Oklahoma Bar Association, Mr. L. E. Payne, of Chandler, gave some reminiscences of his practice in that region. Among other things recorded by the Albany Law Journal are the following : Judge Greene is somewhat of a stickler for niceties of pronunciation. Ex-Judge Dennison, in arguing a motion before him, had occasion to refer to Browne on Torts, and pronounced the author's name as though it were spelled “ Browny." The judge passed the first mistake without notice; at the second he shrugged his shoulders ; at the third he said: “The name is Brown not Browny." “But it is spelled B-r-0-w-n-e," said the counsel, in his deep, measured tone, “ and if that does not spell Browny what does it spell?” “ Brown, of course," sharply answered the judge, whose patience was becoming ruflled. “ My name is spelled G-r-double-e-n-e, but you would not call me Greeny, would you ‘r ” Mr. Dennison turned to his books, saying, apparently to himself, but loud enough to be heard all over the court-room, “ That will depend upon how your honour decides this motion.” N ot long ago Charles Kebolts, of Lincoln county, was charged with contempt of court by a coloured justice in Logan county. He was arraigned for trial, but asked to have witnesses. This was denied, and Kebolts was sentenced to jail at Guthrie. At this point Kebolts began to swear and the court fined him again. Kebolts kept on swearing, and the court kept on fixing fines until the sum of 45,000 dols. was assessed against him. At this point Kebolts said: " This is all comm non judice, anyhow." And thereupon the court, thinking that he was swearing again, said: “I fine you 50 dols. for that.” The learned associate justice of the Supreme Court, the Hon. A. J . Ssay, was passing sentence on a defendant who had been convicted of an infraction of the gambling laws. The judge had intended to be quite lenient in the matter of punishment. The judge said the court would impose a fine of 100 dols. in this case, and was about to stop, thinking that would about fit the offence. But the gambler got too gay, and remarked : “ That’s nothing; I've got that right here in my hip pocket.” “ And," continued the judge, “ six months in jail—have you got that in your hip pocket? "
THE PROPERTY MART.
Messrs. H. E. Fosrsa & Cnssiuarn sold at the Mart, on Wednesday last, the Freehold Shop and Premises, No. 6, Cowcross-street, producing a gross rental of £188 per annum, for £3,000. Two Properties at Haggenton, one being the Freehold of 41, \Vhiston-street, realized £895; the second Property being 3 and 5. Bentley-road, a warehouse and stable adjoining, held for twenty-one years, producing £11 16s., and held t d t f £4 lso id
aagrorm -ren o 7,wn.sa so .
Messrs. DOUGLAS Youso & (‘o. sold i.u n marquee on the estate, at Bembridge, Isle of Wight, on Tuesday. September 20, the Freehold Properties known as " The Bembridge Lodge ' and “B1-ading) Harbour” Estates, comprising 38 acres and 28 Plots of Buildipi; Land; two etached Residences, 18-hole go f links, 520 acres of 'cultur and pastoral land; several Parcels of Allotment hind, and the Bembrigga Br-ickflelds ; the total amount realized being over £13,000.
Messrs. C. C. dz T. Moonn sold at the Mart, on Thursday. 2 houses in Spitalfields for £1,535; :a:ea;:eh3l)l(i) residence near the People's Palace, Mile End, for £610. Total result of
e, 5, .
London Gazsus.—Tuasosr, Sept. ‘10.
Associs-rsn Usnsawmruns, Lusr-rs|>—Creditor-s are reqhmred, on or before Nov 4. to send their names and addreses and the particulars of t eir debts or blaims, to Arthur Edwin Woodington, 5, Philpot ll!-he
C. E. Bnmarr 8: Co, Limri-20-Creditors are required. on or before Oct 17. to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to William Bolton, 13. Sprin gdns, Manchester. Bedell, Manchester. solor to iiquidator
Covnrrav glue Cass sun BBL'l‘l1iG Co, Lnn"rs:o—Credit:rs are required, on or before Oct 16, to send their names and addresses, and particulars of their debts or claims to Roland Allen Felton, 1, Waterloo st, Birmingham. Hughes 8: Mauser, Coventry, solors for liquidator
Human: Io: ssu Con. Co, Lnu-ran-Creditors are required. on or before Oct 81, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Thomas
Fawley Judge, Parliament chbrs, Quay st, Hull