The Solicitors' Journal. CURRENT TOPICS. LONDON, JULY 29, 1882. by section 6 of the Highway Rate Assessment and Expenditure Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 27), which received the Royal assent on the 12th inst., " in maintaining, replacing, or setting up milestones on any highway, and in fencing by posts or rails or otherof persons travelling thereon against danger, shall be a lawful wise a highway where such fencing is required for the protection with the highway authorities whether they shall keep up mileThese words leave it optional charge upon the highway rate." stones or not, whereas it would have been better to make it compulsory. They also still lay those authorities open to the risk of a surcharge by the auditor, in the possible event of that official not THE VACATION REGISTRARS in the Chancery Division will be taking the same view as they do as to the requirement of the Mr. FARRER and Mr. CARRINGTON, IT WILL BE SEEN from the list we publish elsewhere that, out of 108 candidates at the last Honours Examination of the Incorporated Law Society, 32 only obtained honorary distinction. Mr. GLADSTONE inspected the building of the Royal Courts of Justice on Thursday, and expressed his satisfaction with the progress of the works and the effect of the Great Central Hall. There is no longer any doubt that the building will be ready for occupation at the commencement of the Michaelmas Sittings. AS THE SELF-ACCUSED PERSON who is now under arrest at Caraccas on suspicion of being concerned in the Phoenix Park murders had selected for his residence one of the few foreign States with which (so far as we have been able to discover) no extradition treaty exists, it may be well to point out that extradition treaties establish no new principle, but merely define the manner in which a very long-established principle of international law is to be applied. "It is declared by the public jurists," says KENT (2nd ed., p. 113), citing Grotius, b. 2, ch. xxi., ss. 3, 4, 5; Vattel, b. 2, ch. vi., ss. 76, 77, and others, "that every State is bound to deny an asylum to criminals, and, upon application and due examination of the case, to surrender the fugitives to the foreign State where the crime was committed. The language of the authorities is clear and explicit, and the law and usage of nations rest on the plainest principles of justice. It is the duty of the Government to surrender up fugitives upon demand after the civil magistrates shall have ascertained the existence of reasonable grounds for the charge, and sufficient to put the accused upon his trial. The guilty party cannot be tried and punished by any other jurisdiction than the one whose laws have been violated, and, therefore, the duty of surrendering him applies as well to the case of the subjects of the State surrendering as to the case of subjects of the Power demanding the fugitive. The only difficulty, in the absence of positive agreement, consists in drawing the line between the classes of offences to which the usage of nations does, and to which it does not apply, inasmuch as it is understood in practice to apply only to crimes of great atrocity, or deeply affecting the public safety." Upon this point no difficulty is likely to arise in the present case. THE DISCUSSION on the question of the repairs of milestones has resulted very speedily in legislation on the subject. We fear, however, that our correspondents will not be altogether satisfied with the mode in which the Legislature has dealt with the matter. It is now made legal to keep up milestones on a highway; but we cannot think that the enactment by which this desirable change in the law has been effected is framed in the best possible manner. "The expenses incurred by a highway authority," it is provided posts and rails. And last, though not least, inasmuch as the statute is in no case retrospective, they have failed to obviate the necessity of each past expenditure on milestones being disallowed by the auditor, of each disallowance being appealed against to the Local Government Board, and of each appeal being (we presume) followed by a direction from that Board, under the Poor Law Audit Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 91), s. 4, "that the same shall be remitted, upon payment of the costs, if any, which may have been incurred by the auditor in the enforcing of such disallowance." not rate THE ROYAL COMMISSION upon Agriculture has reported in favour of the extension of rating to personal property, and the recommendation appears likely to find considerable favour. The statute and case law on the subject is not a little curious. The Act of Elizabeth (43 Eliz. c. 2) provides for raising the rate "by taxation of every inhabitant, parson, vicar, and other, and of every occupier of lands, houses," &c., in a parish. There are clearly two classes rateable under this statute: first, inhabitants, and, secondly, occupiers of lands; and, independently of authority, it would seem that it was intended to tax all personal property of the inhabitant, as well as all real property of the occupier, and that more detailed language was not employed because personal parison with real property, as hardly to be worth consideration. property was in general of so inconsiderable an amount, in comBut it was held, early in the seventeenth century, in Sir Anthony Earby's case (2 Bulstr. 354), that a man ought not to be rated in a parish by reason of any property he had out of it, and this view of the statute was confirmed in R. v. White (4 T. R. 776), in which the court held that the property, to be rateable, must be visible, and that, therefore, money was able; but partly based its decision on the ground of the inconvenience or impropriety of inquiring into the amount of a man's property, or "opening his bureau to he had got there." For a long time, however, stock-intrade was rateable, although, in Reg. v. Lumsdaine (10 Ad. & E. 157) and Reg. v. Capel (12 Ad. & E. 382), it was, without effect, contended that the Parochial Assessment Act of 1836 (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96) had the effect of exempting it. These cases led to the passing, in 1840, of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 89, which, reciting that it was expedient to repeal the liability of "inhabitants as such" to be taxed, enacts that "it shall not be lawful for the overseers of any parish... to tax any inhabitant thereof as such inhabitant, in respect of his ability derived from the profits of stock-intrade, or any other property, for or towards the relief of the poor." The Act, however, is temporary only, its first period of life having been till December 31, 1841, and has depended for its continuance upon "Expiring Laws Continuance Acts," by the last of which (44 & 45 Vict. c. 70) it now stands limited to expire on the 31st of December of the present year. A mere omission of the Act from the forthcoming "Continuance Act" of the present session might, perhaps, have the effect of re-opening the questions raised in Sir Anthony Earby's case and R. v. White, see what THE QUESTION we discussed a few weeks ago (ante, p. 478), as to adjudicating bankrupts as traders persons who have carried on business, but ceased to trade, has, in a recent case of Ex parte Salaman, reported last week (ante, p. 600), been again before the Court of Appeal upon two further points raised in that case. The first point decided extends somewhat the previous decisions in Ex parte Schomberg (23 W. R. 204, L. R. 10 Ch. 172) and Ex parte McGeorge (ante, p. 478), and it is now expressly laid down that the onus lies upon the petitioning creditor to prove that the debtor is a trader at the time of his committing the act of bankruptcy alleged in the petition. It was contended that, the debtor having once been a trader, it was sufficient for the petitioning creditor to prove that fact; and that the onus then lay upon the debtor to prove that he had ceased to trade; but the Court of Appeal declined to accede to that contention. We notice with some satisfaction that, on the other point raised, the court displayed a disposition rather to limit than to extend the application of the cases referred to. The point was whether a debtor who had ceased to carry on trade, but with the intention of resuming it again, could be adjudicated bankrupt as a trader, and the court held that he could, and that it was a question of intention, to be decided on the evidence, whether the debtor had discontinued his trade permanently, or whether he had only temporarily ceased to carry it on with the intention of resuming it. In the latter case he is still a trader within the Act. It is not stated how long the temporary cessation may be intended to last, but the judgment of Lord ELDON in Ex parte Paterson (1 Ro. 405) was quoted by the Master of the Rolls as being still applicable. Lord ELDON in that case said: "That the bankrupt has ceased to be a trader does not depend upon the fact whether or not you can find any specific acts of trading; but whether or not, in point of intention, he had ceased to be a trader. It is a question for a jury whether there was an entire cessation of trading, or merely an interruption, with an intention of resuming it when opportunity should offer." But our satisfaction upon this point is considerably marred by the reflection that it will be anything but an easy task for a petitioning creditor to prove that such an intention to resume trade exists in the mind of the debtor. And, further, suppose the debtor admitted his intention to recommence trade as soon as he had settled with his creditors or got his discharge in bankruptcy, but not before, would that constitute him still a trader within the decision? We should, though with much hesitation, say not. Again, if the facts should be that the debtor was giving up business for the purpose of undertaking some special employment, or of going abroad for some months, but on his completing that engagement, or returning to this country, he would, if an opportunity offered itself, resume his former or some other kind of trade, would he, after he had given up his business, be a trader within the Act? We have still greater doubt in such a case, and all that is clear to us is, that it will require some further decision to set our doubts at rest. of a coercive ecclesiastical jurisdiction. It is perfectly clear from But SOME DISCUSSION has arisen amongst members of the profession as to the probable effect of clause 8 of the new Bills of Sale Bill-if it should pass into law-which says that "every bill of sale shall be registered within seven clear days after the execution thereof, otherwise such bill of sale shall be void in respect of the chattels comprised therein." As regards bills of sale executed after the commencement of the new Bill, AN IMPORTANT QUESTION upon the application of section 19 of this clause clearly renders all such, if not registered, void for all the Judicature Act, 1873 (which gives a general right of appeal purposes whatsoever, thereby annulling the law as laid down in from the High Court" subject" as therein mentioned), to cases Davis v. Goodman (L.R. 5 C.P.D. 128). But as regards unregistered arising out of the Extradition Act, arose in the recent case of bills of sale executed before that date, the effect of the clause is Reg. v. Weil (ante, p. 597). The prisoner, who had been arrested not so obvious, when we take into consideration clause 3 of the for an alleged extradition crime, appealed to the Court of Appeal same Bill. Clause 3 says, "This Act shall, so far as is consistent from the refusal of a divisional court to grant him a writ of with the tenor thereof, be construed as one with the principal habeas corpus, it being enacted by the Extradition Act, 1870 (33 (1878) Act, but, unless the context otherwise requires, shall not & 34 Vict. c. 52), that "if the police magistrate commits a fugitive apply to any bill of sale duly registered before the commencecriminal to prison, he shall inform such criminal that he will not ment of this Act, so long as the registration thereof is not avoided be surrendered until after the expiration of fifteen days, and that by non-renewal or otherwise." Why, one is naturally led to ask, he has a right to apply for writ of habeas corpus." The court dis- does this clause specially exempt registered bills of sale from the missed the appeal on the ground that, assuming there was juris-operation of the new Bill, unless it means that unregistered bills diction, the facts showed no ground for the exercise of it, but of sale are not to be exempt from its operation? But, if not thought that, "having regard to section 19 of the Judicature exempt from its operation, it is evident that such bills of sale Act, 1873, and other provisions of the Act, it was a serious must, on the commencement of the new Bill, be void under section question whether the court had jurisdiction to entertain an 8, already quoted. In spite, however, of the very careful exappeal in such a case," but they declined to express an opinion clusion of "duly registered" bills of sale from the operation of one way or the other on the question. Inasmuch as in Dale's the new Bill, the better opinion seems to be that clause 3 excludes case (L. R. 6 Q. B. D. 376) the court entertained an appeal all bills of sale executed previous to the commencement of the new from the grant of a habeas corpus, it becomes also of consequence Bill from its operation, and that the clause must be read as if it to inquire whether there is any difference between a case arising ran, " But, unless the context otherwise requires, shall not apply out of the Extradition Act and a case arising out of the exercise to any bill of sale executed before the commencement of this Act"-the remainder of the clause touching the renewal of registration being unnecessary, as this is provided for under the 1878 Act. All one can say is, that if, on the one hand, the framers of the new Bill intended that unregistered bills of sale executed before its commencement should come under its operation, they should have distinctly said so, and if, on the other hand, they intended them to be subject to the old law, this clause should have been drafted as we have suggested. As it stands it is difficult to say what good purpose can be served by such an elaboratelydrawn distinction without any real difference, unless it be considered a desirable thing to create confusion in the minds of those who have to do with bills of sale. IT HAS BEEN STATED that the first person arrested in Ireland under the Prevention of Crime Act for an offence alleged to have been committed in a proclaimed district was promptly discharged upon the representation of his solicitor that the proclamation proclaiming the district had not been "stuck up' as required by the proclamation. The discharge of the prisoner may have been both proper and prudent, but we fail to see how it was authorized by law. The 23rd section of the Act prescribes that "the LordLieutenant. may, . by proclamation, declare the provisions of this Act, which relate to proclaimed districts, or any of those provisions, to be in force within any specified part of Ireland, as from the date of the proclamation, or any later date, and the provisions of this Act which are mentioned in the proclamation shall, after the said date, be in force within such specified part of Ireland, and that part of Ireland shall be a proclaimed district within the meaning of the provisions so mentioned." "The proclamation," it is added, "shall provide for the manner of the promulgation thereof." If there had been were not issued by the Post Office before July, 1881. Upon th's HENRY BOWDITCH was committed to take his trial at the Summer Assizes for perjury. Counsel for the defence urged that the evidence in question was not material to the issue; that whether the stock on the farm belonged to WALTER MULLETT or H. W. MULLETT did not necessarily depend upon who was tenant of the farm, for in numbers of instances rent was paid by the person who did not own the property on the premises. Lord Justice LINDLEY, before whom the case was tried, brushed these objections aside, and the prisoner was convicted, and sentenced to four months' imprisonment. A PARAGRAPH, ending as follows, has appeared in many of the papers concerning the tragedies at Manchester:-"The jury found that Newby murdered the girl, and in his case they returned a verdict of felo-de-se. His body is to be buried in the usual way at midnight by the police." It seems to have escaped the notice of the authorities-if this account is correct-that on the 3rd of July a new Act came into operation (45 & 46 Vict. c. 19), which says, section 3, that "such coroner or other officer shall give directions for the interment of the remains of such felo-de-se in the churchyard or other burial-ground of the parish or place in which the remains of such person might be interred, if the verdict of felo-de-se had not been found against such person." Burial in the public highway, and the thrusting of a stake through the body, is declared to be no longer legal, but the use of any religious rites or ceremonies is not authorized. LIABILITY OF TRUSTEE FOR FAILURE nothing more than this, it might have been doubtful whether a proclamation could be in force without being "promulgated." But section 24 prescribes that "every proclamation shall be published in the Dublin Gazette, and that the production of a A CASE recently decided by Vice-Chancellor Bacon caused a panic printed copy of the Dublin Gazette containing the pub- among business men when it was shortly reported in the newslication of any proclamation shall be conclusive evidence papers. The learned judge, it was thought, had dealt out very hard of the contents of such publication, and, in the case of a measure to a trustee who had acted with regard to the trust funds proclamation, that the district specified in such proclamation is a as any ordinarily prudent man would have acted with regard to proclaimed district, and that the said proclamation has his own money. The Stock Exchange was greatly excited, been duly promulgated." Either in the event of the proclama- because the decision was thought to render it unsafe for trustees tion failing to direct any particular promulgation, or in the event to remit trust funds to brokers in payment for purchases of of the directions of the proclamation not being complied with, it stocks made by them. These exaggerated apprehensions will seems perfectly clear that the publication of the proclamation in probably be removed by a perusal of the report of the case (In the Dublin Gazette affects all her Majesty's subjects with con- re Speight) which appeared in last week's issue of the WEEKLY structive notice of the contents. The provision that the pro- REPORTER (p. 785), but there is a good deal of serious warning clamation shall provide for the manner of promulgation is to trustees in the decision. "directory" only, and appears to have been inserted for the purpose of giving more abundant warning. But it would have been better if the statute itself had directed a particular manner of promulgation. A CURIOUS CASE of perjury has just been tried at the Dorset Summer Assizes. Judgment was recovered by one DRAKE against one WALTER MULLETT, a small farmer, in the autumn of last year, and upon execution being levied upon the goods and stock on WALTER MULLETT's farm, his son, HENRY WILLIAM MULLETT, claimed them as his, and the sheriff interpleading, the trial of this issue came on before Lord COLERIDGE at the Dorset Winter Assizes. In support of H. W. MULLET's claim to the goods and stock, and as tending to show that the goods and stock belonged to him, HENRY BOWDITCH, the landlord, a cousin of the MULLETTS', was called to prove that the farm was let to H. W. MULLETT, and not to WALTER MULLETT. In the course of his examination three half-yearly receipts for rent were put into the hands of HENRY BOWDITCH, made out to H. W. MULLETT, and signed by the witness; and in cross-examination, after being cautioned, he swore that the three receipts in question had been signed by him on the days on which they respectively bore date. A clerk from the Post Office was then called for the execution creditor, who proved that the receipt-stamps (the new postal and inland revenue stamps) upon the three receipts, which respectively bore date April and December, 1880, and May, 1881, Some of the misapprehension which has resulted may, perhaps, be due to the lack of clear explanation by the Vice-Chancellor of the principle on which his decision was based. That principle is one of the most firmly established in the whole law of trusts. It is that a trustee must not transfer to another the confidence which is vested in him. Except in case of necessity he must not place the trust property under the control of another person. This was well stated by Lord Cottenham, with reference to an executor, in the case of Clough v. Bond (3 My. & Cr. 496). He said :"Although a personal representative, acting strictly within the line of his duty, and exercising reasonable care and diligence, will not be responsible for the failure or depreciation of the fund in which any part of the estate may be invested, or for the insolvency or misconduct of any person who may have possessed it, yet, if that line of duty be not strictly pursued, and any part of the property be invested by such personal representative in funds or upon securities not authorized, or be put within the control of persons who ought not to be intrusted with it, and a loss be thereby eventually sustained, such personal representative will be liable to make it good, however unexpected the result, however little likely to arise from the course adopted, and however free such conduct may have been from any improper motive." And after referring to the case of unauthorized securities, Lord Cottenham added, "So, when the loss arises from the dishonesty or failure of any one to whom the possession of part of the estate has been intrusted, necessity, which includes the regular course of business in administering the property, will in equity exonerate the personal representative. But if, without such necessity, he be instrumental in giving to the person failing possession of any part of the property, he will be liable." By "necessity " in this passage Lord Cottenham must be taken to mean what Lord Hardwicke called "moral necessity," and which he thus defined: "Moral necessity is from the usage of mankind; if a trustee acts as prudently for the trust as he would have done for himself, and according to the usage of business, . . the trustee is not answerable. So in the employment of stewards and agents. For none of these cases are on account of necessity, but because the persons acted in the usual method of business, (Ex parte Belchier, Ambl. 219). In the last-mentioned case it was held that, if a trustee, acting in the usual method of business, employs a broker, in good credit at the time, to sell a portion of the trust estate, and the broker fails while the produce of the estate is in his hands, the loss will fall on the trust estate. In like manner, there can be no doubt, upon the principles above laid down, that a trustee employing a broker to purchase in the market stocks usually dealt with through brokers, and remitting to the broker trust money, will not, in the absence of any circumstances showing negligence in the trustee, be responsible for the failure of the broker. But if the trustee omits to take proper precautions for the safety of the trust property-as, for instance, if having employed the broker to invest the trust money in Exchequer bills, he leaves them undistinguished in the hands of the broker, who misapplies them-the trustee will be personally liable (Matthews v. Brise, 6 Beav. 239). These being well-settled principles, let us now consider how they were applied in the recent case. The facts were these A trustee, having power to invest in the securities of any corporation, resolved to invest £15,000 of the trust funds on the security of the loans or debenture stock of the Leeds, Stockton, and Huddersfield Corporations. Now, the money might have been lent to the corporations, or the debenture stock might have been purchased from them, directly without the intervention of a broker. It was not denied that the trustee, who lived in the neighbourhood, was acquainted with the circumstances connected with these corporation securities. The trustee, however, instructed a broker in good repute to effect the investment. This broker, a few days afterwards, presented to the trustee a bought-note purporting to be a contract for the purchase of three several sums respectively of Leeds, Huddersfield, and Stockton Corporation Debenture Stock. This document was irregular in many ways; no account day was fixed; no commission was charged (which showed that the contract had been entered into, not in the market, but with the corporations them selves, who, in such cases, paid the commission themselves); and there were no such securities as Huddersfield Debenture Stock. The trustee, however, on the same day, gave the broker cheques payable to him for the £15,000 odd stated in the bought-note as being the sum due. This was on the 24th of February, but the trustee did not get any debenture or other security or any receipt in return for his money. He often asked the broker for such security, but was put off by various excuses until the 28th of March, when the broker filed a liquidation petition and then absconded. No part of the £15,000 was ever recovered. Under these circumstances Vice-Chancellor Bacon held that the trustee was personally responsible for the £15,000. Now, looking at these facts in relation to the principles above cited, what do we find? Why, first of all, that there was no absolute necessity for the trustee to employ a stockbroker to effect the investment. The trustee, who lived in the neighbourhood of the borrowing corporations, must have known, or, if he did not know, could have ascertained on inquiring of the town clerks, that the securities would be issued by the corporations directly. Secondly, even if the broker were employed, there was no necessity to make the cheques payable to him. The boughtnote clearly showed that the contract was with the corporations themselves, and that the money was to go to the corporations, and any prudent business man would have drawn cheques payable to the officers of the corporations, and not to the broker. Thirdly, instead of ascertaining that the money had reached the corporations and insisting on having given to him at once corporation securities, the trustee allowed himself to be deluded for over a month with various excuses by the broker, This was certainly not such a course as a prudent man would have pursued with reference to his own affairs. There was, as we have said, no absolute necessity for the trustee to employ the broker or to place under his control the trust money; was there, then, any "moral necessity" to use Lord Hardwicke's term? That seems to depend upon whether it is the usage of mankind or the regular course of business for persons to employ brokers to invest money in corporation securities; or, having employed them and received from them a bought-note, clearly showing that the securities have not been purchased in the market, but obtained from the corporations themselves-whether it is the usage of mankind and the regular course of business to draw a cheque for the amount to be invested payable to the broker. Practically these country corporation securities are, probably, of too recent origin for any general course of business or usage to have become established. It appears, however, that in the recent case two stockbrokers of great eminence were called who said, "It is the custom when we buy for clients to take a cheque in order that we may pay the vendor of the stock"-that is to say, it was apparently attempted to set up a custom that a man who employs a broker and takes from him a bought-note must always, under all circumstances, pay the broker. This Vice-Chancellor Bacon described as an unlawful custom, and it certainly is far too sweeping and too serious in its consequences to be admitted as an excuse for a trustee on Lord Hardwicke's ground of "moral necessity." One would have thought that the proper course for the trustee in the recent case would have been to call a number of stockbrokers in the neighbourhood of the towns in whose corporation securities the investment was intended to be made, to testify that they were in the constant habit of negotiating such investments for business men, and always received payment in cheques payable to them. This would have come much nearer to that usage of mankind, or regular course of business, which has been admitted as an excuse for trustees. The fact that no such limited practice seems to have been set up may, probably, be accepted as showing that it did not exist. The most important question is, What are the practical consequences of the recent decision to trustees? There are, we believe, many classes of securities constantly bought through brokers which need not, strictly speaking, be bought through them. Investments in London and North-Western Railway Debenture Stock, for instance, if we are not mistaken, can, or could some time ago, be effected through the secretary of the company, and probably our readers will be able to suggest numerous other important classes of securities to which the same observation applies. Is it meant that in all these cases trustees are not justified in employing a broker and will be responsible for his failure if they employ him? We apprehend that the utmost extent of the decision is this:—If the bought-note is not in regular form, and shows on the face of it that the broker has not purchased in the market, but that the money is to go to the body issuing the security, the trustee's cheque must be made payable to that body, and not to the broker. If the bought-note is in the regular form, and does not, on the face of it, contain anything to show that the security has not been bought in the market, the trustee will be safe in making his cheque payable to the broker. The President and Council of the Incorporated Law Society dined with the Lord Mayor at the Mansion House on Thursday evening. On the vote in the House of Commons, on the 24th inst., to complete the sum of £117,200 for the new Courts of Justice, Sir R. Cross inquired when it was proposed that the new courts should be opened. Mr. Shaw-Lefevre said hoped, however, that the building would be thoroughly completed and that some delay had been caused by the death of Mr. Street, the architect. He the judges would be able to enter upon their duties in it on the first day of term after the long vacation. Mr. Sclater-Booth hoped the right hon. gentleman would be able to give some assurance to the committee that the present law courts in Westminster Hall would be pulled down. Mr. Shaw-Lefevre had indicated by his right hon. friend would be pursued. There was a certain not yet consulted the Government on this matter, but hoped that the course obligation to the public that the old courts should be pulled down so that the exterior of Westminster Hall might be seen. What the general effect would be was at present a matter of doubt. He believed Sir Charles Barry was of opinion that the general architectural effect would not be altogether satisfac but, in regard to this, no decision had been arrived at, tory, and that he had contemplated another wing of the Houses of Parliament. THE LAW OF DISTRESS. THE report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons At the same time, we have always strenuously advocated the amendment of the law. As it stands at present, a distress is an arbitrary and oppressive process, full of danger and prospect of litigation to the landlord who employs it. Hardly any step can be safely taken in it without a knowledge of the law which no one but a lawyer is likely to possess, yet the landlord has to trust to the execution of the process by an auctioneer, whose first step is to procure the execution of a document, making the landlord liable for his irregularities. We believe we are not exaggerating when we say that there are comparatively few distresses levied in which some opening might not be found for litigation on the part of an exasperated tenant. On the other hand, the law, as it stands, affords very insufficient protection to the interests of the tenant. The appraisement of the goods is made by men who are allowed to purchase them at the appraised value, and have, therefore, every inducement afforded to undervalue them. The solitary security of the appraiser's oath was removed by a clause in the Parish Constables Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 92), s. 13. The appraised value is presumed to be the criterion as to whether the goods have been sold at the "best price," as required by the 2 Will. & M., sess. 1, c. 5, s. 2; hence the tenant has little security that the sale will be fairly made. And as no scale of charges is specified for distresses for rent above £20, notwithstanding the rule which has been laid down that such charges must be reasonable, exorbitant charges are constantly made; and, moreover, the tenant who wishes to tender the rent and costs is unable to ascertain what amount he ought to tender for costs. "This court. With regard to the costs of distress, the committee make the useful suggestion that in cases above the limit fixed by the Act they should be subject to taxation by the registrar of the county of this change, or as to the further suggestion that the limits of We think there can be little dispute as to the advisability £20 distress, regulated by the Act of 1817 (57 Geo. 3, c. 93), be raised to £50, and that the allowance in the schedule of that Act for a man in possession be raised from 2s. 6d. to not exceeding 5s. a-day. and that the right should be exercised within six months after The proposal to restrict the right of distress to one year's rent, such year's rent has become due, is also, we think, reasonable. It is allowed to sleep upon his remedy until six years' arrears have certainly unfair to other creditors that the landlord should be become due, and it is anomalous that the restriction to one year's rent in favour of the other creditors of the tenant should only exist in case of the bankruptcy of the tenant. The committee propose to extend the principle of the Lodgers' Goods Protection Act to agisted stock, machinery not the property of the tenant [such machinery is constantly now-a-days borrowed on the hire system], and animals, not the property of the this we can see no reasonable objection, except that it will render tenant, temporarily upon the holding for breeding purposes. To it necessary for landlords of grazing farms to stipulate in their animals shall be taken by the tenant to agist; otherwise, it is leases or agreements that not more than a certain number of obvious that the landlord might at certain seasons be altogether deprived of his remedy by distress. deprived of his remedy by distress. remain in possession under a distress may, at the request of the Lastly, the committee propose that the time a bailiff may tenant, and on his giving security for the costs, be increased from five to fifteen days, and that, in such case, no sale shall take place sooner, except at the request or with the consent of the tenant; also, that at the desire of the landlord, or of the tenant, the goods of the tenant may be removed for sale to public auction-rooms or some other fit place. The first proposal merely represents the consent by the tenant for his remaining on the premises for a longer frequent practice under which the landlord obtains a written time. The period of five days is far too short for proper advertisements of the sale, and for proper arrangements to be made, yet if the landlord does not sell or remove the goods within a reasonable time after the five days, he is liable to an action of trespass by the of sale will need careful consideration if ever a Bill is drafted to tenant. The suggestion as to removal of the goods for the purpose carry out the recommendations of the committee. According to Kemp's Mercantile Gazette the number of bills of sale published in England and Wales for the week ending July 22, was 812. The number in the corresponding week of last year was 938, showing a decrease of 126, being a net decrease in 1882, to date, of 969. The number published in Ire land for the same week was 26. The number in the corresponding week of last year was 23, showing an increase of 3, being a net decrease in 1882, to date, of 240. The committee recognize many of these evils, but fail to specify in detail the remedies for some of them. They say that the consolidation of the numerous and complicated statutes relating to the law of distress is a matter for the consideration of experienced lawyers rather than for the decision of the committee. question is one of importance, and if the law of distress should be maintained, it should not be forgotten," and they add that, "Most of the witnesses who expressed themselves in favour of a retention of the law, at the same time advocated considerable modifications in its provisions. Those who desired the total abolition of the law were of opinion that cheaper and more speedy means of re-jury, and, if so, in what cases? And where trial by jury is retained, is it entry, in the event of non-payment of rent, must be given to the landlord." The committee may well be excused from attempting to explain in detail how the process should be simplified and amended, but they might have indicated the general lines on which the change should be effected. They omit to draw attention definitely to the true remedy for most of the evils attending distresses-namely, to take the process altogether out of the At the Nottingham Congress of the Social Science Association, to be held on September 20-27, the following are the special questions as to Jurisprudence and the Amendment of the Law:-International and Municipal Law Section.-1. Is it expedient to make the devolution of real property in cases of intestacy follow that of personalty? 2. Is it desirable to abolish trial by expedient to require an unanimous verdict? 3. Is it desirable to extend, and, if so, how far, the civil jurisdiction of local courts? Repression of Crime Section.-1. Is it desirable that defendants in criminal cases should be competent to give evidence, and is it desirable that their husbands and their wives should be both competent and compellable to give evidence? 2. Is it desir. able that fines should be allowed after a certain number of convictions for drunkenness within a certain period; or that a month should remain as the maximum imprisonment? 3. How may the efficiency of prisoners' aid societies be best promoted? |
