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SEAL. Colored paper in the form of a seal, attached by mucilage to an instrument, is a sufficient sealing. — Turner v. Field, 44 Mo. 382.
SEISIN. - See BANKRUPTCY.
SENTENCE. Where a defendant is convicted at one term of several crimes, each punishable by imprisonment, it is not error in imposing sentence to make one term of imprisonment begin when another terminates. — Williams v. The State, 18 Ohio St. 46.
SET-OFF. To an action on a promissory note brought in the name of an insolvent bank by the receivers, the defendant filed in set-off certain notes of the bank, some of which he held when the bank failed, and others he had purchased subsequently. Held, that the first should be allowed in set-off, but that on the others he must seek his remedy with other creditors. — American Bank v. Wall, 56 Me. 167.
SHERIFF'S SALE. The law of Georgia requires that before property is sold on execution certain notices shall be given. Land was sold by an officer without complying with these requirements, and bought in good faith. A bill in equity was filed to set aside the sale as illegal. Held, that the neglect of the officer to perform his duty might make him liable to the party injured, but would not affect the title of a bona fide purchaser. - Solomon v. Peters, 37 Ga. 251. See RESIDENCE.
SHERIFF. — See OFFICER; REWARD.
SLAVE. Suit to recover for the services of a slave. The defendant hired him for the year from 28th December, 1864, to 25th December, 1865. The slave was practically freed about the 1st of June, 1865, by the re-establishment of the General Government's authority. Held, that the plaintiff should recover as much as the slave's services were worth while he served as a slave, with interest, and that the amount should be estimated in the money of the United States. — Wilkes v. Hughes, 37 Ga. 361..
SPECIAL DEPOSIT. - See National Bank. 1.
STAY-Law... The act of the Georgia legislature, known as the “stay-law,” is unconstitutional, as impairing the obligation of contracts. (WALKER, J., dissenting.) – Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga. 124.
STOCK. — See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5; NationAL BANK, 2.
STOCKHOLDER. — See STOCK.
SUNDAY. - See LORD's Day.
SURETY. - See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
Tax. The payment of an illegal tax assessed upon bank shares for the purpose of preventing their seizure and sale by the collector, is not a voluntary payment. – Abbott v. Inhabitants of Bangor, 56 Me. 310.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 5; ConstiTUTIONAL Law, STATE, 1, 5; NationAL BANK, 2; TERRITORY.
TELEGRAPH. It being made by statute, where the lines of two telegraph companies connect, the duty of each to transmit messages received from the other, held, that where a message was delivered to one, the other was liable for damages caused by an omission to transmit it over its own line. — Baldwin v. United States Telegraph Co., 54 Barb. 505.
TENANCY AT WILL. A purchaser in possession of lands under a contract to purchase, whether written or verbal, is a tenant at will so far, that an action in the nature of waste can be maintained against him for destruction done while in such possession. Freeman v. Headley, 4 Vroom, 523.
THEFT. — See Bond.
. TRESPASS. An encounter took place in a public street between two opposing parties, and shots were exchanged, one of which wounded the plaintiff. He brought suit against the persons in one party. Held, that the defendants were liable if the shot was fired by either of them, or either of their opponents. — Murphyv. Wilson, 44 Mo. 313.
See EVIDENCE, 4; OFFICER.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. — See AssUMPSIT ; PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 2.
WAIVER. — See InsURANCE, 1, 2.
WAR. 1. Action to recover the value of a mule taken by defendant. The plaintiff was an officer in the United States service. The defendant, a soldier in the rebel army, was one of a detachment sent into Kentucky to recruit soldiers and mount them, and took the mule for that purpose. Held, that defendant was liable, but with permission to amend his answer, and set up any statute of the Confederate government, authorizing such a seizure, in justification. — Ferguson v. Loar, 5 Bush, 689.
2. Action on three promissory notes. The plaintiff resided in Pennsylvania, the defendant in Georgia, during the Rebellion. Judgment was confessed for the principal debts. Held, that interest did not run on the notes during the war. — Mayer v. Reed, 37 Ga. 482.
3. Whether interest should run on a promissory note during the Rebellion, where the maker resided in the North, and the holder in the South, quære. By DILLON, C. J., and Wright, J., that it should. By COLE and BECK, JJ., that it should not. — Griffith v. Lovell, 26 Iowa, 226. See ACTION, 2; SLAVE.
WARD. — See GUARDIAN AND WARD. .
WASTE. An action on the case in the nature of waste will lie against a tenant for years for permissive waste. — Moore ads. Townshend, 4 Vroom, 284. See TENANCY AT WILL.
WHARF. - See DAMAGES, 2.
WILL. · 1. The birth of a child to a testator after the making of the will, and before the testator's death, will operate as an implied revocation of the will. — McCullum v. McKenzie, 26 Iowa, 510.
2. A ward, three days after reaching his majority, made a will in favor of his guardian. He was then in his guardian's house, had lived with him from early childhood, and had implicit confidence in him. The will was contested on the ground of undue influence. Held, that it was presumptively invalid, and that the burden was on those who claimed under it. — Garvin's Adm'r v. Williams, 44 Mo. 465.
WITNESS. — See EVIDENCE, 2.
“ Debt.” — See NATIONAL BANK, 1.
WRIT OF ERROR. A writ of error will lie from a judgment of nonsuit in all cases where the plaintiff, at the trial, prays a bill of exceptions from the ruling of the judge directing such nonsuit. — Voorhees v. Woodhull's Ex'rs, 4 Vroom, 482.
A Treatise on Facts as Subjects of Inquiry by a Jury. By JAMES RAM, of the
Inner Temple. First American Edition. By John TOWNSHEND, New York: Baker, Voorhis, & Company. 1870.
A Law book can rarely, if ever, be termed entertaining. Sometimes it may be called interesting, but then only so to members of the profession. But bere we have a treatise both entertaining and interesting, which may be read with pleasure as well by laymen as by lawyers. The author has ventured upon a new anıl untried sea. The large majority of causes brought before courts of justice present to them mingled questions of law and fact. Our shelves groan with dissertations upon law; but we commit the facts to twelve men taken at hap-hazard from the community, with such comments upon them as may in each case seem appropriate to the presiding justice. Nay, more, in some States, a strenuous effort is made to prevent, or abbreviate, these comments; to reduce them to the baldest phrases, so that the twelve may hold complete and undivided sway in their province. Here, however, is an attempt to inquire into the effect produced by facts, as testified to by witnesses, upon the minds of those whose duty it is to draw conclusions from them. Their legal import and effect is not considered. It is as if a cause has been submitted to a jury with instructions that it is a pure question of fact, to which no strictly legal considerations apply. This, one would say, opens an enormous field. Our common law is a law of precedents. There, at least, there is a starting-point for a law writer. But facts are as uncertain and shifting as clouds in the heavens. There is no beginning and no ending. Yet, in spite of these difficulties, Mr. Ram proceeds with considerable skill to discuss perception, impression, niemory, recognition, under various conditions and with their various limitations; and to note how these powers are usually found in greater or less strength in the testimony of witnesses, under more or less favorable circumstances. “He discusses the facts most common in evidence, such as length of time, speed, and distance; he treats of character, falsehood, and selfconviction. Then follow chapters upon suspicion, probability, and the various degrees of credit to be attached to witnesses. He concludes with some very sensible remarks upon witnesses under examination, the duties and responsibilities of advocacy, and the correct method of drawing conclusions from facts. An appendix to the American edition contains David Paul Brown's Golden Rules for the. Examination of a Witness; Cox's Practical Advice for Conducting the Examination of a Witness; and Whewell's Essay on Theory and Facts.
It will at once be seen that such a work as this cannot be exhaustive. The most it can do is to throw out a certain number of suggestions which have been brought home to a lawyer in his practice, or have come under his observation, or occur to him from his reading, that may be useful to others under similar circumstances. As a book of reference, it can have little or no value. Yet its perusal, VOL. IV.