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POINTON, WILLIAM, Wolstanton, Staffordshire, Farm Labourer. Aug 25 at 2. Hoy, WALTER, Romford rd, Forest Gate, Nurseryman. High Court. Pet July
16. Ord Aug 5
Aug 2. Ord Aug 5
ter. Pet July 16.' Ord Aug 5
July 11. Ord Aug 5
Lynn. Pet Aug 2. Ord Aug 6
LEWIS, HENRY WALTER, Bath, Plumber. Bath. Pet July 20. Ord Aug 3 row, Birmingham
LEWIS, JAMES THOMAS, Pembroke Dock, Grocer. Pembroke Dock. Pet July 30. TEED, ALFRED HALL. 16, Union ter, St Mary Church, Devon, Grocer, Aug 17 at Ord Aug 6 3. Castle of Exeter, Exeter
LOVETT, SAMUEL, Aston, Warwickshire, Coal Merchant. Birmingham. Pet THOMSON, PETER, Hedworth, Durham, Farmer. Aug 18 at 2.30. Off Rec, Pink July 26. Ord Aug 4 lané, Newcastle on Tyne
MEADOWS, ANDREW MILES, Kirby Bellars, Leicestershire, Farmer. Leicester. TOMPKIN, GEORGE, Silverdale, Staffs, Baker. Aug 24 at 4. Off Rec, Newcastle Pet July 9. Ord Aug 5 under Lyme
MILLS, JOSEPH, Hanley, Staffordshire, Brickmaker. Hanley, Burslem, and TunWALDRON, JOHN, Walthamstow, Baker. Aug 18 at 11. 33, Carey st, Lincoln's stall. Pet Aug 2. Ord Aug 1
NOYES, ROBERT JOHN, Swansea, Boot Maker. Swansea. Pet Aug 4. Ord Aug 5. WILDING, HENRY AMBLER, Frederick st, Gray's inn rd, Clerk. Aug 17 at 11. Bankruptcy bldgs, Lincoln's inn
OVENS, JOSEPH, Henbury, Gloucek tershire, Wheelwright. Bristol. Pet Aug 2.
Ord Aug 4. WILLIS, GEORGE, Askew crescent, Askew rd, Shepherd's Bush. Aug 17 at 12.
PARKINSON, FRANK ARTHUR, Leicester, Caterer. Leicester. Pet June 29. Ord 33, Carey st, Lincoln's inn
PHILLIPS, WILLIAM, Hereford, Coal Agent. Hereford. Pet Aug 6. Ord Aug 6 WRIGHT, ALBERT GEORGE, Broadwater, Builder. Aug 18 at 12. 4, Pavilion PICCIRILLO, CATARINA, Wigmore st, Cavendish sq, Italian Warehouseman. High bldgs, Brighton
Court. Pet April 30. Ord Aug 6
toria st, Mantle Manufacturers. High Court. Pet Aug 3. Ord Aug 4
POTTER, THOMAS, Gosforth, Northumberland, no occupation, Newcastle. Pet ALBERT, EDWARD, EMANUEL ALBERT, and FRANCIS HAUPTMAN, Station rd, Aug 4. Ord Aug 4.
Willesden, Glass Manufacturers. High Court. Pet July 14. 'Ord Aug 4 ROBERTSON, W., Brabant ct, Tea Merchant. High Court. Pet June 18. Ord ANDREW, RICHARD, Gainsborough, Miller. Lincoln. Pet Aug 4. Ord Aug 4
Aug 4 BAKER, FREDERICK GEORGE, Shanklin, I.W., Watchmaker. Newport and Ryde.
RODWAY, CHARLES JOHN, Nailsworth, Gloucestershire, Ironmonger. Gloucester. Pet July 23. Ord July 27
Pet June 27. Ord Aug 4 BAILEY, WILLIAM, Rosheı ville, Kent, Gardener. Rochester. Pet Aug 3. Ord
SAUNDERS, Eliza, Folkestone, Boot Dealer. Canterbury. Pet Aug 4. Ord Aug 4
Aug 4 PASHFORD. GEORGE ARTHUR, Southend, Licensed Victualler Bigh Court. Pet SILVER, RICHARD, the younger, Tittle Row, nr Maidenhead, Machinist. Windsor. July 7. Ord Aug 6
Pet Aug 3. Ord Aug 3 BENSON ALFRED, King's Head ct, Bhoe lane, Publican. High Court. Ord Aug 4
SPRUCE, FRANK. Koutsford, Cheshire, Coal Merchant. Manchester. Pet Aug 5.
Ord Aug 5
borough. Pet Aug 4. Ord Aug 4
TAYLOR, EDWARD BROWN, Oat lade, Trimming Manufacturer. High Court. Pet
July 19. Ord Aug 6
18. Ord Aug 3
THORPE, WILLIAM, Mapperey, Nottingham, Lace Manufacturer. Nottingham. Aug 6
Pet June 22. Ord Aug 4 BRINKWORTH, ROBERT MESSITER, Bath, Corn Merchant. Bath. Pet July 16.
TOMMY, HENRY, Wem, Shropshire, Builder. Sbrewsbury. Pet July 8. Ord July Ord Aug 6
19 BURN, RICHARD, Liverpool, Ship Broker. Liverpool. Pet July 1. Ord Aug 2
WHICKER, FREDERICK JAXES, Tunbridge Wells, Grocer. Tunbridge Wells. Pet
July 2. Ord Aug 3
Oid Aug 6
Ord Aug 5 Aug 5. Ord Aug 5
ADJUDICATION ANNULLED. ("ROWTHER, JOSEPH, West Vale, nr Halifax, Rate Collector. Halif-x. Pet July
GUTHRIE, CHARLES SETON JAMES LISTER, B: lton st, Piccadilly, Esq. High Court. 29. Ord Aug 5
Adjud Dec 3. Annul Aug 4
Ord Aug 4
BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS.
ton, solicitor, to Emmeline Mary, daughter of James Tinsley, J.P., of WarringFIRTH. FREDERICK, JOSEPH FIRTH, and EDWIN FIRTH, Dewsbury, Joiners. ton.
Dewsbury. Pet Aug 5. Ord Aug 5
founders. Dewsbury. Pet Aug 5 Ord Aug 5
6d. ; GORMAN. EDWARD, Ryde, I W, Mealman. Newport and Ryde. Pet July 5. Ord Aug 8
Country, 288. 6d. ; with the WREKLY REPORTER, 538.
vance includes Double Numbers and Postage. Subscribers can have GROVES. THOMAS EDWARD, Aylestone pk, Leicestersbire, Carriage Builder. Leicester. Pet Aug 5. Ord Aug 5
their Volumis bound at the office-cloth, 28. 62., half law calf, 58. 6d. HEMINGWAY, CAROLINE, Mirfield, Yorks, Draper. Dewebury. Pet July 28.
Ord Aug 3
Ord Aug 5
687 HIRD, HARTLEY, and HOLLINGS SMITH, Bradford, Worsted Stuff Makers.
THE LAW OF GIFTS INTER Vivos Bradford Pet Aug 4. Ord Aug 4
690 HODGKINSON, JOSEPH, Derby, Butcher. Der by. Pet Aug 3. Ord Aug 4
69 BANKRUPTCY NOTICES
Payment in ad
EDE AND SON,
Anti-Dyspeptic Cocoa or Chocolate Powder, Guaranteed Pure Soluble Cocoa of the Finest Quality, with the excess of fat extracted.
BY SPECIAL APPOINTMENT,
ROBES ith starch, &c., and IN REALITY CHEAPER than such
FOR QUEEN'S COUNSEL AND BARRISTERS.
and Clerks of the Peace.
CORPORATION ROBES, UNIVERSITY AND CLERGY GOWNS
CASES REPORTED THIS WEEK.
by the Court of Appeal in the recent case of Proctor v.
infringement of a patent, the acquiescence relied upon being that, Colonization Co.
781 while the defendants' machines were on sale, the plaintiff had
asked certain of their customers to give his own machine a trial, of London....
as it was better than that sold by the defendants, and that he had
Briton Life Association, In re 803
infringement. The chief reliance was placed upon Lord CRANWORTH'S ..... 704
Sailing-ship Owners' Mutual In dictum in Ramsden v.
Dyson (5 H. L. Cas. 140) to the effect that dempity Association
793 and Trade Protection Society v. Crompton Anglo-American
a person who suffers a stranger to build upon his land, without Booth & Co.
703 Brush Electric Light Corporation 789 pointing out the trespass at the earliest possible opportunity, New Hollingbourne Paper Mills
Crosley, In re. Munns y Burn ...
is afterwards estopped from asserting a title to the property on Co., Re
Beesley v. Blaina Furnaces Co... 798 which the other party has expended money. Lord Justice Cotton,
794 however, pointed out that a patentee's rights were not de(Claimant)
Gardner v. Mansbridge
pendent upon his giving people notice not to infringe his patent, Tussaud, Re
Goodman v. Blake
812 and that the question of the defendants' bona fides was im-
Hall, In re, Branston v. Weight that the plaintiff supposed the defendants to be ignorant of the
...... 607 existence of his patent. There was no acquiescence, and the Automatic Weighing Machine Co.
Johnstone v. Marks
806 plaintiff not having made any representation upon which the (Lim.) v. Knight
Ladywell Mining Co. v. Brookes;
Laływell Mining Co. v. Huggon's 785 defendants were entitled to rely, or by reason of which they bad
Owners of the Cargo of "The
Kronprinz” v. Owners of "The
been in any way prejudiced, there could be no acquiescence. Jordan; Munson v. Donald
Reg v. Leresche
Reg. v. Lord Truro
09 St. Andrew's Hospital, Northamp
THE OBSERVATIONs recently made by Mr. Justice HAWKINS, while v. The Shingleton Ice Co. (Lim.) 705 ton v. Shearsmith
811 on circuit, on the subject of one of the provisions in the Criminal
Law Amendment Act, 1885, may operate as a caution to those The Solicitors' Journal and Reporter. who are responsible for the hasty manner in which legislation is
too often pressed forward at the present period of the Parliamentary LONDON, AUGUST 20, 1887.
Section 4 of that Act empowers the court or justices CURRENT TOPICS.
upon the hearing of a charge of having intercourse with a girl BY AN ERROR it was made to appear last week (ante, p. 687) the evidence of such girl without an oath if it appears that she
under the age of thirteen, or of attempting such an offence, to take that the five Chancery judges had disposed of “about 120" actions does not understand the nature of an oath, but is possessed of and further considerations during the sittings just ended. The sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of the evidence and number disposed of was “about 220"; and therefore the remainder understands the duty of speaking the truth ; but no such disof the 555 undisposed of is 335, and not 435.
cretion is given where a girl of the same age is a witness upon a
minor charge of indecent assult, it being restricted to charges of THE USUAL COMPLAINTS as to overcrowding in the court of the the offences created by the section. The learned judge observed Vacation Judge have already been renewed. It is difficult to see that the statute was full of blunders, and he might have more parwby the Wednesday sittings should not be held in the Lord Chief ticularly pointed out another absurdity in the same sectionJustice's court, the greater width of which would enable both namely, the proviso that a child whose evidence has been taken counsel and solicitors to await their cases with a moderate degree otherwise than on oath, because she does not understand the of comfort.
nature of an oath, is still “liable to indictment and punishment
for perjury." ON WEDNESDAY, the 17th inst, the first day of the Vacation Sittings, Mr. Justice KEKEWICH had before him a considerable list THE RECENT REPORT of the committee on the staff of the legal of 35 applications. The sitting lasted till nearly half-past three offices undoubtedly affords ample justification for the proposed o'clock, and about 22 orders were made, the rest of the applications reduction of the number of the Masters of the Supreme Court being postponed at the instance of the parties.
from eighteen to fifteen. It will be remembered that the former
number was fixed as the maximum by section 8 of the Supreme The Endacort perjury case will possibly give rise to a question Court of Judicature (Officers) Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 78), and of evidence in connection with the admissibility of the statements that the masters were reduced to that number last year by the the Chief Commissioner of Police. The magistrate at Bow-street the masters were first intrusted with jurisdiction at chambers it transpired at that inquiry ; but it is dificult to see how the defend than they had previously been, but this increase of their labours ant’s voluntary statements can be excluded at the trial. It has has since been to a great extent neutralised by the appointment of de pestigation in a bankruptey proceeding are evidence against of the original fifteen masters of the three common law.courts has deponent in a subsequent criminal proceeding; and in Reg. v. Toote more recently been shared by the former associates of the same courte, 121 W. R. 553, 4 P. C. 599) the Judicial Committee of the the Queen's Coroner, the Master of the Crown Ofice, and the
The position of master, while Prive Council laid down that all depositions legally taken on oath Clerks of Records and Writs. are evidence against the witness on a criminal charge, except such bringing with it (after the first three years of service) a salary that answers given without objection are to be deemed voluntary." Police Magistrate, appears, from the recent report, to involve, as a tarily and not on oath are evidence against the declarant on this that a whole day's holiday is not an unusual occurrence even in though they would, of course, be evidence against the cascondendo y masters hold other offices, carrying with them in each case an the other hand, if any such person should be eiramined at the membrancer, while Master Gordon acts as Registrar of judgments, trifore they could be cross-examined as to their previous statements and Master Kave as Registrar of acknowledgements by married beiore Sir CHARLES WARREN.
THE QUESTION as to the right to discovery which was raised THE QUESTION of éstoppel by acquiescence was considered | before the Court of Appeal in Young v. Holloway (35 W. R. 751)
appears to be a novel one-namely, whether anonymous letters trustees to advance on mortgage of business premises, for, of
EVIDENCE TO BASTARDISE ISSU others. Lord Justice Cotton pointed out that the plaintiff's counsel could not suggest that the letters to the solicitor and The questions of the presumption of legitimacy and of the admiscounsel were intended to be used in any other legal proceedings, sibility of evidence tending to bastardise the issue of married women and he therefore inferred that they were sent for the purpose of have, on three recent occasions, been considered in the Probate, the probate action. With reference to the argument that the Divorce, and Admiralty Division. Hetherington v. Hetherington letters had been communicated voluntarily by a person who was (12 P. D. 112) was an appeal against an order of two justices of not even a quasi-agent of the plaintiff, he thought that the in- the peace, who had, after the conviction of a husband for an formation contained in them was really the result of the solicitor's aggravated assault upon his wife, made an order for a judicial labour and skill, and was “obtained by him to be used in the separation, under section 4 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1878 litigation. Lord Justice LINDLEY, although not without doubt as (41 & 42 Vict, c. 19), and ordered him to pay a weekly sum to the point, observed that the privilege did not depend upon the towards his wife's maintenance and that of their children. "On a question whether the solicitor had sought for the information, but subsequent application to the justices to vary the order the wife upon the character in which he obtained it; and he characterised was called as a witness, and in cross-examination by her husband's the argument that the solicitor could not be said to have ob- solicitor admitted that she had, a few weeks previously, giren tained” the information, because it had been voluntarily given birth to an illegitimate child; but the magistrates refused to receive to him, as being “ too refined.” Lord Justice Bowen held that the wife's admission, or to allow the husband to give evidence of nonthe case was covered by Lyell v. Kennedy (32 W. R. 497, 9 App. access, holding that by so doing they should be allowing parents to Cas., 8.1), where Lord BLACKBURN said that public policy protects give evidence to bastardise the issue of the marriage. Sir James a solicitor from disclosing any information which he obtains while Hannen, besides disposing of a question as to the power of the employed in that capacity. Applying that rule, it was difficult to court to entertain an application to vary the order of the justices, see why the letters were sent to the plaintiff's legal advisers if they laid down that after the order of the magistrates for a judicial were not sent for the purposes of the action, and therefore in separation, such order being equivalent to a divorce a mensâ et formation voluntarily given must stand on the same footing as to thoro, the ordinary presumption of legitimacy was reversed, so privilege from production as information which had been sought that it must be presumed that a child born more than nine months for by the solicitor himself.
after the separation of the parties was illegitimate, unless it was
of bastardy instead of an issue of adultery, and that therefore it
In Pryor v. Pryor and Shelford (35 W. R. 349, 12 P. D. 165) Whiteley v. Learoyd, that a trustee is not relieved from responsi- the question was raised upon an application to confirm the regisbility by the report of a valuer employed by him to value property trar's report on a petition for variation of settlements after a for the purpose of a mortgage investment, but is bound to exercise decree dissolving a marriage on the ground of the wife's adultery, an independent judgment on the report, has indicated a new Previous to the adultery there was no issue of the marriage, but direction in which the screw may be applied ; and it seems probable the respondent had given birth to a child after the decree nisi, and that for the next year or so the lists of the courts will be filled fourteen months after she had ceased to cohabit with the petiwith applications against trustees, on the ground that, acting on tioner, and she had since married the co-respondent. The petithe now antiquated notion that it is not worth while both to keep tioner's counsel applied to the court to refer the matter back to a dog and to bark yourself, they have accepted the valuation of the the registrar for the purpose of taking evidence as to the child's valuers employed by them with regard to mortgage investments with paternity; but Sir James Hannen declined to allow the question of out "exercising an independent judgment” upon it. In Re Parting- legitimacy to be raised at that stage of the suit, and pointed out ton, Partington v. Allen, which we report elsewhere, Mr. Justice that the decree had been founded on the petitioner's evidence, Stirling lays down the result of Speight v. Gaunt (31 W. R. 401, 9 which was not admissible to prove the child's bastardy, App. Cas. 1) and Whiteley v. Learoyd as follows:-“ A trustee may avail himself of assistance and advice in the execution of his trust, but a divorced wife had never, before the case of Pryor v. Pryor and
It is singular that the question of the legitimacy of the child of having obtained that assistance and advice, he is not bound (ay. Shelford, been brought before the court, and that the recent suit entitled) to adopt it blindly, but must exercise his judgment upon of Bosville v. The Attorney-General (ante, p. 593) should be it to the same extent to which an ordinarily prudent man would apparently the first case of this description. It was a petition exercise his judgment in dealing with his own affairs.” Assuming under the Legitimacy Declaration Act for a declaration that the that the report of the valuer on a proposed mortgage security infant petitioner was the legitimate son of Mr. and Mrs. Bosville, states (as it ought to state), not merely that the property will be a whose marriage had been dissolved on the ground of the wife's good security for the amount proposed to be invested, but also the adultery. actual selling value of the property, does the above passage mean 30th of June, 1884, with Craven, the co-respondent, and had, on
The wife bad eloped from her husband's house on the that, the “judgment " of the trustee is to consist of a simple the 3rd of April, 1885, given birth to the petitioner. The peticomputation to ascertain whether such selling value shews a titioner's counsel called "no medical evidence at the trial, but margin of one-third in the case of land, and one-half in the case of submitted that, as the birth of the child took place not more than buildings ? Apparently not, for that can hardly be said to be 277 days after the cessation of cohabitation between the husband employed the valuer must practically’re-value the property. The legitimacy must be presumed. The counsel for the husband called recent decision further sbews that, in the case of property employed evidence to shew that, though the husband and wife slept together for business purposes, a trustee must require a valuer not merely on the night of the 29th of June, menstruation was progressing to state the selling value of the property as it stands, but also the when Mrs. Bosville left her husband's house, and two medical value of the land and buildings proposed to be mortgaged inde- witnesses expressed an opinion that such a condition of things pendently of their value for business purposes ; and it is to be rendered pregnancy before the date of her departure almost im to this last value, and not to the value for business purposes. 275 days. It was also shewn that the wife addressed two letters This extension of the rule should be carefully observed. "If it to her husband just before the petitioner's birth, and in neither of should be upheld it will render it practically impossible for them referred to her pregnancy. Sir James Hannen, in summing
up the case to the jury, expressed his regret that the law excluded Sm. 431). Stock purchased by husband in the names of the trus-
to the donor: Standing v Bowring (27 Ch. D. 341). Where there
Purchase in the name of a person whom the purchaser is bound thus no misdirection; and at the same time it could not be argued to support.—On the other hand," where one person stands in such that the verdict was against the weight of evidence. There was a relation to another that there is an obligation on that person to no medical evidence called for the petitioner, and in the recent make a provision for the other, and we find either a purchase or Aylesford Peerage case (11 App. Cas. 1), Lord Blackburn had laid investment in the name of the other, or in the joint names of the down that, though the parents of a child are not competent person and the other, of an amount which would constitute a witnesses on an issue as to its legitimacy, their admissions might be provision for the other, the presumption arises of an intention on relevant as evidence of their conduct. All the facts relied upon the part of the person to discharge the obligation to the other ;
and by the husband appeared to be admissible according to this test, therefore, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that purchase and therefore the verdict was not against the weight of evidence or investment is held to be in itself evidence of a gift. In other This decision is now under appeal, but it is hardly to be expected words, the presumption of gift arises from the moral obligation to that the Court of Appeal will disturb the rule which has been ac- give” (per Jessel, M. R., Bennet v. Bennet, 10 Ch. D., at p. 476). The cepted since the decision of the House of Lords in Morris v. Davies, Master of the Rolls then proceeds to explain the doctrine of in loco as explained by the recent Aylesford Peerage case. The Divisional parentis (see this fully discussed in E. N. & C. on Interpretation, Court have fully recognised the principle that the presumption of 350), and continues : ""So that a person in loco parentis means a legitimacy cannot be displaced upon a balance of probabilities, but person taking upon himself the duty of a father of a child to make only by evidence which carries to the mind of the court or jury provision for that child. It is clear that in that case the prethe conviction that a child born in wedlock is not the issue of sumption can only arise from the obligation ; and, therefore, in that the husband ; but the known facts of the Bosville divorce suit lead case the doctrine can only have reference to the obligation of a to the conclusion that the result of the legitimacy suit is in father to provide for his child, and nothing else. But the father accordance with substantial justice.
is under that obligation from the mere fact of his being the father, and therefore no evidence is necessary to shew the obligation to provide for his child, because that is part of his duty. In the case
of a father you have only to prove the fact that he is the father, THE LAW OF GIFTS INTER VIVOS.
and, when you have done that, the obligation at once arises; but,
in the case of a person in loco parentis, you must prove that he II.
took on himself the obligation. But in our law there is no Purchases in the name of stranger.-It might be thought that moral legal obligation—I do not know how to express it more the mere fact of A. purchasing property in B.'s name was strong shortly—no obligation according to the rules of equity, on a mother evidence that A. intended to make a gift of the property to B. to provide for her child ; there is no such obligation that a court of But this is not the case ; the equitable interest results to the person equity recognizes as such.". who advances the money. This is the rule, whatever be the nature It follows from the doctrine here laid down :
(1) That a transfer to, or a purchase in the name of, a child by in the name of a stranger alone, or of a stranger jointly with the a father, or in the joint names of himself and a child, amounts, in purchaser, or of a stranger in succession to the purchaser. Evi- the absence of evidence to the contrary, to a gift to that child ; purchase was made, or as to the course of dealing with the prop- of, a child does not amount to a gift to that child in the absence erty for the purpose of rebutting the rule.
of evidence that a gift was intended ; The cases may be classified as follows :
(3) That a transfer to, or a purchase in the name of, an illegiti. (12. Where a transfer to or a purchase in the name of a stranger mate child by its father, or in the name of a mistress by the man Ch. 80); Anon. (Freem. Ca. Ch. 123); E. N. & c. on Interpreta- evidence that a gift was intended; ens held not to amount to a gift : Norfolk v. Browne (Finch Pre. with whom she lives, does not amount to a gift in the absence of tion, chap. xx.; Lewin on Trusts, chap. ix.
(4) That a transfer to, or a purchase in the name of, a grandf? Where a purchase in the name of a stranger was held to be a child whose father is dead, by a grandfather, amounts to a gift in gift for his benefit. Moneys paid into savings bank, and paid into bank the absence of evidence to the contrary; educating and intended to provide for, though the nephewms father his wife amounts to a gift to the wife in the absence of evidence was alive : Currant v. Jago (1 Coll. 261). ”Stock partly purchased to the contrary: in the name of, and partly transferred into the name of, a niece,
Evidence as to whether the transaction was intended to amount with a contemporaneous letter of gift : Beecher v. Mayor (2 Dr. & to a gift or not may be afforded
(1) By the contemporaneous declarations of the person making Marshall v. Crutwell (20 Eq. 330); Re Young (28 Ch. D. 705): the transfer or purchase;
see Lloyd v. Pughe, ubi. sup. (2) By the circumstances attending the transfer.
(3) By the acts or declarations of the person to whom the transfer, or in whose name the purchase, is made subsequent to the transfer or purchase.
CASES OF LAST WEEK. Purchases in the name of a child.—A purchase by a father in the name of a child, whether in the name of the child alone, or of COUNSELL v. LONDON AND WESTMINSTER LOAN AND DIS. the child jointly with the purchaser, or of a child in succession to
COUNT CO.-C. A. No. 1, 11th August. the purchaser, is, primâ facie, intended to be an advancement of Bill of Sale—PROMISSORY NOTE OF EVEN Date --Whole AMOUNT IN that child. Evidence is, however, admissible as to the motive PROMISSORY NOTE TO BECOME DUE ON Non PAYMENT OF ONE INSTAL. with which the purchase was made or as to the course of dealing MENT-VALIDITY-BILLS OF SALE Act, 1882. with the property for the purpose of rebutting the rule.
This was an action by the grantor of a bill of sale against the grantee The cases may be classified as follows :
for trespass and wrongful seizure of the plaintiff's goods, and the question
raised was as to the validity of the bill of sale. The bill of sale was given (1) Where a purchase by a father in the name of a child was
as security for a loan of £80, and interest, repayable by instalments. The held' to amount to an advancement: Elliot v. Elliot (2 Cha. Ca. bill of sale, taken by itself, was admitted to be valid, but con231); Mumma v. Mumma (2 Vern. 19); Taylor v. Taylor (1 Atk. temporaneously with it, and in respect of the same loan, the grantor gave 386); Grey v. Grey (2 Swans. 594); Sidmouth v. Sidmouth (2 the grantee a promissory note for £95 12s., the total amount of the loan
and interest, payable by the same instalments as in the bill of sale, and Beav. 447); Williams v. Williams (32 Beav. 370); Hepworth v.
in case default was made in payment of any one instalment, the sum Hepworth (11 Eq. 10); see also Soar v. Fuster (4 K. & J. 152); remaining unpaid should become due and payable. Denman, J., who and that though the purchase was in the names of the child and a tried the case, held, on the authority of Simpson v. Charing Cross Bank (34 trustee : Lamplugh v. Lamplugh (1 P. Wms. 110); Crabb v. W. R. 568), that the promissory note rendered the bill of sale void. The Crabb (1 My. & Kee. 511); or the joint names of the father and Divisional Court having affirmed this judgment, the defendants appealed. child : Scroope v. Scroopé (1 Cha. Ca. 27); Back v. Andrews | Esher, M.R., said that at the same time as the bill of sale, and as part of (Finch Pre. Ch. 1); where the child was nominated by the father the same transaction, the grantee of the bill of sale took a promissory as cestui que vie in remainder of copyholds, and, by the custom, note for the exact amount covered by the bill of sale and interest. A bill the first cestui que vie took the whole beneficial interest : Dyer v.
of sale was the contract between the parties reduced into writing. Were
there two contracts here or only one ? Looking at the identity of dates Dyer (2 Cox, 92); Murless v. Franklin (1 Swans. 13); Finch v.
and figures, his lordship had no doubt that there was only one contract Finch (15 Ves. 43); Swift d. Farr v. Davis (8 East, 354 note), embodied in two documents. One document had been registered. Would where the conveyance was to qualify the son to vote : May v. May the other document, which was part of the same contract, have any effect (33 Beav. 81).
upon the registered document? If the amount payable under the The evidence admissible to shew that a transfer to, or a purchase promissory note were paid either to the grantee or to a third person, with
whom the note had been discounted, the registered bill of sale would be of in the name of, a child by a father was not intended to be an ad no further effect. The bill of sale would be defeated. The note, there. vancement may be:
fore, would operate as a defeasance of the bill of sale, and, under section (a.) Evidence of the father's intention contemporaneous with, 10, sub-section 3, of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, ought to have been conbut not after, the purchase : Elliot v. Elliot (2 Cha. Ca. 231); therefore, rendered void by the Bills of Sale Act, 1882. LINDLEY and Woodman v. Morrel (Freem. Ch. Ca. 32); Birch v. Blagrave Lopes, L.JJ., concurred. - COUNSEL, Crispe and McIntyre; Channell, Q C., (Amb., at p. 266); Murless v. Franklin (1 Swans. 13); Sidmouth and Melsheimer. SOLICITORS, Thomas Young; Vanderpump. V. Sidmouth (2 Beav. 447); Christy v. Courtenay (13 Beav. 96); Dumper v. Dumper (3 Giff. 583); Williams v. Williams (32 Beav. PURKISS ~. HOLLAND; COOPER (CLAIMANT)-C. A. No. 1,
10th August. 370); Stock v. McAvoy (15 Eq. 55); Prankerd v. Prankerd (1 Sim. & St. 1); Collinson v. Collinson (3 De G. M. & G. 409);
-PAYING MONEY INTO COURT-FORM OF ORDER.
Certain goods in the Albert Palace were taken in execution of a judg: (6.) Acts or declarations of the child after the purchase, per by the claimant. The defendant, the execution debtor, was tenant to the
ment recovered by the plaintiff against the defendant, and were claimed Langdale, M.R.: Sidmouth v. Sidmouth (2 Beav., at p. 455); Pole Albert Palace Co., and the claimant was appointed by the court receiver v. Pole (1 Ves. sen. 76); Scawin v. Scawin (1 Y. & C. C. C. 65). of all the property of the company. The master made the usual order (2) Where a transfer to, or purchase in the name of, a grandchild, directed an issue. This order having been affirmed, the claimant appealed,
that the claimant should pay £80, the value of the goods, into court, and whose father was dead, by the grandfather amounted to a gift: and contended that he, as receiver, should not be called upon to pay £80 Ebrand v. Dancer (2 Cha. Ca. 26); Soar v. Foster (4 K. & J. 152). out of his own pocket. (3) Where a transfer to, or a purchase in the name of, a child by
The Court (Lord Esher, M. R., LINDLEY and Lopes, L.JJ.) allowed the its mother was held not to be a gift: Holt v. Frederick (2 P. Wms. appeal. They said that a claimant was as a general rule ordered to 356 ; same case, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 446, pl. 2); Re De Visme (2 De and if the claimant were not a receiver the order would be quite right; G. J. & S. 17); Bennet v. Bennet (10 Ch. D. 474); Garrett v. but it was not necessary for the protection of the execution creditor that Wilkinson (2 De G. & Sm. 244) (the son was his mother's solici- the receiver, an officer of the court, who had no personal interest in the tor, and there were other special circumstances).
matter, should bring money into court. The order that the court would Where a transfer to, or a purchase in the name of, a child by its goods and keep them subject to the further order of the court. That
make would be that the claimant do, as an officer of the court, hold the mother was held to be a gift : Sayre v. Hughes (5 Eq. 376); would give full protection to the execution creditor.--Counsel, R; A. Batstone v. Salter (19 Eq. 250 ; on appeal, 10 Ch. 431).
McCall; Guiry and Cannot. SOLICITORS, McDiarmid f Teather ; Donaldson (4) Where a purchase by a husband in the name of his wife or in their joint names, or in the joint names of the husband, wife,
Re EASY, Ex parte HILL & HYMANS–C. A. No. 1, 11th August. and a stranger, was held to amount to a gift to the wife : Kingdon BANKRUPTCY—PetitiON —Death of Derton before Service or PETITION v. Bridges (2 Vern. 67); Back v. Andrew (2 Vern. 120); Christ's
- STAY OF PROCEEDINGS—BANKRUPTCY Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), Hospital v. Budgin (2 Vern. 683); Lorrimer v. Lorrimer (10 Ves. 367n); Dummer v. Pitcher (2 My. & K. 262); Low v. Carter (1 but before the petition was served the debtor died.
Certain creditors presented a bankruptcy petition againt the debtor, Beav. 426); Drew v. Martin (2 H. & M. 130); 'Gosling v. Gosling Hazlitt ordered all further proceedings upon the petition to be dis.com
Mr. Registrar 3 Drew. 335); Re Eykyn's Trust (6 Ch. D. 115); Re Gadbury (11 tinued. Section 108 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, provides that, " il W. R. 895).
debtor by or against whom a bankruptcy petition has been presented dies, Where a purchase by a husband in the name his wife or their the proceedings in the matter shall, unless the court otherwise orders, be joint names was not a gift to the wife: Smith v. Warde (15 Sim.
continued as it he were alive. The petitioning creditor moved, ex parte, by 56); Lloyd v. Pughe (14 Eq. 241 ; same case, 8 Ch. 88); Deroy court could order substituted service of the petition or dispense with seto
way of appeal from this order. It was contended on their behalf that the v. Devoy (3 Sm. & Giff. 403).
The mere fact of money belonging to a husband or wife trustees for the benefit of his creditors, the only mode of setting the deed being paid into their joint account at a bank may, according to the Sharp, In re Walker (34 W. R. 550) was cited.
aside was by allowing the bankruptcy proceedings to go on. Ex parie circumstances, operate or not operate as a gift to the survivor : The Court (Lord Esher, M.R., LINDLEY and Lopes, L.JJ.) dismissed