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CURRENT TOPICS.

LONDON, JUNE 3, 1882.

OF THE TWO LEGAL APPOINTMENTS announced this week, in the Court of Appeal and House of Lords respectively, that of Mr. Justice BOWEN is the only one upon which an English lawyer can express an opinion. That opinion, we believe, will be universally favourable. The new Lord Justice's learning, acuteness, and ability give every promise of a successful career in the Court of Appeal.

THE CAUSE LISTS are not yet printed, but we believe the list of appeals will show 56 appeals from the Chancery Division, 98 from the Queen's Bench Division, and 20 from the Probate Division and the Court of Bankruptcy, making a total of 174 appeals, besides 5 appeals standing for judgment. At the same time last year there were 151 appeals.

THERE HAVE BEEN 146 public Bills introduced into Parliament during the present session. Of these eight have passed, none of them being of any importance. The Bills of importance which have passed the House of Lords are the Settled Land Bill and the Conveyancing Bill, the Payment of Wages in Public Houses Prohibition Bill, and the Married Women's Property Bill. The only Bill of importance which has passed the House of Commons, and has still to go through the House

of Lords, is the Bills of Sale Act Amendment Bill.

IT WILL BE SEEN from the list of candidates at the Honours Examination, which we publish elsewhere, that "in the opinion of the committee the standard attained by the candidates does not justify the issue of any first class list." We have the fullest sympathy with the wish of the committee to keep up a high standard for this examination, but it is very desirable that the standard should be uniform: that the questions set at successive examinations should either not vary greatly in difficulty, or that some allowance should be made in marks in respect of questions of more than ordinary difficulty. There is an impression abroad that the questions at the last Honours Examination were unusually difficult, and that no allowance was made in the marks.

WE COMMENTED last week on the very inadequate provisions of the Government Middlesex Registry Bill, and we observe, with much satisfaction, that Mr. Hopwoon has re-introduced his Bill" to amend and improve the Middlesex Registry." The measure is not yet printed, but we presume that it will include the provisions contained in the Bills introduced in previous sessions by Mr. OSBORNE MORGAN and Mr. HOPWOOD, reorganizing the office, and compelling a more convenient system of keeping the index, by providing that the registrar shall divide the district into sub-districts, and keep a separate division of the register for each sub-district; that the index shall be so framed as to furnish references to places as well as to persons, and that it shall, as far as practicable, be based on the ordnance map.

MR. JUSTICE CHITTY, on the last day of the recent Easter sittings, stated that upon motion days any member of the inner bar was entitled to take precedence of the outer bar, and move his two motions notwithstanding that such member had been

absent whilst motions were within the bar, and had entered the court whilst the motions were with the outer bar. His lordship said: "This is the undoubted rule, as I have ascertained from a very high legal authority whom I have consulted."

IT IS

HIGH TIME that the practice as to motions in the Chancery Division should be assimilated to that in the Queen's Bench Division, motions being placed in a list which might be arranged according to alphabetical order or date of notice of motion. And at the same time it may be suggested that judges should sit continuously for the purpose of hearing motions. At the present time, and for a long time past, the state of business before some of the Chancery judges, interrupted as they are by circuit duties, has been such that motions in the hands of the outer bar are seldom reached more than once or twice in each sittings, and one or two heavy opposed motions have occupied the whole of the one day set apart in each week for the hearing of motions. When Mr. Justice CHITTY went circuit, Mr. Justice NORTH took his place, and, with the exception of Saturdays, which were petition days, sat continuously for three or four weeks hearing motions according to an alphabetical list. This list, although confined to such motions as were before the court when Mr. Justice NORTH first took his seat, was practically left unexhausted when Mr. Justice CHITTY returned.

But

IT WILL BE SEEN from the report we publish elsewhere that the decision of Vice-Chancellor HALL in Little v. The Kingswood and Parkhurst Colliery Company, on which we recently commented, came before the Court of Appeal last week; and although it became unnecessary to decide the point, the Master of the Rolls seems to have intimated his dissent from the view of the Vice-Chancellor that, although a solicitor has been discharged by a client without any fault on the part of the solicitor, he cannot afterwards act against his former client in the same matter. He said that the decision of the Vice-Chancellor had for, as we pointed out in our previous comments, it seems to have gone further than any previous decision. That is probably correct, been assumed, ever since Earl Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton (19 Ves. 261), that a solicitor discharged by his client stands on a different footing, as regards the application of the rule laid down in that case, from a solicitor who has discharged himself. we should hardly expect the learned Master of the Rolls to object to a decision on the mere ground that it went further than previous decisions, if the direction in which it went was right. What reason is there for thinking that Vice-Chancellor HALL'S decision was wrong in principle ? The only reason that seems to have been alleged by the Master of the Rolls was, that "the client could not deprive the solicitor of the means of earning his livelihood." With great respect, we think this observation must have been made in some forgetfulness of the extent of the operation of the rule under discussion. The rule is not that the solicitor can never act against his former client, but only that he cannot act against him in matters with reference to which the communication of his knowledge of his former client's affairs may unfairly prejudice his former client. Those matters are not likely to be numerous enough to interfere with the solicitor's livelihood. The view of the Master of the Rolls seems to be that a solicitor who has been discharged by his client may act against his former client in any matters, but he must not avail himself of his knowledge of his former client's affairs. "In no case," said the learned judge, can a solicitor be allowed to communicate to the client's adversary information which he has acquired while he was acting for the client." The view of Vice-Chancellor HALL appears to be that no solicitor ought to be put into the embarrass

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ing position of knowing his former client's affairs, acting against him in reference to such affairs, and yet being obliged to act as if he did not know them. We venture to think that this view is both more practical and more politic than that favoured by the Master of the Rolls.

THE NEW CONVEYANCING BILL, which reproduces the clauses of last year's Bill struck out by the House of Commons' Select Committee, on the ground, as Mr. WOLSTENHOLME has stated, that they were "not immediately approved by different members of the committee, or [were] considered likely to give rise to opposition in the House," has now itself been referred to a Select Committee of the House of Commons, and it remains to be seen whether the objections formerly entertained will prevail in the new committee. So far as we can ascertain very little interest is taken by the profession in any part of the measure, except the clauses as to dispensing with investigation of title, and as to abolishing acknowments by married women. We have repeatedly discussed the former provision, which appears to us, for reasons before stated (ante, p. 380), to be ill-considered, wholly unpractical, and a mere trap for solicitors. The proposal that acknowledgments should be abolished is based upon reasons which are explained as follows in the memorandum prefixed to the Bill:-"The legal position of married women, in respect of dominion over and disposal of property, has been much altered since 1833, when the existing system was established, under which deeds relating to land, executed by married women (in lieu of fines), are acknowledged by them before two commissioners, after examination, by way of protection to the married women. This system adds to the difficulty of transfer of land; and, in some cases, as, for example, where a married woman is resident in India, or in a remote foreign country, creates considerable costs and delay. The formality cannot, as the law stands, be avoided, as an instrument requiring acknowledgment cannot be executed under a power of attorney." Let us look a little into the remarkable statement with which this extract commences. The Legislature, for the protection of married women against their husbands, has thought fit to provide, since 1833, that certain limited kinds and amounts of personal property shall belong to a married woman for her separate use, and that the rents and profits of freehold and copyhold land taken by her as heiress shall belong to a married woman for her separate use, leaving her still unable to deal with the fee simple of such land except under the provisions of the Act for the Abolition of Fines and Recoveries. Is it therefore to be concluded that there is no longer any necessity for protecting a married woman against her ignorance of the effect of provisions in deeds relating to land, and her liability to marital influence?

(15 & 16 Vict. c. 84), the Metropolis Water Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 113), and in most cases also by the Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847 (10 Vict. c. 17). The two Metropolitan Acts chiefly provide for a constant supply of water and the preservation of its purity. The Act of 1847 which, in law, applies only to those companies which are governed by Acts incorporating it, but which has, we believe, as a matter of fact, been incorporated into most of the special Acts, by section 68 provides that "the water rates, except as hereinafter and in the special Act mentioned, shall be paid by and be recoverable from the person requiring. . . the supply of water, and shall be payable according to the annual value of the tenement supplied with water, and, if any dispute shall arise as to such value, it shall be determined by two justices ;" and, by section 74, that if any person, liable to pay the rate, neglect to do so, the company may “stop the water from flowing into the premises, and may recover the rate due from such person, if less than £20, in the same manner as any damages for the recovery of which no special provision is made are recoverable by this or the special Act [i.e., by proceedings before justices, under section 85, which incorporates a portion of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, as to proceedings before justices], or if the rate exceeds £20... by action in any court of competent jurisdiction." The construction of these sections was much discussed in New River Company v. Mather (L. R. 10 C. P. 442), and Sheffield Waterworks Company v. Bennett (L. R. 8 Ex. 196). In Mather's case [Mr. Mather appears to have attempted to make the same point as Mr. Dobbs] it was held that if a bona fide dispute as to the annual value of the tenement has arisen before any proceeding has been taken for the recovery of the rate, the company must get such value determined by the justices before they can sue. In Bennett's case the rate varied, not with the annual value, but with the rent, and it was held that an owner who paid water and other rates for his tenants might deduct the amount of such payments from the rent before paying the rate upon it. We may add, in connection with the subject, that the Valuation (Metropolis) Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 67), which, by section 45, makes the valuation list under that Act conclusive for the assessment of poor rate, income tax and a very large number of other purposes, does not make that list conclusive for the purposes of water rate, as perhaps might have been expected.

IT APPEARS from Mr. TREVELYAN's answer to Mr. SEXTON'S question in the House of Commons that several persons of both sexes in Ireland have been held to good behaviour with sureties, or committed to prison in default, under the Act 34 Edw. 3, c. 1. The statute in question, an English Act which applies to Ireland by virtue of Poynings' Act, is well known and often acted upon in this country. It enacts that there shall be assigned in every county" one lord, and with him three or four of the most worthy in the county with some learned in the law," who are to have power (inter alia) "to inquire of all those that have been pillors and robbers in the parts beyond the seas and be now come again and go wandering and will not labour as they were wont in times past, and to take and arrest all those that they may find by indictment or by suspicion and to put them in prison; and to take of all them that be not of good fame where they shall be found sufficient surety and mainprise of their good behaviour toward the King and his people, and the other duly to punish (et les autres duement punir), to the intent that the people be not by such rioters or rebels troubled nor endamaged nor the peace blemished nor merchants nor others passing by the highways of the realms disturbed, nor put in the peril which may happen of such offenders." Mr. Sexton's question was, perhaps, directed to show that the statute applies only to the "pillors, robbers, rioters, and rebels" mentioned in the opening and concluding paragraphs of the above extract; but it has long been the universal practice in England to treat the statute as being of general application, and to take sureties to keep the peace and to commit in default, upon "articles of the peace" being " exhibited" against any person complained of. The practice is to adjudge the peace to be kept towards a particular person, and also towards all the subjects of the Sovereign for a limited time. See a warrant of commitment in default held good, and

THE CASE OF Dobbs, Appellant; Grand Junction Water Company, Respondents, in which the judgment of a divisional court was recently delivered to the effect that the basis of the charge for water rate was on the net rateable value, and not on the gross estimated rental of Mr. Dobbs' house in Westbourne-park, is of very great interest. The Vestry of Paddington considered the case of Mr. Dobbs of so much importance to the parish that they voted one hundred guineas out of the parish money towards his legal expenses, a vote which we imagine to be without parallel, but which is supported in principle by the analogy of Leeman's Act (34 & 35 Vict. c. 91), which allows town councils and governing bodies of other corporations to contribute out of their public funds to promoting or opposing legal proceedings for the general benefit of the inhabitants of the borough or members of the corporation. On the point whether the special Act of the Grand Junction Canal Company (7 Geo. 4, c. 11, s. 27) differs sufficiently from the special Acts of the Metropolitan Water Companies generally to take away from the decision the wide application which it has been conceived in some quarters to have, we propose to speak on a future occasion when a full report of the judgments has appeared; meanwhile we may state that the provisions of the general Water Acts which apply to disputes of this character are shortly as follows:-The eight principal London companies are governed by the Metropolis Water Act, 1852 time. by the Metropolis Water Act, 1852

the practice reviewed, in Ex parte Aston (12 M. & W. 476). For a long time (see Lort v. Hutton, 45 L. J. M. C. 95) the party complained of could not be examined, nor could the complainant be cross-examined, until the law was very properly altered in this respect by section 25 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879.

A COMPLAINT is made by a correspondent of the Times on the subject of the offices of the Supreme Court in vacation. He says that "the Chancery Division of the Supreme Court obstinately adheres to its own old-fashioned, and now illegal, customs; for, without a scintilla of statutory right, the Chancery offices were closed on Saturday, whereas the Common Law Division was open." So far from this being the case, we have the best authority for stating that in the Chancery offices the usual vacation attendance viz., from eleven to three-was given on Saturday last, and that many solicitors attended for the purpose of transacting business. The correspondent proceeds to state that his motive in writing is the hope that some public notification may be given of what holidays public officials are entitled to by law, and he adds, "at present even the legal profession is in darkness upon the subject." Probably the correspondent is not a lawyer, or he would not have hazarded such a statement. The rule which regulates the opening of the offices is ord. 61, r. 4; which provides that, “The several offices of the Supreme Court shall be open on every day of the year, except Sundays, Good Friday, Monday and Tuesday in Easter week, Whit-Monday, Christmasday and the next following working day, and all days appointed by proclamation to be observed as days of general fast, humiliation, and thanksgiving." The result is that the offices are open every and thanksgiving." The result is that the offices are open every day in the year, with the exception of Sundays and six other days, although the attendance during vacations is confined to a limited number of officers, and possibly this number might, with advantage, be increased.

is a member of the corporation which is charged with the duty of prosecuting the offence which he sits to adjudicate upon, but that in order to disqualify the justice it must be established that he has such a substantial interest in the result of the hearing as to make it likely that he has a real bias in the matter. Applying this canon, the only pecuniary interest that a justice can have in the matter is that the penalty in case of a conviction would go to the borough fund or some fund of a similar nature. It is obviously absurd to suggest that this is such a substantial interest as is likely to cause a bias.

We

The more substantial possibility of interest arises, to our mind, on the second branch of the alternative mentioned-viz., that the corporation is the prosecutor, and the justice may feel a sort of esprit de corps in the matter. For instance, the corporation is generally the urban sanitary authority. The town council may be very energetic in promoting sanitary measures, and there may be some amount of conflict on the subject with a considerable body regulation, is it not very possible that a member of a town council of the inhabitants. On a prosecution for breach of some sanitary pledged to energetic sanitary measures, and enthusiastic in enforcing the same, might be very considerably biassed? feel some doubt on this point; but, perhaps, after all, this possibility of interest must, in most cases, be considered as too remote. It may be said that it comes, if analyzed, to little more than this viz., that men are generally more or less likely to take sides on any question. One man will favour the cause of sanitary reform; another will favour economy or individual freedom, and be somewhat disposed to dislike the energetic reformer as a crochetmonger. This is a species of interest you cannot treat as a legal disqualification. There is generally a dissentient minority in most town councils, and one of these may be prepared to adjudicate as well as one of the majority, and his interest will be the other way. The real question is whether the justice, as a member of the corporation, is likely to be biassed apart from his individual predilections merely from the fact that the corporation of which he is a member is prosecuting. We do not think in general that he is; we do not think the esprit de corps of a corporation is generally

INTEREST DISQUALIFYING FOR JUDICIAL strong enough to produce this effect. We can imagine, however,

FUNCTIONS.

THE Queen's Bench Division has recently decided two cases of very considerable importance with regard to the amount of interest which will suffice to disqualify a justice of the peace for acting in a judicial capacity. One of these cases, Reg. v. Handsley (L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 383), is important as overruling a recent case, Reg. v. Gibbon (L. R. 6 Q. B. D. 168), which had gone a very long way in respect of the amount of interest that would disqualify. In the last-mentioned case, the corporation being, by a local Improvement Act, the local authority in a borough, with power to direct prosecutions for offences against the Act, an information had been preferred for such an offence by an officer on behalf of the corporation. A summons was issued upon this information by a justice who was an alderman and a member of the corporation. The summons came on for hearing before justices of whom none were connected with the corporation, and the court held that such justices could not adjudicate upon the summons, because it had been issued by one who was virtually the prosecutor. The court decided not to follow this decision, on the ground that the point had been decided the other way in a case of White v. Redfern, which, however, was not reported on this point. We are glad that they have seen their way to taking this course, for, to our mind, the decision in Reg. v. Gibbon was obviously wrong, quite apart from the question of interest. There are a number of decisions establishing that the summons is for the purpose of causing the defendant to appear. If he does appear, and the information is gone into on the merits, how can it in any way be material that the justice issuing the summons was interested? If the defendant had not appeared, and had been convicted in his absence, the question of the validity of the summons might have arisen. The court, however, in Reg. v. Handsley did not overrule Reg. v. Gibbon on that ground, but on the broader ground that the interest was not sufficiently substantial to disqualify. They laid it down that it is not enough to show that an adjudicating justice is a member of the town council, and, as such, has a pecuniary interest in the result of the complaint or information, or that he

a possible class of cases in which some bias might be produced. The town council as a body might have pledged themselves to some particular line of action or to some particular construction of a bye-law, and a member of the body might be prejudiced as against a person resisting such line of action or construction. We are not clear that the case of Reg. v. Handsley in anywise excludes the possibility of a legal disqualification in such a case. If carefully read, the canon laid down is only that the mere fact that the justice is a member of the corporation which prosecutes is not sufficient. This seems to us quite correct and to leave open the possibility of holding that under certain peculiar circumstances, such as we have mentioned, the fact of being a member of the corporation may disqualify. The decision that the mere fact of being a member of the corporation does not disqualify, besides being common sense and justice, has the additional merit of being very convenient. In most boroughs the aldermen constitute the the most active magistrates, and it is highly inconvenient that they should be ipso facto disqualified whenever a question arises under the Public Health Act or similar statutes.

It may be worth while to point out that the case of Reg. v. Milledge (L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 332), a case which, we believe, considerably influenced the decision in Reg. v. Gibbon, is, when carefully scrutinized, an altogether different case. There the question substantially affected the town council, because the defence to the charge of creating a nuisance was that the nuisance was caused by the acts of the town council themselves. It is obvious that in such a case there was a substantial likelihood of a bias in the matter.

The other case to which we referred at the commencement of these observations is Reg. v. Justices of Yarmouth (L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 525). The circumstances there were briefly these: at a special sessions for appeals against a poor rate, there being several appeals involving similar questions, the chairman of the magistrates, who was himself appellant in one of the cases for hearing, took part in the decision of all the cases except his own. When his own case was called on he left the bench and conducted the case himself. In each of the cases a reduction was made in

the valuation. The court held that the chairman of the magis-ing, the trader may realize his stock-in-trade, and cease to carry on trates was disqualified from adjudicating. This decision seems to business, and then say to his creditors that he is no longer a us a very obvious one, but it strongly illustrates the extreme trader, and when their debts mature they cannot make him bankdifficulty that exists in drawing the line between an interest that rupt as such, even though he may commit any of the acts which legally disqualifies and one that does not. Justices have, no would be acts of bankruptcy in the case of a trader. And in case doubt, sat and decided hundreds of cases being, in substance, just the debtor, being then a non-trader, should depart from his dwellingas much interested as the justice in the case to which we have house and leisurely leave the country, the creditors cannot avail referred. A justice may not be actually an appellant against the themselves of rule 65 when their debts become due, so as to get particular rate in question, but he may be interested in property an adjudication forthwith. True, they can make him bankrupt as of a precisely similar description to that which is the subject of a non-trader for departing out of England with intent to defeat such rate, and so interested in reducing the valuation thereof. We or delay his creditors; but in default of personal service of the can speak from some knowledge of what happens at quarter petition upon him they will have to go through all the formula sessions. A question arises as to the valuation of a particular prescribed by rule 61 of inserting a notice thereof in the kind of property on a re-valuation by the assessment committee in Gazette, which simply means much delay where promptness of a particular union, and the professional valuer called in comes to action is most required, coupled with greatly increased cost. Then the conclusion that the proper valuation should be higher perhaps should execution be issued against him for £50, and be levied by than it is in adjacent unions. Magistrates owning the same class seizure and sale of his goods, this will not constitute an act of of property in adjacent unions are interested, because if the valua- bankruptcy; nor will the sheriff be required, under section 87, to tion is upheld the same class of property is likely to be assessed hold the proceeds for fourteen days to see whether any bankruptcy more highly in the adjacent unions very soon. We will give an petition might be presented against him; nor will the proceeds of instance in our own knowledge. When woodlands were first of such execution, in case of an adjudication being made on a petition all rated under the Rating Act of 1874, there was a good deal of presented within fourteen days, have to be paid to the trustee. divergence of opinion throughout the country as to the proper There have been a good many methods suggested for evading the tests of value and scale of valuation. In a certain union of some provisions of that section, and this offers an additional one. importance the valuers had assessed lands of this description Further, should a creditor issue a debtor's summons against the at a rate certainly considerably higher than the rate in debtor under section 7, such summons will not mature until three other unions. An appeal being brought by some of the weeks after service thereof, instead of seven days, all which is parties rated to quarter sessions, at a quarter sessions where equivalent to giving additional time and opportunity to the rogue generally only a comparatively small number of magistrates to mature his plans. attended, the bench was literally crammed. It was well known that this unusual attendance was composed of country gentlemen interested in similar property in other parts of the county. In this case there was, beyond doubt, a bias, and it may be that the case was practically decided before ever the appeal was called on. Yet there was no interest which could legally be taken advantage of as disqualifying. The same considerations obviously apply in many instances to the case of a jury. The law cannot, in practice, obviate the posssibility of a bias in all cases. Too wide a field would be opened; but that is no reason, of course, why the disqualification should not arise in certain cases where the interest is very obvious, and capable of being ascertained by tests which the law can apply.

So much for the acts of bankruptcy. Let us now see how the decisions will operate upon the order and disposition clause of the Act. In section 15, sub-section 5, the words are the same as in section 6-viz., "being a trader." If, then, a bankrupt who had ceased to trade before he committed any act of bankruptcy has, at the commencement of his bankruptcy (i.e., the date of his commital of an act of bankruptcy to which the trus tee's title would relate back), any goods and chattels of another person in his pos session, order, or disposition by the consent and permission of the the owner, such goods and chattels will not become the property of the trustee. Now, as we are not particularly ena moured with the law of order and disposition, and think that on the whole it works greater hardships than it remedies, if this were the only effect of the decisions, we should have no objection to urge against them. At the same time it is another inroad into the well to note.

BANKRUPTCY OF PERSONS WHO HAVE application of the doctrine of order and disposition which it is

CEASED TO TRADE.

THE opinion which we expressed (ante, p. 226), that the ratio decidendi in the case of Ex parte Schomberg, Re Schomberg (23 W. R. 204, L. R. 10 Ch. 172), would require a person, in order to be adjudicated bankrupt as a trader, to be such at the time of his committing the act of bankruptcy on which he might be adjudicated, has been confirmed by the Court of Appeal in a recent case of Ex parte McGeorge (ante, p. 463). If Ex parte Schomberg must be taken as rightly decided, we do not see how any other conclusion could be arrived at. The effect of the two decisions is to render inapplicable to the present Act the whole of the cases decided upon former Bankruptcy Acts to the effect that a man who had retired from business might become a bankrupt as a trader in respect of debts contracted during the period of his trading or before he commenced trading. We do not think this alteration of the old law any improvement, but, accepting the law on the point as now finally laid down, it behoves practitioners to consider carefully what will be the effect of the decisions upon other sections of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869.

First, all acts of bankruptcy which are applicable to traders only will not be applicable to such a person. Thus if he, with intent to defeat or delay his creditors, departs from his dwellinghouse or otherwise absents himself, or begins to keep house, or suffers himself to be outlawed, after he has ceased to trade, he will not have committed an act of bankruptcy on which a bankruptcy petition can be presented, Coupled with the provision in the Act that a petitioning creditor's debt must be a liquidated sum due at law or in equity, this presents additional opportunities for rogues to cheat their creditors. Whilst the debts of the creditors are matur

Next, have the decisions any effect upon section 91 with regard to the avoidance of voluntary settlements? The words of that section are, "any settlement of property made by a trader," with certain exceptions therein enumerated, shall, in certain events, be void as against a trustee of the settlor's property in bankruptcy. On first consideration it might appear that the settlor must be adjudicated bankrupt as a trader in order that the section should apply. But we think that would be going much further than even the Court of Appeal would be inclined to go, and that it would be sufficient if the bankrupt was a trader at the time he made the settlement. But we do not consider the question beyond all

doubt.

66

Lastly, what is the effect of the decisions we have been commenting upon upon section 11, sub-sections 14 and 15 of the Debtors Act, 1869? The first of those sub-sections provides that any person adjudged bankrupt, &c., shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor if within four months next before the presentation of a bankruptcy petition against him, or the commencement of the liquidation, he, being a trader, obtains under the false pretence of carrying on business," &c. The other sub-section provides the same if, within the like time, "he, being a trader, pawns, pledges," &c. Would a trader, who committed one offences, and afterwards ceased to trade, and was, within four months of his committing the offence, adjudicated bankrupt as a non-trader, be liable to be indicted for such offence? or must he be also a trader at the commencement of his bankruptcy? It would, to our mind, be absurd to contend for the latter view. And yet, on the other view of the question, we have the anomaly of a man who cannot be adjudicated bankrupt as a trader, but

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"Sir, I am instructed by George Keen, of 136, Rhodeswell-road, Limehouse, to apply to you for compensation for injuries received at your dock, particulars of which have already been communicated to your superintendent. I shall be glad to hear from you on the subject.

"(Signed) [Plaintiff's Solicitor.]"

The divisional court decided on May 20, in the case of Stone v. Hyde, that the following notice was sufficient to satisfy the statute; that the judge of the county court ought to have amended, and that the nonsuit which he directed was wrong:

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In both of these written notices there is not a word as to the cause of injury, therefore, as the matter now stands, it would appear that where an employer has been informed verbally of the cause of injury, but such cause of injury is not re-stated in the written notice, the notice is bad in toto, but where, up to the time of trial, the employer has no notice whatsoever of the cause of injury, the notice is not bad, but can be amended. The case of Keen v. Millwall Dock Company was not cited to the judges of the divisional court, or it is probable they would have decided differently.

3, Essex-court.

ALFRED H. RUEGG.

A GIGANTIC LIQUIDATION.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-A Bill now pending in Parliament, styled "The City of Glasgow Bank (Liquidation) Bill," provides for the taking over by a company of the remaining assets of the bank, and you may like to put on record the following facts in connection with that most disastrous failure. The bank was founded in 1840, and on the passing of the Companies Act, 1862, was incorporated as an unlimited company. For many years it did a large business, but in October, 1878, it stopped payment with liabilities of £14,400,000, or thereabouts, and with very small available assets. Two calls were made-the first of £500, and the second of £2,250-in respect of each £100 of stock held by the partners. These calls enabled the liquidators to pay off £13,063,147, and the claims remaining unsatisfied in October last amounted to £1,338,116. A large proportion of the outstanding assets are believed to be of increasing value, but cannot now be advantageously realized, hence the proposed transfer of the remaining assets and liabilities to a company, to be called "The Assets Company." I may add that various sums, representing a total of £54,143, have not been claimed in the liquidation, and I venture to suggest that the names and addresses of the persons entitled, with the amount available in each case, should be published in the leading newspapers, so that persons interested may have a fair chance of making good their claims. Judging by the highly satisfactory results of like publicity in similar cases, there is every reason to believe that most of these unclaimed funds would be transferred to their rightful owners. EDWARD PRESTON.

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1, Great College-street, Westminster, May 30.

During the Easter sittings in London, says the Times reporter, only fifteen cages-nine of which were set down for trial by special juries have had to be made remanets for want of time to try them. Of the whole number of the causes, 205, as many as eighty bave been tried out, just half of which were special jury cases. Sixty cases, thirty-two of which are set down for trial by special juries, have been made remanets by order, and forty-nine have been withdrawn.

CASES OF LAST WEEK.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-SETTLEMENT-CONSTRUCTION-EXCEPTION OF JEWELS -MARRIED WOMAN-SEPARATE ESTATE-ACTION FOR DEBT CONTRACTED BEFORE MARRIAGE-MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1870, s. 12-MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-POWER OF COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT OR VERDICTINTERPLEADER ISSUE-ORD. 1, R. 2-ORD. 40, R. 10.-In a case of Williams v. Mercier, before the Court of Appeal on the 25th ult., a question arose as to the construction of the ordinary clause in a marriage settlement providing for the settlement of other or after-acquired property of the wife, excluding jewels, trinkets, &o. The action was brought by a milliner against a married woman (sued without her husband) for the price of goods supplied to her by the plaintiff before her marriage. Judgment was recovered, and execution was levied upon some jewels which were alleged to be the separate property of the wife. These jewels had been given to her as wedding presents before her marriage, some of them by her husband and some by other persons. The husband claimed the jewels as his property, and thereupon the sheriff took out an interpleader summons, and an issue was directed to try the question whether at the time of the seizure by the sheriff the articles seized were the property of the husband as against the execution creditor. A settlement had been executed prior to the marriage, and it contained a declaration that all real and personal property to which the wife, or the husband in her right, at any time during the coverture, should become entitled, whether in possession, reversion, or otherwise, "except jewels, trinkets, ornaments of the person, plate, linen, china, farniture, pictures, prints, books, and articles of the like nature, which it is hereby declared shall belong to her for her separate use, and except also any legacy or other property acquired at one and the same time not exceeding in amount or value the sum of £300," should be transferred to the trustees of the settlement upon the trusts therein mentioned. The issue was tried before Lord Coleridge, C.J., and he assumed, as did the counsel on both sides, that the settlement did not affect the jewels which had been seized, and he directed the jury that, under the general law, they were the property of the husband, and therefore could not be taken in execution for the wife's debt contracted before marriage, and a verdict was accordingly found for the husband, who was the plaintiff in the issue. The defendant moved for a new trial, and on the hearing of the application in the divisional court the same view was taken of the effect of the settlement. Mathew, J., took the same view of the law as did Lord Coleridge, but Cave, J., differed, and thought that there ought to be a new trial. The application was, therefore, refused. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and LINDLEY, LJ.), took an entirely different view of the construction of the settlement, holding that the effect of it was to make the jewels in question the separate property of the wife, and, therefore, liable to be taken in execution for her debt contracted before marriage. JESSEL, M.R., said that the jewels, being the property of the wife before the marriage, became the husband's property on the marriage, and then the settlement made them at once the separate property of the wife. LINDLEY, L.J., said it was strange that the view which this court took of the construction of the settlement should never have been taken before, but he thought it was not open to any other construction. It seemed to have been tacitly assumed by a common mistake that the settlement had nothing to do with the

question.

Another question arose on the construction of section 12 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, which provides that a wife shall be liable to be sued for, and that any property belonging to her for her separate use shall be liable to satisfy, debts contracted by her before marriage "as if she had continued unmarried." It was urged, that even if the jewels were by virtue of the settlement the wife's separate property, still the verdict on the issue was right, because, no trustee of the jewels being appointed by the settlement, the husband must be a trustee of them for the wife, and, therefore, at law they were his property, and property in which the wife had only an equitable The court interest could not be taken in execution under the judgment. held that this objection was untenable. JESSEL, M.R., said that the effect of wife just as if she had been unmarried. It was then objected that, on a section 12 was that execution might issue against the separate property of the motion for a new trial in an interpleader issue, the court could not enter the judgment or verdict for the applicant instead of directing a new trial. It was said that, inasmuch as, by rule 2 of order 1, the old procedure and practice with respect to interpleader, under the Interpleader Acts, is now to apply to all actions and all divisions of the High Court, the power given to the court by rule 10 of order 40, upon a motion for a new trial, if satisfied that it has before it the materials necessary for finally determining the questions in dispute, to give judgment accordingly does not apply to a motion for a new trial in an interpleader issue. The court overruled this objection also. JESSEL, M. R., said that rule 10 of order 40 clearly applies to every application for a new trial. The old practice in interpleader remained, but there were in rule 2 of order 1 no negative words excluding the new powers which are given to the court by the Judicature Rules. LINDLEY, L.J., agreed that the old practice in interpleader must be observed. But when, as in the present case, there was really no question to be tried, he did not think the court would be exceeding its powers in entering the verdict at once for the execution creditor. The verdict was accordingly so entered, with costs in the divisional court and in the Court of Appeal.-SOLICITORS, Lewis & Lewis; Pawle & Fearon.

SOLICITOR-RIGHT TO ACT AGAINST FORMER CLIENT-INJUNCTION.-In a case of Little v. The Kingswood and Parkhurst Colliery Company, before the Court of Appeal on the 25th ult., a question arose as to the power of the court to restrain a solicitor from acting against a former client. The plaintiff had

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