the United States a party to British crimes or in dealing with the United States rather than with the British Government for a redress thereof. The doctrine of vicarious suffering has not yet been incorporated into international law. It is a far safer rule that each State should be chargeable only with its own delinquencies.

If one State may act and the punishment for the act be visited upon an innocent third party, not only is an injustice done the latter, but one of the most effective restraints upon the acts of States is removed, or at least substantially weakened. Legally as well as morally, each State is accountable for its own acts, and the interest of mankind are best subserved by so holding them.

If a State may by wanton acts involve a neutral in a quarrel by subjecting it to lawful punishment for the consequences of those wanton acts, then the peace of the world is placed at the mercy of the wanton. In this way an unscrupulous State might readily become the beneficiary of it sown wantonness by involving its enemy in a quarrel with States that were making an honest attempt to remain neutral. The only individual or state which can consistently advocate such a policy is one desirous of promoting war rather than peace. This may be the principle on which Germany is proceeding. But of this I am reasonably sure, that it will not commend itself to the majority of States or to the more logical minds in any States.

No more convincing than the contention that unlawful acts by England absolves Germany from her obligation to respect the rights of the United States is the other contention that, as Germany is fighting for her life, no rights of neutrals can be allowed to interfere with the effectiveness of German retaliation for violations of law by England. This contention amounts to an assertion that neutral rights exist only at the caprice of the belligerents. If Germany, in a war of her own making, may justify the most flagrant violations of nentral rights, on the plea of self-defense, all other belligerents have the same right and instead of being something substantial, the term neutral rights becomes a mere rhetorical expression without any real content-a hollow mockery.

If the lives of law-abiding neutrals may be destroyed whenever such destruction renders more convenient the retaliatory destruction of enemy property, we will soon have arrived at the point where neutrals will also be fighting for their lives, lest they have no lives for which to fight. The history of modern international law is in large part a history of the struggle for a recognition of neutral rights. In this struggle the United States has taken a commendable part, and is not now likely to accept the principle that those rights are held merely by suffrance of the belligerent. To do so would be to admit that nations crazed with the wine of conflict are better fixed to determine what rights shall be accorded to others than are nations in their sober senses assembled at conferences for such purpose. This is on the face of it too absurd and contrary to human experience to appeal to a nation endowed with common sense.

As a matter of fact, Germany knows full well that her claim of right to sacrifice the lives of American citizens in order to facilitate the punishment of England rests on no more solid foundation than her ruthless destruction of the law-abiding citizens of neutral Belgium in order to facilitate the punishment of France in retaliation for her attachment to the "lost provinces." Both alike are supported by no stronger reasoning than the bayonet. Neither is it any more reasonable to suppose that Germany can remain on friendly relations with the United States while saying to the government thereof that the lives of its citizens are a matter of less consequence to Germany than the destruction of enemy property as a retaliation for an annoying blockade, than that Germany could remain on friendly relations with Belgium at the same time that German

armies, by order of their government, were sacrificing the lives of Belgians to make easier the invasion of France. Even pacifism has its limits. The United States does not seek war, neither did Belgium. But the United States, no more than Belgium, can afford to condone crime by remaining on friendly terms with the criminal. The technical friendship of Germany is not so indispensable or so valuable to neutrals that they can afford to purchase it at the price of encouraging outlawry.1

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS-ANSWERS OF THE NEW YORK COMMIT

TEE.

DIVORCE-ARRANGEMENT TO SUE IN DISTANT STATE UPON EXISTING CAUSE NOT RECOGNIZED IN PRESENT DOMICIL.-Husband and wife, residents of this State, are not living together; the husband having actually and by express declaration deserted the wife. There is no ground known to the wife on which she could obtain a divorce in New York. Let it be assumed that facts existing at the time of the desertion will give ample grounds for divorce at the instance of the wife in several other States. There has been absolutely no collusion in bringing such facts into existence. The husband, who actively desires a divorce, and his attorney, have requested that the wife accept a substantial money payment for herself in settlement of all claims for future maintenance and also a substantial fee for her attorney; and in return for these payments, that she go to another State, where existing facts would be grounds for a divorce, and there procure a divorce decree, it being the husband's plan to go to such State and accept service of papers. Answer.-In the opinion of a minority of the Committee, it would be unprofessional for a member of our bar to advise, or assist in, the arrangement suggested, the object of which is to escape the operation of the laws of this State; but a majority is of the opinion that the arrangement is not inherently improper, provided there is no imposition on the wife, and the arrangement is fully disclosed to the foreign Court, and the change of residence is actual and in good faith.

ACCEPTANCE OF FEES FOR TESTIFYING AS WITNESS TO WILL.-A and B, lawyers, were engaged in individual practice. A drew up a will for a client of his. B was asked to become an attesting witness. The will was duly executed, and A and B duly witnessed the same. The testator died seven years afterward. Probate of the will was opposed on the ground of fraud, incapacity and undue influence. There was a trial in the Surrogate's Court and then again, several years afterward, a protracted trial in the Supreme Court, at both of which the probate was allowed and sustained. At each of these B was put to inconvenience and loss of time as a witness or for holding himself in readiness as such. No subpoena was issued, B having voluntarily offered to be on hand on every occasion. At the close of the litigation, the attorney for the executor and proponent voluntarily forwarded a check to B for $50. Would it be unprofessional for B to accept the same? Answer.—It would not be improper for B to accept the check voluntarily proffered 1 Edwin Maxey, Professor of International Law, University of Ne

braska.

by A. B, though a lawyer, was merely a subscribing witness to the will, and testified as such. The check was not given under any agreement antecedently made or exacted, nor conditioned in any way upon the giving of particular testimony, nor upon the success of the litigation, nor made to depend upon the amount involved in the probate proceedings; but was a gratuity in partial compensation for B's loss of time while attending Court.

FURNISHING CLIENT WITH BLANK SUMMONSES SUBSCRIBED BY ATTORNEY. -Since the adoption of the new Municipal Court Code (N. Y. Laws 1915, ch. 279, §19), which authorizes the issuance of summonses by attorneys at law, it is stated that some attorneys have permitted their clients to print blank summonses in large numbers, subscribed with the attorney's name, and to furnish their collectors with a pad of such printed summonses, so that the collector may fill the blanks and leave a copy of such summons with any customer who refuses payment. Is such practice improper? Answer.-The practice is unprofessional and illegal. An attorney should not delegate any professional function or power to his client. (See Matter of Rothschild, 140 A. D. 583.)

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR-PROCURING OR FACILITATING NEWSPAPER PUBLICATIONS RESPECTING HIS OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES.-(a) Does Canon 20 of the American Bar Association's Code of Ethics apply to publications by a public prosecuting attorney as to pending or anticipated litigations whereof he has charge by virtue of his office? (b) Is it proper professional conduct for a public prosecuting attorney to inform the newspapers that the government has evidence tending to convict designated individuals of desigated crimes. and that the evidence is laid before the Grand Jury? Answer.—(a) The rule expressed in the Canon is a salutary one; but as applied to public prosecuting attorneys it may be subject to exceptions in the public interest. In the absence of a specific statement of facts, the Committee is unprepared to answer this branch of the inquiry more definitely. (b) A prosecuting attorney is not merely a law. yer; he is also a public officer. His duties are intimately connected with the detection of crime and the securing of evidence for convictions and the preservation of public order. We cannot say that in the discharge of his duties there are no instances in which it would be proper for him to make use of newspaper publicity as stated in the question; but in the opinion of the Committee, under circumstances which would justify such action, his course should be dictated solely by the public interest, and should be taken with due regard to law.

ONE MUST NOT BE NOMINATED AT AN OPPOSING PRIMARY.-The Supreme Court of Ohio rules that under the State law creating primary elections, a man affiliated with one party cannot be nominated as a candidate for office upon a ticket of another party, the Court saying:

"The facts upon which relator relies, as shown by the pleadings, are in brief as follows: That at the state-wide primary held on the 11th day of August, 1914, the secretary of state, as state supervisor of elections,

had printed and distributed primary ballots for use at said primary election; that one of said primary ballots was designated 'Republican,' another designated 'Democratic,' another designated 'Progressive;' that on the Republican ballot there were two or more printed names of candidats, on the Democratic ballot two or more printed names of candidates, and that on the Progressive ballot there were no printed names of candidates; that the relator's name was written on four of the Progressive ballots for judge of the Supreme Court, which fact was certified to the secretary of state by the deputy state supervisors and inspectors of elections for said Mahoning county; and that the secretary of state refused to certify the relator's name as being legally nominated for judge of the Supreme Court of Ohio as a result of the vote had at such August primary election. This is, in substance, the relator's claims as set forth in his petition.

"The answer, so far as it is relevant to this case, avers the fact to be that the 'relator never has been, is not now, and was not at the time of said primary election, a member of said Progressive party, but, on the contrary, was a member of the Republican party,' and voted as such Republican on said August 11, 1914. At this primary there were cast

in excess of 440,000 votes, over 8,000 of which were cast for the Progressive ticket. The total vote cast for the relator for judge of the Supreme Court was four, one-twentieth of 1 per cent of the total vote cast for the Progressive ticket. The relator himself was not at the time, and never had been a member of the Progressive party. On the contrary, he appeared at the primary on that day and voted a Republican ticket, thereby declaring himself a Republican. Under existing law the primary is necessarily a party primary. Wisely or unwisely, there is no provision made for the independent voter. The members of a party are presumed to act as the members of a lodge, or the members of a church, or of any other voluntary organization, to select representatives of their lodge, church, or such association, to fill certain offices and discharge certain trusts.

"By an examination of the primary statutes all combine to demonstrate the soundness of this position. The voters signing the original petition must certify that they are members of the party whose nomination is sought, and some one signer must make oath to that effect. The candidate also makes a declaration that he will abide by the principles enumerated by his political party. But, more than that, the statutes, especially section 4980, General Code, provide as to who are legally qualified electors at such primary. The language of the statute is as follows. 'At such election only legally qualified electors or such as will be legally qualified electors at the next ensuing general election may vote and all such electors may vote only in the election precinct where they reside, and it shall be the duty of the challengers and of the judges, and the right of any elector, whenever there is reason to doubt the legality of any vote that may be offered, to interpose a challenge. The cause of a challenge shall be: That the person challenged has received or been promised some valuable reward or consideration for his vote; that he has not previously affiliated with the party whose ticket he now desires to vote. Affiliation shall be determined by the vote of the elector making application to vote, at the last general election held in even-numbered years.'

"Sections 4981 and 4982 provide as to how the challenge shall be tried, and that the judges of the party with whom the voter claims affiliation are the judges to finally determine his qualifications as a legal voter.

"Suppose the relator in this case had presented himself to the judges of the primary, represented himself as a Republican, and asked for a Progressive ticket to vote the same. Would there be any doubt about the judges' right and duty to refuse him a ticket? Under the statutes he would not be a qualified legal voter at such Progressive party primary.

If he is not a qualified voter, it is difficult to understand how he could be a qualified candidate. The same spirit runs throughout as to the voter and candidate in connection with the party primary. Indeed, it may well be doubted whether or not at the party primaries the voter may write in any name. He may do so at a general election where the purpose is to get at the wishes of the majority of the voters as to the candidates for office or public policies, but the purpose of the primary is to enable the rank and file of each party to nominate the party's representatives for public office. It is unnecessary, however, to determine that question here. "The relator cannot as a Republican consistently claim a Progressive nomination. The natural justice of the situation, as well as the clear legal right, is against him, and the secretary of state rightly denied him a place on the ticket."31

MUNICIPAL REGULATION OF JITNEYS.-Statutes passed to regulate that new method of transportation, the Jitney, are already before the Appellate Courts. In Tennessee a driver of one appealed to the Supreme Court against a State statute making them common carriers (which of course they were before the statute was enacted) requiring a license and bond to pay damages for injuries through negligence. But the statute was declared valid,23 the Court saying:

"We come now to the test of the law made by the circuit judge, and which led him to denounce the classification-the inclusion of jitney automobiles and the exclusion of automobiles privately owned and used. We think that such a classification is easly sustainable by reason of the applicability of many of the considerations above enumerated. The privately owned vehicle ordinarily has but a single destination, at which it comes to rest. Its use is not urged to or towards the limit in order to the reaping of profits. We are unable to see merit in the distinction taken by the circuit judge, when he intimated the opinion that a classification of the jitney from privately used automobiles might be sustained only so far as indemnity for damages done to passengers was concerned. Most of the dangers that surround such passengers in a substantial sense beset also the users of the street.

"Contrasting the jitney with street railway cars, to ascertain whether there be arbitrary classification: The street railway, by reason of its having tracks at definite places assigned it by municipal authority, on which tracks its traffic must move, is less liable to cause injury; and the substantial nature of its cars, and particularly the fixity, permanency and great cost of its roadbed, afford an anchored indemnity in respect of its liability for negligence. Other marks for differentiation, appearing in the above outline of considerations imputable to the legislative mind, need not be reiterated.

"Assuming for test purposes (without meaning to decide or to intimate a decision) that taxicabs are common carriers, and that they are not included within the terms of the statute, does their exclusion operate to make the classification unreasonable and arbitrary?

"The word 'taxicab' is one of recent coinage, to describe a motor-driven conveyance that performs a service similar to the cab or hackney carriage, held for hire at designated places at a fare proportioned to the length of the trips of the several passengers, who are taken to be carried to destinations without regard to any route adopted or uniformly conformed to by the operator. The jitney holds itself out to accommodate 23 City of Memphis v. State, 179 S. W. 632.

31 State v. Graves, 109 N. E. 590.