North-Western Railway Company (L. R. 5 Ex. D. 247), that a company may make a separate charge for sleeping saloons, but it DIRECTION TO TRUSTEES TO EMPLOY A is not clear whether the maximum was exceeded in that case, PARTICULAR SOLICITOR. which turned upon the point whether passenger duty was payable THE recent case of Foster v. Elsley (30 W. R. 596) seems in respect of the extra charge, and decided that it was. In connection with this subject, it may be stated in favour of the comto go a good deal further than the authorities on which it panies that "return-tickets are, so far as they are issued at less professed to be founded. The question was as to the effect of a than double the single fare, purely a present to the travelling direction by a testator that a particular person shall be employed as solicitor to his estate. Now, in this, as in all other matters public, being outside of the Railway Acts altogether, relating to the construction of wills, the intention of the testator is to be ascertained and followed. The question, according to all the cases, is, did he intend to create a trust or merely to offer IF A PARISH or place be so unfortunate as not to possess a opinion and advice? One would suppose that the answer to this church or chapel, it is legally impossible to levy a poor rate question was to be found by the application of the tests which within it. So it was held by a divisional court (GROVE and are applied in the case of precatory words. If there is sufficient LOPES, JJ.) in Reg. v. Dyott on Monday last, and we see no certainty as to the object to be benefited, and as to the benefit to reason whatever to question the correctness of the decision, which be conferred, a valid trust is created. This was the rule acted on merely draws attention to a casus omissus in the statute 7 Will. 4 in the earlier cases. Thus in Williams v. Corbet (8 Sim. 349), & 1 Vict. c. 65, "an Act to alter the mode of . giving a testator who had devised his real estates to trustees on trust to notices on Sunday with respect to various matters." The 2nd let the same and out of the income to keep down charges and section of this statute directs that "all notices which under or by pay outgoings, and accumulate the surplus income, by a codicil virtue of any law or statute, &c., have been heretofore given in appointed the plaintiff to be the auditor of the accounts of all his churches or chapels during or after Divine service shall be estates during the execution of the trusts of his will, and directed reduced into writing, and copies thereof shall, his trustees to pay to the plaintiff such annual remuneration as it previously to the commencement of Divine service, on the several was usual for an auditor to receive. After the death of the days on which such notices have heretofore been given in the testator the plaintiff, being about to be dismissed by the trustees of church or chapel of any parish or place, be affixed on or near to the will, filed a bill to restrain them from carrying their intenthe doors of all the churches and chapels within such parish or tion into effect. Vice-Chancellor Shadwell said that, under the place, and such notices, when so affixed, shall be in lieu of, and codicil, the plaintiff " has as much right to be auditor as any one as a substitution for, the several notices heretofore given as afore- of the devisees has to the real estates. . . . The testator, when he said, and shall be good, valid, and effectual to all intents and pur- directed that [the plaintiff] should be employed to audit the poses whatsoever." The Act 17 Geo. 2, c. 3-the earliest of the accounts of his estates and be allowed a proper remuneration for his three Acts of that year in relation to the poor rate-provides that trouble, clearly intended to confer a benefit upon him. The trustees, "the churchwardens and overseers, or other the persons therefore, were not justified in attempting to remove him." In authorized to take care of the poor in every parish, township, or Hibbert v. Hibbert (3 Mer. 681), a testator by a codicil to his place, shall give public notice in the church of every will directed that his friend Ambrose Humphreys (a solicitor) should rate for the relief of the poor allowed by the justices of the peace be appointed receiver of his real and personal estates, adding the next Sunday after the same shall have been so allowed; and that he made the appointment for the purpose of benefiting that no rate shall be esteemed or reputed valid and sufficient, so as Humphreys in a pecuniary point of view. Sir W. Grant, in to collect and raise the same, unless such notice shall have been an administration suit, in spite of the opposition of the trustees given." The prohibitory words of this early statute are too of the will, appointed Humphreys consignee of the estates of the strong to be got over, and we presume that an amending Act will testator in Jamaica, and receiver of the personal estate directed at once be passed to supply the omitted case, which the justices to be invested in the purchase of real estate, without requiring in Reg. v. Dyott had ineffectually endeavoured to supply by a the usual security, remarking that he was not appointed by the cy-pres publication on a conspicuous building-a mode of publica- court but by the testator himself. And in Lawless v. Shaw (1 Ll. & tion which is enjoined by more than one statute to supply the G., temp. Sugden, 154), a testator stated it as his "particular desire" want of a church: see, e.g., the 2nd section of the Licensing Act, that both his executors, while acting in the management of all 1828, which directs constables to fix notices of the days of or any of his affairs under his will, and also a person to whom he Brewster Sessions "on the door of the church or chapel, and gave a life interest in certain estates, should continue, employ, and where there shall be no church or chapel, on some other public retain the plaintiff in the receipt, agency, and management thereof, and conspicuous place within their districts." "at the usual fees given to agents," and Sir E. Sugden held that a trust was created for the benefit of the plaintiff, and that he was entitled to be retained as agent. It will be observed that in these cases the fact that the testator had directed the "usual remuneration" or the "usual fees" to be paid, was not considered as rendering the benefit intended to be given to the agent uncertain. And we may add that in all these cases it seems to be admitted that evidence of non-performance of duty or negligence would have been a sufficient defence to the plaintiff's claim to be continued in office.

SOME LITTLE TIME AGO we commented on the proposals made by various promoters of Railway Bills that the Standing Order of both Houses of Parliament, whereby the payment of interest or dividend on calls during the construction of railways is prohibited, should be rescinded, and we ventured to point out the reasons why, in our opinion, no alteration should be made. We are glad to observe that a select committee of the House of When, however, Lawless v. Shaw came before the House of Commons has just reported that they consider that the Standing Lords on appeal (5 Cl. & F. 129), Lord Cottenham established a Order in question (No. 167) "is in accordance with sound different criterion for ascertaining the intention of the testator, financial principle, and acts as a protection to the public." The which he afterwards again asserted in Finden v. Stephens (2 committee, indeed, add a recommendation that "in special cases Phil. 142). According to his judgment in the former case, the it may be permitted to pay interest upon capital during the whole will was to be looked at, in order to see whether it conconstruction of railways or tramways," subject to a number of tained any provision inconsistent with the implication of a trust somewhat stringent conditions, of which the most important is in favour of the person directed to be employed, and if any such that the prospectus and share certificates should bear on the face provision could be found, then the words directing that a parof them an intimation that interest is payable during construction ticular person should be employed, ought to be held as words only; but," considering the bearing of these proposed changes of recommendation only. This principle, no doubt, is correct; but upon the existing law, and the desirability of obtaining uniformity Lord Cottenham proceeded to apply it in this way. in legislation," they are also of opinion that it would be better directed that the plaintiff should be employed in the receipt of to proceed by a general public Bill instead of by a mere modifica-rents, agency, and management at the usual fees, the usual fees tion of the Standing Order." The question may therefore be considered shelved for the present session.

The testator

being five per cent. on the rents. He thereby, said Lord Cottenham, if the words were to be construed as containing a trust, made the

"Where an offence has been committed, any resident magistrate in the county or place in which the offence was committed, although no person may be charged before him with the commission of such offence, may summon to appear before him any person within his jurisdiction whom he has reason to believe to be capable of giving material evidence concerning the offence, and he may examine such person on oath concerning any such offerce, and if he see cause, may bind such person by recognizance to appear and give evidence at the next petty sessions, or when called upon; and the law relating to a witness when summoned before a justice having jurisdiction and required to give evidence concerning the matter of an information or complaint shall

apply to a witness summoned under this section."

plaintiff "an equitable incumbrancer to the extent of one- Clause 13 is of so much legal interest that we transcribe it at twentieth of the income of the estates" which he was to manage. | length: The provision that the plaintiff was to manage the estates was inconsistent with the devise of the estates to another person for life. It was giving a right to the plaintiff to exclude the life owner from the management of his own estates. With great deference, we venture to assert that a more extraordinary construction was never given to a will. The plaintiff was to have five per cent. as a salary for performing his duty of agent, but the due performance of this duty was surely a condition precedent to his right to require the percentage. As agent it would be his duty to obey the directions of the owner. How then could it be said that the plaintiff was an equitable incumbrancer, or that to imply a trust in his favour would deprive the life-tenant of the management of his own estate? The truth seems to be that Lord Cottenham did not observe the nature of the trust to be implied. It is a trust to continue the person named as agent so long as he performs his duties properly, not a trust to continue him as agent whether he performs his duties properly or not, or whether he obeys the directions of the landowner or not. But until the decision in Lawless v. Shaw is altered by the House of Lords, it must be considered that a direction to employ a person as receiver of rents and agent to manage estates is not binding where there is a devise of those estates.

Clause 15 empowers the Lord-Lieutenant to order the employment of additional constabulary in any particular district, and to charge the expense upon the district. Clause 16 provides for compensation "where it appears that anyone has been murdered, maimed, or otherwise injured in his person, and that such murder, &c., is a crime of the character commonly known as agrarian, or arising out of any unlawful association," the compensation to be chargeable on the district where the murder, &c., takes place.

Clause 18 is general, and is as follows:

"A person guilty of an offence against this Act shall be liable on summary conviction to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding six months."

other

mine."

as the

The last clause of importance is the 27th, which defines an "unlawful association" as an "association formed for carrying on

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any

But how does this apply to a direction by a testator that a specified person shall be employed as solicitor to his estate? The solicitor does not manage the estate, or receive the rents, provided by Parliament such allowance to judges and officers and Clause 24 provides that "there shall be paid out of moneys or perform business which the trustees or a devisee under a will could perform. persons acting in pursuance of this Act He merely transacts such legal busi-Lord-Lieutenant, with the approval of the Treasury, may deterness and gives such advice as the trustees or devisees may request or instruct him to do or give. There appears to be no inconsistency therefore-even adopting to the full Lord Cottenham's judgment-between a devise of estates and a direction that a specified person shall be employed as solicitor to the estate. Yet in Foster v. Elsley (30 W. R. 596), where a testator declared that "my solicitor, William Edward Foster [the plaintiff], shall be the solicitor to my estate and to my said trustees in the management and carrying out the provisions of this my will," Mr. Justice Chitty held that "the question before the court had been well settled in the cases of Lawless v. Shaw and Finden v. Stephens, which were direct authorities against the contention that the declaration in the will created a trust which the plaintiff could enforce." There may be matters in the case, or arising on the will, which do not appear in the report, but we venture to think that the cases on which the learned judge proceeded do not justify the conclusion he drew from them. It seems obvious that a testator may have very good reasons for desiring that his trustees should have the advice of a solicitor in whom he has confidence; and we fail to see why effect should not be given to such a reasonable desire.

THE IRISH CRIME BILL.

THE main question of legal interest which arises upon the Irish Crime Bill recently introduced into Parliament is how far the numerous provisions which it contains are new, and how far they are re-enactments of prior statutes.

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The chief provisions of the Bill are these :-Clauses 1-3 give power to the Lord-Lieutenant to issue a special commission to any three judges to try certain crimes without the assistance of a jury. Clause 4 provides a punishment for "intimidation," and clause 5 for rioting, or for, "within six months after the execution of a writ of possession of any house or land, taking possession of such house or land without the consent of the owner.' Clause 6 provides a punishment for membership of an unlawful association." Clause 7 gives the Lord-Lieutenant power to prohibit public meetings which he believes "to be dangerous to the public peace or safety." Clauses 8 and 9 give constables special powers in proclaimed districts to arrest strangers or nocturnal wanderers. Clause 10 gives the Lord-Lieutenant power to suppress treasonable newspapers. Clause 11 gives powers of search for, and seizure of, arms, "papers, documents, instruments, or articles "" suspected to be used for the purposes of any secret criminal society. Clause 12 authorizes the expulsion of aliens.

operations (a) for the commission of crimes; or (b) for encouraging or aiding persons to commit crimes"; and "crime" as offence against this Act, and also any crime punishable on indictment by imprisonment with hard labour, or by any greater punishment." The same clause enacts that " arms "shall have the same meaning as in the Peace Preservation Act, 1881 (44 Vict. c. 5), by section 6 of which that expression includes " any cannon, gun, revolver, pistol, and any description of firearms, also any sword, cutlass, pike, and bayonet, also any part of any arms so defined." which have been passed since the Union (for we may omit any The principal statutes for the suppression of crimes in Ireland special mention of such temporary Acts of the Irish Parliament as 38 Geo. 3, c. 21, which were continued by such Acts of the United Parliament as 43 Geo. 3, c. 117, and afterwards suffered to expire), appear to be the Suppression of Insurrection Acts of 1822 commonly called the Coercion Act) of 1833 (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 4), (3 Geo. 4, cc. 1-3); the Suppression of Local Disturbances Act which established courts martial for the trial of agrarian and other offences; the Prevention of Crime Act, 1847 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 2); and the Peace Preservation Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 9), all of which Acts were temporary, but were continued, or, if suffered to expire, occasionally revived, with or without amendments.

Both the Act of 1822 and the Act of 1833 suspended the right of trial by jury. This was done by the Act of 1833 by the establishment of courts martial. The Act of 1822-with which only the present Bill can be compared-proceeded not by empowering the judges of the superior courts to hold trials without the assistance of a jury, but by giving (section 5) the Lord-Lieutenant power to appoint a King's counsel or King's serjeant to preside at special sessions. The power might be exercised in proclaimed districts only, and the jurisdiction was to try without a jury, or with a jury, if the presiding judge saw fit, any person "accused of any of the matters and things in respect whereof any person" was, by the Act," declared to be an idle or disorderly person "-a definition which included persons found abroad at night, or administering unlawful oaths, or circulating notices to excite riots, or having in their houses or possession " any arms, or pike, pike-head, spear, dirk, or any other offensive weapon of any kind whatsoever." The first three clauses of the Bill, therefore, though not without precedent, appear to go much beyond the prior enactment in pari materiâ.

Clauses 4-6 make it "an offence against this Act" to commit

what are, in most cases, common law offences, except that clause 5 covers ground already partly covered by the Forcible Entry Acts, two of which, 5 Ric. 2, st. 1, c. 7, and 8 Hen. 6, c. 9, being anterior in date to Poynings' Act, appear to apply to Ireland by virtue of that Act. Otherwise these clauses are the most novel in the Bill. Clause 7, which gives the Lord-Lieutenant power to prohibit public meetings, is taken with very little variation from the 1st section of the Act of 1833, which section however was repealed when that Act was continued in 1834 by 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 38. In connection with this branch of the subject, it may be pointed out that the Riot Act, 1 Geo. 1, st. 2, c. 5, does not apply to Ireland. An Irish statute, 27 Geo. 3, c. 15, copied from that Act, was continued from time to time by the Irish Parliament, but lapsed by the effect of the union. In some Irish Crime Acts since the union-e.g., in the Act of 1870, it was temporarily re-enacted. Clauses 8 and 9, which give power to arrest strangers and nocturnal wanderers, repeat, almost word for word, sections 23 and 25 of the Act of 1870, except that they are slightly less stringent than those sections by limiting the power of arrest to "suspicious circumstances " in the case of strangers.

Clause 10, which is aimed at the press, is taken from sections 30 -34 of the Act of 1870, but is more stringent than those sections, which interposed a warning notice between the offence and the seizure of the newspaper, and gave the proprietor a right of action in case of illegal search or seizure, both of which saving clauses are omitted from the present Bill. The power to search for arms conferred by clause 11 has been contained in a succession of Acts in pari materiâ, but the power to search for treasonable papers is, so far as we can discover, quite new. If this clause should require amendment it might be well to add "daggers" to the definition of arms," these weapons having been twice proscribed, by 38 Geo. 3, c. 21 (Irish), s. 5, and by 3 Geo. 4, c. 1, s. 11.

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Clause 12, which authorizes the expulsion of aliens, we noticed last week.

effect. Consequently, any persons accused of murders committed before the passing of the Bill will be tried before a jury, and not before the special commission, if such commission should issue. It was held, indeed, in Wright v. Hole (6 H. & N. 217) that the rule that no statute has a retrospective operation does not apply to an enactment dealing with procedure only. This case was followed with considerable doubt by the Court of Queen's Bench in Kinbray v. Draper (L. R. 3 Q. B. 160), and we cannot think it would be held to govern the case of an enactment taking away the right to a trial by jury in a criminal case. If, therefore, it be deemed expedient that the Bill should be retrospective in this respect, the retrospective operation should be given by clear and express words.

CORRESPONDENCE.

WITNESS CAUSES IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-The following history of a witness action in chancery may interest those who wish to know how the Judicature Act is working. The cause in question was about six out of the paper a month before Easter, 1881. In November last it was in the paper before Mr. Justice Chitty for three days, and was not reached. During Mr. Justice Chitty's absence on circuit it got into the paper before Mr. Justice Kay, and was there for another three days. Mr. Justice Chitty having returned, it again got into his paper and was there for another three days. The next thing I heard of it was that it was to be taken by Mr. Justice Monday morning I heard that Mr. Justice North had changed his mind North on the following Tuesday. I informed all my witnesses, but on and would not take witness actions. Finally it came on last Tuesday, and was disposed of on Wednesday. So that the witnesses on both sides have had to attend on four different occasions before the case was heard.

This is no fault of the individual judges, and perhaps the case was unfortunate, as Jumbo, by special leave, occupied a day and a half which ought to have been given to witness causes, and the Belgian Date Coffee Kay. I do rather complain that a case which had stood over for the Company winding-up petition occupied a long time before Mr. Justice convenience of parties and had never been in the paper for the day, should be allowed to have precedence of a case which had been in the paper for the day, because the solicitor found that all the causes before it in the general list had been disposed of. By removing his marking as to standing over, a very unfair advantage was gained. But the remedy is not to be found in altering that practice. I find a growing opinion that the assizes are the proper places at which to try issues of fact, whether in chancery or at common law. Had that been the practice the case I refer to would have been disposed of at Derby a year ago, and the expenses of witnesses would have been about one-tenth of what they will actually amount to. 71, Princess-street, Manchester, May 18.

STAMP DUTY.

JAMES HEELIS.

Clause 13, which we have printed at length above, is taken almost word for word from section 13 of the Act of 1870. We consider this so valuable an enactment for the general administration of justice, that we think it might well be applied to all parts of the United Kingdom, and made perpetual. It would have the salutary effect of substituting a regular examination by a justice of the peace for much irregular questioning by the police, which proceeds from the want of it. Clause 15, which empowers the Lord-Lieutenant to increase the constabulary force, is taken, with little variation, from ss. 3-7 of the Act of 1847, the principal variation being that those sections applied to "proclaimed districts" only, whereas clause 15 is to have a general application "when it appears to the Lord-Lieutenant from time to time that, by reason of the existence or apprehension of crime in any district, that the number of constabulary ordinarily employed in such district are not sufficient." Clause 16, which provides for compensation to injured persons or to the relations of murdered persons, is taken from section 39 of the Act of 1870, which, however, it materially varies by substituting nominees of the Lord-Lieutenant for a presentment of the grand jury to adjudicate upon the claim. Both the section and the clause give the next of kin a locus standi to apply for compensation in the case of murder. The nominees are to have the same powers as justices sitting in petty sessions. There appears to be no provi-leading cases. sion for the representation of the district which would have to bear the burden, and which would be indirectly represented by a As regards the Statute of Anne quoted by your correspondent, I vengrand jury. For these and other reasons the 13th section of the ture to remark that, as Queen Anne is dead, so will your correspondent Act of 1870 might have been re-enacted with greater advantage. find, upon due study, that the General Stamp Statutes of Anne ceased to The remaining clauses of the Bill, which chiefly relate to pro- exist upon the coming into operation of the (consolidating) Stamp Act, cedure, do not call for special notice. It will have been observed 1870, and Inland Revenue Repeal Act, 1870; and that, secondly, as to that the Bill is to a very large extent a repetition of former enact-Hood, 17 L. J. C. P. 58, and Doe. d. Hartwright v. Fereday, 12 A. & E. whether the two cases named by your correspondent (Rushbrooke v. ments; that the Act of 1870 is the principal one borrowed from, 23) are still law, to the extent, even, of its being permissible to cite that clauses 4-6, which we may perhaps term the " anti-Boycotting them in elucidation of the proper construction and application of section clauses," are the chief novelties, and that the Bill, for its working, 8 of the Act of 1870, I will not further remark upon than to say-as I mainly depends, as did the prior enactments, upon the Lord- deem myself safe in saying that the said cases would not now be cited Lieutenant for the time being. by the Inland Revenue authorities. VERITAS. May 24.

It is of no little consequence to point out that the Bill, if it passes, has no retrospective operation. There are no words giving it such operation, and without such words, in accordance with the maxim, "nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non præteritis" (2 Inst. 202), no statute has a retrospective

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-Your correspondent of last week, "Jurisconsultunculus," is in error, he must permit me to say, in stating that in my letter to you of the previous week (ante, p. 431) I expressed the opinion that section 8 of the Stamp Act, 1870, made no alteration in the previous law. I expressed the belief that section 8 was intended to embody the law of the But I did not expressly, nor did I intend impliedly, to say that the said section, in the intention of its framers or in its actual operation, was restricted to the law of the said cases.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-Deeds of the nature of that referred to by Mr. Simey at p. 403 are common in parts of Lancashire, and are generally, so far as Ì have

:

Act, be bound to assign and convey accordingly." The court (JEssel, M.R., and LINDLEY, L.J.) held that, where there is a second mortgage, of which the first (legal) mortgagee has notice, the mortgagor cannot call on the first mortgagee to convey the property to his nominee when the second mortgagee is willing to redeem the first, and desires to have the property conveyed to him. The court said that section 15 only substitutes the right to call for a conveyance to a third party for the right to call for a re-convey. ance, and that it does not apply to a case where, before the Act, the mortgagor would not have been entitled to call for a re-conveyance. In such a case the second mortgagee, as an assign of the mortgagor, would before the Act have been entitled to call on the first mortgagee to convey the property to him.-SOLICITORS, C. & S. Harrism & Co.; R. S. Taylor, Son, & Humbert; Harting, Son, & Ellis.

1881, a Mrs. Needes, who was an agent for the sale of medical practices, and who had been employed by the defendant, having heard that the plaintiff wished to dispose of his practice, wrote to the defendant :-" I have just had a first-class non-dispensing practice in the best part of Kensington placed with me to be disposed of in consequence of failing health. Premium for practice £1,000, for lease £500, and furniture at valuation." The defendant then saw the plaintiff, and on the 13th of April wrote to him :"I shall be pleased to purchase your lease, &c., on the terms stated in Mrs. Needes's letter to me of the 6th of April-i.e., premium for practice £1,000, lease £500, furniture at valuation. I shall trust to you to give me the best introduction you can during the three months, and afterwards, if necessary.' In a letter written the same day to Mrs. Needes, the defendant said :-"I shall be ready to pay the deposit money on receipt of corrected agreement." Further correspondence ensued, and a draft of an agreement was prepared, but a difference arose about the repairs of the house, and ultimately the defendant declined to proceed with the matter. The action was brought for PRACTICE-ACCOUNTS IN CHAMBERS-ADJOURNMENT OF ITEMS TO JUDGE the specific performance of what the plaintiff alleged to be a concluded agree--SOLICITOR-COSTS.-In a case of Upton v. Brown, before the Court of ment between himself and the defendant, and for damages. Bacon, V.C., Appeal on the 24th inst., the question arose whether, when accounts are dismissed the action, being of opinion that there was no agreement sufficiently being taken by a chief clerk in chambers, and one of the parties is die definite to be enforced by the court. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., satisfied with the allowance or disallowance of an item, he has a right to and LINDLEY and HOLKER, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision. They expressed an bave the question at once adjourned before the judge, or whether he must opinion that an agreement by a medical man to introduce another medical take out a summons for the purpose. Fry, J., held that a summons must man to his patients was not one of which specific performance could be be taken out. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and LINDLEY, L.J.) enforced. The question then arose whether the letters between the parties held that this was unnecessary. JESSEL, M.R., said that under the constituted a binding and concluded agreement, so as to entitle the plaintiff to Chancery Amendment Act of 1852 it was the right of the suitor to have the damages for the breach of it. JESSEL, M. R., thought that the decisions of matter at once adjourned before the judge, without taking out any the courts had gone far enough in spelling out contracts from letters, when summons. Of course, if a solicitor took an adjournment before the judge both the parties had intended that a formal contract should be executed, of every item in an account, no business could be transacted. In theory using general expressions to make a contract between the parties, which there was the right to do this, but in practice it was impossible that it neither of them intended. In the present case, the letters written by the should be done. But, though the Act had been in force for thirty years, defendant to the plaintiff and to Mrs. Needes on the 13th of April did not such had been the good sense of solicitors that no such difficulty had ever contain the same terms. The main subject of the negotiation was the arisen. The practice was to wait until the taking of the account was compractice; the lease and the furniture were mere adjuncts. A sale by a medical man of his practice was a sale of an introduction to his patients; he pleted, and then to take an adjournment once for all to the judge. When, had nothing else to sell. He could persuade patients with whom he had however, a question of principle was involved in an item, it was impossible influence to employ the man whom he recommended as a qualified prac adjourn the item at once before the judge. If a solicitor were so unreason. to wait until the account was completed, and then it was quite right to titioner. In such cases there was always, according to his lordship's experience, a stipulation that the selling doctor should retire, and that he should able as to insist on the adjournment of every item in an account, this not practise within a certain distance, and sometimes, also, a stipulation that would be an abnee of the process of the court, and his lordship had no he should not sue the patients. Could it be supposed that the defendant doubt that the judge would in such a case have jurisdiction to punish the intended to buy the practice without any stipulations of this kind? It was solicitor by making him pay the costs personally. Such a case, however, impossible to suppose this. Did, then, the plaintiff accept the terms contained had never arisen, and his lordship hoped it never would arise. The prac. in the defendant's letter? Did he assent to the term that there should be a tice in the Rolls Chambers was for the one party to give previous notice three months' introduction? His lordship could not find it in any of his in writing to the other party of the items in the account. LINDLEY, L.J., letters. He did not bargain to give the defendant a three months' introduc- concurred.-SOLICITORS, Shum, Crossman, & Co.; R. Ballard. tion. He only offered to do his best to give him an introduction. The difference was very important. If by reason of the plaintiff's death or his illhealth he was incapacitated from giving the introduction, in the latter case no action would lie for damages. On the letters themselves his lordship was of opinion that there was not a complete and concluded bargain. Then, turning to the draft agreement which was sent by Mrs. Needes, it provided for a three months' introduction, and there was a clause that, if the plaintiff was prevented, from ill-health or otherwise, from giving this introduction, there was to be an abatement from the purchase-money. This showed that the introduction was considered a most important element; indeed, the substance of the thing which was to be sold. In his lordship's opinion there had been only negotiations, and the parties had never entered into a definite agreement upon the serious subject of the introduction. He thought that the court would be making a new agreement for them if it was to say that, instead of a three months' introduction, the introduction was to be for a reasonable time-i.e., a time which somebody else should think to be reasonable. LINDLEY and HOLKER, L.JJ., concurred.-SOLICITORS, M. James Brown; Kearsey, Son, & Hawes,

Practice-Order FOR AFFIDAVIT OF DOCUMENTS-COPY FOR SERVICE INDORSEMENT-CONSOLIDATED ORDERS OF COURT OF CHANCERY, ORD. 23, R. 10-ORD. 31, RR. 20, 21.—In a case of Thomas v. Palin, before the Court of Appeal on the 19th inst., the question arose whether when an order has been made for an affidavit, or a further affidavit, of documents, it is now necessary that the copy of the order for serv ce on the party who is to make the affidavit should be indorsed, as was required by rule 10 of order 23 of the Consolidated Orders of the Court of Chancery, with a note that the party, if he neglects to comply with the order within the time limited for his doing so, will be liable to be attached. It is now, by rule 21 of order 31 under the Judicature Act, sufficient, in order to found an application of attachment for disobedience, that such an order should be served on the solicitor of the party. And, moreover, an attachment can now, by virtue of ord. 44, r. 2, be obtained only upon notice. North, J., held that it is still necessary that the copy for service should be indorsed as under the old practice. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and LINDLEY, L.J.) held that this indorsement is no longer required.-SOLICITORS, Brownlow & Howe; Chester & Co.

MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE-TRANSFER INSTEAD OF RE-CONVEYANCE

CONVEYANCING AND LAW OF PROPERTY ACT, 1881, s. 15.—In a case of Teevan v. Smith, before the Court of Appeal on the 20th inst., a question arose on the construction of section 15 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, which provides that "where a mortgagor is entitled to redeem, he shall, by virtue of this Act, have power to require the mortgagee, instead of reconveying, and on the terms on which he would be bound to re-convey, to assign the mortgage debt, and convey the mortgaged property to any third person as the mortgagor directs; and the mortgagee shall, by virtue of this

of the

LANDLORD AND TENANT-ATTORNMENT-STAT. 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 9.-In a case of Allcock v. Moorehouse, before the Court of Appeal on the 23rd inst., a question arose as to the effect of section 9 of the Act 4 Anne, c. 16, which of provides that "all grants or conveyances thereafter to be made the reversion or remainder of any messuages or lands shall be good and effectual to all intents and purposes, without any attornment particular tenants upon whose particular estates any such reversion or remain. der shall and may be expectant or depending, as if their attornment had been had and made." The action was brought in the Queen's Bench Division to recover rent. The plaintiffs were the trustees of a building society, and they were mortgagees from one Shier, the owner of some houses which he had deised by parol to the defendant. The defendant had assigned all his estate and interest under the demise to Swan and Hadwen, who had paid rent for some time to Shier, though he had given receipts to the defendant and had not acknowledged the assignees as his tenants. Swan and Hadwen did not attorn to the plaintiffs. A divisional court, consisting of Mathew and Cave, JJ., held that the action could not be maintained, and this decision was JESSEL, M.R., said that when the defendant had made the assignment he affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and LINDLEY, L.J.). ceased to have any estate or interest. But it was alleged that he was under a liability to Shier, because Shier had not agreed to accept the assignees as bis liable, but, assuming that he was, the plaintiffs were assignees of Shier's His lordship was not prepared to say that the defendant was so estate and not of any contract. The question was whether the conveyance of the reversion gave a right against the defendant. Clearly, without the statute 4 Anne, c. 16, it could not give such a right. The point was whether the defendant had any estate. In his lordship's opinion he had not. Then it was argued that, assuming the defendant had no estate left, still, as between him and Shier, he was liable for the rent or for use and occupation. But, if so, still he would only be liable by contract and not by reason of any estate. Then it was said that the estate from year to year was a tenancy for a year certain, plus a contract, and, therefore, was not assignable at common law. His lordship thought otherwise. An estate from year to year was a term, though of a peculiar kind. It was either a present or a future interest, and so was assignable under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 6. LINDLEY, L.J., said that it was possible that, if Shier had not assigned, he might have maintained an action for rent against the defendant after his assignment to Swan and contract or of estate between the plaintiffs and the defendant, and the case Hadwen, but he agreed with the divisional court that there was no privity of did not come within the Statute of Anne.-SOLICITORS, Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Co.; Pritchard, Englefield, & Co.

tenants.

MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEe-Sale-PartITION-CONVEYANCING AND LAW OF PROPERTY ACT, 1881, s. 25, SUB-SECTION 2.-In a case of Gibbs v. Haydon, before Fry, J., on the 11th inst., a question arose as to the