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CASES OF THE WEEK.

SOLICITOR-BREACH OF DUTY-MORTGAGE FROM CLIENTUNUSUAL CLAUSE-OMISSION TO LIMIT RIGHT TO EXERCISE POWER OF SALE-MEASURE OF DAMAGES-DEFAULT IN PAYMENT OF INTEREST-KENTS RECEIVED BY MORTGAGEE IN POSSESSION-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-3 & 4 WILL. 4, c. 27, s. 40.-In a case of Cockburn v. Edwards, before the Court of Appeal on the 2nd inst., a question arose as to the duty of a solicitor, who takes a second mortgage from his client to himself, to limit the right to exercise the power of sale of the mortgaged property, by providing, as is usual in the case of first mortgages, that it shall only be exercised after six months' notice to pay off the principal, or in case the interest shall be in arrear for more than three months; and there was a further question as to the measure of the solicitor's liability in damages for his omission to insert such a limitation. The question also incidentally arose whether the receipt of the rents of mortgaged property by a mortgagee in possession amounts to a pay ment of interest on the mortgage debt. The plaintiff had employed the defendant, who was his solicitor, to procure him an advance of money on the security of property of which he was seised in fee. The defendant accordingly negotiated a first mortgage of the property for £450 to a third person, and took a second mortgage to himself for £50. The defendant himself prepared the second mortgage, which contained a power of sale without any limitation on the mortgagee's right to exercise it, and the defendant, without any notice to the plaintiff, sold the property for £630. The plaintiff alleged that the sale was at an undervalue, but on the evidence, Fry, J., held that the price was not an inadequate one. He held, however (L. R. 16 Ch.D. 393, ante, p. 117), that the defendant had acted improperly, in not fully explaining the effect of the deed to the plaintiff, and that, consequently, the defendant was liable in damages. And his lordship gave damages (inter alia) under the following heads: (1) The costs which the plaintiff would be put to in re-investing the £630 in property of a similar nature; (2) the probable prospective increase in the value of the property sold (there being some evidence that property in the neighbourhood had considerably increased in value); and (3) the extra costs of the action, above the party and party costs, which were given to the plaintiff in the ordinary way. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision as to the liability of the defendant, though they differed from it as to the measure of damages. JESSEL, M.R., said that a solicitor ought to be doub'v careful when he was acting in a double capacity in bis own interest, and as the adviser of his client, and the obligation was on him to show that he had fully informed his client of the nature of the deed. In such a case, a solicitor would act wisely in insisting on the intervention of another solicitor on behalf of the client. The defendant, therefore, did wrong in inserting such a power of sale, if it was unusual. On this point his lordship had some doubt. He was not prepared to say that the right to exercise the power of sale in a second or subsequent mortgage ought necessarily to be limited in the same way as was usual in a first mortgage. No evidence had been adduced as to the practice, and his lordship had not sufficient judicial or professional knowledge to enable him to say what it was. In several cases which had come before him judicially more stringent provisions had been inserted in second mortgages than are usual in first mortgages. But be could not say that there was any such established practice of conveyancers, and he could not hold that the power in the present case was a usual clause. If, therefore, no notice of the sale was given to the plaintiff, and the interest was not in arrear, the sale was wrongful, and the defendant was liable for some damages. Moreover, it was said on behalf of the plaintiff that the defendant had not informed him that his estate was liable to be sold if the interest was in arrear, and that the plaintiff had a right to know this so that he might pay the interest in time. His lordship could not see any answer to this argument. Therefore, assuming that the interest was not in arrear, the defendant was liable in damages. What then were the damages ? As to the first head, the plaintiff would never have had anything like £630 to re-invest; for the amount due on the mortgages must be deducted from that sum. On the second head, the evidence of increase in value of the property was

too vague, but still his lordship could not differ from the judge of first instance. The third head was the most important, and in his lordship's opinion this was not allowablebis costs of the action as between party and party, and he at all. All that the law gave to a successful litigant wae could not in the same action be said to have sustained any damage in this respect, for his costs were paid when they were paid as between party and party. BRETT, L.J., said that whenever the court could see that a particular prac tice in business was likely to lead to oppression or fraud, it ought to endeavour to check it as much as possible. A practice seemed to have grown up where a solicitor had some clients who had money and other clients who had none, and wanted to obtain advances of money, for the solicitor to advise the former class of clients to lend money to the latter on mortgage, but only to advise them to lend part of the money which was wanted, the solicitor lending the rest himself on the second mortgage. This gave the solicitor very great power, for he really became the mortgagee himself, and he obtained the benefit of the costs of preparing two mortgage deeds. It would be much better for a solicitor not to lend money to his own clients at all. But, if he did so, he ought not to conduct the conveyancing in his own office; he ought to hand it over to some other solicitor. Still, if he did conduct it himself, and could show that the client had had the same advantage as he would have had from an independent solicitor, the law could not touch the trans-action, however much it was to be regretted. But the onus was on the solicitor to show this.

Upon the appeal it was argued that, when the property was sold, the interest had in fact been in arrear for more than three months, and therefore that no injury had been done to the plaintiff by the omission to qualify the power of sale. The defendant had been in receipt of the rents of the property as mortgagee in possession, and in some of the accounts which he had rendered to the plaintiff he had treated the rents which he had received as appropriated to the payment of interest, but this appropriation had not been made in the last account rendered before the sale. It was, however, contended on behalf of the plaintiff that, whether an appropriation of the rents to the payment of interest was or was not made, it could not be said that the interest was in arrear if the rents received by the mortgagee had in fact covered the interest. Reliance was placed on the dictum of Vice-Chan cellor Shadwell in Brocklehurst v. Jessop (7 Sim. 438), that the receipt of rent by a mortgagee in possession would operate as a payment on behalf of the mortgagee to prevent the Statute of Limitations from running as against the mortgagee. JESSEL, M.R., said that the receipt of rents by a mortgagee in possession was not a payment by contract of either the principal or the interest of the mortgage debt. When the account came to be taken between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, the mortgagee must of course account for what he had received in that way, but till the account was taken there was no set-off or appropriation of the rents against principal or interest. His lordship thought that the dictum in Brocklehurst v. Jessop was wrong, and it was inconsistent with the principle of the decision of the House of Lords in Chinnery v. Evans (11 H. L. C. 115). The receipt of rents by a mortgagee in possession was not a payment which could prevent the Statute of Limitations from running, for it was not a payment by the mortgagor or by an agent on his behalf. The rents were the mortgagee's own property, he had a complete ownership of them, subject to the mortgagee's right of redemption. He received the rents as the legal proprietor of them. Of course, by agreement between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, the rerts of interest. In the present case his lordship was of opinion received by the latter could be appropriated to the payment that the earlier accounts which had been rendered by the defendant were evidence of such an agreement, and he was setting off the rents which he received as mortgagee in of opinion that a solicitor who had for some time gone on possession against the interest due on the mortgage could not, without any notice to his client, put an end to the arrangement. The client was entitled to consider that this appropriation would still continue to be made, and con sequently it could not in the present case be said that the interest was in arrear at the time when the sale was made. BRETT, L.J., was of opinion that the accounts rendered by the defendant amounted to an admission by

him that he had appropriated the rents to the payment of interest, and therefore it was unnecessary to decide whether, in the absence of any such appropriation, it could be said that interest was not in arrear because the rents which had been received equalled or exceeded the amount of the interest for the same period. COTTON, L.J., agreed with what the Master of the Rolls had said as to Brocklehurst v. Jessop. The receipt of rents by a mortgagee in possession would not prevent the Statute of Limitations from running. It was not a payment by the mortgagor or his agent, it was a taking of the rents by the mortgagee in the most forcible way under his own legal title.

[It should be noted that these observations of Jessel, M.R., and Cotton, L.J., appear to be entirely inconsistent with the recent decision of Fry, J., in the case of Harlock v. Ashbury (ante, p. 640), that a receipt of rent by a mortgagee in possession will keep alive his right to foreclose the mortgagor.]-SOLICITORS, Van Sandau & Cumming; F. Venn & Son.

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COMPANY-WINDING UP — - JURISDICTION- STANNARIES COURT-COMPANIES ACT, 1862, s. 81.-In a case of In re The Silver Valley Mining Company, before the Court of Appeal on the 2nd inst., a question arose upon the con. struction of section 81 of the Companies Act, 1862, which provides that, "The expression 'the court' shall mean the following authorities (that is to say) :-In the case of a company engaged in working any mine within and subject to the jurisdiction of the Stannaries, the court of the Vice-Warden of the Stannaries, unless the Vice-Warden certifies that, in his opinion, the company would be more advantageously wound up in the High Court of Chancery, in which case the court' shall mean the High Court of Chancery." An order for the appointment of a provisional liquidator of the company had been made by Bacon, V.C., on a winding-up petition presented to the High Court, and it was objected that under section 81 the jurisdiction was in the Stannaries Court. The company was formed to work mines (generally) in Cornwall or elsewhere, and the appellants had not shown that it had in fact worked any mine in Cornwall. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that it was necessary to show that the company was, at the time when the petition was presented, or had previously been, engaged in working a mine within the juris diction of the Stannaries Court, and their lordships expressed their disapproval of the decision of Lord Romilly, M.R., in In re The East Botallack Mining Company (34 Beav. 82), the effect of which was that a company which had been formed for the purpose of working a mine within the Stannaries jurisdiction, but had never worked any mine, was, within the meaning of section 81, a company "engaged in working" a mine within the jurisdiction. SOLICITORS, F. W. Snell & Greenip; Beale & Co.; James Davis.

The

NEWSPAPER -NAME-PIRACY INJUNCTION.-On the 29th ult. the Court of Appeal (Lord SELBORNE, C., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) affirmed in substance the decision of Jessel, M.R., in the case of Watter v. Head (ante, p. 742). The action was brought by the proprietors of the Times newspaper to restrain the defendant from selling any newspaper under the name or title of the Times. defendant had been issuing reprints of old copies of the Times, which were exact facsimiles of the original issues, except the last sheets, upon which the defendant had inserted advertisements for his own profit. He had also issued some so-called "skits," which were supposed to be copies of numbers of the Times, published in the years 1962 and 1980, but containing actual advertisements of the present year. The prices of the defendant's issues and of those of the plaintiffs were dissimilar, but the name and the device and arins at the commencement were the same as those of the plaintiffs. Jessel, M.R., granted an injunction, on the ground that the plaintiffs had a right of property in their name and heading which the defendant had infringed, and that he had attempted to appropriate the plaintiffs' advertisements, which was one of the most profitable branches of their business. The COURT of APPEAL varied the order of the Master of the Rolls by Omitting some words which they thought would have the effect of preventing the defendant from publishing a volume of reprints of old copies of the Times and other newspapers,

and which the plaintiffs did not seek to interfere with, but they ordered the defendant to pay the costs of the appeal. The order as varied restrained the defendant from printing or publishing any newspaper or other publication in the form of a newspaper with or under the name or title of the Times, and from doing any other act or invasion or infringement of the plaintiffs' right or interest in the name or title of the Times.-SOLICITORS, A. W. Hodgkinson; Soames.

PRACTICE-APPLICATION TO CHANGE CONDUCT OF ACTION -PERSONS TO BE SERVED-ORD. 58, R. 3.-In a case of Sephton v. Quillian, before the Court of Appeal on the 2nd inst., an appeal was brought from the refusal of Hall, V.C., to take away the conduct of the action from the plaintiff, on the ground that he had improperly snapped a judgment. On the opening of the appeal it was objected by the respondent's counsel that notice of the appeal ought to have been served on the other parties to the action, as well as on the plaintiff. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) allowed the objection, saying that all the parties to the action had an interest in the question who was to have the conduct of the proceedings. And the hearing of the appeal was ordered to stand over, with liberty to serve the other parties to the action.-SOLICITORS, Sharpe, Parkers, & Co.; Hargreaves.

APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER-MORTGAGED PROPERTY IN OCCUPATION OF MORTGAGOR-FORM OF ORDER. In a case of Hawkes v. Holland, before the Court of Appeal on the 3rd inst., a question arose as to the proper form of an order appointing a receiver of mortgaged property when the property is in the occupation of the mortgagor. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that the order ought to direct that possession of the property be given to the receiver. Hall, V.C., had refused to insert such a direction. JESSEL, M.R., said that, without such a direction, the appointment of a receiver would be useless when the mortgagor was in the occupation of the property, unless the order, as was sometimes done, fixed an occupation rent to be paid by the mortgagor.-SOLICITORS, Wright, Bonner, & Wright; Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Co.

ACTION-DEBT-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-Insa casel of Re Greaves, deceased; Bray v. Tofield, before the Master of the Rolls on the 28th ult., a question arose on a summons to vary the chief clerk's certificate, whether the claim of certain creditors against the testator on a promissory note dated the 11th of November, 1873, was barred by the Statute of Limitations. The writ was issued for administration of the testator's estate on the 30th of December, 1878, and a decree for administration was made on the 8th of December, 1879, and the point argued was whether the pendency of the action before the decree prevented the statute from running. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that the grounds of the decision in Sterndale v. Hankinson (1 Sim. 393), no longer applied, and that the debt was barred.-SOLI CITORS, Ridsdale & Co.; Pilgrim & Phillips; Ashurst, Morris, Crisp, & Co.

COMPANY-ALLOTMENT OF SHARES-MISREPRESENTATION IN PROSPECTUS-REMOVAL FROM REGISTER.—In a case of Re Great Wheal Polgooth Company (Limited), before the Master of the Rolls on the 29th ult., a motion was made by an allottee of shares in the company for the removal of his name from the register of shareholders, on the ground that he had been induced to apply for the shares on the faith of untrue and misleading statements in the prospectus, and for the return of the moneys paid on application and allotment. The ap-plicant received the prospectus by pcst, and applied for the shares on the faith of the statements therein contained, which were, among others, that the mine purchased by the company had already returned, it was estimated, over £200,000 in profits, while the £5 shares had risen to £195 each, and this too with the disadvantage of inferior machinery, and, further, that the reports showed there was £2,000,000 worth of ore in the mine. The applicant had given the company notice to produce the "reports' in question, but they would not do so. There was no proof as to the truth of the other statements. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that the above statements were absolutely without

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foundation in fact, and he ordered the applicant's name to be removed from the list of shareholders, and ordered the company to repay the sums paid by the applicant, with £5 per cent. interest from the time of payment, and the costs of the motion.-SOLICITORS, Snell & Greenip; G. Turner.

COMPANIES ACTS, 1862-1880-GENERAL ORDERS, NOVEMBER, 1862-WINDING-UP PETITION-ADVERTISEMENT · "SEVEN CLEAR DAYS"-NEWSPAPER-FRENCH BUSINESS.— A petition of In re The Anglo-French Union Bank (Limited) was mentioned to Hall, V.C., on the 29th ult., with respect to two technical objections advanced by the registrar on proceeding to draw up the order which his lordship had made upon the petition on the 22nd ult., whereby the voluntary liquidation of the company was directed to be continued under the supervision of the court. The registrar objected that the petitioner could not obtain his order, inasmuch as (1) the petition was presented on July 15, and heard on July 22, and could not therefore have been advertised "seven clear days" before the bearing, as prescribed by the General Orders, November, 1862, rule 2; (2) that the advertisement of the petition in the Daily News as a "London daily morning newspaper was insufficient, inasmuch as the business of the company was carried on in Paris, and the Times was, as the learned registrar considered, the only London paper having any extensive circulation there. His lordship, however, dispensed with advertisement for any further time, and overruled the second objection.-SOLICITORS, Paddison, Son, & Co.

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PRACTICE TRUSTEE ACT, 1850-NEW TRUSTEE HUSBAND OF CESTUI QUE TRUST-In a petition of In re Parrott's Trusts, before Hall, V.C., on the 29th ult., being an application under the Trustee Act, 1850, for the appointment of a new trustee of a will, to act jointly with a surviving trustee, his lordship was asked to appoint the husband of one of the cestuis que trust under the will, who was entitled to the interest for her separate use. The existing trustee consented to the application, but his lordship, in the exercise of his discretion, refused to accede to it. -SOLICITORS, Walters, Deverell, & Walters.

SETTLED ESTATES ACT, 1877, ss. 20, 21-JURISDICTION -DRAINAGE SCHEME-8 & 9 VICT. c. 56.—In a Case of Dickson-Poynder v. Cook, before Fry, J., on the 29th ult., a petition was presented under the Settled Estates Act of 1877, asking the sanction of the court to a scheme for the drainage in the ordinary way of some agricultural land forming part of a settled estate. Section 20 of the Act provides that "it shall be lawful for the court, if it shall deem it proper and consistent with a due regard for the interests of all parties entitled under the settlement, and subject to the provisions and restrictions in this Act contained, from time to time to direct that any part of any settled estates be laid out for streets, roads, paths, squares, gardens, or other open spaces, sewers, drains, or water-courses, either to be dedicated to the public or not; and the court may direct that the parts so laid out shall remain vested in the trustees of the settlement, or be conveyed to or vested in any other trustees upon such trusts for securing the continued appropriation thereof to the persons aforesaid, in all respects, and with such provisions for the appointment of new trustees when required, as by the

court shall be deemed advisable.' And section 21 empowers the court to direct that the works authorized under section 20, and other works incidental thereto, be made and executed, and to order the cost thereof to be raised and paid by means of a sale or mortgage of a charge upon all or any part of the settled estates. FRY, J., held that he had no jurisdiction under these sections to do what was asked. Under the scheme proposed there should be no dedication of any part of the land to drains: the land would remain in the occupation of the tenants just as it did before. It would be no more dedicated to drains than land under which there was a mine was dedicated to the mine. But his lordship held that there was jurisdiction to sanction the scheme under the Act 8 & 9 Vict. c. 56.-SOLICITORS, Burne, Hunt, & Burne.

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SOLICITORS' CASES.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.⚫
(Sitting in Banc before GROVE and LINDLEY, JJ.)

Aug. 1.-Re H. E. Fildes, a Solicitor.

This was a rule calling upon the solicitor to answer the matters contained in certain affidavits, or, in default, to show cause why he should not be struck off the rolls.

The case having been referred to a master, he now read his report, from which it appeared that—

(1) Henry Edward Fildes did fraudulently attempt to obtain the sum of £1 3s. 6d. as a fee paid to counsel for settling a statement of claim in the case of Allen v. Lucas, knowing at the time of the taxation of the costs of the suit before the taxing officer of the Court of Passage at Liverpool that the statement of claim had not been settled by counsel. (2) Henry Edward Fildes attempted to make use of a copy of a supposed affidavit of increase, purporting to be made by his clerk, John Rooney, in which the following passage occurred:" That I caused to be paid to the plaintiff's counsel, besides the usual fee for settling statement of claim and reply, and drawing interrogatories, and case to advise, the sum of £5 15s. with brief, and the sum of £1 6s. on consultation." Whereas, in fact, no fees whatever for settling statement of claim in the cause had ever been paid to the counsel.

(3) In the bill of costs of H. E. Fildes, presented to the taxing officer for taxation, the following costs were charged and presented, and the officer taxed them after making a disallowance on certain items of 2s. 6d., viz. :-"Drawing affidavit of increase, fos. 6. 6s.; paid oath, 18. 6d. ; copy for the defendant's solicitor, 2s.; and paid filing 1s.." Whereas, in fact, H. E. Fildes knew that no such affidavit existed.

(4) H. E. Fildes did obtain from counsel, on the 21st of October, 1880, his brief, with a list of the whole of counsel's fees indorsed on the back, by misrepresentation, by stating that he would send up a cheque at once, and for the purpose of satisfying the taxing officer at Liverpool that the fee had been paid, whereas on the 22nd of October, 1880, when the bill was taxed, the fees had not been paid, but a cheque for the same was sent to counsel by H. E. Fildes on the 25th of October, dated on the 26th of October.

McConnell showed cause.-I ask the court to allow me to re-open the question of fraud found against the solicitor in the first paragraph of the master's report, as from the evidence given before the master I submit that no fraud was proved. [GROVE, J.-Yes, you can do so, as the master's report is not in the nature of a judgment; if it were final there could be no use in our discussing the matter in court.] If any fraud was committed, and there is little doubt that it was, it was by Rooney, the clerk, and not by Mr. Fildes. The clerk had charge of the case, and Mr. Fildes thought that the clerk would have attended the taxation, but in consequence of the unavoidable absence of the clerk, Mr. Fildes had to attend it himself, and he knew nothing of the details of the case. The solicitor on the other side had, by some means, dis covered that counsel had not been instructed to draw up the statement of claim, and, on taxation, objected that the amount should be charged against his client. Then the taxing officer said that he should require a voucher for it, whereupon Mr. Fildes said, If you have my clerk's affidavit that the amount was paid to counsel, I suppose it was; and when the clerk returned, Mr. Fildes reprimanded him for inserting the item of £1 3s. 6d. Rooney was examined before the master and said that he put it in inadvertently, and in cross-examination it was elicited that he had been discharged from a former situation with an aspersion on his character, and that circumstance was perhaps looked upon as showing that he might perhaps have done this intentionally, but even so it could not criminate Mr. Fildes. In making his report the master was no doubt influenced by the fact that there was no system of book-keeping in the office, and there were no entries at all in relation to the action in question, but the solicitor was working short-handed to save money, and a book-keeping clerk was dispensed with. Then, as to the affidavit of increase, dealt with in the second paragraph of the report, the explanation was that Rooney had drafted it and left it on his desk, and that while he was away the copying clerk had seen it, and thought it was

* Reported by W. BLEW, Es‹J., Barrister-at-Law.

his duty to copy it and send it to the solicitor on the other side. It was not pretended that it was a proper affidavit; it was not filled in with a commissioner's name, and the signature was in the writing of the copying clerk, who had copied the whole thing as it stood. Counsel's fees were paid eventually. The solicitor had been twenty years in the profession, and nothing had hitherto been said against him. It must be admitted that he had acted negligently, but he had been guilty of no fraud.

Hollams, for the Incorporated Law Society.

GROVE, J.—This is a case of great gravity, although the sum involved is very small, because anyone conversant with the taxation of a bill of costs must know how serious a matter a mistake of this sort is, and how greatly it may affect other people. A client is quite in the hands of his solicitor, and that gives the latter opportunity for the commission of offences of a serious description. Most counsel have known of bills of costs, or affidavits of increase, in which certain items bave never been paid at all, and they know too that there is sometimes great carelessness in these matters, and money is often got which never should be got. In some matters, like this one for instance, the solicitor must be taken to have known his duty; he should have gone through the bill of costs carefully, and satisfied himself that the several charges had been paid. In this case I think there is considerable evidence to justify the master's report, and were I a juryman I should have little hesitation in saying that the solicitor knew quite well what he was about; but the evidence is not very demonstrative, and it is just possible that the solicitor was careless enough to have left the matter to a clerk, and to have presented the bill of costs without having looked through it. Among the items are fee to counsel, for statement of claim, and attending him. Now there was neither fee nor attendance here, on that point at least, but the only attendance was on the question of misjoinder of plaintiffs. I do not like saying anything behind the back of a man who is not here to defend himself, but I must say that counsel made a great mistake in signing for fees he had not received. This signing a brief for fees is a most important matter, and I never knew anyone initial a brief unless he had received the fee. As regards Mr. Fildes I cannot help thinking that he knew the fee was never paid. His one excuse is that he left these things to his clerk-that is to say, that he left to others matters that he should have taken care to have within his own knowledge. He was guilty of gross carelessness, to ase a mild term, but my own impression is that it was more than carelessness, for considering that Mr. Fildes has been in the profession for twenty years, this was not the first bill of costs he had drawn. The only doubt I entertain is whether we should not strike him off the rolls, but as it is just possible that he might not have absolutely known all the circumstances, we will take a lenient view and look upon the case as one of culpable neglect only. Under these circumstances we have come to the conclusion that Mr. Fildes be suspended for three years.

Solicitor for the Incorporated Law Society, Williamson.

COURT OF BANKRUPTCY.

(Before Mr. REGISTRAR MURRAY, sitting as Chief Judge). July 31.-In re W. R. Preston.

The debtor was a solicitor having offices in Mark-lane. A petition for adjudication having been presented against him, Mr. Shirreff, on behalf of the petitioning creditor, applied for the appointment of Mr. Southcott, accountant, as receiver. In support of the application he read an affidavit of the petitioning creditor, from which it appeared that the bankrupt was in difficulties and that he had absconded. An application to strike him off he rolls was also pending. There were bills of costs to be collected, and it was there'fore necessary for a receiver to be appointed.

His HONOUR made the desired appointment.

In re John Grove.

The bankrupt was a solicitor and scrivener, carrying on business in Queen-street, Cheapside, under the firm of Alfred Jones & Grove. He now failed to attend the meeting appointed for his public examination, and it was stated that he had absconded.

The learned REGISTRAR directed the usual memorandum to be entered.-Times.

SOCIETIES.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

The adjourned annual general meeting of the Incorporporated Law Society was held at their hall, Chancery-lane, on Thursday, Mr. CHARLES CLARIDGE DRUCE, president, in the chair. The meeting was simply for the purpose of ten vacancies on the council, and there was only a quorum receiving the scrutineers' report of the election by ballot to the of members present.

The PRESIDENT having stated the object of the meeting, report of the scrutineers, as follows:Mr. EUGENE WASON, chairman of the scrutineers, read the

Pursuant to the appointment made by the president at the meeting of the society held on the 8th day of July, 1881, in undersigned, the scrutineers so appointed, beg to present to compliance with the 5th section of bye-law 15, we, the the members of the society our report certifying the result of the election, which has been conducted in accordance with the charter and bye-laws of the society.

instant, a box containing the voting papers, which had been The secretary handed to us on Tuesday, the 2nd of August, placed in it as soon as they were delivered.

The first schedule hereto annexed contains the total number of voting papers received, amounting in all to 1,482.

The same schedule sets forth the number of voting papers rejected, and the grounds of rejection. Six have been rejected the 30th of July, and six because the voting papers were not on the ground that they were not received by midnight on signed.

The total number of votes in favour of each candidate is set forth in the second schedule hereto annexed.

The third schedule contains the names of those candidates whom we find and certify to be duly elected.

The voting papers have been duly closed up under our seals, and will be retained in our care for the period of one month, which will expire on the 5th of September next, when we shall destroy them as provided by section 2 of bye

law 18.

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ASSOCIATION FOR THE REFORM AND CODI

FICATION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS. The following is the programme of the Cologne Conference, to be held 16th to 19th August, 1881:-The conference will hold its sittings in the great hall of the Hansa, at Cologne; and the inaugural meeting will take place on Tuesday, the 16th of August, at twelve o'clock. Members attending the conference are required to sign a list, setting forth their names and their addresses in Cologne. Members are requested to procure their tickets of admission immediately on arrival in Cologne. Reception of the members by the Cologne Committee; opening of the conference by the president; annual report of the council; communication of letters, &c.; reports by the secretaries.

Subjects for discussion, recommended by the Executive Council:

:

1. Public International Law.-Consular jurisdiction in China and Japan; domicile as a test of national character; the neutralization of telegraphic sea cables in time of war; the operation of the mixed tribunals of Egypt.

2. International Commercial Law.-Bills of exchange; law of negotiable securities (shares, bonds, and coupons, nominative or to bearer); international copyright; conflict between the law of joint stock companies.

3. International Maritime Law. The law of affreightment.

Subjects proposed by the International Code Committe of the United States :

Longitude and time; international coinage, weights, and measures; sea signals, collisions at sea.

Subjects proposed by members :

The early charters granted by the kings of England to the merchants of Cologne, by Sir Travers Twiss, Q.C., D.C.L., F.R.S.; customs of the early trading companies of Europe, by Cornelius Walford, F.S.A., F.S.S., F.R.H.S.; on a common form of bill of lading as a basis for an international law of affreightment, by Richard Lowndes; the Scandinavian coinage laws, by Alfred Kirsebom, viceconsul in London for Sweden and Norway.

NEW ORDERS.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

CHANCERY DIVISION.
LONG VACATION, 1881.
Notice.

Daring the vacation, until further notice, all applications which may require to be immediately or promptly. heard are to be made to the judges who for the time being shall act as Vacation Judges.

One of the Vacation Judges will sit in the court of the Master of the Rolls, Rolls-yard, Chancery-lane, at eleven a.m. on Wednesday in every week, commencing on Wednesday, the 17th of August, until. further notice, for the purpose of hearing such applications.

No case will be placed in the court paper unless leave has been previously obtained, or a certificate of counsel that the case requires to be immediately or promptly heard, and stating concisely the reasons, is left with the papers.

The necessary papers relating to every application made

to the Vacation Judges are to be left with, or addressed (under cover marked outside Chancery Vacation Papers) to the officer in attendance, Chancery Registrars' Chambers (room 136), Royal Courts of Justice, before one o'clock on the Monday previous to the day on which the application is intended to be made.

In any case of great urgency the brief of counsel is to be sent to the judge by book post, or parcel, prepaid, accompanied by office copies of the affidavits in support of the application, and also by a minute, on a separate sheet of paper, signed by counsel, of the order he may consider the applicant entitled to, and an envelope capable of receiving the papers, and addressed as follows: "Chancery Official Letter: To the Registrar in Vacation, Chancery Registrars' Chambers, Royal Courts of Justice, London, W.C."

On applications for injunctions or writs of ne exeat regno, in addition to the above, a copy of the writ, and a certificate of writ issued, must also be sent.

The papers sent to the judge will be returned to the registrar.

The address of the judge for the time being acting as Vacation Judge in the Chancery Division can be obtained on application at the Chancery Registrars' Chambers.

The chambers of the Master of the Rolls will be open on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, in every week, from eleven to one o'clock.

Chancery Registrars' Chambers, July 31.

Notice to Solicitors.

On and after the 20th of August, the registrar in attendance will, for the purpose of facilitating vacation business, sign certificates for sale and transfer on Tuesday and Friday in every week, but the certificates should be left for examination at least one clear day previously, and on Tuesday in every week the registrar will make alterations necessary in orders to be acted on by the Chancery Paymaster.

The registrar will not attend on Saturdays and Mondays unless on notice of any intended application to the judge for an order of an urgent_nature.

L. J. MERIVALE, P. J. KING,

Vacation Registrars.

Chancery Registrars' Chambers, Royal Courts of Justice, July 31.

AMENDING ORDER AS TO THE FEES AND PERCENTAGES WHICH ARE REQUIRED TO BE TAKEN IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE BY MEANS OF STAMPS.

Whereas by section 26 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1875, it is provided that the fees and percentages appointed to be taken in the High Court of Justice and in the Court of Appeal, and in any court to be created by any commission, and in any office which is connected with any of those courts is conducted in, shall, except so far as they of those courts, or which any business connected with any be otherwise directed, be taken by means of stamps; and further that such stamps shall be impressed or adhesive, as the Treasury may from time to time direct; and that the Treasury, with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor, may from time to time make such rules as may seem fit for publishing the amount of the fees, and regulating the use of such stamps, and particularly for prescribing the application thereof to documents from time to time in use or required to be used for the purposes of such stamps and for ensuring the proper cancellation of such stamps, and for keeping accounts of such stamps.

And whereas, by an order made under the same section of the said Act on the 22nd April, 1876, it was provided that the stamps to be used in the collection of certain of the fees therein mentioned should be either impressed or adhesive.

And whereas it is expedient to extend the use of impressed stamps and to make the use of them obligatory in the collection of certain fees.

Now, we, the undersigned, being two of the Lords of her Majesty's Treasury, do with the concurrence of the Lord. Chancellor hereby give notice and order and direct :

1. That from and after the 1st day of August, 1881, the stamps used for denoting the fees as described in the schedule hereto subjoined, shall, in so far as they are pay able at the Royal Courts of Justice, be of the character, and be applied and otherwise dealt with as prescribed by such schedule.

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