ment for debt should seem effective as a means of coercion, from the fact that in many cases the simple threat of imprisonment induces the performance of that which would be otherwise withheld, it should be remembered that often a debtor, to satisfy his judgment creditor, is constrained to borrow money at ruinous rates, whereby he gets into still greater trouble and distress, and that still more frequently, the creditor, after having obtained his warrant of commitment, finds it useless to carry it out; for what good is it to him to put the debtor in prison, if the debtor has really nothing to pay? The probability, indeed, is that only in a very few cases the commitment is effective in extracting payment from an unwilling debtor. But the coercive character of the present imprisonment for debt is after all disavowed. Its object, as contemplated by the County Courts, is not coercive but absolutely penal, for it is awarded against a debtor, not for the non-payment of the debt, but for the contempt of court, for his defiance both of his legitimate creditor and of the law in the fact of his having money to pay an not paying it. And for this, two reasons have been adduced. The first is the necessity of strengthening the sanction of the law. The second is to punish fraudulent and semi-fraudulent acts. If this power is necessary for the efficiency of the judgments of the County Courts, it is strange that like powers are not also asserted by the superior courts, or even by the Bankruptcy courts. And as to the punishment of fraudulent acts, that is surely the province of the criminal court, and not of courts for the settlement of civil disputes. In how many cases, however, is this so-called contempt of court any more than a simple fiction? In practice, it seldom happens that a man has money in his hand and will not open it to pay it out. It is far more the case of a man who ought, in the opinion of the judge, to have had sufficient to pay his debt, and yet has not paid it. The question really is not whether he is able to pay with what he has, but whether he ought to have paid, or may be made to pay, with what he might have had or may yet have?

The onus of proving that the debtor has the means to pay resting, moreover, with the creditor, the debtor being generally absent, the proof is of necessity very loose, and the judge has not always the proper means to estimate the real circumstances of the debtor, what other debts he might have, or what other judgments there may be against him. There is indeed reason to believe that the judges are often mistaken in their estimates of such circumstances. Mr. Atkinson, the learned judge of the Halifax County Court, is reported to have admitted that a man is sometimes sent to prison without sufficient care being taken by the presiding judge that the evidence shows satisfactorily that the man could if he would pay the debt. Mr. Nicol, the superintendent of county courts, had no doubt that many debtors who have not the means of paying at the time, are sent to prison. Let it be remembered that the fact that the debtor is in the receipt of certain wages is only one item in the proper appreciation of the means at the disposal of the debtor. In estimating the extent of such means it is necessary to take into account his outgoings as well as his incomings. Doubtless in many cases, by self-control and self-denial, such means might be ample not only to satisfy necessary wants, but to pay lawful debts. But there are cases also where high wages may go hand-in-hand with sickness, a large family, or needy friends, which soon absorb any apparent surplus. It is, moreover, doubtful whether there was ever any intention in the Act to give judicial power or discretion to take into account the future earnings of the debtor. And there is an apparent incongruity, if not injustice, in the fact that whilst a small debtor is often ordered by the judge to pay the debt by instalments out of his future earnings to the last farthing, subject to his being sent to prison for noncompliance with the payment of every one of such instalments, the larger debtor in the court of bankruptcy, by sacrificing everything he has, and paying ten shillings in the pound, is free as to his future earnings, and, whether paying ten shillings in the pound or not, is always free from impri

sonment, except indeed in case of fraud. From whatever view we examine it, imprisonment for debt, as now exercised by county-court judges, is really both coercive and penal in its character, and practically maintains imprisonment for debt intact, as if the Legislature had never abolished the

same.

Nor is it unworthy of notice that the remedy of imprisonment for debt is too often enforced by parties whose business does not deserve the special countenance of the Legislature. Who are they that come more frequently before the courts as plaintiffs? They are the loan societies or money clubs, who charge enormous rates of interest for the accommodation they render, and who ruin the debtors by their commissions and expenses. They are the Scotch drapers or tallymen, who charge very high prices for their goods, and who, by their house-to-house hawking with fineries, foster improvidence and waste among a class which little needs any prompting in that direction. They are collectors of debts, who speculate on their better power of recovering them by threats and pressure. But few tradesmen avail themselves of the remedy. The upper class of them do not stoop to press their claims to imprisonment. The debtors themselves who appear before the county courts on such summonses are persons of small income, petty dealers, clerks, and workmen. Now and then the genteel and the fashionable doubtless appear, and there are some out of all grades and professions who feel no compunction in refusing to pay lawful debts, who are not ashamed to delay payment till a writ has actually been issued. But these are few. Whilst the greater number of creditors who sue for imprisonment for debt are forlorn creatures often at the verge of starvation.

Whether owing to the power still vested in the county courts to imprison for debt or to any other cause, it is the fact, that, whereas the original scope of the Legislature in establishing such courts was to make them courts for the termination of contentions between suitors, in practice by far the greater proportion of their business consists in the en

forcement of small debts. The amount of claims for which the machinery of the county court is set in motion is in many cases very small. In 1870, out of 911,753 plaints entered, as many as 594,825, or 66 per cent., were for sums not exceeding 40s., and of these 67,216 plaints were for less than 5s., and 1,340 for sums not exceeding Is. Of course, under such circumstances, the expenses incurred for enforcing the claims are large, and often exceed the amount recovered. To imprison a person for a plaint of 5s. the expenses are at least 5s. In 219 cases, for sums under 5s. for a total amount of £46 16s., the costs amounted to £36 4s. 6d.

And what is the real amount of benefit which the plaintiffs get by endeavouring to recover their debts through the county courts? In 1872 plaints were entered for a total amount of £2,590,792. Add to this £62,360 costs, £349,266 fees, and at least 5 per cent. other expenses not taxed-£129,000-we have a total claim of about £3,100,000. How much of this has been recovered it is difficult to say. Mr. Daniel, Q.C., the learned judge of No. 11 District County Court, ventured to name £2,000,000, but there is no means of ascertaining the fact. The chances are that it is considerably less. First of all only about one half of the plaints entered are really prosecuted. Out of the total number of claims entered, only 56.8 per cent. were settled in court, and 43°2 per cent. out of court. The number of judgments given for the plaintiffs was 494,713, and the amount for which judgments were obtained was, for debts, £1,282,693; and costs, £61,360: total, £1,344,963. But to get a judgment and to recover the debt are two different things. What amount was paid even upon these judgment summonses without any further step, it is not shown. Mr. Daniel, Q.C., in his letter in the Times of the 27th May, gives, however, a clue to the understanding of various facts in the county court returns. Supposing the notes which he appended to his letter explaining the figures for his circuit to apply equally to all the other circuits the following results will arise: In 1872 the total number of judgment

summonses issued was 124,367, and the number heard, 64,992. The difference between these two figures, represents in onehalf those judgments not served in consequence of personal service not being effected, and one-half those upon which the debtors paid on being served. Consequently we may take it that 29,686 judgments are effective, and that a similar number failed at the outset. But though 64,992 judgments were heard, no more than 33,823 warrants of commitment were issued, the difference, 31,169 representing those in which, in consequence of the evidence not being satisfactory, no orders were made. When we arrive at this point, we find a difference between 33,823 warrants issued and 6,899 persons imprisoned, and it seems that that difference, 26,924, represents the cases in which the debters pay or arrange with their creditors on notice of the order. It thus appears, that after the plaintiffs have got 124,000 judgment summonses, only about 57,000, or 46 per cent. proved effective in procuring payment, and 68,000, or 54 per cent., proved abortive of any result. Now this is not very satisfactory when we consider the enormous expenses connected with the county courts. It is certainly worthy of serious consideration whether the whole system might not be more economically administered. As it is, to sustain claims for about £2,500,000, only the half of which are settled in court, the plaintiffs have to put £530,000 for costs and expenses; the State has to pay some £170,000, which is the balance between the amount of salaries and expenses of the county courts and the costs and fees received from plaintiffs; and the ratepayers have to defray the cost of maintaining the defaulters whilst in prison, and often the further charge for the maintenance of the families thereby thrown on the parish.

There are many other circumstances, indeed, connected with the present practice of imprisonment for debt, which are exceedingly objectionable. When a person is committed to prison, say at Leeds or Bradford, he has to be sent to York gaol, at considerable cost of conveyance, and when he