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POINTON, WILLIAM, Wolstanton, Staffordshire, Farm Labourer. Aug 25 at 2.
Off Rec, Newcastle under Lyme
POTTER, THOMAS, Gosforth, Northumberland, no occupation. Aug 18 at 3. Off
Rec. Pink lane, Newcastle on Tyne

RITSON, THOMAS, Wellingborough, Coal Merchant. Aug 18 at 4. County Court,
Northampton

ROWE, JOHN, Bletchley, Bucks, Draper. Aug 18 at 2. County Court, Northampton

SALSBURY, WILLIAM GEORGE, Gt Grimsby, Smack Owner. Aug 17 at 1. Off Rec, 3, Haven st. Gt Grimsby

SCOTT, A. G, Copthall chbrs, Stockbroker. Aug 16 at 11. Bankruptcy bldgs. Lincoln's inn

STOKES, WILLIAM HENRY, Birchfield, Staffs, Jeweller. Aug 24 at 3. 25, Colmore row, Birmingham

TEED, ALFRED HALL. 16, Union ter, St Mary Church, Devon, Grocer. Aug 17 at 3. Castle of Exeter, Exeter

THOMSON, PETER, Hedworth, Durham, Farmer. Aug 18 at 2.30. Off Rec, Pink lane, Newcastle on Tyne

TOMPKIN, GEORGE, Silverdale, Staffs, Baker. under Lyme

WALDRON, JOHN, Walthamstow, Baker.

inn

Aug 24 at 4. Off Rec, Newcastle Aug 18 at 11. 33, Carey st, Lincoln's

WILDING, HENRY AMBLER, Frederick st, Gray's inn rd, Clerk. Aug 17 at 11. Bankruptcy bldgs, Lincoln's inn

WILLIS, GEORGE, Askew crescent, Askew rd, Shepherd's Bush. Aug 17 at 12. 33, Carey st, Lincoln's inn

WORTERS, WILLIAM HENRY. Broughton, Northamptonshire, Commission Agent. Aug 18 at 1. County Court, Northampton

WRIGHT, ALBERT GEORGE, Broadwater, Builder. Aug 18 at 12. 4, Pavilion bldgs, Brighton

WRIGHT, JOHN, Masbrough, nr Rotherham, Yeast Dealer. Aug 17 at 11.30. Off
Rec, Figtree lane, Sheffield
ALBERT, EDWARD, EMANUEL ALBERT, and FRANCIS HAUPTMAN,

ADJUDICATIONS.

Station rd, Willesden, Glass Manufacturers. High Court. Pet July 14. Ord Aug 4 ANDREW, RICHARD, Gainsborough, Miller. Lincoln. Pet Aug 4. Ord Aug 4 BAKER, FREDERICK GEORGE, Shanklin, I.W., Watchmaker. Newport and Ryde. Pet July 23. Ord July 27 BAILEY, WILLIAM, Rosherville, Kent, Gardener. Rochester. Pet Aug 3. Ord Aug 4 PASHFORD, GEORGE ARTHUR, Southend, Licensed Victualler High Court. Pet July 7. Ord Aug 6

BENSON ALFRED, King's Head ct, Shoe lane, Publican. High Court. Ord Aug 4 BERRY, WILLIAM. Darlington, Tailor's Assistant. Stockton on Tees and Middlesborough. Pet Aug 4. Ord Aug 4

BINNS, JABEZ, Nelson, Lancashire, out of business. Burnley. Pet July 29.
Aug 4

Ord BLAMIRES, JOSHUA, Staincliffe, nr Batley, Rag Merchant. Dewsbury. Pet July

18. Ord Aug 3

BRIDGER, RUEBEN, High rd, Kilburn, Draper. High Court. Pet July 29. Ord Aug 6

BRINKWORTH, ROBERT MESSITER, Bath, Corn Merchant. Bath. Pet July 16. Ord Aug 6

BURN, RICHARD, Liverpool, Ship Broker. Liverpool. Pet July 1. Ord Aug 2 BUTTERFIELD, ELIJAH TATHAM, Nelson, Lancashire, Builder. Burnley. Pet July 19 Ord Aug 4

CALWELL. ROBERT, Hayton, Cumberland, Farmer. Carlisle. Pet Aug 6. Ord Aug 6

CLUTTERBUCK, JABEZ, Bristol, out of business. Bristol. Pet July 21. Ord Aug 4 COWDREY, ALFRED, New Clee, Lincolnshire, Fisherman. Great Grimsby. Pet Aug 5. Ord Aug 5

CROWTHER, JOSEPH. West Vale, nr Halifax, Rate Collector. Halifax. Pet July 29. Ord Aug 5

Pet July 5.

DALTROFF, BENJAMIN, City rd, Boot Manufact irer. High Court.
Ord Aug 4
DAVIES, GEORGE HENRY, Swansea, Builder. Swansea. Pet Aug 4. Ord Aug 5
DAVIS, WILLIAM, Walsall, Police Constable. Walsall. Pet July 27. Ord Aug 4
DAWSON, GEORGE MASON, Broadstairs, Builder. Canterbury. Pet Aug 4. Ord
Aug 4

FARR. GWENLLIAN, Porth, Glamorganshire, Grocer. Pontypridd. Pet Aug 3
Ord Aug 4

FIRTH. FREDERICK, JOSEPH FIRTH, and EDWIN FIRTH, Dewsbury, Joiners. Dewsbury. Pet Aug 5. Ord Aug 5

FIRTH, FREDERICK, and WILLIAM HOWROYD FIRTH, Dewsbury, Yorks, Ironfounders. Dewsbury. Pet Aug 5 Ord Aug 5

GERRARD, THOMAS, Hindley, Lancs, Grocer. Wigan. Pet Aug 3. Ord Aug 5 GORMAN. EDWARD, Ryde, I W, Mealman. Newport and Ryde. Pet July 5. Ord Aug 5

GOULSTONE, HENRY ALBERT, Yate, Glouces, Innkeeper. Bristol. Pet July 28. Ord Aug 5

GROVES, THOMAS EDWARD, Aylestone pk, Leicestershire, Carriage Builder. Leicester. Pet Aug 5. Ord Aug 5

HEMINGWAY, CAROLINE, Mirfield, Yorks, Draper. Dewsbury. Pet July 28. Ord Aug 3

HIBBEN, JOHN MAXTED, Gt Yarmouth, Shipsmith. Gt Yarmouth. Pet Aug 5. Ord Aug 5

HIGGINS, S. Leather lane, Provision Dealer. High Court. Pet July 21. Ord Aug 5

HIRD, HARTLEY, and HOLLINGS SMITH, Bradford, Worsted Stuff Makers. Bradford. Pet Aug 4. Ord Aug 4

HODGKINSON, JOSEPH, Derby, Butcher. Derby. Pet Aug 3. Ord Aug 4

SCHWEITZER'S COCOATINA.

Anti-Dyspeptic Cocoa or Chocolate Powder. Guaranteed Pure Soluble Cocoa of the Finest Quality, with the excess of fat extracted.

The Faculty pronounce it "the most nutritious, perfectly digestible beverage for Breakfast, Luncheon, or Supper, and invaluable for Invalids and Children."

Highly commended by the entire Medical Press. Being without sugar, spice, or other admixture, it suits all palates, keeps for years in all climates, and is four times the strength of cocoas THICKENED yet WEAKENED with starch, &c., and IN REALITY CHEAPER than such Mixtures.

Made instantaneously with boiling water, a te spoonful to a Breakfast Cup, costing less than a halfpenny. COCOATINA A LA VANILLE 18 the most delicate, digestible, cheapest Manilla Chocolate, and may be taken when richer chocolate is prohibited.

In tins at 1s. 6d., 3s., 5s. 6d., &c., by Chemists and
Grocers.
Charities on Special Terms by the Sole Proprietor,
H. SCHWEITZER & Co., 10, Adam-st., Strand, London, W.C.

HOY, WALTER, Romford rd, Forest Gate, Nurseryman. High Court. Pet July
16. Ord Aug 5
HUGHES, WILLIAM, and THOMAS OWEN, Bangor, Ironmongers. Bangor. Pet
Aug 2. Ord Aug 5
LAUNDON, JOHN EADY, Kibworth Beauchamp, Leicestershire, Butcher. Leices-
ter. Pet July 16. Ord Aug 5
LEE, FAULKNER, Devonsbire st, Gt Portland st, Surveyor. High Court. Pet
July 11. Ord Aug 5

LEARMONTH, JOSEPH STEPHEN, King's Lynn, Lodging-house Keeper. King's
Lynn. Pet Aug 2. Ord Aug 6
LEWIS, HENRY, Caldicot, Mon, Grocer. Newport, Mon. Pet July 30. Ord Aug 6
LEWIS, HENRY WALTER, Bath, Plumber. Bath. Pet July 20. Ord Aug 3
LEWIS, JAMES THOMAS, Pembroke Dock, Grocer. Pembroke Dock. Pet July 30.
Ord Aug 6

LOVETT, SAMUEL, Aston, Warwickshire, Coal Merchant. Birmingham. Pet
July 26. Ord Aug 4
MEADOWS, ANDREW MILES, Kirby Bellars, Leicestershire, Farmer. Leicester.
Pet July 9. Ord Aug 5

MILLS, JOSEPH, Hanley, Staffordshire, Brickmaker. Hanley, Burslem, and Tunstall. Pet Aug 2. Ord Aug 5

NOYES, ROBERT JOHN, Swansea, Boot Maker. Swansea. Pet Aug 4. Ord Aug 5.
OVENS, JOSEPH, Henbury, Gloucestershire, Wheelwright. Bristol. Pet Aug 2.
Ord Aug 4.
PARKINSON, FRANK ARTHUR, Leicester, Caterer. Leicester. Pet June 29. Ord
July 19

PHILLIPS, WILLIAM, Hereford, Coal Agent. Hereford. Pet Aug 6. Ord Aug 6
PICCIRILLO, CATARINA. Wigmore st, Cavendish sq, Italian Warehouseman. High
Court. Pet April 30. Ord Aug 6
POOLE, REGINALD CLAUDE, and EDWARD FRANCIS LAMBERT BROWN. Queen Vic-
toria st, Mantle Manufacturers. High Court. Pet Aug 3. Ord Aug 4
POTTER, THOMAS. Gosforth, Northumberland, no occupation, Newcastle. Pet
Aug 4. Ord Aug 4.
ROBERTSON, W., Brabant ct, Tea Merchant. High Court. Pet June 13. Ord
Aug 4

RODWAY, CHARLES JOHN, Nailsworth, Gloucestershire, Ironmonger. Gloucester.
Pet June 27. Ord Aug 4

SAUNDERS, ELIZA, Folkestone, Boot Dealer. Canterbury. Pet Aug 4. Ord
Aug 4
SILVER, RICHARD, the younger, Tittle Row, nr Maidenhead, Machinist. Windsor.
Pet Aug 3. Ord Aug 3
SPRUCE, FRANK. Knutsford, Cheshire, Coal Merchant. Manchester. Pet Aug 5.
Ord Aug 5
SYKES, BENJAMIN, Liverpool, Gent. Liverpool. Pet July 12. Ord Aug 2
TAYLOR, EDWARD BROWN, Oat lane, Trimming Manufacturer. High Court. Pet
July 19. Ord Aug 6

Aug 6

THOMSON, PETER, Hedworth, Duraham, Farmer. Newcastle. Pet Aug 4. Ord THORPE, WILLIAM, Mapperley, Nottingham, Lace Manufacturer. Nottingham. Pet June 22. Ord Aug 4

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694

LEGAL NEWS WINDING-UP NOTICES CREDITORS' NOTICES BANKRUPTCY NOTICES

......

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691 ..... 695 ...... ..... 695 695

UNTEARABLE LETTER COPYING BOOKS.

(HOWARD'S PATENT.)

1,000 Leaf Book, 5s. 6d.

500 Leaf Book, 3s. 6d. English made

THE BEST LETTER COPYING BOOK OUT.

WODDERSPOON & CO.,

7, SERLE STREET, AND 1, PORTUGAL STREET, LINCOLN'S INN, W.C.

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Blake v. Mayor and Corporation
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Beddington v. Atlee

V.

791

799

791

793

Beyfus. Ex parte. In re Saville
Briton Life Association, In re
Carmichael & Co. v. Liverpool
Sailing-ship Owners' Mutual In-
demnity Association
Crompton Anglo-American
Brush Electric Light Corporation 789
Crosley, In re. Munns v Burn... 790
Beesley v. Blaina Furnaces Co... 798
794

Edmonds v. Blaina Furnaces Co.;

Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insur-
ance Co.

Gardner v. Mansbridge
Gee v. Bell

Goodman v. Blake

by the Court of Appeal in the recent case of Proctor v. Bennis (ante, p. 691), which was an action to restrain the infringement of a patent, the acquiescence relied upon being that, while the defendants' machines were on sale, the plaintiff had asked certain of their customers to give his own machine a trial, as it was better than that sold by the defendants, and that he had not then given the defendants notice that they had been guilty of 803 infringement. The chief reliance was placed upon Lord CRANWORTH'S dictum in Ramsden v. Dyson (5 H. L. Cas. 140) to the effect that a person who suffers a stranger to build upon his land, without pointing out the trespass at the earliest possible opportunity, is afterwards estopped from asserting a title to the property on which the other party has expended money. Lord Justice COTTON, however, pointed out that a patentee's rights were not dependent upon his giving people notice not to infringe his patent, and that the question of the defendants' bona fides was immaterial. Moreover, there was nothing to lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff supposed the defendants to be ignorant of the existence of his patent. There was no acquiescence, and the plaintiff not having made any representation upon which the defendants were entitled to rely, or by reason of which they had been in any way prejudiced, there could be no acquiescence.

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805

812

Gray, In re, Dresser v. Gray 795
Gregson, In re, Christison v. Bolam 803
Hall, In re, Branston v. Weight-

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Hughes v. Finney
Johnstone v. Marks
Ladywell Mining Co. v. Brookes;

797

807

806
La ly well Mining Co. v. Huggons 785

Owners of the Cargo of "The
Kronprinz" v. Owners of "The
Kronprinz "

Reg v. Leresche

Reg. v. Lord Truro

..... .........

St. Andrew's Hospital, Northamp-
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783 805 803

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THE ENDACOTT perjury case will possibly give rise to a question of evidence in connection with the admissibility of the statements made by the accused and other persons at the public inquiry before the Chief Commissioner of Police. The magistrate at Bow-street has determined to exclude from the depositions everything which transpired at that inquiry; but it is difficult to see how the defendant's voluntary statements can be excluded at the trial. It has been several times held that depositions taken on a compulsory investigation in a bankruptcy proceeding are evidence against the deponent in a subsequent criminal proceeding; and in Reg. v. Coote (21 W. R. 553, 4 P. C. 599) the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council laid down that all depositions legally taken on oath are evidence against the witness on a criminal charge, except such as he has objected to as having a tendency to criminate him, and that answers given without objection" are to be deemed voluntary." From this it would follow à fortiori that statements made voluntarily and not on oath are evidence against the declarant on his trial. The statements made by other persons at the inquiry, though they would, of course, be evidence against the accused if made in his presence, could not be proved in their absence. the other hand, if any such persons should be examined at the trial, they could be cross-examined as to their previous statements

before Sir CHARLES WARREN.

On

THE OBSERVATIONS recently made by Mr. Justice HAWKINS, while on circuit, on the subject of one of the provisions in the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, may operate as a caution to those who are responsible for the hasty manner in which legislation is too often pressed forward at the present period of the Parliamentary year. Section 4 of that Act empowers the court or justices upon the hearing of a charge of having intercourse with a girl under the age of thirteen, or of attempting such an offence, to take the evidence of such girl without an oath if it appears that she does not understand the nature of an oath, but "is possessed of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of the evidence and understands the duty of speaking the truth; " but no such discretion is given where a girl of the same age is a witness upon a minor charge of indecent assult, it being restricted to charges of the offences created by the section. The learned judge observed that the statute was full of blunders, and he might have more particularly pointed out another absurdity in the same sectionnamely, the proviso that a child whose evidence has been taken otherwise than on oath, because she does not understand the nature of an oath, is still "liable to indictment and punishment for perjury."

When

THE RECENT REPORT of the committee on the staff of the legal offices undoubtedly affords ample justification for the proposed reduction of the number of the Masters of the Supreme Court from eighteen to fifteen. It will be remembered that the former number was fixed as the maximum by section 8 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Officers) Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 78), and that the masters were reduced to that number last year by the retirement of the senior master, Sir FREDERICK POLLOCK. the masters were first intrusted with jurisdiction at chambers it was thought that their duties would become much more onerous than they had previously been, but this increase of their labours has since been to a great extent neutralised by the appointment of of the original fifteen masters of the three common law courts has Official Referees and of Examiners of the court, while the business more recently been shared by the former associates of the same courts, the Queen's Coroner, the Master of the Crown Office, and the Clerks of Records and Writs. The position of master, while bringing with it (after the first three years of service) a salary of the same amount as that of a County Court Judge, or a Metropolitan Police Magistrate, appears, from the recent report, to involve, as a general rule, only four hours official attendance. It is also hinted that a whole day's holiday is not an unusual occurrence even in the middle of a sitting. It is to be observed that some of the masters hold other offices, carrying with them in each case an increase of remuneration. Thus Master POLLOCK is also Queen's Remembrancer, while Master GORDON acts as Registrar of judgments, and Master KAYE as Registrar of acknowledgements by married

women.

THE QUESTION as to the right to discovery which was raised THE QUESTION of estoppel by acquiescence was considered before the Court of Appeal in Young v. Holloway (35 W. R. 751)

appears to be a novel one-namely, whether anonymous letters addressed to a legal adviser are privileged from production. Two anonymous letters had been addressed to the plaintiff in a probate action, and another anonymous letter was addressed to her solicitor, and another to her counsel. All four letters were included in the plaintiff's affidavit of documents. She claimed privilege in respect of them, but Mr. Justice BUTT ordered all the four letters to be produced. The Court of Appeal upheld his decision as to the letters addressed to the plaintiff, but reversed it as to the two others. Lord Justice COTTON pointed out that the plaintiff's counsel could not suggest that the letters to the solicitor and counsel were intended to be used in any other legal proceedings, and he therefore inferred that they were sent for the purpose of the probate action. With reference to the argument that the letters had been communicated voluntarily by a person who was not even a quasi-agent of the plaintiff, he thought that the information contained in them was really the result of the solicitor's labour and skill, and was "obtained" by him to be used in the litigation. Lord Justice LINDLEY, although not without doubt as to the point, observed that the privilege did not depend upon the question whether the solicitor had sought for the information, but upon the character in which he obtained it; and he characterised the argument that the solicitor could not be said to have "obtained" the information, because it had been voluntarily given to him, as being "too refined." Lord Justice BOWEN held that the case was covered by Lyell v. Kennedy (32 W. R. 497, 9 App. Cas. 81), where Lord BLACKBURN said that public policy protects a solicitor from disclosing any information which he obtains while employed in that capacity. Applying that rule, it was difficult to see why the letters were sent to the plaintiff's legal advisers if they were not sent for the purposes of the action; and therefore information voluntarily given must stand on the same footing as to privilege from production as information which had been sought for by the solicitor himself.

THE WORK of tightening the rules relating to trustees' investments goes on briskly. The recent decision of the House of Lords in Whiteley v. Learoyd, that a trustee is not relieved from responsibility by the report of a valuer employed by him to value property for the purpose of a mortgage investment, but is bound to exercise an independent judgment on the report, has indicated a new direction in which the screw may be applied; and it seems probable that for the next year or so the lists of the courts will be filled with applications against trustees, on the ground that, acting on the now antiquated notion that it is not worth while both to keep a dog and to bark yourself, they have accepted the valuation of the valuers employed by them with regard to mortgage investments without "exercising an independent judgment " upon it. In Re Partington, Partington v. Allen, which we report elsewhere, Mr. Justice STIRLING lays down the result of Speight v. Gaunt (31 W. R. 401, 9 App. Cas. 1) and Whiteley v. Learoyd as follows:-"A trustee may avail himself of assistance and advice in the execution of his trust, but having obtained that assistance and advice, he is not bound [qy. entitled] to adopt it blindly, but must exercise his judgment upon it to the same extent to which an ordinarily prudent man would exercise his judgment in dealing with his own affairs." Assuming that the report of the valuer on a proposed mortgage security states (as it ought to state), not merely that the property will be a good security for the amount proposed to be invested, but also the actual selling value of the property, does the above passage mean that the "judgment" of the trustee is to consist of a simple computation to ascertain whether such selling value shews a margin of one-third in the case of land, and one-half in the case of buildings? Apparently not, for that can hardly be said to be an "exercise of judgment." If not, then the trustee who has employed the valuer must practically re-value the property. The recent decision further shews that, in the case of property employed for business purposes, a trustee must require a valuer not merely to state the selling value of the property as it stands, but also the value of the land and buildings proposed to be mortgaged independently of their value for business purposes; and it is to be presumed that the rule as to the margin of value is to be applied to this last value, and not to the value for business purposes. This extension of the rule should be carefully observed. If it should be upheld it will render it practically impossible for

trustees to advance on mortgage of business premises, for, of course, mortgagors of such premises will not be satisfied with an advance to the extent of one-half the value of the land and buildings on which their business is carried on.

EVIDENCE TO BASTARDISE ISSUE.

THE questions of the presumption of legitimacy and of the admissibility of evidence tending to bastardise the issue of married women have, on three recent occasions, been considered in the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division. Hetherington v. Hetherington (12 P. D. 112) was an appeal against an order of two justices of the peace, who had, after the conviction of a husband for an aggravated assault upon his wife, made an order for a judicial separation, under section 4 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict, c. 19), and ordered him to pay a weekly sum towards his wife's maintenance and that of their children. On a subsequent application to the justices to vary the order the wife was called as a witness, and in cross-examination by her husband's solicitor admitted that she had, a few weeks previously, given the wife's admission, or to allow the husband to give evidence of nonbirth to an illegitimate child; but the magistrates refused to receive access, holding that by so doing they should be allowing parents to give evidence to bastardise the issue of the marriage. Sir James Hannen, besides disposing of a question as to the power of the court to entertain an application to vary the order of the justices, laid down that after the order of the magistrates for a judicial separation, such order being equivalent to a divorce a mensâ et thoro, the ordinary presumption of legitimacy was reversed, so that it must be presumed that a child born more than nine months after the separation of the parties was illegitimate, unless it was shewn that they had come together again. He thought that the justices had been wrong in treating the case as involving an issue of bastardy instead of an issue of adultery, and that therefore it was their duty to hear the evidence of the parents.

In Pryor v. Pryor and Shelford (35 W. R. 349, 12 P. D. 165) the question was raised upon an application to confirm the registrar's report on a petition for variation of settlements after a decree dissolving a marriage on the ground of the wife's adultery. Previous to the adultery there was no issue of the marriage, but the respondent had given birth to a child after the decree nisi, and fourteen months after she had ceased to cohabit with the petitioner, and she had since married the co-respondent. The petitioner's counsel applied to the court to refer the matter back to the registrar for the purpose of taking evidence as to the child's paternity; but Sir James Hannen declined to allow the question of legitimacy to be raised at that stage of the suit, and pointed out that the decree had been founded on the petitioner's evidence, which was not admissible to prove the child's bastardy.

It is singular that the question of the legitimacy of the child of a divorced wife had never, before the case of Pryor v. Pryor and Shelford, been brought before the court, and that the recent suit of Bosville v. The Attorney-General (ante, p. 593) should be apparently the first case of this description. It was a petition under the Legitimacy Declaration Act for a declaration that the infant petitioner was the legitimate son of Mr. and Mrs. Bosville, whose marriage had been dissolved on the ground of the wife's adultery. The wife had eloped from her husband's house on the 30th of June, 1884, with Craven, the co-respondent, and had, on the 3rd of April, 1885, given birth to the petitioner. The petititioner's counsel called no medical evidence at the trial, but submitted that, as the birth of the child took place not more than 277 days after the cessation of cohabitation between the husband and wife-which was a not impossible period of gestation-his legitimacy must be presumed. The counsel for the husband called evidence to shew that, though the husband and wife slept together on the night of the 29th of June, menstruation was progressing when Mrs. Bosville left her husband's house, and two medical witnesses expressed an opinion that such a condition of things rendered pregnancy before the date of her departure almost impossible, and that the period of gestation seldom exceeded 275 days. It was also shewn that the wife addressed two letters to her husband just before the petitioner's birth, and in neither of them referred to her pregnancy. Sir James Hannen, in summing

up the case to the jury, expressed his regret that the law excluded the evidence of the parents in such cases, and he also observed that the stringency of the rule as to the presumption in favour of the legitimacy of the child of a married woman had been much relaxed in recent times. He directed the jury that the presumption of legitimacy could not be rebutted unless the evidence carried to their minds the conviction that the child had not been begotten by the husband, and he cited the following passage from the judgment of Lord Lyndhurst in Morris v. Davies (5 Cl. & F. 265): "That presumption of law is not lightly to be repelled. It is not to be broken in upon or shaken by a mere balance of probability. The evidence for the purpose of repelling it must be strong, distinct, satisfactory, and conclusive." The jury found that the petitioner

Iwas not the son of Mr. Bosville.

The summing up was so far favourable to the petitioner that his counsel were compelled, upon an application to a divisional court for a new trial on the grounds of misdirection and that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, to contend that the presumption of legitimacy is a præsumptio juris et de jure, and that the President ought, therefore, to have directed a verdict in favour of the petitioner, but the Divisional Court dismissed the application, and Mr. Justice Butt, in delivering the judgment of himself and the Lord Chief Justice, pointed out that the President's summing up had fully explained the law to the jury, and that it was impossible to put the case more strongly for the petitioner than by citing the above-mentioned passage from Lord Lyndhurst's judgment in Morris v. Davies. There was thus no misdirection; and at the same time it could not be argued that the verdict was against the weight of evidence. There was no medical evidence called for the petitioner, and in the recent Aylesford Peerage case (11 App. Cas. 1), Lord Blackburn had laid down that, though the parents of a child are not competent witnesses on an issue as to its legitimacy, their admissions might be relevant as evidence of their conduct. All the facts relied upon by the husband appeared to be admissible according to this test, and therefore the verdict was not against the weight of evidence. This decision is now under appeal, but it is hardly to be expected that the Court of Appeal will disturb the rule which has been accepted since the decision of the House of Lords in Morris v. Davies, as explained by the recent Aylesford Peerage case. The Divisional Court have fully recognised the principle that the presumption of legitimacy cannot be displaced upon a balance of probabilities, but only by evidence which carries to the mind of the court or jury the conviction that a child born in wedlock is not the issue of the husband; but the known facts of the Bosville divorce suit lead to the conclusion that the result of the legitimacy suit is in accordance with substantial justice.

THE LAW OF GIFTS INTER VIVOS.

II.

Purchases in the name of stranger.-It might be thought that the mere fact of A. purchasing property in B.'s name was strong evidence that A. intended to make a gift of the property to B. But this is not the case; the equitable interest results to the person who advances the money. This is the rule, whatever be the nature of the property purchased, and whether the conveyance be taken in the name of a stranger alone, or of a stranger jointly with the purchaser, or of a stranger in succession to the purchaser. Evidence is, however, admissible as to the motive with which the purchase was made, or as to the course of dealing with the property for the purpose of rebutting the rule.

The cases may be classified as follows:

(1) Where a transfer to or a purchase in the name of a stranger was held not to amount to a gift: Norfolk v. Browne (Finch Pre. Ch. 80); Anon. (Freem. Ca. Ch. 123); E. N. & C. on Interpretation, chap. xx.; Lewin on Trusts, chap. ix.

(2) Where a purchase in the name of a stranger was held to be a gift for his benefit. Moneys paid into savings bank, and paid into bank on a deposit note by A. in favour of his wife's nephew, whom he was educating and intended to provide for, though the nephew's father was alive: Currant v. Jago (1 Coll. 261). Stock partly purchased in the name of, and partly transferred into the name of, a niece, with a contemporaneous letter of gift: Beecher v. Mayor (2 Dr. &

Sm. 431). Stock purchased by husband in the names of the trustees of his settlement. He wrote a letter to his bankers which sufficiently shewed his intention that the stock should be an accretion to stock held by the trustees on the trusts of the settlement: Re Curteis' Trusts (14 Eq. 217).

(3) Where a transfer into the joint names of the owner and a stranger did not amount to a gift. Where the stranger was the owner's concubine: Rider v. Kidder (10 Ves. 360).

(4) Where stock transferred into the joint names of the owner and a stranger was held to amount, under the circumstances, to a gift.

Where the transfer was originally made with the deliberate intention of benefiting the stranger, but a life interest was reserved to the donor: Standing ▾ Bowring (27 Ch. D. 341). Where there was some evidence of intention to benefit the stranger: Batstone v. Salter (19 Eq. 251; same case, on appeal, 10 Ch. Ap. 431); Fowkes v. Pascoe (10 Ch. Ap. 343); George v. Howard (7 Pri. 646); letter stating the object of transfer to be to save legacy duty: Deacon v. Colquhoun (2 Drew. 21).

(5) For the purposes of the rule, a woman with whom a man has gone through the ceremony of marriage which he knows to be invalid: Soar v. Foster (4 K. & J. 152); a woman with whom a man is living in adultery: Rider v Kidder (10 Ves. 360); or a man's illegitimate issue: Tucker v. Barrow (2 H. & M. 515) (but see Beckford v. Beckford, Lofft. 490) is considered as a stranger to that man.

Purchase in the name of a person whom the purchaser is bound to support.-On the other hand, "where one person stands in such a relation to another that there is an obligation on that person to make a provision for the other, and we find either a purchase or investment in the name of the other, or in the joint names of the person and the other, of an amount which would constitute a provision for the other, the presumption arises of an intention on the part of the person to discharge the obligation to the other; and therefore, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that purchase or investment is held to be in itself evidence of a gift. In other words, the presumption of gift arises from the moral obligation to give" (per Jessel, M. R., Bennet v. Bennet, 10 Ch. D., at p. 476). The Master of the Rolls then proceeds to explain the doctrine of in loco parentis (see this fully discussed in E. N. & C. on Interpretation, 350), and continues: "So that a person in loco parentis means a person taking upon himself the duty of a father of a child to make provision for that child. It is clear that in that case the presumption can only arise from the obligation; and, therefore, in that case the doctrine can only have reference to the obligation of a father to provide for his child, and nothing else. But the father is under that obligation from the mere fact of his being the father, and therefore no evidence is necessary to shew the obligation to provide for his child, because that is part of his duty. In the case of a father you have only to prove the fact that he is the father, and, when you have done that, the obligation at once arises; but, in the case of a person in loco parentis, you must prove that he took on himself the obligation. But in our law there is no moral legal obligation-I do not know how to express it more shortly-no obligation according to the rules of equity, on a mother to provide for her child; there is no such obligation that a court of equity recognizes as such."

It follows from the doctrine here laid down:

(1) That a transfer to, or a purchase in the name of, a child by a father, or in the joint names of himself and a child, amounts, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to a gift to that child;

(2) That a transfer to, or a purchase by a mother in the name of, a child does not amount to a gift to that child in the absence of evidence that a gift was intended;

(3) That a transfer to, or a purchase in the name of, an illegitimate child by its father, or in the name of a mistress by the man with whom she lives, does not amount to a gift in the absence of evidence that a gift was intended;

(4) That a transfer to, or a purchase in the name of, a grandchild whose father is dead, by a grandfather, amounts to a gift in the absence of evidence to the contrary;

(5) A transfer to, or a purchase by a husband in the name of, his wife amounts to a gift to the wife in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

Evidence as to whether the transaction was intended to amount to a gift or not may be afforded

(1) By the contemporaneous declarations of the person making Marshall v. Crutwell (20 Eq. 330); Re Young (28 Ch. D. 705): the transfer or purchase; see Lloyd v. Pughe, ubi. sup.

(2) By the circumstances attending the transfer.

(3) By the acts or declarations of the person to whom the transfer, or in whose name the purchase, is made subsequent to the transfer or purchase.

Purchases in the name of a child.-A purchase by a father in the name of a child, whether in the name of the child alone, or of the child jointly with the purchaser, or of a child in succession to the purchaser, is, primâ facie, intended to be an advancement of that child. Evidence is, however, admissible as to the motive with which the purchase was made or as to the course of dealing with the property for the purpose of rebutting the rule.

The cases may be classified as follows:

(1) Where a purchase by a father in the name of a child was held to amount to an advancement: Elliot v. Elliot (2 Cha. Ca. 231); Mumma v. Mumma (2 Vern. 19); Taylor v. Taylor (1 Atk. 386); Grey v. Grey (2 Swans. 594); Sidmouth v. Sidmouth (2 Beav. 447); Williams v. Williams (32 Beav. 370); Hepworth v. Hepworth (11 Eq. 10); see also Soar v. Fuster (4 K. & J. 152); and that though the purchase was in the names of the child and a trustee: Lamplugh v. Lamplugh (1 P. Wms. 110); Crabb v. Crabb (1 My. & Kee. 511); or the joint names of the father and child: Scroope v. Scroope (1 Cha. Ca. 27); Back v. Andrews (Finch Pre. Ch. 1); where the child was nominated by the father as cestui que vie in remainder of copyholds, and, by the custom, the first cestui que vie took the whole beneficial interest: Dyer v. Dyer (2 Cox, 92); Murless v. Franklin (1 Swans. 13); Finch v. Finch (15 Ves. 43); Swift d. Farr v. Davis (8 East, 354 note), where the conveyance was to qualify the son to vote: May v. May (33 Beav. 81).

The evidence admissible to shew that a transfer to, or a purchase in the name of, a child by a father was not intended to be an advancement may be :

(a.) Evidence of the father's intention contemporaneous with, but not after, the purchase: Elliot v. Elliot (2 Cha. Ca. 231); Woodman v. Morrel (Freem. Ch. Ca. 32); Birch v. Blagrave (Amb., at p. 266); Murless v. Franklin (1 Swans. 13); Sidmouth v. Sidmouth (2 Beav. 447); Christy v. Courtenay (13 Beav. 96); Dumper v. Dumper (3 Giff. 583); Williams v. Williams (32 Beav. 370); Stock v. McAvoy (15 Eq. 55); Prankerd v. Prankerd (1 Sim. & St. 1); Collinson v. Collinson (3 De G. M. & G. 409); Bone v. Pollard (24 Beav. 283); Childers v. Childers (1 De G. & J. 482, overruling 3 K. & J. 310).

(b.) Acts or declarations of the child after the purchase, per Langdale, M.R.: Sidmouth v. Sidmouth (2 Beav., at p. 455); Pole v. Pole (1 Ves. sen. 76); Scawin v. Scawin (1 Y. & C. C. C 65). (2) Where a transfer to, or purchase in the name of, a grandchild, whose father was dead, by the grandfather amounted to a gift Ebrand v. Dancer (2 Cha. Ca. 26); Soar v. Foster (4 K. & J. 152). (3) Where a transfer to, or a purchase in the name of, a child by its mother was held not to be a gift: Holt v. Frederick (2 P. Wms. 356; same case, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 446, pl. 2); Re De Visme (2 De G. J. & S. 17); Bennet v. Bennet (10 Ch. D. 474); Garrett v. Wilkinson (2 De G. & Sm. 244) (the son was his mother's solicitor, and there were other special circumstances).

Where a transfer to, or a purchase in the name of, a child by its mother was held to be a gift: Sayre v. Hughes (5 Eq. 376); Batstone v. Salter (19 Eq. 250; on appeal, 10 Ch. 431).

(4) Where a purchase by a husband in the name of his wife or in their joint names, or in the joint names of the husband, wife, and a stranger, was held to amount to a gift to the wife: Kingdon v. Bridges (2 Vern. 67); Back v. Andrew (2 Vern. 120); Christ's Hospital v. Budgin (2 Vern. 683); Lorrimer v. Lorrimer (10 Ves. 367n); Dummer v. Pitcher (2 My. & K. 262); Low v. Carter (1 Beav. 426); Drew v. Martin (2 H. & M. 130); Gosling v. Gosling 3 Drew. 335); Re Eykyn's Trust (6 Ch. D. 115); Re Gadbury (11 W. R. 895).

Where a purchase by a husband in the name of his wife or their joint names was not a gift to the wife: Smith v. Warde (15 Sim. 56); Lloyd v. Pughe (14 Eq. 241; same case, 8 Ch. 88); Devoy v. Devoy (3 Sm. & Giff. 403).

The mere fact of money belonging to a husband or wife being paid into their joint account at a bank may, according to the circumstances, operate or not operate as a gift to the survivor:

CASES OF LAST WEEK. COUNSELL v. LONDON AND WESTMINSTER LOAN AND DISCOUNT CO.-C. A. No. 1, 11th August.

BILL OF SALE-PROMISSORY NOTE OF EVEN DATE-WHOLE AMOUNT IN

PROMISSORY NOTE TO BECOME DUE ON NON-PAYMENT OF ONE INSTALMENT-VALIDITY-BILLS OF SALE ACT, 1882.

This was an action by the grantor of a bill of sale against the grantee for trespass and wrongful seizure of the plaintiff's goods, and the question raised was as to the validity of the bill of sale. The bill of sale was given as security for a loan of £80, and interest, repayable by instalments. The bill of sale, taken by itself, was admitted to be valid, but contemporaneously with it, and in respect of the same loan, the grantor gave the grantee a promissory note for £95 12s., the total amount of the loan and interest, payable by the same instalments as in the bill of sale, and in case default was made in payment of any one instalment, the sum remaining unpaid should become due and payable. Denman, J., who tried the case, held, on the authority of Simpson v. Charing Cross Bank (34 W. R. 568), that the promissory note rendered the bill of sale void. The

Divisional Court having affirmed this judgment, the defendants appealed. THE COURT, having taken time to consider, dismissed the appeal. Lord ESHER, M.R., said that at the same time as the bill of sale, and as part of the same transaction, the grantee of the bill of sale took a promissory note for the exact amount covered by the bill of sale and interest. A bill of sale was the contract between the parties reduced into writing. Were there two contracts here or only one? Looking at the identity of dates and figures, his lordship had no doubt that there was only one contract embodied in two documents. One document had been registered. Would the other document, which was part of the same contract, have any effect upon the registered document? If the amount payable under the whom the note had been discounted, the registered bill of sale would be of promissory note were paid either to the grantee or to a third person, with no further effect. The bill of sale would be defeated. The note, therefore, would operate as a defeasance of the bill of sale, and, under section 10, sub-section 3, of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, ought to have been contained in the same instrument and registered. The bill of sale was, therefore, rendered void by the Bills of Sale Act, 1882. LINDLEY and LOPES, L.JJ., concurred.-COUNSEL, Crispe and McIntyre; Channell, Q C., and Melsheimer. SOLICITORS, Thomas Young; Vanderpump.

PURKISS v. HOLLAND; COOPER (CLAIMANT)—C. A. No. 1, 10th August. PRACTICE-INTERPLEADER-CLAIMANT-RECEIVER APPOINTED BY COURT -PAYING MONEY INTO COURT-FORM Of Order.

Certain goods in the Albert Palace were taken in execution of a judg ment recovered by the plaintiff against the defendant, and were claimed by the claimant. The defendant, the execution debtor, was tenant to the Albert Palace Co., and the claimant was appointed by the court receiver of all the property of the company. The master made the usual order that the claimant should pay £80, the value of the goods, into court, and directed an issue. This order having been affirmed, the claimant appealed, and contended that he, as receiver, should not be called upon to pay £80 out of his own pocket.

appeal. They said that a claimant was as a general rule ordered to THE COURT (Lord ESHER, M. R., LINDLEY and LOPES, L.JJ.) allowed the bring the money into court for the protection of the execution creditor, and if the claimant were not a receiver the order would be quite right; but it was not necessary for the protection of the execution creditor that the receiver, an officer of the court, who had no personal interest in the matter, should bring money into court. The order that the court would make would be that the claimant do, as an officer of the court, hold the goods and keep them subject to the further order of the court. That would give full protection to the execution creditor.-COUNSEL, R. A. McCall, Guiry and Cannot. SOLICITORS, McDiarmid & Teather; Donaldson Re EASY, Ex parte HILL & HYMANS-C. A. No. 1, 11th August. BANKRUPTCY-PETITION-DEATH OF DEBTOR BEFORE SERVICE OF PETITION -STAY OF PROCEEDINGS-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883 (46 & 47 VICT. c. 52), s. 108.

but before the petition was served the debtor died. Certain creditors presented a bankruptcy petition againt the debtor, Mr. Registrar Hazlitt ordered all further proceedings upon the petition to be discontinued. Section 108 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, provides that "if a debtor by or against whom a bankruptcy petition has been presented dies, the proceedings in the matter shall, unless the court otherwise orders, be continued as it he were alive. The petitioning creditor moved, er parte, by way of appeal from this order. It was contended on their behalf that the court could order substituted service of the petition or dispense with service altogether, and that, as the debtor had assigned all his property to trustees for the benefit of his creditors, the only mode of setting the deed Sharp, In re Walker (34 W. R. 550) was cited. aside was by allowing the bankruptcy proceedings to go on. Ex parte

THE COURT (Lord ESHER, M.R., LINDLEY and LOPES, L.JJ.) dismissed

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