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Mr. WAKE (Sheffield) thought that all must agree in the broad principle, and that it was desirable to have justice brought to their doors.

Mr. RYDER (St. Helens) did not know that the decisions of county court judges were always accurate. He thought the frequent appearance of solicitors in the county courts would do much to raise the status of the courts.

Mr. LAVERICK (Hull) observed that the profession in London had never taken kindly to the county court system, whilst in the country it was felt that there could be no question of the desirability of extending its jurisdiction. Mr. WOODHOUSE, in reply, remarked that the objections raised to the reforms he had proposed had all come from London solicitors, and he would impress upon them that there was a broad distinction between their practice and that of their country brethren. The London solicitors had counsel always at hand and the courts just over the way, and had, therefore, not the necessity to resort to the county courts, which was experienced in the country. The country solicitor's remuneration was diminished by having to employ London agente, and if they could get their work satisfactorily done by the county courts it was to their interest as well as to their clients' that they should go to them. He maintained that the county court judges were very competent men. With the permission of the meeting he would alter his motion as follows:-" That in the opinion of this meeting it is expedient that the jurisdiction of county courts, at all events in the courts possessing bankruptcy jurisdiction, should be generally extended, and that the practice and procedure should be revised, and that the remuneration should be adequately increased.' The resolution was carried nem. con. in this shape.

3.

OUGHT THE EXECUTION OF WRITS TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE OF SHERIFF?

But we

Mr. F. K. MUNTON (London) read the following paper on this subject :After referring to the history of the office of sheriff, Mr. MUNTON said :Let us look at the circumlocution connected with the putting into force of final civil process in England. Assume that a plaintiff recovers judgment by default, say for £100, with the average law costs of about £4, and that it is desired to realize this £104 on the debtor's goods. The creditor has to issue a lengthy, rambling document, bearing signs of an endeavour to modernize an ancient form, directed to the sheriff (without even mentioning his name, and he most assuredly will never see the writ nor trouble himself at all about it), authorizing the seizure of the defendant's goods within a certain district, but not elsewhere. This document being handed to the under-sheriff, that unctionary transfers his authority to a third person, the officer, and the first expense incurred by the suitor is a fee for No. 2 delegating or warranting No. Here we may pause to look at some incidental points in reference to this preliminary and unnecessary item. If a levy be wanted on the Middlesex side of Westminster Bridge, the "warrant" costs 2s. 6d. ; if you cross the bridge into Surrey, the fee is 5s.; whilst a warrant in, say, Lincolnshire, is 6s., and further still, say Lancashire, is 78. These fees were of course fixed before railways and penny postage were universal; but there they remain, and although they may be unimportant per se, they serve to illustrate my point. Before passing on we may glance at one or two positive anomalies. Whilst ordinary process has long since been operative all over England, a writ of execution is for one county only. Near a boundary, not always well defined, a second writ often becomes necessary, and delays may be serious. Again, if you are moving about the time of change of sheriff, a new warrant is charged for on the strength of such change. If a sheriff dies, too, a new warrant must be made out; and even if the Sovereign dies, the process has to be gone through afresh, demonstrating that whilst every other step in an action has been simplified, the final process remains as complicated as ever. will suppose that the correct warrant has at last been handed to the third person, the bailiff, who is to execute the writ in such a way that the sheriff may "forthwith" return the result to the court whereout the process issued. Bailiffs are a class of people varying from a decently respectable auctioneer down to an impecunious person, who would stand at nothing to serve his own purpose. Blackstone defined bound bailiffs to be "mean persons appointed by sheriffs, on account only of their adroitness and dexterity in hunting and seizing their prey; rather a harsh definition, but it was complimentary in a sense some of us would not indorse, for now-a-day few sheriff's officers are either adroit or dexterons-in fact, as a body, they are mere machines. It is understood that one of the usual conditions in a bailiff's security bond is that he shall notify, "day by day," what he has done under each warrant, whether successful or not, and that he will never make excessive or improper charges. It would be interesting to know whether any sheriff's officer in the kingdom returns "day by day what his movements are. All I can say is, that in some counties I might name it would give me much satisfaction to peruse such a diary in relation to executions issued out of my own firm's office. Again, I should be glad to know of any instance of an under-sheriff voluntarily enforcing a bailiff's bond as regards excessive charges (unless proceedings have arisen), the under-sheriff, as far as I know, invariably leaving the unfortunate debtor to the mercy of chance. It is probably unnecessary for me to say that I am only directing attention to the system, and not blaming, as a body, the existing under-sheriffs, generally solicitors of the highest repute; but I submit that they have no direct interest, and it is no affair of theirs to keep strict watch over the officers, or, at all events, in practice they do not effectually do so. Neither am I condemning all bailiffs; there are officers and officers, and some in London and some in the country are to be trusted implicitly; but my case is that people armed with such important powers should either be permanent officers of the court, or persons under the direct and immediate control of the creditor's solicitor, strengthened by speedy means of appeal, on either side, in case of difficulty. I am told that in certain rural districts special bailiffs, nominated by the creditor's solicitors, are permitted to act, but the plan is scarcely feasible in large cities and towns under the existing system. To return to the officer with his warrant to levy the £104 above mentioned, and assume that he proceeds conscientiously and with alacrity, and that on calling at the debtor's house the claim is met in

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half an hour. Besides the ordinary legal costs of the writ, including the warrant fee before referred to, the debtor has to pay one guinea for the officer's visit, mileage at sixpence a mile beyond five miles from the officer's residence (and the officer may apparently live where he pleases), 5s. for possession money, 4s. 61. for discharge fee, and, finally, £5 4s. for "poundage," so that whilst the total law costs from the commencement of the proceedings to the lodging of the execution average but £5, the expense to the debtor within an hour is increased by one blow to about £12. If it be said that the debtor bears the burden, and the creditors need not complain, I answer that these prohibitory fees work as a drawback to the plaintiff, for a generous creditor hesitates to assert his right when he knows that the penalty to his adversary is disproportionably serious. I may here quote a very small case. A poor man living some seven miles from Charing Cross, London, had been paying off a considerable debt by easy instalments, and the final balance of £3 14s. 10d. falling in arrear, the creditor instructed the sheriff. Within ten minutes after the officer entered, the defendant paid the claim out thus: Debt, £3 14s. 10d.; law costs of execution and warrant, £1 53.; levy £1 1s.; mileage, 10.; poundage, 5s. ; possession money, 5s.; release, 4s. 6d. ; total, £7 58. 4d. The mileage of ten shillings was clearly an extortion, but the frightened debtor paid it, and the bailiff in question may yet hear of this matter. I say nothing of the cost in the event of the debtor not paying the officer instanter, such as further possession money, auctioneer's charges, and the rack and ruin more or less inevitable to no organized system or surveillance; but very questionable actions pass unchallenged. As to extortion, an Act passed nearly fifty years ago constitutes it a contempt of court; moreover, an action will lie, and indeed a bailiff (though not the sheriff) may be indicted. But all these remedies are too complicated, for between the officer, under-sheriff, and sheriff, an ordinary person completely loses himself-in short, the legal machinery is rarely put into motion. The irregularities of bailiffs have, of recent years, assumed serious proportions, and they may be classed thus: mere neglect incident to the want of proper control, and wilful neglect for reward at the hands of the debtor, for most persons pressed to the extremity of an execution seek delay, and a douceur to the officer or his man is an undetectable bargain. This wilful neglect may be carried out in two ways: one by suspending the actual levy, the other, and more frequent course, levying formally and then quietly taking or charging 58. a day for possession. know of an interpleader case where 70s. was received for fourteen days' possession," though the man only remained on the premises one night, limiting his attendance on the other thirteen days to a call at meal-times, and drawing from the unlucky debtor the price of an omnibus trip to and fro! This item recalls the fact that it is 1s. 6d. a day more than the authorized charge where the man is boarded (and he is invariably well looked after in this respect), but such excessive charge is now so commonly made that I have not come across an officer for years who recognizes a threeand-sixpenny fee for possession. Sometimes the officer, without instruction, sets himself up as a judge and takes the levy by instalments (probably on liberal terms to himself for the accommodation), and there are many other opportunities for the officer to retard progress before he gets to realization, and when he combines the business of auctioneer, as he frequently does, he is completely master of the situation. But let us consider what happens when there is a claim for rent, or, what is more common, a third party sets up a bill of sale or hiring agreement. What does the officer do? Does he with despatch apprise the creditor, and does he take the slightest trouble to ascertain the nature of the claim set up, or examine or check the schedules with the goods on the premises to see if there be a surplus? My experience is that be does neither; indeed, in many cases the officer does not move a pin's point until the creditor goes to the expense of issuing a peremptory rule of court against the sheriff, commanding him to certify the result of his labours. Interpleader summonses are issued in the most reckless manner, involving the creditor in delay and expense, and there is one reported case of an officer actually interpleading on the strength of a bill of sale given after the date of the levy! The neglect of sheriffs' officers has become so habitual-that is to say, it is found so difficult to procure voluntary speedy attention-that many practitioners issue a rale peremptorily demanding a return simultaneously with the issue of the writ itself, a needless expense to a creditor simply because he cannot get at the officer by any less roundabout process. I could cite numerous instances of irregu larities and troublesome conduct on the part of sheriffs' officers in various counties, but where their misdoings have not been followed by legal proceedings, I will not weary the members with details, confining myself to a particular case as a specimen. Having been provoked by many previous defaults, I recently made an example of the sheriff of a populous home county by demanding and obtaining damages for withholding the payment of the proceeds of a fi. fa. As soon as it was reasonably believed that the sheriff was in default, I resolved to issue a writ without the slightest notice; so in an action of N. v. B., where the sheriff was ruled, and he omitted for half an the sheriff was served with a writ without even the formality of a letter. hour beyond the prescribed time either to obey the rule or pay the money, Now we all know that this is prima facie a very discourteous proceeding, and if any of us here were served with & writ for an ordinary claim without notice we should make a pretty strong remonstrance. Did the undersheriff do so? Not at all. He was apparently so used to it that he simply sent a messenger immediately, not only to pay the full amount of judgment debt and costs of execution, but the indorsed costs of the writ against the sheriff. I declined the money on the following grounds: (1) I denied the right to tender at all in an action for damages; (2) no interest on the levy was offered; (3) I claimed compensation for detention of the fund; and (4) I frankly avowed that I wished to take every opportunity of exposing the system. Vague suggestions were thrown out but I stood firm, and in due time I put in a statement of claim, afterwards delivering particulars of a somewhat novel character, under four heads: first, the

claim of the few shillings interest on the amount directed to be levied; second, the expenses of ruling the sheriff; third, the nominal loss attendant on the money being withheld; and fourth (I copy this item nearly verbatim), "damages incident to plaintiff being obliged to make terms with sundry debtors from the impossibility of getting writs of fi. fa. executed by defendant in his county with anything like order or regularity, or obtaining the money from the defendant after execution of such writs." I reduced this latter item to a formal sum (it being inconvenient to deliver particulars of the debtors with whom I was compromising), and the claim altogether was experimental. It aimed at the system, rather than actual loss; nevertheless the fourth item was really well-founded in point of fact; and, as the master remarked at a later stage, he "wondered I had not indicted the parties." Not to weary the meeting, let me say that the sheriff, in the end, not only paid the sixty odd pounds originally levied, but £4 damages, and £11 19s. 6d. taxed costs, incident to his default. Few practitioners, however, would take this trouble, especially as the writ has to be pointed at the sheriff himself, who, one knows, is usually personally innocent. In some private correspondence I had with the new sheriff it transpired that before he had been in office twenty-four hours three complaints from solicitors reached him! I may say that there is now an improved state of things in the county in question, and, on the whole, I abstain from quoting the name in this paper. But we come back to the main question whether the time has not arrived for introducing a radical change in these matters, and in conclusion I throw out the following suggestions for the consideration of my professional brethren and the council of our society, should occasion offer for recommending alterations in the system :-(1) That the execution of final civil process should be removed from the office of sheriff. (2) That an execation department should be established in the Supreme Court, controlled by an official easily accessible. (3) That all writs of execution should be available throughout England, and be acted on without supplementary warrant. (4) That bailiffs should be appointed by the court, under proper regulations and supervision, and be answerable direct on application to the execution department by any person alleging himself to be aggrieved. (5) That writs of execution should be marked with the day and hour of issuing, and take priority accordingly, the writ being dispatched by the execution department straight to the bailiff in rotation. (6) That unless otherwise directed in writing by the creditor's solicitor, all proceeds of execution should be at once paid into court. (7) That the costs and fees on executions should be altogether revised. (8) That all business in relation to executions and interpleader should be transferred to the execution department with provisions for the speedy intervention of the judge. Lastly, that whether the foregoing suggestions be acceptable or otherwise, the system should be forthwith modified by stringent regulations so as in some degree to lessen the present abuses, which I venture to characterize as among the gravest in the practice of the law.

Mr. MILLER (Bristol) hoped that some such suggestion as that suggested with regard to the execution department, &c., would be adopted.

Mr. P. GODFREY (London) moved a resolution to the effect that the law of execution required amendment, and that the meeting would suggest to the council that the subject should be taken into consideration forth with with a view to immediate legislation.

Subsequently Mr. GODFREY withdrew the motion, and a motion by Mr. MUNTON, that the recommendations contained in his paper should be taken into consideration by the council with a view to their suggested legislative action, was carried.

The meeting then adjourned.

SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION.

The forty-ninth half-yearly meeting of this society was held on Wednesday morning at the Royal Institution, Albion-street, Hall, Mr. F. H. JANSON presiding.

The usual formal business having been transacted,

Mr. MARSHALL (Leeds) brought forward a motion of which he had given notice as follows:-"That having regard to the large accumulated funds of the society, and to the annual income from other sources and probable increase, this meeting recommends the board of directors to consider whether the amount granted might not be increased, and whether, if in their opinion this cannot be done, some other mode of carrying out the main objects of the society might be devised." He observed that the income of the association amounted to 1,731 guineas from annual members. There were also a certain number of life members who paid ten guineas, and a certain amount from donations under wills, and so on, which, although they might vary, might be looked upon as a sure source of income. Last year, in addition to the amount expended in relief, they had paid the whole of their expenses and bad capitalised £1,600 or £1,700. He thought that a society so strong in funds actually and prospectively might properly spend larger sums in granting relief. He thought that instead of £30 a year being given to necessitous members, the sum might well be increased to £40 or £50. In canvassing for the society he was frequently met with the remark, "The society is rich enough, you don't want money," and it was very difficult under existing cir cumstances to answer that objection. They had the large accumulated capital of £44,000, which was constantly increasing by virtue of the bequests and other windfalls which came to the society. The annual subscriptions would also doubtless increase. He therefore begged to move his resolution. Mr. BRAMLEY (Sheffield) seconded the motion. He thought the £15 given on an average to the non-members was not nearly sufficient. The CHAIRMAN remarked that the total income in subscriptions for the last year was £1,817, for invested property £1,604, making 3,421. The working expenses were £743, leaving a balance of £2,677. There were ten board meetings, which would give £267 to be given at each meeting, without trench. ing upon donations or life-donations, and it appeared that in the course of last

year £276 was expended in this manner at each board meeting, which, in the year, amounted to about £100 in excess of the receipts for annual subscriptions. Mr. GRIBBLE (London) supported the resolution, and observed that if there were any necessity at any time for an increased income, the solicitors would respond to any appeal which might be made to them.

Mr. BURNE (Bath) was in favour of granting annuities instead of requiring the applicants to come to the board every year.

Mr. WILLAN (Darlington) thought that too much was paid to non-members. This rather held out a premium to solicitors to refrain from subscribing. The CHAIRMAN remarked that the question was fully gone into at Brighton last year, when there was an unanimous expression of opinion that the society should not be considered as a benefit, but as a charitable association. Mr. W. MELMOTH WALTERS (London) observed that the average amount given to non-members was £15, and to members £30. He objected to the accumulation of funds. What did they intend to do with them? Some were of opinion that they should be spent in bricks and mortar, and a school built; but he was most strongly opposed to this, and would have the money given so that the children might be sent to whichever schools were preferred by their friends. Mr. WHITEHEAD (London) was opposed to the life subscriptions being treated as capital.

The motion was carried.

On the motion of Mr. BURNE (Bath), seconded by Mr. HARPER (Bury), it was resolved, "That the directors be requested to consider whether grants for such objects of the bounty of the society as may seem suitable may not be by way of annuity." On the motion of Mr. W. BERIAH BROOK (London), seconded by Mr. SIDNEY SMITH (London), the bye-laws were altered, so that a public accountant should be appointed, in addition to twojauditors selected from amongst the members.

Mr. Stephen Williams, Mr. Henry Soutar, and Mr. H. Schröder were elected auditors for the ensuing year.

chairman, were carried unanimously, and the proceedings terminated. Votes of thanks to the board of directors, who were re-elected, and to the

Previous to the resumption of the regular order of proceedings, on Wednesday, Mr. S. WHITEHEAD (London) said that the society were without an invitation for 1883, and suggested that they should entertain their provincial friends in London next year. The PRESIDENT remarked that the matter had better be left to the consideration of the council. When the Metropolitan and Provincial Law Association was amalgamated with the Incorporated Law Society, it was stipulated that a meeting should be held annually in the provinces.

Mr. LEE (Birmingham) moved, and Mr. KEMP (Wakefield) seconded, that the paper on the Married Women's Property Act, by Mr. Lowe, be next taken, the subject being of great practical interest.

A discussion ensued, and eventually the motion was negatived. At a subsequent period Mr. COTHAM (Bradford) moved: "That it be an instruction to the council to settle the order in which the papers are read at provincial meetings-that first in order should be read such papers as, in having regard to then recent legislation, in preference to those of more the opinion of the council, deal with subject-matters of great interest, general interest.”

Mr. DEAKIN (Birmingham) seconded the motion.

The PRESIDENT thought it scarcely desirable that a resolution to this effect should be passed. The council were prepared to pay due attention to the wish of the meeting, and it would be better that it should be left in their hands.

The motion was withdrawn.

PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COURTS OF COMMERCE.

Mr. A. M. JACKSON (Hull) read a paper on this subject.

ON THE INCONVENIENCE CAUSED BY THE CUSTOMS AND INLAND REVENUE ACT, 1881, AS TO DUTIES UPON PROBATES OF WILLS AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION, AND THE MORAL OBJECTION TO THOSE ENACTMENTS.

Mr. W. SMITH (Sheffield) read the following paper with this titla:— In offering these observations, I beg to disclaim any idea of adding to the information already possessed by the gentlemen who hear me. The inconveniences of the present law as to probate duties are necessarily more frequently brought before solicitors than any other class of the community. To the merchant or manufacturer, or to men of other callings, the inconveniences in question occur, perhaps, only twice or thrice in a lifetime. But to the practising solicitor they are of constant occurrence. And therefore I wish to take the sense of a gathering like this, which, although possessing no official authority, may be taken potentially and actually to represent the views and feelings of the profession. Prior to 1880, the law and practice as to probate duties were based upon common sense and convenience. An executor, as is well known, cannot take a step (except "of his own wrong, as the law puts it)--cannot draw a cheque, or give a receipt, until he gets his probate. And inasmuch as in the great majority of cases considerable time is required before he can ascertain, with anything like accuracy, the exact amount or value of the estate, the law allowed him a margin by fixing stages of value; so that it was sufficient to depone that the value of the estate was (c.g.) above £1,000 and under £1,500. This met the circumstances of the case; and when the detailed account came in due time to be furnished, if it

we re found that the value had been over-estimated, duty was returned; if
the original estimate were insufficient, further duty had to be paid. So far
as I know, the system worked well; and speaking with the experience of a
solicitor who has been in practice thirty-eight years, I have no hesitation in
saying that, as a rule, the Crown managed to get every penny it was entitled
to. In 1880 the practice was introduced of requiring a detailed account of
particulars of the estate to be delivered, along with the application for pro-
bate; but no alteration was made in the form of oath as to the value, and the
account to be furnished was to include the "estimated value" of the parti-
culars. But in 1881 the attempt was made to adjust the duties payable in
the first instance on taking out probate, according to a standard more nearly
approximating to a perfect theory. After all, it was but an approximation.
The perfect theory would be to adjust the duties to every pound, shilling, and
penny of the value of the estate. This, I think, may be taken admittedly
to be impossible. The Legislature, however, seem to think-or those who
pull the wires of the Legislature are of opinion-that the duties may at once,
in the first instance, be adjusted to every £50 in value of the estate up to
£1,000, and afterwards to every £100 of value. Well, I think that except in
very small estates, and where the assets are of the simplest character, this is
impossible. Take the case of a solicitor in good practice. He has bills in
his books for chancery matters in which he cannot get his costs taxed and his
bills paid until the actions are ended. His executor can only make a blind
guess at their value as an asset. Or take the man of business, who is perhaps
a partner in three or four different concerns in different parts of England. How
can the value of his interests be ascertained with anything like exactness within
the time by which it is absolutely necessary that probate should be taken out?
But the executor has to pledge his oath before he can obtain probate that the
account is "a true account of all the personal estate and effects of the
deceased," &c., and that "the gross value thereof altogether is £ "; and
his deposition that this is true ends with the solemn words, "so help me
God"; which are equivalent to the more impressive Scotch phrase as I
shall answer to Almighty God"! It is true that all this is qualified by the
concluding words of the affidavit, "to the best of my knowledge and belief."
But does not this open the door to great laxity, and negligence of the sanctity
of an oath? And is it not morally wrong to compel a conscientious person,
who happens to be appointed an executor, to pledge his oath to the entire
accuracy of an account, even but to the best of his knowledge and belief,
when he feels that he has not had time to make that full inquiry which is
necessary to enable him to ascertain within some hundreds--it may be more
-of pounds the total value of the estate? And what is the value of "know-
ledge and belief," where by the very hypothesis that "knowledge" is im-
perfect, and "belief" based upon that "knowledge" must necessarily be
worthless? If the meeting concur in the above views, I hope we shall not
separate without urging upon the council of the society the desirability of
their taking action with the view of returning to the former practice, which
was infinitely more convenient, and did not press upon tender consciences in

the matter of the oath.

66

Mr. WAKE (Sheffield) hoped that the society would be able to bring their weight to bear in the direction of recognizing the sanctity of an oath. He would suggest that they should take the paper into consideration with a view to legislation, by which a temporary probate might be granted, so that a return might be made and in six or twelve months afterwards increased duty might be paid. The PRESIDENT Said that shortly after the Act was passed he had seen Mr. Hanson in a case that arose in his own office under which he was subjected to great inconvenience. His reply to his (the President's) complaint was that the practice had prevailed in Scotland for an indefinite period and was considered to act well by the Inland Revenue authorities, and had been forced upon them by their having been forced to consent to the deduction for debts. He (the President) did not think there was anything in the moral objection, because the oath was qualified by "the best of my knowledge and belief." Mr. MUNTON (London) knew several cases where executors had declined to prove wills at all, and were practically carrying on the testator's business and undergoing all the risks that would accrue under such circumstances. Mr. J. DODDS, M.P. (Stockton-on-Tees) could not agree in the conclusion of Mr. Smith's paper. He (Mr. Smith) proposed to go back to the former practice, which would be a step in the wrong direction. They had better proceed on the lines which they had taken up by recent legislation and improve the practice so as to get rid of the difficulties which had been referred to. Solicitors were now allowed to deduct the debts owing by the testator. Everything was of course approximate, and he thought the suggestion that there should be something in the shape of a professional certificate in the first instance, giving validity to the will and leaving the exact amount to be ascertained at a subsequent period, would work well. He thought that the difficulties which had been referred to could be met by improvements in the regulations at Somerset House, and that further legislation was not needed. It had been under consideration whether the whole of the probate and legacy duties should not be paid in one lump; but it was never contemplated that it should be paid down immediately upon the death of the testator, but that the person having to pay it should have the option of paying it at either time, in the way that succession duty was now paidpaying interest at four per cent. and being allowed interest at four per cent. on payments being made in anticipation. The steps that had been taken had been in the right direction, and things would work better in the future than in the past. There would always be a little room for laxity. Mr. BURNE (Bath) spoke of the very great inconvenience to solicitors in the arrangements at Somerset House whenever it was necessary to go into the probate room and the clerk had to "draw" the affidavit, when the solicitor was sometimes kept two hours waiting for the will and affidavit. Mr. DODDS observed that this was entirely a matter of arrangement at Somerset House, and that no legislation was needed.

Mr. WAKE moved, "That Mr. Smith's paper commends itself to this

meeting, as containing matter well worthy of the best and earliest attention of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society."

Mr. DODD (London) seconded the motion, which was carried.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHT.

Mr. T. A. ROMER (London) read a paper on this subject.
Mr. MUNTON (London) criticised the arrangements at Stationers' Hall, and
suggested that they should be placed under the control of a solicitor.

SOLICITORS AND THEIR SELF-CREATED HINDRANCES AND
HELPS.

Mr. S. LEAROYD (Huddersfield) read a paper upon this subject, which we hope to find room for hereafter.

examination.

Mr. BRAMLEY spoke in favour of raising the standard in the preliminary Mr. KIMBER was of opinion that the preliminary examination should be made as severe as the matriculation examination.

Mr. L. EMANUEL (London) urged that solicitors should be permitted to send documents to a solicitor who should lay himself out for such work instead of being obliged to send them to a barrister.

Mr. WALTERS was glad to be able to state that all applications for dispensing with the preliminary examination were now submitted to the Council of the Incorporated Law Society. He agreed in the principle that solicitors should extend their efforts in the direction of appearing as advocates; but it must be remembered that the solicitor had to occupy himself with an end. less variety of work. Let those who felt themselves fit for the work do it, but let others call in the legitimate specialist, the barrister.

OUGHT SOLICITORS TO BECOME AUCTIONEERS? Mr. J. S. RUBENSTEIN (London) read a paper thus entitled as follows :— tioneers ?" would have sounded strange if not meaningless. In Liverpool, But three months ago the question "Ought solicitors to become aucit is true, and perhaps in some other parts of the country, sales by auction have been conducted by solicitors up to the point at which the property was And in actually put up to be bid for; then the auctioneer steps in. Scotland the same practice prevails. But London solicitors at least, and indeed the vast majority of the profession, had never thought of competing with auctioneers. By the General Order laid before Parliament on the 10th of August last, under the Solicitors' Remuneration Act, 1881, this question has however been suddenly raised. The order expressly authorizes solicitors to make professional charges for conducting sales by public auction. It provides, moreover, that "the scale for conducting a sale by auction shall apply only in cases where no commission is paid by the client to an auctioneer." These are the very words of the order. Is not the inference irresistible that the highest legal authorities in this country consider that the work hitherto done by the auctioneer may properly be done by the solicitor? Attempts have indeed been made to fasten some other meaning upon the order; but those attempts have failed. That solicitors may therefore act as auctioneers, without in any way overstepping the bounds of professional propriety, must be taken to be beyond dispute. The practice has hitherto been local and exceptional; it has now been officially recognized and officially sanctioned. The one question that remains for discussion is a question, not of professional etiquette, but simply of expediency. It is not unprofessional for a solicitor to act as an auctioneer; but is it wise for him to do so? At the very outset it must be allowed that the ordinary duties of an auctioneer are in no way unworthy of solicitors. A fair knowledge of surveying and of the management of farms and building estates, sufficient literary and descriptive talent to draw up a business-like advertisement, the self-possession, good humour and address necessary for the actual conduct of a sale would be very desirable additions to the qualifications of many solicitors, and would lower the dignity of none. Can any good reason be given why a solicitor should not exercise these qualities if he possesses them, why he should not by such exercise cultivate his business talent, and why such business talent should not receive the increased remuneration it deserves? From a professional point of view an objection, perhaps the only one, may be urged against solicitors undertaking these new duties-namely, that these duties may lead to touting, and a consequent lowering of the tone of the profession. If this result were inevitable, or even in any high degree probable, then this extension of the solicitor's duties could not be too strongly deprecated, not only in the interests of the profession, but in the interests of the public. Nothing that degrades the profession can profit the public. But is there any good ground for supposing that this enlargement of their sphere will tempt solicitors to be untrue to the honourable traditions of their profession? The men that would tout then are the men that tout now. Every extension of the duties of the profession, every development of new branches of law, as has been seen for instance in regard to bankruptcy and public companies, opens a new field for professional improprieties in opening a new field for professional activity. But is the development of the profession to be hampered because every new field must be open to the unscrupulous few as well as to the upright many? The leaders of the profession and the great body of its members may surely be trusted in the future, as in the past, to condemn and practically to weed out unworthy or unprofessional practices. In the interest of the client is not the innovation on the whole desirable? It is no true division of labour to employ two to do the work of one. If particulars of sale can be prepared and properly submitted to competition as well by the solicitor as by the auctioneer, then the division of labour entailed by the employment of two persons in place of one is no longer a gain to the client but a positive loss. In mercantile affairs it is not now considered an advantage to break up business into a needless multiplicity of branches. In large establishments where many branches are combined, tl e public can be better

and more cheaply supplied than if they made their purchases at many small shops. Even now legal firms divide their work into depart ments. What could be simpler than to extend the conveyancing department so as to include the conduct of sales by auction? The public would benefit by the unity of management, and still more by the high standing and responsibility of the persons to whom their sales would be intrusted. At present anyone can call himself an auctioneer, and hold himself out as competent to conduct a sale, no matter how large or important. Considerable sums frequently pass into the hands of auctioneers by virtue of their calling. Can there be a doubt that it would be to the advantage of the public to be able to employ men occupying the position of officers of the court and directly subject to its control? In the training a solicitor must undergo before he can be admitted, and in the position he subsequently occupies as an officer of the court, the public have guarantees for the due discharge of the duties such as can be given by no other class of persons. Auctioneers of the highest standing and the nicest sense of professional honour there undoubtedly are, but the public have no protection such as the employment of solicitors will give. The changes thus foreshadowed have come upon solicitors generally entirely by surprise, and no doubt find some to whom they are unwelcome, and many more to whom they are still puzzling. To attempt now to frame regulations for the guidance of this new departure may perhaps be premature, if not unwise; but such changes, far reaching and of vast importance as they undoubtedly are, may well lead to still further enlargement of the duties, of the responsibilities, and also of the rewards of the profession.

There was no discussion.

SIMONY.

Mr. G. R. DODD (London) read a paper on this subject.

MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY.

:

Mr. F. W. Lowe (Birmingham) read the following paper on this subject :In olden times, before the primitive rules of our much-venerated common law had begun to yield to the encroachments of an advancing civilization, the title of my paper would have seemed but a paradox; for I must have started with the initial doctrine that a woman with all her belongings became, by the act of marriage, altogether invisible to the eye of the law, except as forming part of the estate of the man to whom she had thus resigned her being. This procees of merger, I believe, came into vogue mainly for the advantage of women themselves, who were wont to be regarded as the weaker sex; and, therefore, to need for themselves and their property the more powerful control of those, who were looked upon as their most natural protectors. But, as everyone is aware, this time-honoured doctrine has long since undergone a considerable amount of change. Whether it was considered too plain in its native simplicity to form part of a system of law so complicated as our own, or whether women gradually awoke to the consciousness that this absolute control on the part of their husbands was not altogether consistent with what they had learned to consider as their rights, I know not. At all events, let it suffice for me to say that a great change has taken place. Trustees have in very many instances been substituted for husbands as protectors of the property of married women. The Court of Chancery has assumed a special control over such property, in like manner to that of infants and other persons supposed to need protection; and various statutory enact ments have from time to time been passed with similar objects in view. So that married women have long since emerged from what I will call their "extinct coverture," and have gradually attained to the proud position of being entitled by law to enjoy property separately and apart from their husbands. But, although the original doctrine of husband and wife being considered one person in law has been thus modified, it has until recently continued to exist, and it has moreover been hitherto recognized as the basis upon which all laws affecting husband and wife have been founded. Unfortunately, all husbands are not good husbands, and even if they were, they are not all provident and careful over money matters; otherwise, married women's property would probably have continued to be as little known to lawyers of the present as it was to those of the past. But this being so, and likely to continue so to the end of the chapter, I do not think that many will complain that the doctrine of separate estate has hitherto been carried farther, or, at all events, not much farther, than was necessary and expedient in order to prevent the possibility of married women of means being ruined and left destitute by reason of their property being squandered or lost by spendthrift or improvident husbands. But whilst the necessity of guarding against the vagaries of bad husbands has thus become recognized, the majority has not hitherto been altogether sacrificed for the minority. The fact that there are very many more good husbands, able and willing to look after and protect the property of their wives, has not been altogether ignored. Hence the funda. mental principle of unity between husband and wife, to which I have referred, has been preserved throughout all changes; and it would be difficult to trace anything in the decisions or statutes hitherto regulating this subject which could be said materially to war against this principle-anything which could be said to raise up bones of contention between husband and wife or anything which could by possibility be construed as likely to provide weapons to either with which to destroy the harmony of domestic life. Prior to the Act of 1870, the law affecting the property of married women, stated briefly and generally, | seems to have been pretty much as follows:-The husband of a married woman, immediately on his marriage, became entitled to the whole of her property, with the exception of her real estate, in which he took a qualified, but still a very substantial interest. This rule, however, was subject to exceptions in the following cases :-(1) The wife had a certain qualified property separately from her husband in articles of personal adornment, usually referred to as her paraphernalia; (2) she was entitled in equity to enjoy all property settled to her separate use, with the intervention of a

;

trustee; (3) she was entitled to a settlement on the part of her husband,
whenever he had to seek the aid of the Court of Chancery, in order to possess
himself of any property that he was entitled to in her right; (4) she was
entitled to enjoy, as her separate property, all earnings acquired by her in any
business carried on apart from her husband after she had obtained protection
under the Divorce Act. In addition to these exceptions, she had the chance
of again acquiring, by survivorship, any of her chattels real which her
husband had not disposed of, and any of her choses in action which he had
not reduced into possession. But these were indeed very remote contingen-
cies, and could hardly be said to constitute an additional class of separate
property. The concurrence of a married woman was necessary in the disposal
by her husband of her real property and of her reversionary personalty, and,
as a safeguard against her being coerced into this concurrence, the Fines and
Recoveries Act and Malins' Act respectively rendered the formality of separate
And a married woman was
acknowledgment on her part also necessary.
totally unable either to sue or be sued in her own name, except, perhaps, when
carrying on business apart from her husband, and having the protection to
which I have referred. I think that up to this point no one could say that
the doctrine of "separate estate" had been carried in any degree too far. I
next come to "The Married Women's Property Act, 1870." The chief
alterations effected by that Act may be shortly stated as follows:-(1) The
earnings of any married woman acquired after the passing of that Act, apart
from her husband, and all investments of them, were declared to be her
separate property; (2) all personalty coming under an intestacy, and money
not exceeding £200 coming under a deed or will, to any woman married after
the passing of the Act, were declared to be her separate property; (3) the rents
and profits of any freehold, copyhold, or customary property (not affected by
settlement) coming to any woman married after the passing of the Act, as
heiress or co-heiress of an intestate, were declared to be her separate property.
It was also provided that certain investments of money might be made, and
certain policies of life assurance might be effected in the name of a married
woman for her separate use. But as the husband would in these cases have to
be more or less of a consenting party, and as the same things could previously
have been carried out by settlement with the intervention of a trustee, I
do not think that this provision made any material alteration. Another
provision, however-namely, that a married woman could take civil and
criminal proceedings with regard to her separate property, in her own
name-certainly created an entirely new principle; but, strangely enough,
there was no provision for similar proceedings being taken against her.
The principal changes, then, effected by this Act, were the creation of the
three new kinds of separate property which I have mentioned, and the
enabling a married woman to institute proceedings in her own name. It will
be seen that these changes trespassed, to some extent, upon the old doctrine
but it was still preserved, and the effect in practice has certainly not been to
create any separate legal status for women materially different from that
which they before possessed. But now a great and revolutionary change has
suddenly been wrought. At the fag end of last session a large and important
measure upon this subject was hurried through Parliament with scarcely any
warning and with scarcely any protest. I need hardly say that I refer to
the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, which ostensibly professed to con-
solidate all previous law upon this subject. I do not know what meaning
the framers of this Act desired to convey by the word "consolidate," but a
perusal of its provisions shows beyond all question that, instead of consoli-
dating, they have in effect made away with the greater portion of the law
which was previously considered to govern the property of married women.
And they have not only done this, but they have proceeded to enact their
new law from an entirely different standpoint and on an entirely new basis
from that upon which the whole of the previous law was founded. The most
material of its provisions are as follows:-(1) Any woman married before the
Act comes into operation (the 1st of January, 1883) is to be entitled to hold
and dispose of all property whatsoever, her title to which accrues after that
date, as her separate property in the same manner as a feme sole, and with-
out the intervention of a trustee. (2) Any woman married after the Act
comes into operation is to be entitled to hold and dispose of as her separate
property, in like manner, all property whatsoever belonging to her at the
time of her marriage, or which after her marriage she may acquire, or which
may devolve upon her. (3) Any married woman whether married before or
after the commencement of the Act, is empowered to enter into contracts in her
own name-she may sue and be sued in contract, in tort, or otherwise, in her
own name—and she may have, in her own name, all the same remedies, civil
and criminal, for the protection and security of her separate property as if
she were a feme sole. Any damages which she may recover in any action
are to belong to her for her separate use. And all this, with few, and as I
think, unimportant, exceptions, is to apply to dealings with and proceedings
against her husband in the same manner as with and against other persons.
(4) Any married woman having moneys invested at the commencement of the
Act in any of the very numerous classes of security specified, either in her
own name or jointly with some other person (not being her husband), and
any married woman who shall invest moneys or have moneys invested for her
in like manner after the commencement of the Act, will, unless the contrary is
shown, be entitled to hold them as her separate property, and she may receive
the dividends and transfer the securities quite independently of her husband.
(5) As a natural consequence of the provisions I have mentioned, all the
separate property of any married woman is to be liable in law to meet her
general engagements, and to compensate for any wrong committed by her, or
for any costs to which she may become liable in any action. She is to be
liable to criminal proceedings on the part of her husband to the same extent
as he is to be liable to criminal proceedings on her part. She is to be subject to
the bankruptcy laws. And she is enabled to accept any trust or to under-
take the office of executrix or administratrix in the same manner as a
feme sole, and without the consent of her husband. (6) The Act is not to
interfere with the provisions of any settlement or with any restriction against

anticipation which may be attached to the property of any married woman. It is somewhat remarkable that the application of the Act of 1870 should have been so carefully limited to women married after its commencement, whilst this Act is made to apply, almost without exception, to married women generally, whether married before or after it comes into operation. It seems to me that it would have been better to allow a little more time for the country to prepare itself for legal changes of this magnitude. Then, too, this Act seems to be inconsistent with the policy of the previous law affecting this subject, in the following respect :-Before, even when there was no restriction against anticipation attaching to the separate property of a married woman, she had by no means so full a power of disposing of it as is conferred upon her by this Act. Now, apart from any settlement, she will be as free and unfettered in this respect after marriage as before, and during the whole period of her coverture she will be left entirely open to that exceptional influence on the part of her husband which it has hitherto been the policy of our laws to guard against. For this reason I fear that there is danger of the Act itself defeating the very purpose it was intended to serve. But my chief objection is that, without really giving very much more protection to married women than they had before, it has the effect of severing the interests of husband and wife, when the first aim of our legal policy should be, as heretofore, to make these interests as far as possible identical. Before, as I have endeavoured to show, although the untoward circumstance of a bad husband was necessarily guarded against, it was still recognized that the great majority of husbands and wives live happily together in domestic harmony, and the underlying principle of unity was accordingly preserved. But now the majority are made to yield to the minority, for this new legislation appears to be based on the unheard-of assumption that married people generally are hostile to each other, and that they are living in a state of domestic strife, each trying to amass a separate competence, which shall be safe from the depredations of the other. The idea that their interests can, by any possibility be identical, seems to be utterly discarded. They cease, for all legal purposes, to be one person; and henceforth, married women, though living with their husbands under the same roof, and sharing everything with them, are to stand out before the law in almost identically the same position as a feme sole, retaining everything which they possess, or which they may ever possess, quite independently, and having rights and interests which may frequently be set up in direct antagonism to those of their husbands. It may be said that this won't affect those who are living happily together, as they will not be likely to disagree over questions of money, whichever it may technically belong to in point of law. But it seems to me that the Act, throughout the whole of its provisions, holds out inducements to married people to quarrel such as no previous law has afforded; and we know what a fruitful source of contention money is even amongst the best of people. We can imagine that a woman prone to extravagance would be much less likely to act prudently if she is able to do everything quite independently of her husband, and without recourse to him. We can imagine that a woman prone to be unfaithful to her husband would be much more likely to yield to temptation, and leave him, when she is provided with means independently of the slightest control on his part. Again, it may be said that all this may be prevented by settlement. But it must be remembered that in very many cases, especially amongst the less wealthy classes, there are no settlements, and that it is to provide for cases in which there are no settlements that the law has been changed. It seems to me, then, that I am not in any way overstating the gravity of the principle upon which this measure is founded, when I say that it strikes at the very foundation of our social system; and I do not believe that it will be very generally acceptable in this country when there has been time for its provisions to become known, and for its full moment and importance to be appreciated. That they were not generally known at the time when it became law, I think is sufficiently evidenced by the fact that it encountered but slight opposition in either House of Parliament, and none whatever from out. side. It is, in effect, a great step in advance for that small but ardent body of politicians who advocate the political equality of women with men, and who are constantly striving to obtain for women the political franchise and other so-called rights. That married women should be enabled to vote upon political questions, even against their husbands if they feel disposed, is certainly the logical consequence of this measure, and I have little doubt that it is simply the prelude to the introduction of other measures for what is popularly termed the emancipation of women, and that if it is allowed to go unchallenged we may reasonably look for other surprises of a like nature before many sessions of Parliament have elapsed.

A discussion followed in which a very general expression of opinion was given in opposition to the Act.

Mr. HOWLETT protested against a Bill being hurried through at the end of the session without adequate discussion.

Mr. WAKE moved, "That in the opinion of the meeting the Married Women's Property Act should be repealed at the next opportunity."

The PRESIDENT was afraid he would be compelled to rule the motion out of order. It was most desirable that politics should not be admitted into the discussion. This was not a question of law and the council could not, except in details, make a suggestion. The Bill so far from having been hastily passed had been before the council as early as March in the present year, and was almost a reproduction of one that was before them last year.

A FEW SUGGESTIONS FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF OFFICIAL
TRUSTEES OF PRIVATE ESTATES.

Mr. J. TANNER RAY (Bradford) read a paper on this subject.
The following papers were not read, their writers not being present :-
"Solicitors and the Public," Mr. F. T. BIRCHAM (London).

"A Few Thoughts on the Laws which affect a Bastard Eigné," Mr. WILLIAMS (London).

"Legal Education," Mr. F. A. CHATWIN (Birmingham).

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tion.

VOTES OF THANKS.

A cordial vote of thanks to the Hull Law Society was, on the motion of Mr. WALTERS, seconded by Mr. HOWLETT, passed upstanding, and with acclamaMr. Lowe, President, and Mr. WATERHOUSE, Secretary, of the Hull Law Society, replied. On the motion of Mr. MUNTON, seconded by Mr. BRAMLEY, & vote of thanks was passed, with applause, to the Philosophical Society for the use of their building. Mr. DEVONSHIRE moved, and Mr. SHIRLEY seconded, a vote of thanks to the readers of the papers, which was carried unanimously.

A vote of thanks to the President was moved by Mr. HARVEY (Liverpool), seconded by Mr. WINTERBOTHAM (Stroud), and carried upstanding with cheers. The PRESIDENT briefly returned thanks, and the proceedings terminated. On Tuesday evening a dinner was given by the Hull Law Society at the Public Rooms, Jarratt-street. Mr. FRANCIS LOWE, President of the Hull Law Society, occupied the chair, and about three hundred gentlemen were present. On Wednesday evening a very successful and largely attended ball was given in the same place, and on Thursday excursions were made to several places of interest in the locality.

OBITUARY.

MR. HENRY BATHURST.

Mr. Henry Bathurst, solicitor, died at Faversham on the 1st inst. in his seventieth year. Mr. Bathurst was born in 1813. He was admitted a solicitor in 1853, and he had ever since practised at Cheltenham, having for many years been in partnership with his elder brother, the late Mr. Richard Ba hurst. The deceased was a perpetual commissioner for the county of Kent, and he had an extensive private business. He was for many years auditor for the East Kent Poor Law District, and he was also solicitor to the Faversham Starr Bowkett Building Society, and secretary and solicitor to the Faversham Gas Company. Mr. Bathurst's death has caused universal regret at Faversham.

MR. GERALD FITZGIBBON, Q.C.

Mr. Gerald Fitzgibbon, Q.C., of the Irish bar, died on the 27th ult., in his ninetieth year. Mr. Fitzgibbon was born in 1793, and he was for many years engaged in teaching. He was called to the bar at Dublin in 1830, and he received a silk gown in 1841. He had for many years a large leading business, and in 1843 he was one of the counsel for the defence in the O'Connell State trials. Mr. Fitzgibbon held for a short time the rank of serjeant-atlaw, and in 1860 he was appointed a master of the Court of Chancery in Ireland. He held that office for nineteen years, and in 1879 (at the age of eight-six) he retired on a pension. Mr. Fitzgibbon was the father of the Right Hon. Lord Justice Fitzgibbon.

MR. EDMUND JAMES DANIELL.

Mr. James Daniell, solicitor (of the firm of Bevan & Daniell), of 40, Chancery-lane, died suddenly at his residence, Page Green, Tottenham, on the 2nd inst. Mr. Daniell had been for some time out of health, but had spent a part of the Long Vacation at the seaside, and was thought to have returned home very He was born in 1814. He was admitted a solicitor in 1859, and he had been much better, but on the day above-mentioned he was found dead in his bed. for several years in partnership with Mr. Arthur Talbot Bevan, solicitor to the Brewers' Company. Mr. Daniell formerly resided at Forest Gate, and he acted as solicitor to the Epping Forest Defence Fund long before the question of the preservation of the forest was taken up by the Corporation of London.

MR. HENRY LAWES.

Mr. Henry Lawes, barrister, died at Hawthorne, near Melbourne, on the 7th of August, from disease of the heart. Mr. Lawes was the son of the late Mr. Serjeant Edward Lawes, and was born in 1832. He emigrated to Australia about thirty years ago, and be spent some time at the gold-fields. He was afterwards clerk in the offices of the Master in Equity, and in 1859 he was called to the bar at Melbourne. He was for many years one of the leading practitioners in insolvency cases, and he had also a fair share of practice in equity. He had been several times elected mayor of the municipality of Hawthorne. Mr. Lawes leaves a widow and a large family.

MR. EDWARD THOMAS SMITH.

Mr. Edward Thomas Smith, one of the judges of the District Court of Jomaica, died on the 26th ult., from angina pectoris, when on the voyage from Jamaica to England. Mr. Smith was born in 1836. He was educated at Tunbridge School and at Brasenose College, Oxford, where he graduated B. A. in 1858. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Hilary Term, 1862, and for several years went the Home Circuit, attending also the Central Criminal Court, and the Middlesex and East and West Kent Sessions, where he had a fair share of oriminal business. He had been S. employed for nearly ten years in the colonial service. He was appointed a police magistrate at the Falkland Islands from 1873 till 1876, when he was appointed a stipendiary magistrate for the Colony of British Guiana, and

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