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TION-TRUSTEE APPOINTED SURVEYOR-LANDS CLAUSESCONSOLIDATION ACT, 1845, ss. 7, 9.-In a case of Peters v. The Lewes and East Grinstead Railway Company, on the 5th inst., the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that the power given by section 7 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, to trustees of land for (inter alia) femes covert, to sell and to railway company, does not extend to trustees on behalf of convey the land on behalf of their cestuis que trustent to a a married woman of an absolute estate in fee simple for her separate use, suɔh a married woman not being a person under disability, but being competent to convey the land herself. The court also held that when trustees of land had appointed one of themselves, who happened to be a surveyor, to act as a surveyor, under section 9 of the Act, in determining the price to be paid by a railway company for a part of the land, such an appointment was not a valid one under section 9, and that, consequently, there had been no proper valuation, and the sale to the company was invalid as against the cestui que trust.-SOLICITORS, Cope & Co; Wyatt & Barraud. In

Act, 1869, which provides that, "where any portion of the property of the bankrupt consists of things in action, any action, suit, or other proceeding for the recovery of such things instituted by the trustee shall be instituted in his official name, as in this Act provided, and such things shall, for the purpose of such action, suit, other proceeding, be deemed to be assignable in law, and to have been duly assigned to the trustee in his official capacity." But there are no negative words such as there were in the corresponding section (section 141) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1849, which provided that "neither the bankrupt, nor any person claiming through or under him shall have power to recover the same, nor to make any release or discharge thereof; . but such assignees shall have the like remedy to recover the same in their own names as the bankrupt himself might have had if he had not been adjudged a bankrupt." arose thus :-A debtor, who was entitled to a reversionary The question interest in a sum of stock, filed a liquidation petition in March, 1873, under which, in June, 1873, a trustee was appointed. No discharge was given to the debtor. 1873, he mortgaged,his reversionary interest to A. In July, April, 1875, he mortgaged it again to B. The fund was in court in an administration action, and, in October, 1875, B. obtained a stop order on the fund. On the 8th of November, 1875, A. obtained a stop order. On the 26th of November, 1875, the debtor made a third mortgage to C., and in December, 1875, C. obtained a stop order. the trustee obtained a stop order. In March, 1876, Palmer v. Locke, who had purchased the rights of A. and The plaintiff in B., and of the trustee, entered into an agreement to sell the reversionary interest. The purchaser, after an abstract of tit'e had been furnished to him, discovered the existence of C.'s stop order, and he then required to be furnished with an abstract of C.'s incumbrance. The vendor declined to furnish it, on the ground that, by the operation of section 22, the trustee had obtained an absolute legal title, which no subsequent dealing by the debtor, even with a person who had no notice of the liquidation, could displace. Jessel, M.R., held that an abstract of C.'s incumbrance must be furnished, and that if that incumbrance were not shown to have been discharged, it would be incumbrance on the plaintiff's title. His lordship said that the case was distinguishable from In re Bright's Settlement (28 W. R. 551, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 413), which arose under section 141 of the Act of 1849, in which there were the negative words which did not occur in section 22 of the Act of 1869. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (Lord SELBORNE, C., and BAGGALLAY and LUSH, L.JJ.), who were of opinion that the question whether, if C. had no notice of the liquidation when he obtained his mortgage, seeing that he obtained a stop order before the trustee, his title might not be better than that of the trustee, was too doubtful to be decided against the purchaser in the absence of C.-SOLICITORS, Last & Sons; Burne & Hunt.

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WILL-CONSTRUCTION-GIFT TO CHARITY-UNCERTAINTY. -In a case of Marsden v. Graham, before the Court of Appeal on the 4th inst., the question arose whether a gift by will to trustees for the benefit of a specified parish was a good charitable gift, or was void for uncertainty. The testatrix gave the residue of her personal estate to trustees upon trust to apply the same as to them in their uncontrolled discretion should seem expedient, "in, for, or towards such end, intent, object, or purpose, or for or towards such ends, intents, objects, or purposes in or in connection with or in relation to the parish, as they should think fit, without being in any manner accountable to or responsible for the mode of such application, or the end, intent, object, or purpose thereof to any person or persons or body of persons whatsoever." The court (JESSEL, M. R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that the gift was void for uncertainty, there being, as JESSEL, M.R., said, nothing to limit the application of the gift to those purposes which the court considered charitable. The trustees might apply it to any object or purpose they thought fit, provided that it was some object or purpose in the particular parish. The case of Dolan v. Mc Dermot (L. R. 3 Ch. 676) was distinguishable.-SOLICITORS, Pritchard, Englefield, & Co.

RAILWAY COMPANY-PURCHASE OF LAND BY AGREEMENT -TRUSTEES-MARRIED WOMAN-SEPARATE USE-VALUA

PRACTICE-EXTENDING TIME FOR APPEALING-PETITION -ORD. 58, RR. 9, 15.-In a case of In re Jaques, before the Court of Appeal on the 6th inst., an application was made for an extension of the time for appealing, under the following circumstances. An order had been made, on petition, for the division of a fund which had been paid into court by a corporation for the purchase of land taken by them under the Lands Clauses Act. Some of the persons entitled, who had claimed a larger share of the fund than the order bad given them, were resident in America, and the court was asked on their behalf to extend the three weeks allowed for appealing, in order to enable their solicithey desired to present an appeal. tors in England to receive instructions from them whether The solicitors held a power of attorney, but it did not distinctly authorize them to present an appeal. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) extended the time for a month. JESSEL, M.R., said that the order, though in form an interlocutory one, was really a final one. It was a mere accident that it came to be made in a " matter." Rule 8, which provides that "the time for appealing from any order or decision made or given in the matter of the winding up of any company, or any order or decision made in the matter of any bankruptcy, or in any matter not being an action, shall be the same as the time limited for appeal from an interlocutory order under rule 15," was disposed of quickly. made because, as a general rule, "matters" ought to be The rule was really intended to provide for "other matters" of a similar nature to bankruptcy had not been used. The present case, though it was within and winding up of companies, though the word "similar" the letter of the rule, was not within its spirit. But the applicants must pay the costs of the application, for they were asking for an indulgence. They should have given & James. fuller instructions to their solicitors.-SOLICITORS, James, Son,

LANDS CLAUSES ACT, 1845-PURCHASE FROM LIMITED OWNER-PAYMENT OUT OF COURT-COSTS OF DISCHARGE OF INCUMBRANCES.-In a case of Re Thorney's Trusts, before the Master of the Rolls, on the 2nd inst., certain lands had been taken by the Hull Dock Company, under their special Acts, incorporating the Lands Clauses Act, from a limited owner, who held the lands for life, with remainders over. The money was paid into court, and the trustees of the settlement, the tenant for life and some of the persons interested in remainder now petitioned for payment out and for the application of the money in discharge of certain incumbrances on other parts of the settled estates. The petitioners asked that in addition to the costs of, and incidental to, taking the land, the company might also be ordered to pay the costs of and incidental to the discharge of the incumbrances, and they relied on the cases of Garnett Company (L. R. 10 Ch. D. 481), as showing that the court v. Bradley (L. R. 3 App. Cas. 944), and In re Mercers' had a discretion in the matter, and could give the petitioners their costs. It was admitted that no provision payment of the costs of discharging the incumbrances, had been made by section 80 of the Lands Clauses Act for and that in several cases it had been decided that the com

pany were not bound to pay such costs, but it was submitted that it was a casus omissus from the Act, and that now the court had a discretion as to such costs. JESSEL, M. R., said that all that he had decided in In re Mercers' Company was that all costs of and incidental to applications to the court were in the discretion of the court, but the present costs were not relative to the application, but were subsequent costs, and therefore not in the discretion of the court. Under the circumstances, therefore, the company were not bound to pay them, but as they were liable to pay the costs of an investment in land, he should give the petitioners a fortnight, if they liked, within which to amend their petition and ask for an investment in land.-SOLICITORS. Iliffe, Russell, & Iliffe; Chester & Co.

PRACTICE-FORECLOSURE-JUDGMENT AGAINST MORTGAGOR -PAYMENT WITHIN ONE MONTH.-In an action of Thorndon v. Tell, which was an ordinary action by mortgagees for foreclosure, the plaintiffs by their minutes asked for judgment against the defendant for payment of the amount to be found due within one month, instead of the period of six months given in the forms in Seton on Decrees. HALL, V.C., gave judgment as asked.-SOLICITORS, Jones, Blaxland, & Son.

ESTATE PUR AUTRE VIE-LIMITATION IN FEE WITH EXECUTORY DEVISE OVER-POWER OF ALIENATION OF FIRST TAKER-LEASE FOR LIVES-TRUST FOR RENEWAL OUT OF RENTS-REFUSAL OF REVERSIONER TO RENEW-SALE UNDER SETTLED ESTATES ACT-APPLICATION OF PURCHASE-MONEY.-In a case of In re Barber's Settled Estates, before Fry, J., on the 2nd inst., a question arose as to the extent of the power of alienation of the first taker of an estate pur autre vie, of which successive limitations had been created by will. The holder of a lease of land to himself and his heirs, for the lives of three other persons, devised it by his will to trustees, their heirs and assigns, upon the trusts therein declared, and he directed his trustees from time to time to let the land and to receive the rents and profits thereof, and thereout to keep the estate renewed and full lived. And he declared that his trustees should stand seised of the land upon trust for J., his heirs and assigns, but if he should die without leaving lawful issue living at his death, then upon trust for W., his heirs and assigns. After the death of the testator, the lease was, on the dropping of one of the lives, renewed by the reversioner on the payment of a fine by the trustees. The amount of the fine was raised by J. on the security of an agreement by him to give an equitable charge upon the estate. On a subsequent occasion the reversioner refused to renew the lease or to sell the reversion, and the estate was then sold, with the sanction of the court, under the Settled Estates Act. A petition was presented by J., asking that the mortgage money might be paid out of the proceeds of sale, and that the rights of himself and W. in the balance of the purchase-money might be declared. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that he, being the first taker of an estate pur autre vie, had the whole estate in him, and had the right to dispose of it, and thus to defeat the quasi-executory devise over after his Own quasi-estate in fee, and, consequently, that he was entitled to the whole purchase-money, subject to the mortgage. The precise point, it was said, had never been actually determined. FRY, J., said, that though, when an estate pur autre vie was given to a man, all he could take was an estate for life, and anyone who came in after him came in as a special occupant, and not through him, yet in many cases the Legislature and the courts had enforced an analogy between successive limitations of an estate pur autre vie, and similar limitations of an estate in fee, and had given effect to the analogy with regard to the capacity and the incapacity of the first taker to alienate. His power of alienation had been limited by the intention, expressed by the settlor or donor, that a particular person should be the special occupant after him. The Statute of Frauds enforced that analogy by enacting that the heir, though only a special occupant, should hold the estate pur autre vie as assets for the payment of the ancestor's debts. In the same way a number of decisions of the courts had permitted the creation of a series of limitations of an estate pur autre vie, quasi-estates for life, quasi-estates in tail, and quasi-estates in fee with executory devises over. The courts had permitted an alienation by a quasi-tenant in tail in

possession, and also by a quasi-tenant ia tail in remainder, with the concurrence of the quasi-tenant for life in possession. But the courts had declined to allow an alienation by a quasitenant in tail in remainder without the concurrence of the quasi-tenant for life in possession, at least so far as it would have the effect of barring the remainders expectant on the estate tail, though probably such an alienation would have been held to create a base fee. They had also disallowed a disposition by will by a quasi-tenant in tail in possession, though he was, in one sense, entitled to the whole interest in the property. The designation by the settlor of a person to take as special occupant after the first taker had been held sufficient to limit his power of disposition. Lord St. Leonards acted on this analogy in Allen v. Allen (2 D. & W. 307). His lordship said he should act upon it in the present case. If the limitations created by the will had been created of an estate in fee, J. could not have defeated by his alienation the executory devise in favour of W., and by analogy he could not be allowed to do so in the present case. His lordship then held, on the authority of Allan v. Backhouse (2 V. & B. 65), that the will had created a charge on the estate for the purpose of renewing the lease, and that consequently the mortgage debt must be paid out of the purchase-money. The further question arose how the remainder of the purchase-money was to be applied. The petitioner contended that it ought to be laid out in the purchase of an annuity for the lives upon which the lease was held, and that the annuity should be paid to him for his life. FRY, J., held that the case was governed by the principle of the decisions in In re Wood's Estate (19 W. R. 59, L. R. 10 Eq. 572), Hollier v. Burne (21 W. R. 805, L. R. 16 Eq. 163), and Maddy v. Hale (24 W. R. 1005, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 327). The primary intention of the testator was to create a perpetuity by means of a continual renewal of the lease. And when by the action of a third person, the estate was converted into money, the court would leave it in the condition of money invested, and thus create another property of a perpetual character which would take the place of the original property of the same character. The principle applied where there had been a sale under the general power conferred by the Settled Estates Act. The balance of the purchase-money must therefore be invested in ordinary securities, and the interest paid to the first taker.-SOLICITORS, Janson, Cobb, & Pearson; Hunt & Son; Church, Sons, & Clarke.

CASES BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY
REGISTRARS.

(Before Mr. REGISTRAR Hazlitt acting as Chief Judge.) June 8.-Ex parte Miller and another, Re Levy. Costs of solicitors incident to meeting of separate creditors of one of two partners allowed out of the joint estate of the partners in liquidation

This was an application on behalf of Messrs. A. Hindson, Miller, & Vernon, solicitors, for an order that the trustees of the property of Messrs. H. Levy & M. H. Levy should, out of the joint estate in their hands, pay to the applicants the sum of £24, being the amount of their costs of and relating to the meetings of the separate creditors of M. H. Levy, as taxed by the taxing master.

The debtors filed their petition on the 17th of January, 1881, and the general meetings of creditors, both of the joint estate and of the separate estate of each of the partners, were duly held.

Under the joint estate it was resolved to liquidate by arrangement, and the creditors appointed trustees. In the case of the senior partner, H. Levy, liquidation by arrange. ment was also resolved upon, and the same trustees were appointed, but at the meeting of the separate creditors of M. H. Levy a resolution was passed to accept a composition of two shillings in the pound, and such resolution was duly confirmed at a second meeting, and all the resolutions before mentioned were duly registered.

Messrs. Miller & Vernon were the solicitors acting for the debtors, and presented the petition on their behalf, and they taxed three separate bills of costs against the joint estates and the separate estates of the respective partners. The trustee duly paid the amount of the allocaturs obtained in respect of the joint estate, and also the separate estate of H. Levy, but, with respect to the costs now claimed by Messrs. Miller & Vernon, they disclaimed all liability.

From the joint estate a large sum of money had been realized by the trustees.

Vernon (solicitor), in support of the application, referred to rule 113, and was then stopped.

E. M. Micholls, for the trustees.-Under rule 113, the order must be made on the application of the trustee. The present application is misconceived, and Messrs. Miller & Vernon have no locus standi to make it. Rule 113 is no doubt framed in pursuance of section 20, which instructs trustees in regard to their conduct in certain matters. This is not an ordinary case, and the rule must be strictly construed. It cannot apply in a case of composition. The applicants must obtain the amount of the costs from the debtor; the trustees cannot allow them out of the joint estate. He also referred to rules 76, 102, and 285.

Vernon, in reply.-The court has a discretion as to all costs rules 186 and 188. The joint creditors have had the benefit of the proceedings as to the separate estate of M. H. Levy, and unless the meeting of the separate creditors had been convened, they could not have passed any valid resolution with reference to the joint estate. The solicitor has no control over the resolutions which the creditors may pass.

Mr. REGISTRAR HAZLITT.-I think the question is whether the meetings of the separate creditors were convened with a reasonable prospect of benefit to the joint creditors.

Vernon. The meeting of the separate creditors of M. H. Levy was a necessary step in the proceedings, and all the applicants ask is that the incidental costs be paid.

Mr. REGISTRAR HAZLITT said he thought he had a discretion in the matter, and he should act upon it by allowing the costs out of the joint estate. A large amount had been realized by the trustees, and they must pay the applicants the sum mentioned in the allocatur, and the costs of the present application.

Solicitor for the trustees, Montagu.

SOLICITORS' CASES.
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

(Sittings in Banc before GROVE and DENMAN, JJ.)
July 4.-Re E. Edmonds, a Solicitor.*

In this case the usual rule had been served upon Mr. Edmonds, calling upon him to answer the matters contained in certain affidavits, or, in default, to show cause why he should not be struck off the rolls.

Wills, Q.C., and Hollams, appeared for the Incorporated Law Society, and from their statements it appeared that a person of the name of Wood died in the year 1832 possessed of certain real estate. In 1875 Wood's trustees sold a part of the trust property, and Mr. Edmonds received the purchase-money, £3,250, of which he paid the greater portion, but retained a part in his own hands. In 1877 the trustees sold more of the property, and Mr. Edmonds again received the purchase-money, £4,100, but this time he retained the larger portion of the money, and refused to

account for it.

In August, 1878, the trustees brought an action against the solicitor, calling upon him to account for the money in his hands, and an order was made for the payment of money into court by the solicitor. In April, 1879, persons beneficially entitled under Wood's will brought an action against the trustees for an account. The solicitor failed to comply with the order made, and subsequently filed a petition for liquidation, his creditors, with the exception of the trustees who took nothing, receiving one shilling in the pound. The solicitor was unrepresented, and had done nothing beyond asking that the case should be postponed.

GROVE, J. (after stating the facts).-It does not appear to me that the court has any option in this matter. The rule

must therefore be made absolute to strike Mr. Edmonds off the rolls.

Rule absolute.

Solicitor for the Incorporated Law Society, Williamson.

July 4.-In the Matter of Edwin Hunt. This was a case in which a rule for an attachment had been granted against the defendant for having, contrary to the st atute, acted as a solicitor without being duly qualiReported by W. BLEW, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

fied.

The matter had been referred to one of the masters of the court for inquiry, and his report was now read to the court.

Wills, Q.C., and Murray, appeared for the Incorporated Law Society.

According to the evidence taken before the master, as embodied in his report, the defendant was an accountant, living in Charlotte-street, Bedford-square, when he inserted an advertisement in the Times addressed to solicitors without practice, offering them business at a good remuneration. A solicitor named Cotton responded to the advertisement, and an arrangement was entered into between him and the defendant, which, however, was not reduced to writing, and as to which the parties to it did not quite agree in their description. It was clear, however, from the defendant's own statement, that he was to have a certain share in the profits of the business, and there was ample evidence that in various matters of a legal character he had acted as an attorney, using the name of Cotton, but without his knowledge or authority. Notice of the rule had been duly served upon the defendant, and he had written in reply that he would instruct counsel to attend. No counsel, however, appeared on his behalf.

GROVE, J., said the rule must be made absolute for an attachment, but the defendant would be allowed a week to purge himself, if he could, of his contempt of court. -Times.

THE PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.

THE Lord Chancellor on Tuesday last, in introducing a Bill to amend the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts, said that the Bill was in some respects of considerable importance, but he hoped that it would not excite much difference of opinion. A number of changes were proposed, some of considerable magnitude, others comparatively simple. Their lordships were aware that the High Court of Justice had contained the three separate divisions called respectively the Queen's Bench, the Common Pleas, and the Exchequer Divisions, and that these three divisions had recently been consolidated. In consequence of the consolidation there was now but one division of what was popularly called the common law side of the High Court and one Lord Chief Justice. He would first address himself to the most im

portant parts of the Bill. There had been five ex officio judges of the Court of Appeal-viz., the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, aud the Lord Chief Baron. Owing to the cessation of the two latter office theex officio judges were reduced to three. The Court of Appeal further coubeen reduced by the loss of a judge whose merits it would be sisted of six ordinary judges; and that number had recently possible to exaggerate-Lord Justice James. He spoke very difficult by any language to do justice to, and iman intimate personal friendfrom long knowledge, and ship of many years; and he could not speak of his official services to the country without recollecting the generosity of his noble nature. But, speaking of him only served by a judge of higher character-of a sounder and as a judge, he would say that the country had never been more rapid discrimination; a more ardent love of justice as distinguished from technicalities; a more accurate knowledge of law, and a greater power of immediately ap plying that knowledge to the determination of the cases which came before him. For several years those qualities had been exhibited by the late Lord Justice as a Vice-Chan cellor, and for more than ten years in the Court of Appeal. It would be very difficult for any man to bring to the duties higher qual ties as a lawyer or as a man. Now, with regard to the Court of Appeal, although the business of the court had been ably administered and arrears prevented from accumulating, yet the business was of an arduous and important character, and it required strong judges, as well as able judges, to prevent it falling into arrear. When the question arose what should be done to meet this state of things, it was impossible not to call to mind the proposals which had been made by the Judicature Commission. He had examined carefully into the recommendations and the various changes which had been made

down to the Act of 1875, when his noble and learned friend proposed a scheme to meet the want which was felt by the judicial power. It was then proposed to introduce into the Court of Appeal three judges of first instance, and under extreme circumstances it would have been possible to bave four additional judges affording temporary assistance. Now, they had come to a time when the number of ex officio judges was reduced from five to three. What he asked their lordships to do with regard to the constitution of the Court of Appeal was this:-He proposed to take the opportunity of reverting to the recommendation of the Judicature Commission with regard to the position of the Master of the Rolls in connection with the Court of Appeal. Of the special qualifications of the Master of the Rolls he need not speak; they were well known and appreciated by the country at large. It was not his proposal that the present Master of the Rolls should be transferred from his position to the Court of Appeal. He reverted to the proposal of the Judicature Commission. The Master of the Rolls was perfectly willing to undertake the position. Instead, therefore, of filling up the vacancy now existing among the ordinary judges in the Court of Appeal, he proposed that the Master of the Rolls should take up the position which seemed more in accordance with his office than that of being one of a number of judges of co-ordinate position, except in the matter of salary and a few other matters. The Master of the Rolls, therefore, would be-he did not say transferred-bat confined to the Court of Appeal; and practically, therefore, that would make it unnecessary to fill up the vacancy. Then he came to the consideration of ex officio jadges. There were now two less than had been contemplated, and if the Master of the Rolls ceased to be one of these judges, of course three ex officio judges would have ceased to exist. He proposed in the first place that the President of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division, who was not now an ex officio judge of the Court of Appeal, should become such an ex officio judge. proposed in the next place that two other judges should be appointed annually, to be at the service of the Court of Appeal when their other duties permitted. The question remained-in what way should these annual appointments be made? He did not propose that they should be nominated annually by the Crown. Some other mode of selection, he thought, might be found; they might be selected as the election judges were now chosen. The judges of the High Court could meet together, and from year to year nominate for the succeeding year three of their body to serve in the Court of Appeal.

He

Of course,

they would not be called upon to do duty in the Court of Appeal so as to interfere with their primary obligations as judges in the High Court; they would be called upon to assist when the state of business in their own courts admitted of that assistance being given. Those proposals would not subject the country to any substantial increase of expense. It was also sought to remove some doubt as to the effect of the Act of 1877, under which an additional judge of first instance was to be appointed for the Chancery Division of the High Court. The language of that Act did not make it absolutely clear to his mind whether it authorized an appointment on a single occasion only or an appointment from time to time. He proposed to remove that doubt, and to enable the power given by the Act to be exercised from time to time. Occasion had also been taken to regulate some portions of the existing law as to certain appeals. By the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Acts certain appeals from the Divorce Court Judge were given to a court which was called the Full Court for Matrimonial Causes. He had consulted with the learned judze who presided over that court, and found that he, as well as others, was of opinion that it would be desirable that that appeal, which was practically to that judge himself, with the assistance of others, should no longer be to the Full Court for Matrimonial Causes, but should, like all other cases, go the Court of Appeal.

He also proposed, very much at the instance of that judge, to correct what in practice had turned out to be an unsatisfactory provision in the same Acts, which gave the right to appeal from decrees for the dissolution or the nullity of marriage, not in the first instance when the decree nisi was given, but when it had been made absolute after a certain lapse of time, as if no cause were shown in the meantime it might be made as a matter of course. He proposed that for the future the appeal should be from the decre nisi, and that there should not be another appeal. With regard

to the Acts which related to parliamentary registration and elections, the Acts proceeded on the footing of giving the final authority on matters of law to the court to which Parliament had thought fit to intrust that class of cases. It was now proposed to make the decision final and conclusive, unless the court thought fit to give a right to appeal, in which case the Court of Appeal would have jurisdiction. The Bill also gave some useful powers to regulate the holding of assizes, and that power would not be limited to winter assizes only, but would extend to all assizes, by which means it was hoped that an inconvenience at present felt would be mitigated. The measure likewise dealt with the power under the Act of 1875 for making rules to govern the practice of the High Court. It also contained a clause enabling the time of holding the sessions of the Central Criminal Court to be fixed, no', as was now required by Act of Parliament, by eight judges, but by four judges of the Queen's Bench Division. It further contained provisions as to the appointment of officers of the courts and the filling up of vacancies in the staff of all the courts. There were various other minor provisions in the Bill, on which he need not now trouble their lordships.

OBITUARY.

MR. FREDERICK OUVRY.

Mr. Frederick Ouvry, solicitor (of the firm of Farrer, Ouvry, & Farrer), of 66, Lincoln's-inn- fields, died at his residence, 12, Queen Anne-street, on the 26th ult. Mr. Ouvry was the third son of the late Mr. Peter Aimé Ouvry, and was born in 1815. He was admitted a solicitor in 1837, and had for many years carried on business at 66, Lincoln's-innfields in partnership with his brothers-in-law, Messrs. William James Farrer (the high bailiff of Westminster) and Frederick Willis Farrer. He was a perpetual commissioner for the county of Middlesex and the cities of London and Westminster, and he had a large private practice, being solicitor to Lady Burdett-Coutts, and to others of the nobility. He had been, since 1858, solicitor to the regiment of Scots Guards. Mr. Ouvry took a great interest in literary and antiquarian pursuits, and he was a vice-president of the Society of Antiquaries, and one of the treasurers of the Royal Literary Fund.

MR. CHARLES CLARK, Q.C.

Mr. Charles Clark, Q.C., died rather suddenly at his residence, 10, Albert-road, Regent'-park, on the 25th alt. Mr. Clark was in early life a parliamentary reporter on the staff of the Morning Chronicle, and he was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Easter Term, 1830, when he joined the Home Circuit. He was the author of a work on Colonial Law, and acted about twenty-five years ago as a commissioner to inquire into the laws of the Channel Islands. He was, however, best known as a law reporter in the House of Lords, where his reports dated back as far as the year 1827. They range through several volumes of "Dow and Clark," "Clark and Finnelly," and the "House of Lords Cases." About forty years ago he was appointed official reporter to the House, and since the establishment of the Law Reports he had continued to furnish the reports of English and Irish appeals. Mr. Clark was for many years a revising barrister. He was elected a bencher of the Middle Temple in 1872, and in the following year he received a silk gown from Lord Selborne. He was formerly secretary to the Juridical Society, and he was an active member of the Association for the Reform of International Law. He had also been for many years treasurer of the Royal Society of Literature, the meetings of which he constantly attended. Mr. Clark was a man of most amiable and courteous disposition, and the recollections of his long professional career imparted great interest to his conversation. Notwithstanding his great age he retained all his active habits. He caught a severe cold while taking a country holiday at Whitsuntide, but he still persevered in his work, and he was actually reporting in the House of Lords on the day before his death. The deceased was a bachelor.

MR. THOMAS WILLIAM RODGERS. Mr. Thomas William Rodgers, barrister, of Endcliffe Vale, Sheffield, died on the 29th alt., while on a visit tɔ London, after a short illness. Mr. Rodgers was the third son of Mr. Robert Rodgers, solicitor, of Sheffield, and was born in 1811. He was admitted a solicitor in 1834, and he soon afterwards went into partnership with his father, to whom he had been articled, and at a later date he was associated with his brother, Mr. Henry Rodgers. On his father's death in 1841 he became clerk of indictments for the West Riding of Yorkshire, and deputy-steward of the Eccleshall and Sheffield Manorial Court of Requests, and on the passing of the first County Courts Act he became clerk to the Sheffield County Court (Circuit No. 13). He afterwards withdrew from practice, and entered at Lincoln'sinn, where he was called to the bar in Trinity Term, 1859, but he continued to reside at Sheffield, and he never practised as a barrister. Mr. Rodgers took an active part in local business, and he was for some time a town councillor for the Upper Hallam Ward. He was a member of the committee of the Sheffield Church Extension Society, and he was a magistrate for the borough, in which capacity he often rendered valuable assistance to the stipendiary. He was a magistrate and deputy-chairman of quarter sessions for the West Riding of Yorkshire, and also a magistrate for Derbyshire, and chairman of the Eckington Petty Sessions. Mr. Rodgers retained the registrarship of the county court until his death (Mr. William Wake being associated with him in the office), and he was also district registrar at Sheffield under the Judicature Acts. Mr. Rodgers had been twice married, but he leaves no family. The news of his death caused universal regret at Sheffield. On the 30th ult. Mr. Ellison, the county court judge, and Mr. Welby, the stipendiary magistrate, each paid a high tribute to Mr. Rodgers' high character and attainments, and at the quarter sessions, on the 1st inst., Mr. Wills, Q.C., the recorder, spoke of the great public loss which had been sustained. He was buried at Eccleshall on the 2nd inst.

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.

BIRMINGHAM LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. A general meeting of this society was held in the Law Library, on Tuesday evening last, J. Marigold, Esq., occupying the chair. Moot Point No. 649 was discussed, the subject being " A. bays goods of B., and C. guarantees the payment of the price. A. becomes insolvent before delivery, and before the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu is defeated. Can C., upon payment of the price, stop the goods in transitu?" The speakers on the affirmative were Messrs. E. C. Rogers, Browett, Travis, O'Connor, and W. S. Rogers; and on the negative, Messrs. Davis and J. Clark. A spirited debate was carried on by both sides, and the chairman, in summing up the arguments, called attention to the particular difficulties of the question, and invited a further discussion by the members before putting it to the vote. The speakers availed themselves of the chairman's invitation, and the moot being put to the meeting was carried in the affirmative. A hearty vote of thanks to the chairman concluded the meeting.

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in 1872. Mr. Bagshawe has for several years practised in the Rolls Court. He is a bencher of the Middle Temple, and examiner in equity and the law of real property at the University of London.

Mr. CLAUDE LEATHAM, solicitor (of the firm of Scholey, Wilson, & Leatham), of Wakefield, has been appointed Clerk to the Magistrates for the Upper Osgoldcross Division of the West Riding. Mr. Leatham was admitted a solicitor in 1878.

Mr. SAMUEL HALL SMITH LOFTHOUSE, barrister, has been appointed Deputy-Recorder of the Borough of Sheffield. Mr. Lofthouse was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inu in Trinity Term, 1869. He practises on the North-Eastern Circuit, and at the West Riding of Yorkshire Sessions.

Mr. JUSTICE MATHEW has received the honorary degree of LL.D. from the University of Dublin.

Mr. JABEZ MCDIARMID, solicitor (of the firm of McDiar mid & Teather), of 5, Newman-court, Cornhill, has been appointed by Mr. Ogg, sheriff-elect, to be one of the undersheriffs of London and Middlesex for the ensuing year. Mr. McDiarmid was admitted a solicitor in 1864.

Mr. ARTHUR THOMAS SHEPHERD, solicitor, of Sunderland, has been appointed Clerk to the Bishopwearmouth Burial Board. Mr. Shepherd was admitted a solicitor in 1876.

DISSOLUTIONS OF PARTNERSHIPS. CHARLES MALCOLM MAGILL, ALFRED EWEN, and JAMES GEORGE ROBERTS, solicitors, 75, Chancery-lane (Magill, Ewen, & Roberts). June 21. So far as regards the said Alfred Ewen and James George Roberts.

RANDALL GLYNES, WEBSTER GLYNE, and ALFRED FREDERIC CHURCH, solicitors, 29, Mark-lane (Glynes, Son, & Church). June 24. The said Randall Glynes and Webster Glynes will in future continue alone in practice, under the style of Glynes & Son, at 29, Mark-lane, and Alfred Frederic Church will in future practise alone at 45, Fenchurch-street.

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MORAY FIRTH MINING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Creditors are requirai on or before July 30, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to John Henry Tilly, Queen Victoria st, Mansion house. Aug 6 at 12 is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims

UNITED SERVICE SUPPLY ASSOCIATION, LIMITED. - Petition for winding up, presented June 30, directed to be heard beford V.C. Bacon on July 9. Best and Co, Essex st, Strand, solicitors for the petitioners

[Gazette, July 1.] AVONSIDE ENGINE COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order, dated June 25, Fry, J., appointed Henry Spain, 1, Gresham bldgs, provis G ally official liquidator. Clarke and Co, Lincoln's inn fields, solici tors for the petitioner

HORNSEA STEAM BRICK AND TILE WORKS, LIMITED.-V.C. Bacon has, by an order dated June 3, appointed Joseph Hardy, Norfak row, Sheffield, to be official liquidator

NEW BRONFLOYD COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented July 4, directed to be heard before the M.R on July 16. Foss and Legg, Abchurch lane, solicitors for the petitioner VICENZA STEAM TRAMWAY COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented June 29, directed to be heard before V.C. Hall on July 15. Foss and Legg, Abchurch lane, solicitors for the petitioner

[Gazette, July 5.1

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