allowed to apply to the court for liberty to redeem the security upon payment of the principal sum advanced and such interest as the court shail consider reasonable; that this power should be exercisable by either a judge of the High Court or a county court judge, from whose decision there should be no appeal except by leave of the court; and that, whenever it shall appear to the court desirable, the court shall have power to hear any money-lending case in private. The report is likely to contain also suggestions rendering more formal the practice under bills of sale and providing for the registration of moneylenders and other matters, but upon these points its terms are still under consideration. There is, of course, no chance of any action being taken on the report this session, and before next year there will have been time for it to receive ample consideration; but it is possible that in dealing with the abuses of money-lending the committee will have been found to have gone too far. In particular, we deprecate the idea of hearing money-lending cases in private. If contracts are to be set aside, this should only be done under the guarantee of a public inquiry.

depend on the language of the statute authorizing the charge. For instance, the Metropolis Management Act, 1862, s. 96, does not impose or charge paving expenses on the premises, but on the owner, and a covenant in the form alluded to would not be effectual: Allum v. Dickinson (9 Q. B. D. 632). The safest words are "upon the premises or the owner or occupier in respect thereof," although the mere use of the words "on or in respect of" the premises is no doubt sufficient (see Brett v. Rogers, supra).

PROBABLY no more despicable human being exists than the man who, doing no sort of work himself, lives on the wages of No doubt in prostitution earned by some wretched woman. London, and in other large towns, many men live in this disgraceful way. In most cases they seem to act as tyrants toward their victims, and very often to treat them with the utmost cruelty. In other cases the man acts as "bully," he and the woman working together either to rob the woman's visitors or to intimidate them into paying more than otherwise they would do. This is by no means so dangerous a game as it appears at first sight, as few men robbed under such circumstances are willing to face the disagreeable exposure which would follow upon any appeal to the police. Up to the present time men of this sort have been able to lead their lives without coming within the criminal law, as long as they escaped a charge of larceny or robbery. A Bill has, however, passed a second reading in the Commons which is calculated to put difficulties in the way of those following this career. This is to be known as the Vagrancy Act, 1898, and provides that every male person who "knowingly lives wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution 99 may be dealt with as a rogue and vagabond within the meaning of the Vagrancy Act, 1824. It further provides that where a man is shewn to live with a prostitute and to have no visible means of subsistence, he shall be presumed to be living on the earnings of prostitution unless he can satisfy the court to the contrary. Power is also proposed to be given of issuing warrants to search houses in which such men are said to reside and to arrest the men. These provisions ought to be effectual if the police are active; especially as, under the Act of 1824, on a second conviction the guilty person may be treated as an incorrigible rogue and may be sent to prison for twelve months with hard labour. It does not seem likely that the proposed alteration in the law will excite any opposition, and most people will probably agree that the sooner it is made the better. The Bill also proposes that any man who "in any public place persistently solicits or importunes for immoral purposes " shall be deemed a rogue and vagabond. This may, of course, be used against the same class of men we have been discussing, but it apparently also gives facilities for striking a blow at a very different class of man.

THE CASE of Baylis v. Jiggens, decided this week by CHANNELL, J., calls attention afresh to the care necessary to be used in framing a lessee's covenant to pay rates and taxes, if it be intended that it shall cover any sums for paving or sewering expenses and the like which may be charged upon the premises or upon the landlord by the local authority under the Public Health and the Metropolis Management Acts. The covenant in this case was to pay all rates, taxes, and assessments whatsoever which now are, or during the term shall be, imposed or assessed upon the premises or the landlord or tenant in respect thereof by authority of Parliament or otherwise." The dispute was as to the liability of the tenant to repay certain paving expenses charged on the premises and on the landlord, and recovered summarily from him under section 150 of the Public Health Act, 1875. The sum so charged was clearly not a rate or a tax: the question whether it was an assessment was more difficult, but CHANNELL, J., held that it was not, and that therefore it was not covered by the covenant. In so deciding the learned judge relied on Wilkinson v. Collyer (13 Q. B. D. 1), in which MANISTY and WILLIAMS, JJ., held that the words "assessments payable in respect of the premises" in a similar covenant did not include a sum apportioned on the premises for paving expenses under the Metropolis Management Acts. These two cases seem to be indistinguishable, and a further authority on the import of the word "assessment " is Hartley v. Hudson (4 C. P. D. 367), in which LINDLEY, J., said that paving expenses could hardly be said to be a rate, tax, or assessment, but held that they were a charge," which word occurred in the covenant there in question. It is clear, therefore, that a covenant to pay "rates, taxes, and assessments" will not bind the tenant to pay paving or sewering expenses. As to what words are sufficient, there are several authorities. In Brett v. Rogers (1897, 1 Q. B. 525) the additional words ("rates and taxes" being of universal occurrence) were "duties, assessments, and impositions," and these were held to cover the cost of laying a new drain which had been required under the Public Health (London) Act, 1891; the court laying stress on the word "duties." The same word was relied on in the well-known cases of Thompson v. Lapworth (L. R. 3 C. P. 149) and Budd v. Marshall (5 C. P. D. 481), in which cases the landlord was held entitled to recover the sums the subject of considerable litigation. Very properly it has been paid for either paving or sewering expenses. In Aldridge v. Ferne (17 Q. B. D. 212) the tenant was held liable to pay paving expenses under his covenant to pay "outgoings." The prudent draftsman will therefore use the word "duties" or "outgoings,' or both, in preparing a form of lease on behalf of the landlord; and if it is intended to exclude any liability on the part of the tenant to pay these charges under the Public Health Acts, clear words of exception ought to be used, for, as has been seen, the cases (a few only of which have been cited above) run somewhat fine as to the meaning of individual words. Another point to be remembered in the landlord's interest is that the covenant should not be made to relate only to duties or outgoings "charged or imposed on the premises." If those words only be used, the effectiveness of the covenant will

THE COURT of Appeal have affirmed the decision of BYRNE, J., in Anderson v. Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Co. (ante, p. 396), that where a railway company had acquired a reversion upon a lease, a breach by the company of the lessor's covenant for quiet enjoyment could not be used as a set-off to a claim by the company for rent. The question of liability under covenants where land is taken by a railway company or other public body has been, as we recently pointed out (ante, p. 425),

held that a lessor who covenants for himself and his assigns cannot be held responsible for the acts of assigns who are a railway company purchasing under compulsory powers: Baily v. De Crespigny (L. R. 4 Q. B. 180). The lessor has no control over such assigns and he cannot be supposed to have undertaken responsibility for them when he entered into the covenant. Neither is the railway company or other public body liable directly on the covenant when in pursuance of its statutory powers it does acts upon the land which are in violation of the covenant. The proper remedy for the lessee is, not to proceed upon the covenant, but to make a claim under section 68 of the Lands Clauses Act, 1845, on the ground that his premises have been injuriously affected, and this he can do whether the lands have been taken compulsorily or by agreement: Kirby v.

School Board for Harrogate (1896, 1 Ch. 437). In Anderson v. Man- on the part, not only of other workmen in the same rank as the chester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Co. the company had acquired by agreement the reversion in certain premises which were adjacent to land upon which their operations were being carried on, and it was alleged that these operations constituted a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. According to the judgment of BYRNE, J., however, the railway company, upon acquiring the reversion, came under no liability to perform the covenant so far as such performance would interfere with their statutory rights and obligations. For the purpose of the action the result was the same as though the covenant had been put an end to, but in the Court of Appeal it has been pointed out that the covenant still exists and is binding on the company. In the particular case of a violation of the covenant by acts done in pursuance of statutory powers, the remedy under the covenant is changed to a claim under section 68; but in other cases the remedy on the covenant remains unaffected.

IN CASES where an execution would most probably fail to satisfy a High Court judgment debt, a creditor is at liberty to proceed in the county court, by way of judgment summons, under section 5 of the Debtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62). Before adopting this course, however, he should first ascertain whether the execution, if issued, will really prove unproductive. For, after the county court judge has once made the usual order on the judgment summous, directing payment of the judgment debt by instalments, no writ of fi. fa. will be issued from the High Court so long as such order remains undischarged. This, in substance, is what was held by the Court of Appeal (CHITTY and COLLINS, L.JJ.) in the recent case of Montgomery & Co. v. De Bulmes (ante, p. 590), affirming the order of DARLING, J., made in chambers. The decision in question will prevent a judgment debtor from being needlessly harassed by his creditor. It, moreover, accords with the judgment of the Court of Exchequer in Jones v. Jenner (4 W. R. 651, 25 L. J. Ex. 319), though it certainly conflicts with the dictum of CAVE, J., in Re Ives, Ex parte Addington (34 W. R. 593, 16 Q. B. D. 665), which, however, must now be regarded as overruled.

THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1897. THE two leading features in the Workmen's Compensation Act, which came into operation on the 1st inst., are the entirely new liability imposed on employers in cases to which the Act applies, and the preservation at the same time of all existing liabilities. Existing liabilities depend on proof of negligence on the part of the employer or of some person for whom he is responsible; the new liability is imposed irrespective of negligence, and forms an insurance for the workman of the benefit of which he can only be deprived if the injury is attributable to his own "serious and wilful misconduct."

plaintiff, but on the part also of workmen in a position of superintendence. The master, if he does not personally superintend the work himself, is bound, indeed, to select proper and competent persons to do so, but he is not answerable to his workmen for the negligence of the persons so selected (see per Lord CAIRNS in Wilson v. Merry, L. R.1 H. L. Sc., p. 332). Under the Act of 1880 the liability of the employer is extended so as to include liability for the negligence of a person in superintendence, whether such person is entrusted with actual super intendence of the work or with the duty of seeing that the machinery and plant is in proper condition; but the amount of compensation is limited to three years' earnings of a person in the same position as the plaintiff, and an action under the Act is not maintainable unless notice of the injury is given within six weeks, and the action is commenced within six months, from the occurrence of the accident, or in case of death within twelve months from the time of death. Under the Act of 1897 the amount of compensation is also limited, and in case of injury not causing death, is restricted to a comparatively small amount. Moreover, it is not placed entirely at the disposal of the person to whom it is payable. On the other hand, the right of the workman to recover some compensation is practically absolute, and he is not subject to the risks which attend litigation to enforce either the common law liability or the liability under the Act of 1880.

Assuming, however, that an action is brought independently of the Act of 1897, and that the liability of the employer is not established, the costs of the proceedings are not necessarily thrown away. If it is determined that the case is one in which the employer would be liable to pay compensation under the Act of 1897, the court in which the action is tried must, if the plaintiff so chooses, proceed to assess the compensation, and may deduct therefrom the costs which have been caused by the plaintiff bringing the action instead of proceeding under the Act (section I (4)). Hence in a case where it is desired to proceed independently of the Act, but the employer's liability is doubtful, all that the plaintiff risks is the excess of the costs of the action over those which would be incurred in an arbitration under the Act.

Turning to the new liability under the Act of 1897, and the procedure by which it is to be enforced, it has already been observed that the guiding principle is the insurance of the workman against accidents irrespective of any question of negligence upon the part of the employer, provided only the workman has not disqualified himself by his own serious and wilful misconduct. This is the result of section 1 (1), which provides that if, in any employment to which that Act applies, personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment is caused to a workman, the employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the first schedule to the Act. The employments to which the Act applies are employments on, in, or about a railway, factory, mine, quarry, or engineering work, or any building exceeding thirty feet in height wherein operations of the nature specified in section 7 (1) are being carried on. In such employments, accordingly, the right to compensation will usually be clear. By section 2 (1) it is provided that proceedings are not to be maintainable unless notice of the accident has been given as soon as practicable after the happening thereof and before the workman has voluntarily left his employment, and unless the claim for compensation has been made within six months from the occurrence of the accident, or, in case of death, within six months from the time of death. Had the enactment stopped here it would doubtless have had the effect of excluding many cases from compensation under the Act, but it is followed by the proviso that the want of or any defect in the notice is not to be a bar to the maintenance of proceedings if the employer is Independently of the Act of 1897 the workman can proceed not thereby prejudiced in his defence, or if the want or defect either at common law or under the Employers' Liability Act, was occasioned by mistake or other reasonable cause. The 1880. If he proceeds at common law he is under no special notice is to give the name and address of the person injured, and restrictions as to procedure, and no limit is placed upon the is to state in ordinary language the cause of the injury and the damages which he can recover, but in practice this remedy is date at which it was sustained, and is to be served usually barred by the necessity of proving personal negligence employer, or, where there are several employers, upon one of on the part of the employer. The doctrine of common employ- them. It would seem that the employer can only be prejudiced ment saves the employer from the consequences of negligence in his defence by failure to send the notice where he loses the

Existing liabilities are preserved by section 1 (2) (b), which provides that where the injury is caused by the personal negligence or wilful act of the employer, or of some person for whose act or default the employer is responsible, nothing in the Act shall affect any civil liability of the employer, but the workman may at his option claim compensation under the Act or may take the same proceedings as were open to him before the commencement of the Act. At the same time it is provided that the employer shall be under only one liability. If the workman recovers independently of the Act, he cannot recover compensation also under the Act. In any case of injury it will be necessary, therefore, in the first place, to ascertain whether there is a right to recover damages apart from the Act, and, if so, whether the procedure independently of the Act or under the Act is more advantageous.

upon

the

opportunity of producing evidence, as where a witness has died;
so that ordinarily the want of the notice will be no bar to pro-
ceedings.
Sections 4, 5, and 6, contain important provisions in favour of
workmen. Section 4 applies to cases of sub-contracting, and
gives the workmen employed in the carrying out the sub-
contract a claim for compensation under the Act against the
head-contractor or original employer; but it the sub-contractor
would have been liable independently of the section, the head-
contractor or original employer is entitled to be indemnified by
him. In deciding whether this right of indemnity arises, it will
be necessary to determine whether the employment under the
sub-contractor is an employment to which the Act relates,
though in general the work under the sub-contract will fall
within the same category as the work undertaken by the head-
contractor. Section 5 will be of great value to claimants in
case of the insolvency of the employer. If the employer is
entitled to insurance moneys in respect of the compensation
payable by him, the workman is to have a first charge on the
insurance moneys for the compensation, and the judge of the
county court may direct the insurers to pay the amount of the
compensation into the Post Office Savings Bank in the name of
the registrar. Section 6 provides for the case where the work-
man has a claim in respect of the injury against some person
other than the employer. He may then at his option proceed
either at law against such other person to recover damages, or
against the employer for compensation under the Act, but not
against both, and if compensation is paid under the Act the
employer is entitled to be indemnified by the other person.

The amount of compensation which can be recovered under the Act is regulated by the first schedule. In case of death, the amount depends on whether or no the workman leaves dependants wholly or partly dependent on him. If he leaves dependantsthat is, a wife, husband, parent, or child (including under these latter words grandparents and grandchildren)-wholly dependent on him, the amount is a sum equal to three years' earnings, but in any case not less than £150 or more than £300; if the dependants are in part dependent on him, such sum, not exceeding that just mentioned, as may be agreed upon or be determined on arbitration to be reasonable and proportionate to the injury to the dependants. If he leaves no dependants, the sum payable is the reasonable expenses of his medical attendance and burial, not exceeding £10. For total or partial incapacity for work the compensation will take the form of a weekly payment not exceeding one-half the average weekly earnings of the workman during the previous twelve months, to commence after the second week from the accident. The sum allotted as compensation to a dependant may be invested or otherwise applied for the benefit of the person entitled, as ordered by the arbitrator. Weekly payments are to be liable to review, and where they have been continued for six months may, on the application of the employer, be redeemed by payment of a lump sum, and such lump sum may, by order of the arbitrator, be invested or otherwise applied, as in the case of sums payable on death.

after the judge may either settle any matter himself, or, with the approval of the Lord Chancellor, appoint an arbitrator for the particular matter. Where no general order is made the county court judge may apply to the Lord Chancellor to authorize the appointment of an arbitrator in any particular matter, if from the state of business in the court, or for any other reason, he is unable to settle such matter within a reasonable time; and the Lord Chancellor, if he assents, must also approve the appointment made by the judge. In general, the procedure before an arbitrator appointed by the judge will be the same as before the judge himself; but an arbitrator (whether agreed on by the parties or appointed by the judge) may submit any question of law to be decided by the judge in the form of a special case (rule 30). The question of immediate practical importance in relation to the Act is the rate at which insurance against the liability under it can be obtained, but before many months have passed there is likely to have been abundant opportunity for testing its provisions and the procedure established by the rules.

THE LAND TRANSFER RULES.

VIII.

Part III. (continued).-Transfers.-Mines and minerals.-A registered proprietor has power to transfer his land "or any part thereof" (Act of 1875, section 29). This, however, does not confer power to sever by transfer in prescribed form minerals which have been previously registered with the land: Re Yates (31 Ch. D. 112), Buckley v. Howell (29 Beav. 546); but now forms are provided for carrying out this transaction (First Schedule to the Rules, Forms 22 to 27).

Corporations. A transfer of land to a company or other corporation is to refer to the licence in mortmain or statute enabling the corporation to acquire or hold land (rule 94); such a transfer is not to be registered until the registrar is satisfied that it is in accordance with the law relating to mortmain. Notice of a right of pre-emption or reverter or of a restriction on alienation by the transferee is to be entered (rule 96). We conceive that corporations, and especially railway companies, will usually prefer to have nominees registered to complying with this rule, though this will not exempt them from the law of mortmain (Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1888, s. 1).

Vesting declarations.-It may be doubted whether registered land can be affected by a vesting declaration at all. A vesting declaration is inoperative in the case of property which is only transferable in manner directed by Act of Parliament (Trustee Act, 1893, s. 12, sub section 3). Registered land would clearly seem to come within this description. Rule 97, however, provides for the correction of the register if a transfer cannot be obtained, and the rule expressly refers to a vesting declaration. Possibly the rule may have the effect of extending the operation of a vesting declaration.

Exchange and partition.—Provision is made as to exchange and partition of registered land and forms are given (rules 99 to 101).

The procedure for recovering compensation under the Act is prescribed by Schedule II. as supplemented by the rules just Charges.-There is nothing in the Acts or Rules to confer a issued, to which we called attention last week. The tribunals statutory title on a chargee corresponding to the estate conferred are either voluntary or compulsory. Voluntary tribunals are by a transfer for value of registered land (see Act of 1875, s. either (1) a committee representative of the employer and his 30). A registered transferee of a charge seems to get a good workmen; or (2) an arbitrator agreed upon by the parties. title either to his charge or to indemnity (see the Act of 1875, Compulsory tribunals are (1) the county court judge; or (2) if s. 40, as amended by the Act of 1897, First Schedule), but the in England the Lord Chancellor so authorizes, an arbitrator original chargee, though he takes without notice of any unappointed by the county court judge. It is to be noticed that registered equities (see Act of 1875, s. 83, sub-section (1), as the Arbitration Act, 1889, is expressly excluded from applying amended by the Act of 1897, First Schedule), is not put into to arbitrations under this Act, so that committees and voluntary the position of a legal mortgagee who has no notice of an arbitrators will not have the power of compelling the attend- equity. Thus if a proprietor is registered with an absolute title, ance of witnesses, though by 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 16, they and after registration a lis pendens is registered in the Central can examine on oath witnesses brought before them. Compul- Office against him, then it is not clear that a registered chargee sory arbitrations are to be conducted according to rules of court, would take free from the rights protected by the lis pendens and the rules which have been issued provide in detail There is nothing in the rules to get over this doubt, and mortfor procedure before a county court judge or an arbitrator gagees will be wise therefore to insist on ordinary mortgages appointed by the judge. The regulations with respect to the off the register accompanied by a transfer of the land into their authority of the Lord Chancellor for appointment of an arbitra- names, leaving the mortgagor to protect himself by a caution. tor are contained in rule 27. With respect to any court a The transfer in such a case would be registered without payment general order may be made by the Lord Chancellor, and there-of any further stamp duty (rule 155).

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir, I observe that the Council have again brought forward members to supply the four vacancies. This does not seem to me and many of my legal friends to be right or reasonable. It was never intended, I am sure, that the Council should be co-optative. It cannot be disputed that all those gentlemen who have been nominated or supported by the Council occupy eminent positions in the profession, but what, may I inquire, have they ever done to further the interests of the profession or of the society? M.A. OXON. [We have received another letter to the same effect.-ED. S. J.]