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advantage of facilitating recourse would induce every transferee of papers to register, and when once the register became known, searches would be almost as plentiful as at Somerset House.

SEVERAL QUESTIONS were raised in the discussion on the legality of Father KELLER's imprisonment, but the real ground upon which the Court of Appeal in Dublin based its decision does not seem to have received much notice in the English accounts of the trial. It appeared very clearly that the committal was not in any way for contempt of court, and so the general jurisdiction with regard to contempt did not require to be considered. But by the Irish Bankruptcy Act of 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 60) power is given to the court to enforce answers to lawful questions by imprisonment, and it was under this statutory power that Judge BOYD proceeded. By section 385 it is enacted, inter alia, that if any person shall refuse to answer any lawful question put by the court, it shall be lawful for the court to commit such person to prison until he shall be willing to make full answers as required. Section 386 provides that the question need not be specified or set forth in the warrant, but it is sufficient to refer therein to the deposition remaining on the file of the proceedings, provided that the question in respect of which the warrant is made out is specified in the deposition so remaining on the file. From these sections it is clear that, in any case where the legality of the warrant is called in question, the actual deposition becomes of the greatest importance. This it is which shews the question out of which the trouble has arisen; and from the general tenor of this it will be possible to shew whether the question is so irrelevant to the proceedings as not to be a lawful one. Hence it becomes of importance, too, that the deposition should be an exact record of the witness's answers. But in Father KELLER'S case it appeared, as the Master of the Rolls remarked, that the deposition was neither taken by a sworn officer nor certified by the judge to be correct, nor-and this was the most important of all-completed by the witness's signature, which was essential to give validity to the document. Every facility ought to be given to enable the witness to explain or correct what he had said, and until he had deliberately signed the deposition, or refused to do so-in which case, of course, different considerations applied-it was impossible to make out a warrant under the statutory power of the Bankruptcy Act.

IN THE ABOVE CASE the court seems to have passed over the chief arguments put forward by counsel, and to have decide'l upon a point which had received little consideration at the bar. It will hardly be so in the case of Mr. BELL-Cox, who also has just been discharged from his imprisonment. The formal judgment of the court has not yet been given, but it is unlikely that any stronger reasons will be found for it than those advanced by his counsel. It seems to be clearly established that the writ de contumace capiendo is only designed to enforce obedience to an order, and not to punish the delinquent for past acts of disobedience. So it was laid down by Lord DENMAN, C.J., in The Queen v. Thorogood (12 Ad. & El. 196). So soon then as it becomes, for any reason, unnecessary or impossible to enforce obedience, the object of the writ fails, and the imprisonment ought to come an end. This is illustrated by the cases of Hudson v. Tooth (2 P. D. 125) and Dean v. Green (8 P. D. 79). In Mr. TooтH's case possession of the church was obtained during his imprisonment by a clergyman authorized by the bishop, and Divine service was performed in a lawful manner. With this arrangement it was assumed he would not interfere, and hence, as no further disobedience was apprehended, his release was ordered. In Mr. GREEN's case, while he was still in prison, his living became vacant under the Public Worship Regulation Act, the inhibition having remained in force more than three years. In these circumstances it was held that the inhibition had come to an end, being swallowed up in the larger punishment of deprivation. Hence, as there was no longer any question of obedience to it, the imprisonment ought to come to an end equally. The case of Mr. BELL-COX is very similar to this. He was imprisoned for disobeying an order suspending him for six months from officiating in his church. The six months have now elapsed, the order is, therefore, at an end, and on the authority of the above cases it is clear that the imprisonment must end also.

THE PAPERS to be read at the forthcoming meeting of the Incorporated Law Society promise to be of unusual interest. The President will contribute an important paper on the extension of the functions of the society, and the Land Transfer Bill will be dealt with by Mr. Joan HUNTER, whose paper on that subject at the Liverpool Meeting in 1885 will be remembered as a very able contribution to the literature of the subject. Mr. ALBERT SAUNDERS is also to discuss the question of land transfer. Mr. F. K. MUNTON will contribute some practical suggestions as to the sittings of the Law Courts; and Mr. F. E. SAWYER, of Brighton, an accomplished antiquarian scholar, will propose the preparation by the society of a history of attorneys and solicitors. Mr. F. D. LowNDES, of Liverpool, will deal with the question whether a successful litigant ought to be recouped by his opponent all his reasonable professional expenditure in obtaining or defending his BERNARD WAKE, of Sheffield, on Newbould v. Smith (34 W. R. rights. Among other papers of interest we observe one by Mr. 690, 33 Ch. D. 127), with regard to which we may perhaps deviate so far from our usual practice as to say that the article on the subject which appeared in our columns (ante, p. 228) should not be overlooked, representing as it did professional opinions of great weight.

The

THE NOW WELL-KNOWN CASE of Jenner - Fust v. Needham (34 W. R. 709, 32 Ch. D. 582) continues to exercise the judges. decision, it will be remembered, is this-Where a receiver has received rents of mortgaged property between the date of the certificate under a foreclosure judgment and the day fixed for redemption, the mortgagee is not entitled to the rents so received, except on the terms of bringing them into account as between mortgagee and mortgagor, and a fresh date must be fixed for redemption. It is easy to see that the result of this decision, by prolonging the period allowed for redemption, may operate hardly in cases of an insufficient security. Mr. Justice CHITTY had the case before him not long ago, when he said that it seemed to put an unnecessary expense on mortgagees. There is, however, little probability of Jenner-Fust v. Needham being overruled. The point is not likely to be taken to the House of Lords, and, if the Court of Appeal has a similar case before it, the Lords Justices will probably uphold their own decision. There is a rumour that it is in contemplation to meet the difficulty by framing a new rule on the subject.

REFERRING to Sir EDWARD WATKIN's statement that the decision of Mr. Justice KAY in Tomkinson v. The South-Eastern Railway Co. would be appealed against, we ventured to point out (ante, p. 458) the hopelessness of an appeal from the order granting the interlocutory injunction. It now appears that the appeal is to be withdrawn and the action is to be brought to trial, so that probably we shall ultimately have a decision of the highest tribunal on the important question how far a statutory corporation is justified in expending its funds on objects only indirectly conducive to the purposes specified in its Act.

THERE IS a story current about a supposed meeting of the judges to consider a Jubilee address to the Queen, which is an obvious adaptation to that event of an incident which we believe really occurred with reference to another matter. When the address to the Queen at the opening of the Royal Courts was under consideration by the judges, one very eminent judge of appeal objected to the phrase "Conscious as we are of our own shortcomings." am not conscious of my shortcomings," he said, "and if I were I should not be so foolish as to say so"; whereupon a learned Lord Justice blandly observed, "Suppose we say " Conscious as we are of each other's shortcomings."""

"I

We are requested to state that the entrance for members of the Incorporated Law Society to the banquets in the Central Hall will be in the Strand; that for the distinguished guests will be in Carey-street. The carriages of members and others attending the ball must enter Chancery-lane from Fleet-street and the Strand, and set down with the horses' heads towards Holborn, and take up in the opposite direction.

BANKERS' MORTGAGES.

In the debate in the House of Lords on the second reading of the Land Transfer Bill, Lord Selborne called attention to the question of registered charges for future advances, and pointed out that clause 20 (clause 27 in the Amended Bill) was intended to overrule their lordships' decision in Hopkinson v. Rolt (9 H. L. C. 524). The matter is one which, as is well known, chiefly affects bankers, and it is noteworthy that it has been quite recently discussed in the Scotch case of Union Bank of Scotland v. National Bank of Scotland (12 App. Cas. 53). The result was to uphold emphatically the rule in Hopkinson v. Rolt, and Lord Halsbury, C., commented upon the obtaining of further advances from the National Bank after notice of a second mortgage to the Union Bank in the following terms: "It seems to me that such a proceeding is contrary to good faith, and the decision of your lordship's House in Hopkinson v. Rolt establishes the principle, and establishes it upon the broadest grounds of natural justice." Nevertheless, it is now proposed to upset the principle so far as regards registered charges, and this is to be done, as Lord Selborne informs us, for the convenience of bankers.

The clause in question (in its amended form) is as follows:"Where a registered charge of a specified sum is expressed to be created on any land for the purpose of securing (whether with or without present advances) future advances to an amount not exceeding that sum, the registered proprietor of the charge shall be entitled in priority to any subsequent charge or transfer to the payment of any sum due to him in respect of advances up to the full amount of the specified sum, notwithstanding that some of such future advances have been advanced after the date and with notice of the subsequent charge or transfer.'

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mined the judgment of the Scotch judges. In the case above referred to a good deal depended upon the peculiar nature of the

mortgages in question, which were by way of absolute disposition, accompanied by a back bond-i.e., a condition of re-conveyance upon payment of the sum (in this case) at any time due from the disponor to the disponee. At first sight this seems exactly like an English mortgage, but there is a distinction. The Scotch law recognizes heritable securities which are properly charges upon the land, and which do not divest the owner of his title. But the security in question is one of recent introduction, devised in order to evade the law, and it is apparently treated very much as an English mortgage was before equity interfered. Hence a majority of the judges held that the first bank, having the absolute property in the land, had a right to retain it as security for all sums at any time owing by the mortgagor, and that the second bank could only take the same personal right which the mortgagor had—viz., the right to a re-conveyance upon payment of all moneys owing by the mortgagor at the time of demand. This was the opinion of eight judges, and it is to be noticed that they distinctly refused to be guided by Hopkinson v. Rolt, on the ground of the fundamental difference between securities of this kind and the ordinary English mortgage. But there was an important minority. It was held by five judges that the security, whatever it might be in form, was in reality a charge only, and that the mortgagor retained a valuable interest in the land, which could be charged in favour of a second mortgagee, and that after notice of such second charge the first mortgagee would make any further advances at his own risk. They held the principle of Hopkinson v. Rolt to be as applicable to Scotch law as to English, and in addition to the considerations which we have already noticed, a new and very striking one was adduced by Lord Shand, which seems so apposite as to merit quotation (p. 83):

"Suppose that after a certain amount had been advanced by the National Bank [the first mortgagee], a creditor of Mrs. McArthur [the mortgagor] had by diligence attached her reversionary right in the property or its proceeds; could that bank possibly, in disregard of the diligence, have gone on voluntarily to make advances to Mrs. McArthur, or on her account, which would affect, and even sweep away, the reversion, and so defeat the diligence; and could it really be said that they had such a right in order that they might earn banker's profits under their It seems to me too clear for agreement with Mrs. McArthur? argument that a creditor's diligence could not be so defeated." When this case came before the House of Lords it was, as we have already stated, decided against the bank which was the first mortgagee, on the principle of Hopkinson v. Rolt, and in two of the judgments that principle was stated to be founded upon natural justice. We seem to have here an instance of judge-made and judge-confirmed law which has been the subject of no ordinary consideration. When such law is overruled by the Legislature it is usually on the ground that the judges have felt themselves bound to follow time-honoured precedents with which they did not themselves agree. But in this case special pains had been already taken to overrule the time-honoured precedent, and a modern rule had been settled with general approval. Possibly the convenience of bankers may be entitled to great consideration, but we may at least expect eminent legislators to consider also the principles of law which they have themselves, in their judicial capacity, so recently approved.

The apparent discrepancy between this provision and the reasons which have hitherto decided the law seem to make it worth while to attempt a brief examination of the subject. The rule in Hopkinson v. Rolt was not established without considerable discussion. In the judgment appealed against Lord Chelmsford had stated the matter as follows:-"A prior mortgage for present and future advances; a subsequent mortgage of the same description; each mortgagee has notice of the other's deeds; advances are made by the prior mortgagee after the date of the subsequent mortgage with full knowledge of it; is the prior mortgagee entitled to priority for these advances over the antecedent advances made by the subsequent mortgagee ?" In answering this question the great difficulty was to get over the old case of Gordon v. Graham (2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 598, pl. 16). There Lord Cowper, C., is reported to have said:"The second mortgagee shall not redeem the first mortgage without paying as well the money lent after as that lent before the second mortgage was made; for it was the folly of the second mortgagee with notice to take such security." But this decision had been much doubted. First mortgagees were advised not to act upon it for fear the court should impute fraud to them rather than folly to the second mortgagee, and it was shaken by the remarks of Lord St. Leonards in Blunden v. Desart (2 Dr. & W. 405) and Shaw v. Neale (6 H. L. C. 581). In the case in question Lord Cranworth, indeed, chose to be guided by it; but, after a minute examination of the records, Lord Campbell, C., decided that it must have been wrongly reported, and both he and Lord Chelmsford held that it must in any case be overruled. They were much influenced by the reason urged in Fisher on Mortgages (1st ed. 363; 4th ed. 570), that it is contrary to the general principles of equity that a mortgagee should, by taking a security for advances which may never be made, put a pressure upon the mortgagor by taking away his power of raising money from other persons; the first mortgagee being never bound by such a clause to make further advances at the mortgagor's pleasure. And it was pointed out that the hardship upon the banker at once vanished upon considering that the security of the first mortgage could not be impaired without notice of the second. It is important to remark that the law as thus established applies when each party has notice of the other's security, and, indeed, requires that this should be the case. Registration, however, is merely a safer and mere general way of giving notice, and the mere fact that a charge is registered does not seem to introduce any new consideration to weigh against those upon which the present rule is founded. But, as we have already remarked, it has quite recently received over again the highest judicial confirmation, and was made to The Times announces the death of Mr. F. J. Maltby, solicitor, for many override the technical difficulties of Scotch law which had deter-years British Vice-Consul at Brussels.

On the point of registration it may be well to refer to the case of Bradford Banking Co. v. Briggs (12 App. Cas. 29). There the first charge was, in fact, registered, for it was created by the articles of association of a company registered under the Companies Act, 1862. It was to be "a first and permanent lien and charge, available at law and in equity, upon every share for all debts due from the holder thereof." Yet, when the share was given as security to a bank, with notice of the transaction to the company, it was held that the principle of Hopkinson v. Rolt applied, and that, in spite of the articles of association, the company had no claim in priority to the bank for debts contracted after such

notice.

In the interest of legal consistency it seems proper to urge that the clause of the Land Transfer Bill in question should not become law without full consideration.

even the owner of the legal estate. Among the disabilities in THE AMENDMENTS TO THE LAND TRANSFER BILL. clause 2 (a.), attending neglect to register, "taking any benefit

I.

THE Land Transfer Bill, as presented in amended form to the Committee of the House of Lords on the 17th inst., is a very different and much more complete document than it originally was. It has been partly re-arranged, many minor gaps and omissions have been filled up, even mere verbal improvements have not been considered unworthy of insertion, and some solid alterations in its substantive provisions have also been made. By these means the Bill has been considerably lengthened; it now consists of sixtynine clauses, instead of fifty-seven, and covers thirty-four pages, instead of twenty-six.

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As an instance of re-arrangement, we notice that the old clause 6, vesting land in personal representatives on death, which had been placed in "Part II., Compulsory Registration," in the original Bill, now appears, considerably filled out with needful detail, under its proper title in "Part IV., Amendments of Law of Real Property (new clause 38). Some of the excisions for the purpose of these re-arrangements are a little alarming at first sight, until the omitted portions are seen to re-appear elsewhere, or to be otherwise provided for-for instance, the (old) clause 9 (3), requiring the applicants for confirmation of boundaries to pay the reasonable costs of objectors-an obviously proper rule, though one likely to diminish the numbers of such applications -is struck out in the amendments. Its place is really supplied, however, by (old) clause 29 (9).

We do not propose to lay before our readers an exact summary of the amendments. We would do something less, and, we hope, something more, than that. The amendments are so numerous, and, in many instances, so minute, that it would be impossible to mention them all, or nearly all, short of a reprint of the Bill, and, unless some commentary were added, nothing would be gained when it was done; while to add a discussion to such a work would occupy more space than we can devote to the subject. We propose to review the points (which are not many) in which the three leading novel features of the Bill with regard to land transfer proper namely, compulsion, confirmations, and insurance-are modified by the amendments; then to note its further effects on registration generally and on the law of real property, and finally to offer observations on portions of it which seem to affect solicitors in particular.

(1) Compulsion.-A correspondent had already pointed out to us that the language of the first paragraph of clause 2 of the original Bill, providing that after a certain date "land transfer " was to be compulsory, and that thenceforth it should be the duty of "every person" before selling, &c., to be registered, seem to imply a more permanent kind of compulsion than we, in our notice (ante, p, 375 (d.)), had deduced from the words of the Bill. In our original view we had relied principally on the opening words of sub-clauses (a.) and (b.), "until a proprietor," &c., coupled with the fact that section 49 of the Act of 1875 (allowing the legal estate to pass by unregistered deed) remained unrepealed -provisions which are hardly consistent with a very strict interpretation of the early part of clause 2. Now, however, the intention of the Legislature is to be made plainer; (new) clause 9 provides that:

"Nothing in section forty-nine or any other part of the principal Act shall enable any legal estate or interest in any registered land or charge to be conferred otherwise than by a registered disposition."

Beyond declaring the mind of the Legislature, however, this addition does not much alter the case, for the following reasons: Under the provisions of the principal Act referred to, an unregistered purchaser got the legal estate, obtained power to protect himself by cautions, &c., and, on the other hand, was liable to be ousted by a subsequent registered disposition; under the present provision he will only get an equitable estate, but this, while it lasts, is just as good as a legal estate. He will still have power to protect himself by caution, and as to being ousted by destruction of his estate, his chances of that are no more and no less than if clause 9 had not been inserted, because, though he has no legal estate, no one else can have one either, except by being registered -in other words, by exactly the same means as sufficed before, under the old rule of section 49 of the Act of 1875, to oust

from the land" was originally included. The precise effect which these words would have had was not very clear; they have now been removed. In other respects the list of penalties remains unaltered; we discussed their effect, ante, p. 375 (a.). A proviso is now added to the clause, exonerating the grantor from the duty of registering previously to sales (a.) under the Lands Clauses Acts, (b.) in execution of judgments and processes, (c.) by mortgagees alone-and in other cases where the grantor is not a party to the conveyance. In cases (a.) and (b.) the board is directed to register the new proprietor in manner to be prescribed by rules, and subject to an appeal to the court by persons aggrieved (new clause 7).

Under the heading "Compulsory Registration" there are also included provisions as to the classes of persons entitled to apply for first registration, also as to the registration of settled land, and for new registrations on defeasances. On these we observe that the amended clause 5 provides that tenants for life shall be registered as proprietors, with an appropriate addition-not the trustees, as before provided the trustees of the settlement being also entered under an appropriate heading. The present registry practice in these cases seems a good one, and will possibly be continued under this enactment-it is, to register the tenant for life as proprietor simply, and to place "a restriction" on all dealings, requiring that the purchase-money be paid to the trustees (naming them). The same clause provides that the trustees shall cause the new proprietor to be registered when the tenant for life dies; it does not appear from what source the necessary funds are to be provided in cases where (as often happens) "the trustees" have no property vested in them. The new clause 5 (6) also enables land already settled to be registered without the express appointment of trustees of the settlement, which would probably have been necessary as the Bill originally stood.

2. Confirmation.-The alterations and improvements in these sections are very numerous, but only one or two of them make any inroad upon the general policy of the Bill. An application for confirmation can be carried on (under new clause 13 (6)) by any successor in title of the original applicant, not only (as in the old clause 10 (6)) in cases of death. Unborn persons are (new clause 15 (2)) added to the list of incapacitated persons on whose behalf petitions against confirmations may be presented; and married women are removed from it. Power is also given to the board to confirm titles, subject. to qualifications, which will doubtless be useful (new clause 16). Confirmation of boundaries by consent of neighbours is extended to all cases, instead of being confined (as by old clause 14 (2)) to the case where the adjoining neighbour was also registered.

Under new clause 19, however, a really most important alteration is introduced. It will be remembered that section 21 of the Land Transfer Act of 1875 runs as follows:-"A title to any land adverse to, or in derogation of the title of, the registered proprietor, shall not be acquired by any length of possession." This rule has been the subject of much criticism, and has been shewn to be both inexpedient and unjust-inexpedient, because it interferes with the very convenient practice of informally adjusting boundaries; unjust, as helping the "dormient" at the expense of the "vigilant" owner. To remedy these defects, the new clause 19 enables the board, subject to an appeal to the court, to rectify the registered description of the property in all cases where the registered owner has lost possession, and would not, under the ordinary law, be entitled to recover it.

3. Insurance. There are several points of interest in connection with the insurance system, on nearly all of which the amendments have some bearing. The occasions of payment of insurance fees remain the same as before-namely, on registration with absolute or qualified (but not possessory) title, or on confirmation of title, and on every subsequent dealing for value, save that it is now provided (schedule 1 (B.) end) that, where a transfer for value occurs within three months of first registration with absolute or qualified title, or confirmation, no insurance fee shall be paid. The amendments (new clause 20 (1)) appear to require that, before claiming compensation out of the fund, the claimant must have attacked "the person liable to pay the same "-that is, the person (if any) owing to whose forgery or fraud the error complained

of was made. This is the rule under the Torrens' system, but its expediency is more than doubtful, and, if the new provision stood alone, it would probably not be altogether satisfactory to claimants, as it would involve them in the risks of a preliminary action, against a very unsatisfactory defendant usually; before approaching the fund. But schedule 1 (I.) gives the board power to "award compensation out of the insurance fund in the first instance, and to determine whether a right to compensation from the insurance fund has arisen." This power, if we interpret it rightly, will enable applications to be made direct to the board, who, it would appear, must have large powers of admitting claims. It would seem desirable, however, that, on so important a point, the language of the enactment should be made a little clearer. On another point which was slightly ambiguous in the original Bill, the amendments introduce a satisfactory clearness. Under the old clause 16 and schedule 1 (A.), which provided that persons "deprived of registered land" by registry errors might apply for its restoration in specie, it was not quite clear whether, if an error occurred on a first registration, the true owner would have come within the definition "deprived of registered land"; and if he did not, it seemed as if in those cases he would be forced to content himself with money compensation out of the fund. The new clause 21 (1) and schedule 1 (A.) (2) have been framed so as to give to such persons, in common with persons deprived of land by mistakes in subsequent registered dealings, the same right to apply for restoration as was undoubtedly given to registered proprietors.

The Lord Chancellor (schedule 1 (J.)), with the approval of the Treasury, may from time to time apply the insurance fund to any matters of which notice may be entered on the register under section 18 of the Land Transfer Act-for instance, rights of way, rights of common, easements, rights to mines and minerals, succession duty, land tax, and short leases incapable of registration, &c.—or which may be entered in subsidiary registers under the present enactment.

required much of the applicants for admission, and the want of any proper test of legal knowledge was, no doubt, one of the principal reasons which influenced the public against allowing to the profession its proper rank and influence. The Law Society was instituted in and in 1836 it induced the judges to order that all persons seeking to 1825. In 1833 it established a course of lectures for law students, become solicitors should, before admission, pass an examination in legal knowledge. In 1843 the Solicitors Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 73) was passed, under which the Law Society was appointed the registrar of attorneys and solicitors, and since that time-in fact, since 1836-they have conducted the examinations, until 1877 nominally under the supervision of the judges. In 1877 the power of making rules for, and conducting the examinations, previously vested in the judges, was transferred to the Incorporated Law Society, which has since praise is due to those members of the council (all of them busy men) that date performed the duty in a very satisfactory manner, and great who, without fee or reward, act as examiners.

At present there are two offices where practically the same functions are performed-viz., the Law Society and the Petty Bag Office. For instance, all articles of clerkship have to be enrolled at the Petty Bag Office, and they have afterwards to be registered at the Law Society. If an articled clerk requires an order for any purpose, he must take out a summons at the Petty Bag Office, and a copy of this tion is based, must be left at the Law Society. A roll of solicitors is summons, together with a copy of the affidavit on which the applicakept at the Petty Bag Office, and another at the Law Society. The latter shews who are entitled to practise, but the former does not, and is, therefore, of no practical utility.

We would suggest that the Petty Bag Office, which only exists for the purposes mentioned and other minor matters of a kindred character, should be abolished, and that the powers now vested in being, of course, made for the protection of vested interests, but, as that office should be transferred to the Law Society, due provision to this, it is believed that there would be no practical difficulty. Under the Judicature Officers Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 78), s. 14, the Petty Bag Office will be abolished on the next vacancy, but there seems to be no sufficient reason why this contingency should be waited for.

Another suggestion which has been made, and deserves consideration, is that all solicitors should be compelled by statute to be members of the Law Society. At present only about 5,000 out of the 13,000 who take out their certificates annually belong to the Law Society, and the consequence is that the society has a limited

THE JURISDICTION OF THE LAW SOCIETY OVER jurisdiction over its own members, but none over the remainder.

SOLICITORS.

FROM the earliest period in legal history until a comparatively recent date the duty of inquiring into the fitness and capacity of solicitors rested with the judges. In them was also vested the power of admitting solicitors and removing from the roll such of them as were deemed to be unfit to practise.

As early as the year 1292 Edward I., with the sanction of Parliament, issued a commission, which was addressed to the Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, John de Mettingham, authorizing him, in conjunction with the other judges, to look out for, provide, and appoint from every county a certain number of attorneys to practise in the courts, and a certain number of pupils to study the common law and secure its continuance. The commission suggested that 140 attorneys might suffice for the purpose in view, but power was granted to increase or diminish the number, as the justices in their wisdom might see fit; and it was declared that the persons to be thus chosen, and those only, should attend the courts and conduct the business of the king's subjects therein.

The only persons spoken of as constituting the legal profession are the justices to whom the commission was addressed and the attorneys and students who were the subjects of it. No bar is mentioned. It is true that there were serjeants in those days, but they were very few, and confined themselves to one tribunal. In the time of which we speak the duty of advocate was performed by the attorneys, and it seems that for some centuries after the profession had what may be termed a legal origin that attorneys were also the advocates. When, however, we arrived at a comparative state of civilization, these functions were severed, and what we now call the bar came into existence. Very shortly after the issuing of the commission mentioned the attorneys and apprentices chosen by the justices were located in the Inns of Chancery. From what we have stated it will be seen that to the judges, the Crown, and the Legislature was intrusted the power of determining who were fit to practise in the superior courts.

We will not weary our readers with an account of the Acts of Parliament, about seventy in number, which were passed, and the Rules of Court which were made for regulating the examination and admission of attorneys; suffice it to say that down to the year 1836 the judges themselves exercised these powers.

As far as regards examination, the judges do not appear to have

Barristers are subject to the jurisdiction of the Inn of Courts to which they belong, each of which has the power, on sufficient cause being shewn, to suspend a barrister from practising or to disbar him altogether, as has been done on more than one occasion. In some of the colonies there are Law Societies of which all barristers and members, and it is believed that the system is found to work very solicitors practising in the Colony are bound by statute to become

well.

At all events, having regard to the fact that the Law Society has complete jurisdiction as to who are fit persons to enter the profession, it seems desirable that it should not only have the power of admission, but it should also have the power of exclusion, subject, of course, to appeal. This would effect a considerable saving of the funds of the society, and of the time of the judges before whom these cases come, and of the masters to whom they are often referred. The adoption of our suggestions would have the effect of concentrating in one body all the functions necessary to be exercised with regard to the training, examination, admission, and punishment of solicitors, and would add greatly to the convenience both of the solicitors and the public. We see no practical difficulty in the way of carrying our suggestions into effect, and we venture to hope that steps will be taken for obtaining the legislative sanction necessary for the purpose.

It is stated that the costs of the Campbell divorce trial amount to more than £20,000.

On Wednesday Mr. Justice Stirling stated that he had directed a summons for the confirmation of a scheme for the reconstruction of the Briton Medical Life Assurance Association to be at the head of the paper for the consideration of the court on the 8th of June, and that he intended to commence taking causes with witnesses on Tuesday, June 14.

Assizes:-viz., Western Circuit, Lord Coleridge, C.J., and Cave, J.;
The following are the circuits chosen by the judges for the Summer
South-Eastern Circuit, Grove, J.; Oxford Circuit, Huddleston, B., and
Wills, J.; Midland Circuit, Hawkins and Grantham, JJ.; Home
Circuit, Cave, J.; North Wales Circuit, Denman, J.; South Wales
Circuit, Field, J.; Northern Circuit, Day and A. L. Smith, JJ.;
North-Eastern Circuit, Manisty and Mathew, JJ.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE ACCUMULATIONS BILL.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir, I ask a little space in your journal to call attention to the provisions of this Bill, which has passed the House of Commons entirely without discussion.

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It enacts, in language taken verbatim from the Thellusson Act, that no person shall, after the 1st of January, 1888, settle or dispose of any property in such manner that the income thereof shall be wholly or partially accumulated for any longer period than the minority or respective minorities only of any person or persons who, under the uses or trusts of the instrument directing such accumulations, would for the time being, if of full age, be entitled to receive the income so directed to be accumulated." Without denying that cases may and do occur (see Havelock v. Havelock, 17 Ch. D. 807) in which accumulations to an unreasonable extent are directed, an inquiry among members of the profession well able to form an opinion has shewn that such cases are very uncommon; it therefore becomes desirable to consider whether the Bill as prepared does not interfere with dispositions of property which are not injurious and which ought not to be prohibited.

There is a not uncommon desire among testators in all classes of society that the vesting of legacies with the interest thereon should be postponed for some few years after the legatee attains his majority, say until he attains twenty-five. The object of this desire is not so much to increase the magnitude of the legacy by means of accumulations as to postpone the enjoyment of it until the legatee attains years of discretion-an object which, in many cases, is most desirable. The operation of the Bill on a gift to a person contingently on his attaining twenty-five, accompanied either with an express or implied direction to accumulate the income for the benefit of the legatee, would appear to be that the gift of the capital would stand, but the direction for accumulation would be wholly void, inasmuch as there is no person who would for the time being, if of full age, be entitled

to receive the income.

Again, the Bill would render invalid a direction for accumulation for a fixed period however short, say, for four or five years-a direction which was contained in the will of the late Mr. Atkinson Morley, and without which it is not probable that his large fortune would have sufficed to build and maintain the magnificent Convalescent Hospital at Wimbledon which bears his name.

CASES OF THE WEEK. LEVER v. GOODWIN.-C. A. No. 2, 25th May. TRADE-MARK-IMITATION-SALE OF GOODS AS THOSE OF RIVAL TRADERACCOUNT OF PROFITS.

This action was brought by manufacturers of soap to restrain the defendants, who were also manufacturers of soap, from selling their soap in such a way as to pass it off as the plaintiffs' soap. The defendants did not sell their soap retail, but they sold it to retail dealers, who then sold the plaintiffs' soap. it retail to the public. The retail dealers knew that they were not buying At the trial Chitty, J., granted an injunction restraining the defendants from selling any soap not being manufactured by the plaintiffs in the wrapper and of the form of any one of three specified exhibits which were admitted to have been issued by the defen. dants, or in any wrapper or in any form calculated or intended to pass off, or to enable others to pass off, as and for the goods of the plaintiffs. And it was ordered that an account should be taken of the profits made by the defendants in selling soap made by them in any wrapper such as that contained in the three specified exhibits, and in the form of those exhibits, and that the defendants should pay to the plaintiffs the amount The defendants found due to them on the taking of the account. appealed, and it was argued on their behalf that, even if the injunction was properly granted, the account of profits directed was too extensive. It was contended that the defendants were accountable for profits only in cases in which the ultimate purchaser of the soap believed that he was buying the plaintiffs' soap, and that, therefore, the plaintiffs were bound to shew in each case that the ultimate purchaser had been deceived, or that at any rate the defendants were entitled to shew, in any case in which they could do so, that the ultimate purchaser had not been deceived.

THE COURT OF APPEAL held that the injunction had been properly granted, and also that the account of profits directed was in the proper form. COTTON, L.J., was of opinion that the defendants had intentionally got up their soap in such a way as would lead incautious purchasers to believe it to be the plaintiffs' soap. As to the other point the complaint against the defendants was that they had dressed up their soap in such a way as to enable the middlemen to sell it as the plaintiffs'. The whole gist of the complaint was that the defendants had sold a weapon which had made was made by the sales to the middlemen, and it was immaterial was capable of being used fraudently. The profits which the defendants to the plaintiffs what the middlemen did with the soap afterwards. Whatever they did with it the gale by the defendants to them was a wrongful act, because it put into their hands the means of selling the defendants' soap as the plaintiffs'. LINDLEY and BOWEN, L.JJ., concurred.-COUNSEL, Aston, QC, and Chadwyck Healey; Romer, Q.C., Lockwood, Q.C., and J. Cutler. COUNSEL, Emmet, Son, & Stubbs; J. S. Salaman.

BLAKE

I venture to think that in the two instances I have named the existing law ought not to be interfered with. At any rate, it is to be hoped that the Bill will not pass the House of Lords without full PROPERTY consideration. CONVEYANCER. P.S.-It is, I think, open to question whether the Bill applies to wills executed before the 1st of January, 1888-it would be well to make this point more clear.

[The Bill was, we believe, suggested by the remarks of the late Mr. Justice Pearson in Re Alford, Damant v. Hennell (34 W. R. 773). -ED. S. J.]

A CITY OF LONDON LAW SOCIETY.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-The distance of the Incorporated Law Society's hall from the City makes that institution almost valueless as a library to solicitors practising in the vicinity of the Mansion House and further East, and I have long felt that a library could, with great advantage, be formed in the City, where text-books and law reports might be consulted.

The idea is capable of expansion. A Solicitors' Society might be formed in connection with the library, whose objects should be to strengthen the hands of the Incorporated Law Society in matters relating to the profession (especially that of the reduction of the annual certificate duty), to hold meetings for discussion of points of practice or etiquette, and to form a kind of Solicitors' Exchange, where business matters, such as mortgages, might be negotiated. The few City solicitors to whom I have mentioned the matter appear to think that such a society would meet with support, and if any of your readers are of that opinion, and are prepared to cooperate with me in setting it on foot, I shall be glad to hear from them with a view to calling a meeting and taking other proceedings. HERBERT M. Low.

The Daily News says that a consignment of eight large turtles which were on view on Wednesday in the basement of the Law Courts, near the refreshment department, was the cause of much curiosity and interest. These strange guests are to be sacrificed and converted into soup for the banquets of the Incorporated Law Society.

MAYOR AND CORPORATION OF LONDON.-C. A. No. 1,
May 23.

TAX-ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOL-CHARITABLE INSTITUTION
-5 & 6 VICT., c. 35, s. 61, R. 6.

This was an appeal from the decision of a divisional court (Denman and Hawkins, JJ.), reported 35 W. R. 212, 18 Q. B. D. 437. The premises occupied by the City of London School having been assessed in the valuation list of the parish of St. Bride, at a rateable value of £1,667, and a gross value of £2,000, the Corporation of the City of London appealed, claiming allowances in respect of property tax under 5 & 6 Vict., c. 35, s. 61, r. 6, by which allowances are to be made, inter alia, for the duties charged on any college or hall in any of the universities of Great Britain, in respect of the public buildings and offices belonging thereto, and on any hospital, public school, or almshouse in respect of the public buildings, offices, and premises belonging thereto. The City of London School was founded by a private Act (4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 35) obtained by the corporation of London in 1834, by which it was enacted that the corporation should make an annual payment of £900 towards the support of the school, and should maintain for ever thereafter, upon the ground appropriated by the Act, a school for the religious and virtuous education of boys. By the City of London School Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. lxiii.), the corporation and to build thereon a school, and to transfer the school to the new were empowered to appropriate certain lands on the Victoria Embankment, premises, and there maintain it in like manner as they were authorized to maintain it on the old premises. The corporation accordingly built on the land in question the present schools, in which a large number of boys are educated. No pront is made, or sought, by the corporation in carrying on the school, but there is a yearly deficiency, which is made up by the corporation. The mode of admission is according to a form signed by the parent and by some members of the corporation, who are, however, unlimited as to the number of recommendations they may sign. The sons of freemen and householders of the city have preference in admission. The charge for each pupil is £12 12s. up to twelve years of age, and school was entitled to exemption as a public school, and stated a case for £15 15s. after that age. The Income Tax Commissioners held that the the opinion of the Divisional Court, who upheld their decision. The surveyor of taxes appealed, contending that the exemption was only meant to apply to public schools, which were purely charitable institutions, and that this was shewn by their collocation in the Act with hospitals and almshouses.

THE COURT (Lord ESHER, M.R., FRY and LOPES, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision of the Divisional Court. They said that they would not lay down auy exhaustive definition of the term public school as used by the Act, but that where a school had a public foundation, and a portion of its

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