A MAN AND HIS NAME.

I.

MANY years have passed and much has happened since the question-"What's in a name?"—was first asked, but the time has not yet come for the lawyer to deny that there is much in a name which concerns him. The common law courts and the judges at Nisi Prius have their time occupied for weeks with libel cases which have all come of calling names,' while the chancery practitioner surveys an elongated list of actions arising out of the use or misuse of names bestowed by parents or sponsors. The extent of litigation which has originated in this source is beyond dispute, as will appear from the amount of authority to which it will be necessary to refer in considering, from an equity point of view, the rights and duties of men in respect of their names.

Let us take, first, a man's rights in respect of his name. A very lucid and valuable statement of the general law on this subject will be found in the judgment of the Privy Council (delivered by the late Lord Chelmsford) in the case of Du Boulay v. Du Boulay (17 W. R. 594, L. R. 2 P. C. 441), where the object of the suit in which the appeal was brought was to restrain one man from assuming another man's family name. What Lord Chelmsford says is this-" In this country we do not recognize the absolute right of a person to a particular name to the extent of entitling him to prevent the assumption of that name by a stranger. The right to the exclusive use of a name in connection with a trade or business is familiar to our law; and any person using that name, after a relative right of this description has been acquired by another, is considered to be guilty of a fraud, or, at least, of an invasion of another's rights, and renders himself liable to an action, or he may be restrained from the use of the name by injunction. But the mere assumption of a name which is the patronymic of a family by a stranger who had never before been called by that name, whatever cause of annoyance it may be to the family, is a grievance for which our law affords no redress."

In discussions on this topic the case of Clark v. Freeman (11 Beav. 112) is always made the subject of much remark, and the exact effect of the decision does not appear to be even yet clearly ascertained. Lord Langdale there refused to accede to the contention of an eminent physician, named Sir James Clark, who did not manufacture or sell pills or other medicines, and to restrain another person from advertising or selling pills under the name of "Sir J. Clark's Consumption Pills." There could, of course, be no question with respect to the object the defendant had in view, but the Master of the Rolls considered that, since the plaintiff did not sell pills, there could be no injury to property even if the defendant's pills were bought under the impression that they were made by the plaintiff; the plaintiff could not thereby lose the sale of any genuine pills. Other judges have observed unfavourably upon this decision, and Lord Cairns, in Maxwell v. Hogg (15 W. R. 467, L. R. 2 Ch. 307), said that it had always appeared to him that the case might have been decided in favour of the plaintiff, on the ground that he had a property in his own name. Of course, no one but Lord Cairns himself can state positively in what precise sense he used the words "property in his own name," but it certainly seems that those words are sometimes understood in a sense which his lordship could hardly have attributed to them. It seems impossible that his lordship could have meant to say that the mere fact of Sir J. Clark being so named entitled him to sue; in the very same judgment Lord Cairns, speaking of the acquisition of a trade-mark, said that protection could not be given where there had been no sale, or offering for sale, of the articles to which the name was to be attached; but it seems that the two statements are perfectly reconcilable if his lordship is understood to have regarded Sir J. Clark's great reputa

The

the sole principle on which the court interferes. court interferes solely for the purpose of protecting the owner of a trade or business from a fraudulent invasion of that business by somebody else. It does not interfere to prevent the world outside from being misled into anything." A good example of the case in which the court does interfere is Cave v. Myers, in which Vice-Chancellor Giffard (December 3, 1868) granted an injunction to

66

restrain a fraudulent imitation of the name of a tradesman named Cave," by a neighbour who, occupying a corner shop, painted up the name "Cavendish House" in such a manner that "Cave " alone appeared

in the same street as the plaintiff's shop, the remainder of the inscription being round the corner of the next street.

In Levy v. Walker Lord Justice James speaks of the right to restrain the use of a particular name in a particular business as "a right in the nature of a trademark," but when a name has been employed in an appropriate manner, the right acquired therein is not merely a right in the nature of a trade-mark, but it is an actual and positive right of trade-mark, for, to use Lord Hatherley's language in Ainsworth v. Walmsley (14 W. R. 363, L. R. 1 Eq. 518)—"Is not a man's name as strong an instance of trade-mark as can be suggested ?— subject only to this inconvenience, that if a Mr. Jones or a Mr. Brown relies on his name, he may find it a very inadequate security, because there may be several other manufacturers of the same name." Injunctions have repeatedly been granted, both in England and America, to restrain the use of names which have become trade-marks, as, for instance, in Ainsworth v. Walmsley; Rodgers v. Nowill (6 Hare, 325); Holloway v. Holloway (13 Beav. 209); Wolfe v. Barnett (13 Amer. Rep. 111); and many more cases might be cited. In Scotland, too, as early as 1823, an interdict was granted in Wilkie v. McCulloch (2 S. 413) to restrain the wrongful use on ploughs of the name of a well-known plough manufacturer. There is, then, no doubt that it is generally recognized that a name may become and be protected by a trademark when the necessary conditions have been complied with, subject, indeed, to the limitation pointed out in Ainsworth v. Walmsley, which was thus re-stated by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in a case which came before that tribunal-Gilman v. Hunnewell (122 Mass. 139)—“A person may have a right in his own name as a trade-mark as against a person of a different name. But he cannot have such a right as against another person of the same name, unless the

defendant uses a form of stamp or label so like that used by the plaintiff as to represent that the defendant's goods are of the plaintiff's manufacture." The law on the whole subject was carefully considered and laid down in the same way by the highest court in the United States in McLean v. Fleming (96 U. S. Rep. 245). In Howev. Howe Machine Company (50 Barb. S. C. 236) it was even held that A. B. Howe, who had been accustomed to manufacture sewing machines under a licence from his brother, the original patentee and inventor, Elias Howe, and to mark such machines with the name of "Howe," was entitled to a right in the name capable of protection even against Elias Howe and those claiming through him, though no injunction was actually granted, there being a question to be decided with respect to an alleged agreement between the parties, authorizing the defendant to use the name.

EFFECT OF SIGNATURE OF NAME COMMON TO FIRM AND INDIVIDUAL MEMBER OF FIRM.

THE case of the Yorkshire Banking Company v. Beatson (L. R. 5 C. P. D. 109), recently decided in the Court of Appeal, raised several points of importance which had been considered doubtful with regard to the law of negotiable instruments. It not unfrequently happens that the business of a firm is carried on under the name of an individual partner. It is a general rule with regard to bills of exchange and other instruments that, in order to bind the firm, the signature must be that of the name or style of the firm. But, of course, where the name or style of the firm is the same as that of an individual partner, a difficulty may arise with regard to the effect of an instrument signed in such name. The facts of the case we refer to were briefly these:-A. and B. carried on business in partnership. B. was a dormant partner, and A. was the sole ostensible partner, the business being carried on in his name only. A. entered into accommodation transactions for his private purposes, and without the authority of B. accepted and indorsed bills of exchange in his own name. In so doing he did not intend to bind B., but considered the bills as private transactions, and signed them merely on his own behalf. The plaintiffs became bona fide holders for value of the bills so signed, and took the bills as the bills of the proprietor or proprietors of the business carried on by the partnership, whoever he or they might be, and not merely as the private bills of A. Besides the business of the partnership, A. was not engaged in any business. It was held that the plaintiffs could not recover against B. upon the bills. The court, in giving judgment, appear to have laid down the following propositions, which are summarized in the head-note of the report:-First, when a signature is common to an individual and a firm of which the individual is a member, a bona fide holder for value of a bill bearing such signature, without notice whose paper it is, has not an option to sue either the individual or the firm; secondly, there is, however, a presumption that the bill was given for the firm, at least, when the individual member carries on no business separate from the business of the firm of which he is a member; but, thirdly, this presumption may be rebutted by proof that the bill was signed, not in the name of the partnership, but of the individual for his private purposes, and it is immaterial that the bona fide holder took the bill as the bill of the proprietors of the partnership business, whoever they might be, and not merely as that of the individual.

We cannot help somewhat doubting the soundness of the general proposition that there never can be a right to elect in such a case whether you will sue the individual partner or the firm. Dicta are no doubt to be found in the text-books to the effect that you cannot have an option to sue either of two parties on one signature to a

|

bill of exchange, because the law of negotiable instruments is that, in order to be liable on the instrument, the defendant's name must appear as that of a party on the instrument. That principle is an obvious one with regard to ordinary cases. You cannot make B. a

party to a bill because it bears A.'s signature, even though A. was agent for B. in the transaction. That class of cases does not help much here. An ambiguous signature being used, it may, as it seems to us, be a question whether under certain circumstances a right may not exist in favour of the holder of the bill, to elect which effect he will give to the signature. We think that the first proposition decided by the court must be looked at with relation to the circumstances of the particular case, and that it cannot be considered as absolutely determined yet that there never can be such a right of election. It seems almost impossible to suggest that under any circumstances the individual member signing the bill could not be held solely liable on a bill eigned in his own name by which he intended to bind himself solely for his own private purposes. If it is to be assumed that there can never be a right of election, of course it follows from this that the firm can never be liable on such a bill; but we cannot think the matter so obvious or capable of being so simply disposed of. Neither the ordinary doctrine with regard to principal and agent, nor the exception to it with regard to negotiable instruments, appears to afford sufficient materials for a solution of the problem.

The second point decided by the court seems to us the more important—viz., that the onus of showing that the bill was the private bill of the individual member and not the bill of the firm lay on the dormant partner. The argument ab inconvenienti upon which the court proceeded appears to us to be almost irresistible. They say, in giving judgment, "The vast majority of bills given under the circumstances supposed would be really partnership bills, and yet it would be often difficult, if not impossible, for the holders of such bills to do more than prove that the only trade carried on under the individual name was the trade of a partnership; and if they were compelled to go further and prove that the particular bill was a partnership bill, the effect might be that in many cases dormant partners, and in some cases ostensible ones too, might escape from just liabilities." The court below had held otherwise on the supposed result of the English and American authorities; but the Court of Appeal, on a full review of those authorities, thought they did not bear the construction that had been put upon them.

At first sight it seemed to us that the principle involved in the second proposition was somewhat antagonistic to what we supposed to be the effect of the third proposition. But on a careful perusal of the reports it will be observed that the court do not, in the third proposition, say that a bond fide holder, who takes the bill, knowing of the existence of the dormant partner sought to be charged, and intending to give credit to the firm, cannot recover against such partner. In the case in question the holder of the bill was treated as having taken the bill as the bill of the proprietor or proprietors of the business, whoever they might be, but he had never heard of B., the dormant partner, whom it was sought to make liable together with the partner who signed the bill. He never knew of any one but the ostensible partner in connection with the business. Unless due notice is taken of this fact, the decision may mislead. There was no reason in justice why the holder should be entitled to have recourse to B., whom he had not trusted, and of whom he had never even heard. When this consideration is duly appreciated, it appears to us that the actual decision in the case becomes a very obvious affair, hardly worth so much elaboration as it received. It might have been assumed, rather than decided, that the onus lay on the defendant B. of showing that this was a private bill. Assuming that it did, he having shown this, the only question remaining

was what, in such a case, was his liability-a question which, for the reasons above alluded to, seems to us comparatively easy of solution. The whole thing resolves itself into this. A man gives a bill for his own private purposes in his own name, intending to bind himself only. He happens to carry on business in conjunction with another person under the same name. Why should a person, who takes the bill without any reason for thinking that he is taking any but the bill of the individual, be entitled to make the partner liable? The thing is too simple. Why should recourse be necessary to a long train of English and American authorities to solve such a question? The court, however, thought it desirable to consider and express their judgment on the point involved in their second proposition, and as to the importance of this point there can be no doubt.

The interesting question that this case seems to us to leave open is whether, if the person taking the bill knows of the other partner, and takes the bill as a partnership bill, he can charge the partners, though the bill was, in fact, drawn by the individual for his private purposes. It seems to us that a strong argument may be drawn from the second proposition laid down in the judgment in favour of the view that he may. If the presumption, as a matter of evidence, is that a bill drawn under such circumstances is a trade bill drawn by the partnership, it seems to us arguable that, as a matter of business, a person taking the bill is entitled similarly to presume that the bill is a partnership bill, and if he does so presume the partnership will be liable. The question seems to us to turn on considerations of expediency. If the law were laid down one way or the other, no business man taking a bill of this sort could afterwards complain of hardship, for he would do so with his eyes open to the risk. The real question seems to be whether it would be reasonable or practicable to throw on persons engaged in business the necessity of inquiring in every case where a bill bearing a name common to a firm and an individual was presented to them whether it was the bill of the individual only or of him and the other persons whom they knew to be partners. Such inquiries would often be troublesome, and would cause delay, and in some cases it might be practically impossible to make them. At the same time, if we could suppose that it would prevent partnerships from being carried on under the name of a single individual, we think it would be an advantage, because it is obvious, from the considerations that arise out of the case we have been discussing, that inconveniences and anomalies result therefrom. It seems to us an anomaly that different parties should be the parties to a bill of exchange according to the state of knowledge of the party taking it, and this may possibly be a difficulty in the way of the view that the dormant partner can be liable upon the bill given by the ostensible partner for his private purposes.

The Social Science Association have received from the president of the Juristic Society of Berlin a communication in reference to the prize of 6,900 marks to be offered in the year 1882 for an essay on "The Formulæ in the Perpetual Edict of Hadrian, in their Wording and Connection." The Savigny Foundation is a fund subscribed in commemoration of the great lawyer, Von Savigny, the interest of which is applied every two years in a prize for an essay on a legal subject, the adjudicators being the Imperial or Royal Academies of Sciences of Vienna, Munich, and Berlin, in rotation. The competition, from which only the ordinary home members of the Royal Bavarian Academy are excluded, is confined to no nationality. The essays, which must be written in Latin, German, English, French, or Italian, must be sent in by the 28th of March, 1882, addressed to the Royal Bavarian Academy of Sciences, and bearing, instead of the author's name, a motto, repeated in a closed envelope containing the author's name.

Recent Decisions.

IMMUNITY OF PUBLIC SHIP, NOT A SHIP OF WAR.

(The Parlement Belge, C.A., 28 W. R. 642.) There arose in this case the exact question referred to by Mr. Justice Blackburn in The Charkieh (26 W. R. 438, L. R. 8 Q. B. 201) as a difficult question of international law: What is the liability of a vessel, not a ship of war, which is the property of a foreign State, when she causes damage by a collision to another vessel ? Does the circumstance of her being the property of a foreign State oust the jurisdiction of the English Court of Admiralty? This question has never before been distinctly decided in England. In the case of The Frins Frederik (2 Dodson, 451) the question was raised, but not decided, whether an armed ship of war belonging to the King of the Netherlands was liable to civil process in a British port. In The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon (7 Cranch. 116) it was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that an armed ship of war of a foreign Sovereign coming into the ports of the United States was exempt from the jurisdiction of the courts of that country, and the principle has since been generally recognized. Dr. Lushington seems to have first extended it to a troopship (The Athol, 1 W. Rob. 374); and in Briggs v. The Light Boats (11 Allen, 157) the Supreme Court of Massachusetts explained the reason of the immunity of ships of war as being that they are public property, and laid down the broad principle that the public property of the Government of any State, in use for public purposes, is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of its own or any other State. On the other hand, Mr. Justice Story, in United States v. Wilder (3 Summer, at p. 315), said that the immunity might well apply to property, like public ships of war, held by the Sovereign jure coronæ, and not be applicable to the common property of the Sovereign of a commercial character. The case of The Schooner Exchange, he added, decided that ships of war coming into the ports of the United States were exempt from all process, but it did not decide that the property of a foreign Sovereign, not belonging to his military or naval establishment, was entitled to a similar exemption.

In the recent case-where it was sought to render a Belgian mail packet, which was a public vessel of the Belgian State, liable for a collision-the Court of Appeal adopted both the decision and the reasons given in Briggs v. The Light Boats, and laid it down that "as a consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign authority, and of the international comity which induces every sovereign State to respect the independence and dignity of every other sovereign State, each and every one declines to exercise by means of its courts any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person of any Sovereign or ambassador of any other State, or over the public property of any State which is destined to public use, or over the property of any ambassador, though such Sovereign, ambassador, or property be within its territory, and, therefore, but for the common agreement, subject to its jurisdiction."

BILLS OF SALE. (National Mercantile Bank v. Hampson, Q.B.D., 28 W. R. 424; Taylor v. McKeand & Co., C.P.D., 28 W. R. 628.)

It is odd that in the first of these cases it should have been thought open to doubt that a bill of sale of all his growing crops, goods, chattels, and effects, given by a farmer and dealer, implied an authority to carry on his trade, and to sell in the ordinary course of such trade. It would obviously be as much opposed to the interests of the grantee of the bill of sale as of the grantor not to imply such a power, and the court had no difficulty

in deciding in favour of the power. But the sale must, of course, be bonâ fide and in the ordinary course of business; hence, in the second case, where a jury in an action by the grantee of a bill of sale for wrongful conversion had found that the sale by the grantor was fraudulent and not in the ordinary course of business, the court held that the plaintiff must succeed. The case deserves notice as showing the advantage to the bench and the profession of the so-called "unauthorized" reports. "I am aware," said Lord Coleridge, in delivering judgment, "that in the report of the National Mercantile Bank v. Hampson in the Law Reports, the words in the ordinary course of his trade' do not appear, but I may say that I feel sure that the WEEKLY REPORTER is more accurate in that respect for two reasons (1) because I think it is evident from the rest of the reasoning of Mr. Justice Lush; and (2) because it says in the statement of defence that the defendant bought them in the ordinary course of his business,' and that it was the ordinary course of Seaman (the grantor) in such business to make such sale.' I have really no doubt that my brother Lush did use the words in question." It appears not improbable that if the report in the WEEKLY REPORTER had been before the solicitors and counsel in Taylor v. McKeand & Co. that action would never have been brought.

Reviews.

NEGLIGENCE.

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE. BY HORACE SMITH, B.A. Stevens & Sons.

There is no topic which is more frequently involved in litigation of various descriptions than that which forms the subject of this treatise. The law of negligence is, however, a topic which it is almost impossible to reduce within accurate general propositions. Our own law, as well as the Roman law, upon which it is largely founded in this respect, has distinguished between the degrees of care rendered obligatory by different classes of relations; and to a very considerable extent the classification adopted by Mr. Horace Smith depends upon these distinctions. There are difficulties connected with such a mode of classification, in which distinctions depend on matter of degree. But all subjects do not admit of a perfectly satisfactory logical classification; and though we were at first doubtful whether this mode of arrangement was good, we are not sure that a better one could have been adopted. The three principal divisions adopted are neglect of duties requiring ordinary care, more than ordinary care, and less than ordinary care. Under each head come a variety of subordinate heads, which may be said to constitute the species of the genus-that is to say, the various classes of cases in which the particular degree of care is required.

66

A man may

The definition given of negligence is, perhaps, as successful as any definition could be. Negligence in law is a breach of duty unintentional and proximately producing injury to another possessing equal rights." The author elaborately justifies each of the terms of the definition. To some part of this definition we could find objections. We doubt whether it is essential that the breach of duty should be unintentional. break a duty and he may intend to break it, and yet we think it may be negligence in law. It seems to us that the idea really intended to be conveyed is that he does not intend the consequences. The observations of the author on the words "possessing equal rights," as a part of the definition, are interesting, but to our mind the idea involved is too abstract and metaphysical to afford much practical test in judging of the existence of negligence. It seems to us, however, that legal definitions can seldom be perfect.

There are two uses of a work of this nature. It is useful, not only as a treatise by way of instruction in principles, but also as a means of discovering authorities.

Here a good index is very valuable, and the book appears to us to be excellent in that respect. In order fairly to judge of the book it is necessary to have regard to its scope. Many cases of negligence arise out of very special contractual relations and matters of business, such as shipping and other mercantile matters. It was beyond the scope of the book to go into these matters at any length. The more immediate object of the work, as we gather from the author's account of it, is to afford a ready means of reference to the law and the authorities on the subject of negligence with regard to the more ordinary circumstances and relations of life. It seems to us, so far as we can judge, that the author has performed his task with judgment and skill, bearing in mind the object at which he aimed. We may add a word of commendation for a device which the author has adopted. He cites the authorities for the propositions in the text in footnotes in the usual way, but in citing a case he adds a few words indicating its subject-matter, such as "scaffolding in pit obstructing ventilation," "shaft of mine," "machine left near hoarding in dangerous position," &c. This appears likely to be useful. It gives an intimation to any one searching for authorities whether the case in question is likely to be in point.

General Correspondence.

THE BILLS OF SALE ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, I am glad you have devoted some space to a consideration of the above-named Bill.

There is certainly a mistake in the preamble of the Bill, for instead of reading "Whereas it is expedient to amend the Bills of Sale Act," it ought to read "Whereas it is expedient to abolish bills of sale," for the latter will probably be its effect should it become law. The provisions for making a bill of sale void if the donor commit an act of bankruptcy within a certain time after the execution of the bill, and for requiring every bill of sale to be advertised in the London Gazette, are monstrous. I believe the desire of the commercial community, as represented by the Association of Chambers of Commerce, is to prevent traders from giving bills of sale upon trade stocks and property of a shifting nature which is not paid for. There is nothing objectionable in this, and in order to put such a desirable restriction on bills of sale, all that is required is a provision that the grantor of a bill of sale should, at the time of its execution, make a statutory declaration before the solicitor who attests such execution that the goods comprised in the security are then the bona fide property of the grantor, and that he is not indebted to any person in respect of the purchase-money of any part of such goods.

This would prevent traders from giving bills of sale upon unpaid-for stocks-in trade, but would not affect the right of a private individual to give a bill of sale on his goods and chattels, while the provisions of the Bill under consideration would practically abolish such a legitimate security.

I hope your attention will also be given to another Bill before Parliament, also introduced at the instance of the Associated Chambers of Commerce-viz., “A Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 1869." The Chambers of Commerce, and other mercantile bodies, are anxious to secure this session some sort of amendment of the existing bankruptcy laws, but I have no hesitation in saying that should this Bill become law, it would in many respects make matters worse than they are at present. I cannot but think that the inconsistencies and anomalies which are apparent to anyone giving a critical consideration to these Bills, must be attributed to the carelessness or incompetency of the draftsman. It cannot be supposed that Mr. Whitwell, and the other members of Parliament whose names are associated with

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, I think the time has come when the nonsense (for it is nothing else) of acknowledging deeds by married women may be dispensed with, and I am glad to see by the report of the committee of the Provincial Law Societies, clause 30, in your paper of the 5th inst., that they are taking the matter up. Their recommendation, however, does not go far enough, as it proposes to retain the special commissioners-the present chief source of difficulty and expense.

I hope we shall soon live to see the day when the laws relating to married women will be abolished, and women shall be able to sign deeds and dispose of their property as if unmarried. Speaking from a tolerably long and extensive experience, I am satisfied it would be the best thing to do, but until it is done I submit that the present system should be abolished in toto, and that every necessary security will be given to married women by providing for a certificate in the margin of deeds, as suggested in clause 30 of the report, but signed only by the woman and any solicit or specially designated by her, and who may very properly be the solicitor who prepares

the deed.

The present system has become a farce, and not one woman in a hundred understands it. The expense is a serious obstacle to the disposal of property, and it frequently happens that we do not get the office copies of the certificate, for six months, during which time the property may have changed hands several times; nor, for the life of me, can I see why the fact of a married woman having executed a deed of the most strictly private character should be made a matter of public record. June 8. AN OLD PRACTITIONER.

A LONG-LOOKED-FOR WINDFALL. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-In 1823 a barrister named White bequeathed the bulk of his property to the trustees of the British Museum, subject to the life interest of his widow. It was not until last year (fifty-seven years after the bequest) that the widow died, but the amount-about £65,000-has now been handed over, and the trustees have made a beginning towards utilizing the same for museum purposes.

I have not come across a similar bequest by a barrister, and you may like to note the case. June 7.

EDWARD PRESTON.

If we may judge from a case decided last year by the Cour de Paris, the French law differs considerably from the English with respect to the extent to which it recognizes a right of property in a name. Connected with a business a name may become a valuable property in England, but apart from such a connection it has been laid down that there can be no property therein. In the case, however, to which we refer, the representatives of a former conductor of an orchestra were held to have a sufficient interest in his name to prevent its continued use by the lessee of the concert and ball-room at which he had been accustomed to preside, although, for many years the room had been commonly known and spoken of as the "Salle Valentino." For many years, in fact, the name had been placed on the front of the room, and on the various articles belonging to the proprietors, without any objection ever being made, but the court nevertheless restrained the lessee from continuing to use the name, and gave him a remedy over against his lessor, who had leased the premises to him under the name in question, by reducing the rent to correspond to the loss incurred by having to discontinue the use of the popular name.

Cases of the Week.

LIQUIDATION BY ARRANGEMENT-SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTION OF CREDITORS TO ACCEPT COMPOSITION-TAXATION OF TRUSTEE'S CHARGES JURISDICTION-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 28-BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, RR. 108, 278.In a case of Ex parte Ranby, before the Court of Appeal on the 3rd inst., a question arose as to the jurisdiction of the court to direct a taxation of the charges of the trustee in a liquidation. After the creditors of a liquidating debtor had resolved upon a liquidation by arrangement, and had appointed a trustee, the debtor, under the provisions of section 28 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, offered to pay the creditors a composition of 6s. 8d. in the pound. The trustee then summoned a meeting of the creditors, and it was resolved to accept the debtor's offer, and the resolutions were approved and confirmed by the court. They provided that the composition should be paid in three instalments, to be secured by promissory notes, and that the debtor should also pay (before the date of the confirmation of the scheme) all costs, charges, and expenses of solicitors, receiver, and trustee incurred in relation to the settlement of his affairs and of the scheme. The discharge of the debtor was to be granted, and the liquidation closed, so soon as he should have given effect to the resolutions, and the trustee should have certified in writing that he had done so. The trustee made out an account of his costs and other charges and expenses, including his remuneration, and it was paid by means of what he had received from the proceeds of the debtor's business, and some money which was paid to him by the debtor. The promissory notes were also delivered to the creditors. Some months afterwards the trustee's account was audited and approved by the committee of inspection who had been appointed when the liquidation was resolved upon. After this had been done the debtor, who was dissatisfied with the trustee's charges, applied to the court for an order that an account should be taken of the trustee's

receipts and disbursements, and that the balance (if any) which might be found due from him might be paid to the debtor. The registrar, in the first instance, referred it to the taxing master to tax the trustee's charges, and adjourned the hearing of the application. But, when the matter came before the taxing master, he was of opinion that, as the account had been certified by the committee of inspection, he had no power to tax it. The motion was then re-heard by the registrar, and he dismissed it, but it did not clearly appear whether he did so because he thought that he had no jurisdiction in the matter, or because he considered the charges in the account proper. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, COTTON, and THESIGER, L.JJ.) held that, on the confirmation of the scheme, the functions of the committee of inspection came to an end, and that, consequently, their approval of the account had no effect. The court had, therefore, jurisdiction to tax the account. And the appeal was ordered to stand over for the purpose of ascertaining from the registrar the ground of his decision.-SOLICITORS, Berry & Binns; Phelps, Sidgwick, & Biddle.

BILL OF SALE-APPARENT POSSESSION-FRAUDULENT PREFERENCE-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 92.-In a case of Ex parte Symmons, before the Court of Appeal on the 3rd inst., the question arose whether the grantee of an unregistered bill of sale, who had obtained actual possession of a part of the goods comprised in it, and had removed them out of the apparent possession of the grantor, before the latter filed a liquidation petition, could be deprived of the goods which he had thus obtained, because he took possession of them in consequence of the debtor's telling him that he was in pecuniary difficulties. The grantee had joined with the grantor in signing a promissory note as his surety, and the bill of sale was given as a security against his liability on the note. The bill of sale was not registered. The day before the note fell due the grantor told the grantee that he should not be able to meet it, and that he was in pecuniary difficulties, and advised him to do what was legal in the matter. The grantee was under the impression that, as the bill of sale had not been registered, he was not entitled to seize the goods comprised in it. And it was arranged that some of the articles which were comprised in the bill of sale and which were selected by the grantee, should be invoiced to him as a purchaser,